2025 MT 304
Separation of powers does not preclude the AG from discipline under the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct, and he violated those Rules by failing to comply with a court order and by allowing his subordinates to disobey a court order. However, this Order constitutes sufficient discipline as a public admonition where the AG’s due process rights were violated during disciplinary proceedings and ODC failed to prove most of the alleged violations.
During a dispute regarding legislative subpoenas that were later quashed, AG Knudsen and his subordinates engaged in communications to the Court that accused certain Justices of unethical conduct, conflicts of interest, and self-serving decisions. After a disciplinary complaint was filed against Knudsen, ODC appointed Special Counsel who charged Knudsen with 41 counts of misconduct. After a disciplinary hearing, the Commission on Practice concluded Knudsen violated five Rules of professional conduct and recommended Knudsen be suspended from the practice of law for 90 days.
Knudsen objected to the Commission’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation for discipline. Five Montana Supreme Court Justices recused themselves and Chief Justice Swanson appointed five District Court Judges to sit in their place. After further briefing and oral argument, the Court held Knudsen is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct and regulation by the Court because the Montana Constitution requires the AG to be an attorney admitted to the bar and in good standing. The Court also held Knudsen violated M. R. Pro. Cond. 3.4(c) and 5.1(c) because he and his subordinates failed to comply with the Court order to return subpoenaed materials. The Court further concluded the Commission on Practice violated its own rules by denying a summary judgment motion without a quorum, violated Knudsen’s due process rights by granting ODC’s motion to exclude his expert witness without allowing time to respond, and issued inadequate findings and conclusions that lacked sufficient detail to explain the Commission’s decision.
The Court rejected the Commission’s recommendation for a bill of costs and a 90-day suspension from the practice of law. Due to the seriousness of the Commission’s due process violations, the Court issued its opinion as a public admonition to Knudsen and dismissed the case.
Points of Interest: attorney discipline, Attorney General, due
2025 MT 303
District Court’s failure to advise non-citizen defendant of immigration consequences of pleading guilty implicated defendant’s fundamental rights. Plain error review was not warranted because record did not otherwise cast doubt on voluntariness of guilty plea.
Padilla-Canales pled guilty to mitigated deliberate homicide. Padilla-Canales is not a U.S. citizen and appeared before the District Court with an interpreter. After confirming that Padilla-Canales and his attorneys had no concerns about a language barrier or their ability to communicate, the court found that Padilla-Canales entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The court made no specific affirmative finding that Padilla-Canales understood the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, as required by § 46-12-210(1)(f), MCA, and Padilla-Canales’s signed plea agreement and acknowledgment of rights did not discuss likely immigration consequences. However, during Padilla-Canales’ initial and sentencing hearings, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court openly discussed Padilla-Canales’ immigration status and repeatedly stated that deportation was likely upon completing his prison sentence. These statements were fully translated for Padilla-Canales in real time.
On appeal, Padilla-Canales argued for the first time that the court’s statutorily inadequate advisement rendered his guilty plea involuntary, thus warranting plain error review. The State conceded the lack of advisement of immigration consequences implicated Padilla-Canales’s fundamental rights. However, it argued that no miscarriage of justice occurred because Padilla-Canales never objected or sought to withdraw his guilty plea, despite knowing before he was sentenced that deportation was a likely consequence of pleading guilty.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that plain error review was unwarranted in this case. Aside from the inadequate advisement, the record did not cast doubt on Padilla-Canales’s awareness that pleading guilty would likely result in deportation and thus make his plea involuntary. Despite extensive discussion of likely immigration consequences at his sentencing hearing, Padilla-Canales did not object or seek to withdraw his guilty plea.
Points of Interest: plain error, plea agreements, voluntariness of plea
2025 MT 302
A witness is not considered an accomplice as a matter of law, and therefore no jury instruction is required directing the jury to view their testimony with distrust, when the State initially charges the witness with the same offense as the defendant but later drops that charge in an amended information and the witness is never tried or convicted of it.
Entzel staged a burglary at her home to fraudulently obtain insurance proceeds. She enlisted Skaw, Lord, and others to remove items and make the house appear burglarized. Entzel and Skaw, having pleaded guilty to related charges, testified against Lord without any plea deal requiring their testimony. Entzel testified that Lord arrived with Skaw, joined discussions about the scheme, disassembled Entzel’s refrigerator, and helped load its parts into vehicles. Skaw testified that he took Entzel’s boat and trailer, first to his home and later to Lord’s garage. Skaw later moved the boat elsewhere. The boat was recovered, but the refrigerator was never found. Skaw confirmed Lord’s presence at Entzel’s home. In a police interview, Lord admitted arriving with Skaw but denied knowledge of the scheme. Lord claimed she arrived after a supposed robbery and left without entering the house. The jury acquitted Lord of conspiracy but convicted her of tampering with evidence.
On appeal, Lord argued the District Court erred by refusing her proposed accomplice instruction, which would have directed the jury to view Entzel’s testimony with distrust as a matter of law because Entzel was initially charged with tampering with evidence by accountability in Entzel’s original information. The Supreme Court held that Entzel was not an accomplice as a matter of law because the amended information against Entzel dropped any tampering with evidence charge. Because Entzel was never prosecuted for tampering, she was not an accomplice as a matter of law to Lord’s tampering offense.
Points of Interest: jury instructions, witnesses, criminal law
2025 MT 299
District Court did not err when it appointed a guardian for minor children based on its findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that further efforts would likely be unproductive.
In June 2021, the Department removed I.D., T.D., and L.D. from Mother’s care after T.D. suffered unexplained injuries. The District Court adjudicated the children as YINC and subsequently extended the Department’s temporary legal custody several times to allow Mother time to complete her treatment plan.
Following a supervised in-home visit with Mother, I.D. alleged that Mother’s boyfriend sexually abused her. Although the visit supervisor reported that she did not witness the alleged abuse, I.D. refused to attend further visits with Mother. Two months later, the Department petitioned the District Court to appoint a guardian for the children. Following a contested guardianship hearing, the court appointed the children’s foster parent as their guardian.
On appeal, Mother challenged the District Court’s findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the family and that further efforts would likely be unproductive. Mother argued that the court should have held the Department’s failure to pursue attachment therapy with I.D. to be unreasonable. Mother also contended that District Court erred in failing to find that Mother was an unfit parent before ordering guardianship.
The Supreme Court affirmed, considering the deferential standard of review and the District Judge’s active involvement and conscientiousness during the pendency of the case. The record showed that Mother lacked the ability to safely parent multiple children at once and manage their unique needs. Because attachment therapy would not have resolved the Department’s concerns about Mother’s parenting skills, substantial evidence supported the District Court’s findings. Furthermore, the guardianship statute is devoid of a fitness requirement.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, guardianship, reasonable efforts
2025 MT 296
The Court declined to exercise plain error review to address a defendant’s appellate claim he did not have a fair and impartial jury when the defendant did not object to, and affirmatively argued in favor of, having the Yellowstone County Undersheriff serve on the jury.
Soapes was charged with multiple counts of sexual intercourse without consent and sexual assault relating to allegations made by two family members. The Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Office had investigated the allegations. When the matter went to trial, the YCSO Undersheriff, who was present in full uniform, was a member of the prospective jury panel. Both the State and Soapes conducted voir dire of the Undersheriff. Soapes specifically asked about the Undersheriff’s experience investigating claims of sexual assault. Neither party sought to strike the Undersheriff and he became a member of the jury. Midway through the second day of trial, Soapes questioned a testifying YCSO officer about whether he was nervous about testifying in front of his boss. Outside the presence of the jury, the State noted Soapes’ questioning highlighted the possibility that the Undersheriff may not be able to be fair and impartial. Soapes argued that the Undersheriff’s relationship to the YCSO was plainly evident during voir dire and that the defense had no concerns about him serving on the jury. Soapes was convicted.
On appeal, Soapes argued his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury had been violated by the Undersheriff serving on the jury. Because he did not object below, he sought review under the plain error doctrine. The Court determined that, because Soapes repeatedly argued in favor of the Undersheriff serving on his jury, failing to review his new challenge would not result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, prejudicially undermine the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process, which a defendant is required to affirmatively demonstrate under the plain error doctrine.
Points of Interest: plain error, jury selection, juror challenges
2025 MT 295
Counsel’s subsequent disbarment for unrelated matters does not support an ineffective assistance claim absent a link between counsel’s allegedly deficient performance and their violations of professional conduct in other non-related matters.
Kapps was charged with various sex crimes involving a minor victim. At trial, the State presented testimony from the officer who initially interviewed Kapps, as well as a video recording of the interview. The video depicted the officer repeatedly making statements implying Kapps’s guilt and the officer’s belief that the allegations were truthful. Freedman, Kapps’ defense counsel for Kapps, cross-examined the officer questions regarding the basis for his statements in the interview. The officer responded that he believed Kapps to be guilty early on in the interview and explained why. In closing argument, Freedman referenced the officer’s responses for the position that his conclusion of guilt had been based on a rush to judgment rather than the evidence at hand. Kapps was convicted of the offenses.
Kapps later petitioned for postconviction relief, claiming Freedman’s cross-examination was deficient. The District Court issued a subpoena ordering Freedman to attend an evidentiary hearing and a Gillham order directing Freedman to respond to Kapps’ allegations. Freedman, who was disbarred for unrelated reasons subsequent to Kapps’s trial, avoided service of the subpoena and failed to provide any response. The District Court then denied Kapp postconviction relief.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The testimony Freedman elicited was for the purpose of attacking the adequacy of the State’s investigation, as evidenced by his use of the testimony in closing argument. Kapps failed to overcome the presumption that Freedman’s conduct was based on sound trial strategy. Freedman’s subsequent disbarment and absence from the postconviction proceedings were not “unique circumstances” resulting in an insurmountable barrier to obtaining information and Kapps was afforded an evidentiary hearing. Kapps also did not demonstrate he was prejudiced by Freedman’s performance given the strength of DNA evidence presented by the State.
Points of Interest: ineffective assistance of counsel, disbarment, postconviction
2025 MT 294
Litigant did not lack standing to pursue a facial challenge of the constitutionality of a statute notwithstanding other entities’ previous success in navigating the statutory process.
Noland started a business seeking to transport construction debris. He received a notice from the Public Service Commission and filed an application for a Class D certificate. He withdrew his application after receiving discovery motions from other Class D Certificate holders. He then filed suit against the Commission, alleging the application process was unconstitutionally infringing on his right to earn a living. District Court held Noland lacked standing for an as-applied challenge, had standing for a facial challenge, and held the facial challenge failed because prior applicants overcome the competitor’s veto and received a certificate.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held Noland lacked standing for an as-applied constitutional challenge because of his early withdrawal from the application process. Under the facts of the case, the case would essentially be an as‑applied challenge in a vacuum, and the Court would have to speculate about how the Commission would apply the procedures to infringe on Noland’s constitutional rights.
However, the Court reversed the District Court’s denial of Noland’s facial challenge, concluding Noland had standing to pursue this issue. Just because other applicants overcame a competitor’s veto and received a Class D certificate, this did not defeat the challenge which alleges the application process is unconstitutional. The Court remanded the case to the District Court, instructing the court to properly analyze each of the constitutional provisions invoked by Noland under the appropriate standard.
Points of Interest: standing, facial challenge
2025 MT 293
District Court erred in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial where a comment made in open court by the prosecutor’s legal assistant amounted to jury misconduct.
After methamphetamine was discovered in a gas station convenience store, a law enforcement officer, utilizing grainy surveillance footage, concluded Andersen was the person who dropped the meth. He arrested Andersen and found another meth package on him. Case proceeded to trial, where surveillance footage was introduced to the jury. During deliberations, the jury asked to review the footage. During the review in open court, the legal assistant to the County Attorney murmured “there it is” when the footage showed Andersen in the aisle where the drugs were later found. Andersen moved for mistrial based on the comment, and the District Court denied the motion no inquiry into the comment’s prejudice.
The Supreme Court reversed. The legal assistant’s comment amounted to “jury misconduct,” which entitled Andersen to a presumption of prejudice. Furthermore, the District Court’s failure to consider the comment resulted in the presumption not being rebutted. The denial of mistrial was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Points of Interest: mistrial, jury misconduct, prejudice
2025 MT 288
A voluntary absence from trial constitutes a waiver of the defendant’s right to be present and relieves the District Court of the requirement it exercise due diligence to procure the defendant’s presence prior the rendering of the verdict.
McKnight, facing felony drug possession charges, failed to return to the courtroom after a lunch break. Trial proceeded in his absence, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. After McKnight was later arrested, he asserted he failed to return because he experienced a medical emergency. He claimed he went to an emergency room at an Idaho hospital, despite the availability of a nearby emergency room, and he provided no evidence he had sought treatment. On appeal, he challenged the District Court’s decision to proceed in his absence as a violation of his constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the criminal proceedings.
The Supreme Court affirmed. McKnight’s absence was voluntary and he failed to provide evidence of an actual medical emergency despite many opportunities to do so. He thus waived his right to be present at trial and verdict. The District Court was under no obligation to procure his presence when the jury returned its verdict. The court further complied with the statute governing trial of a defendant in absentia, which allows for trial to proceed in situations where the defendant is voluntarily absent and the offense is not punishable by death.
Points of Interest: right of presence, waiver, trial in absentia
2025 MT 287
Shahood v. City and Cnty. of Butte-Silver Bow
A party who intentionally and tactically concedes that an issue must go to a jury for the purpose of gaining a litigation advantage is bound by their judicial admission as to the existence of a factual dispute for which reasonable jurors could disagree.
Shahood sued Butte Silver Bow City-County for negligence and negligence per se after a grader operated by BSB backed into Shahood’s sedan at approximately 1.5 mph. At trial, Shahood presented evidence of BSB’s negligence and BSB presented evidence of Shahood’s comparative negligence. Shahood moved for a partial directed verdict on BSB’s negligence, negligence per se, and causation, but conceded the issue of comparative negligence must go to the jury. The district court granted Shahood’s motion. The jury returned a verdict apportioning 54% of negligence to Shahood, barring her recovery. Shahood moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59(a).
The District Court granted Shahood’s motion for new trial due to irregularity in the proceedings. Relying on Cooper v. Hanson, the court concluded that statements BSB made during closing argument and jurors’ general familiarity with BSB employees resulted in cumulative prejudice and excused Shahood’s failure to contemporaneously object. Additionally, the court granted a new trial based on insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of comparative negligence.
The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury’s verdict. Unlike Cooper, Shahood failed to file any motions in limine seeking to prohibit the arguments and comments BSB made in its closing argument. Shahood also failed to contemporaneously object to the comments and did not preserve the issue as a basis for a new trial. Additionally, Shahood waived her right to challenge the sufficiency of evidence supporting comparative negligence. Shahood’s express statement conceding comparative negligence as an issue for the jury, which was intentionally and tactically made in support of Shahood’s motion for a partial direct verdict, constituted a binding judicial admission. Furthermore, the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence.
Points of Interest: negligence, verdicts, Rule 59(e)
2025 MT 286
Trial court committed reversible error when it conducted a sentencing hearing on revocation where defendant was unrepresented and did not waive his right to counsel.
Lambert, with court-appointed counsel present, admitted to probation violations and the court revoked his suspended sentence. He later sought continuance of sentencing so that he could hire private counsel. When those efforts failed, he asked OPD to assign new counsel. At the time of sentencing, Lambert was without representation. The court did not inform Lambert of his right to counsel or ascertain whether he was voluntarily waiving the right and proceeding pro se.
The Supreme Court held the District Court violated Lambert’s rights by allowing him to proceed pro se at sentencing without inquiring whether he understood his right to counsel and the consequences of waiver, and without obtaining a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. The record showed that Lambert had persisted in seeking representation, even after dismissing his court-appointed counsel, and therefore did not waive the right. The Court remanded for a new dispositional hearing where Lambert either had counsel or validly waived the right.
Points of Interest: revocation, right to counsel, sentencing
2025 MT 285
Montanans for Fair & Impartial Judges v. Knudsen
Attorney General lacks the statutory authority to revise a ballot initiative’s Statement of Purpose and Implication unless he first determines in writing that the proponent’s proposed statement is statutorily deficient.
Proponent MFIJ, in conjunction with MNC, the proponent of a similar ballot initiative, sought declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction after the AG revised MFIJ’s proposed Statement of Purpose and Implication for a constitutional initiative that sought to amend the Montana Constitution to require certain judicial elections to be nonpartisan. MFIJ maintained that the AG had no authority to revise MFIJ’s proposed statement because the AG did not first make a written determination that MFIJ’s proposed statement did not comply with § 13-27-212, MCA. In response, the AG argued that MNC was not a proper party to this original proceeding.
The Court agreed with the AG that MNC was not a “proponent” under the statutes and had not moved to intervene and it therefore was not a proper party to the proceeding. However, the Court agreed with MFIJ that the AG did not have the authority to revise the statement for this ballot initiative because he did not determine in writing that the proposed statement clearly does not comply with § 13-27-226(3)(a), MCA. The AG’s explanation that he revised the proposed statement to “improve” and “explain” did not meet the statutory requirement that authorizes the AG to revise a ballot statement if he finds it statutorily deficient. The Court then examined MFIJ’s proposed statement and concluded that it met the requirements of § 13-27-212(1), MCA, in expressing the true and impartial explanation of the initiative in plain, easily understood language without being argumentative or written so as to create prejudice for or against the issue. The Court then certified MFIJ’s proposed statement to the Secretary of State.
Points of Interest: ballot initiatives
2025 MT 280
Trial court did not err in concluding sufficient evidence supported a SIWOC charge where the victim’s prior inconsistent statements, the parents’ reactions, and the victim’s demeanor comprised independent, reliable evidence supporting the victim’s prior statement that French committed sexual intercourse without consent when she spent the night at his house.
During trial and after the State rested its case-in-chief, French moved to dismiss one of two charged counts of sexual intercourse without consent, arguing the State had presented insufficient evidence to sustain the count because the prior inconsistent statements of a young child victim, not supported by corroborative evidence, were insufficient to sustain a conviction. The District Court denied his motion and French was ultimately convicted of the offense.
The Supreme Court affirmed. For a prior inconsistent statement to be admitted as substantive evidence, there must be corroborative evidence supporting the facts alleged in the prior inconsistent statement. The corroborative evidence may be circumstantial but must be reliable as a matter of law. Prior inconsistent statements independently may prove an element of the offense so long as there is some independent, reliable evidence supporting the substance of the statement. The corroborative evidence need not supply direct proof when the prior inconsistent statement independently establishes an element of the offense.
In this case, the timing of the victim’s prior inconsistent statements, the parents’ reactions, and the victim’s demeanor comprised independent, reliable evidence supporting the victim’s prior statement that French committed sexual intercourse without consent when she spent the night at his house. Although the corroborating evidence did not include direct evidence of penetration, the victim’s out-of-court statements were sufficient to establish that element, and the corroborating evidence supported an inference that the events described in the prior inconsistent statement occurred.
Points of Interest: sexual offenses, prior inconsistent statements, corroboration
2025 MT 277
Litigant’s state claim for professional negligence against his former attorney was collaterally estopped by his federal ineffective assistance claim that raised the same issues.
Benton pled guilty to illegal possession of a firearm in federal court. Throughout this proceeding, Babcock represented Benton. Babcock negotiated a plea deal which Benton accepted. However, Benton later brought an action for ineffective assistance of counsel against Babcock in federal court, asserting that Babcock coerced Benton into taking the plea, colluded with the prosecution, and failed to investigate “manufactured” evidence. The federal court found that Babcock had not ineffectively represented Benton. Benton then began a state civil District Court proceeding against Babcock, asserting professional negligence in the prior federal court conviction. Benton also filed a certificate of appealability with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The District Court asserted that the issue was barred by the collateral estoppel doctrine. The Ninth Circuit Court also denied Benton’s certificate of appeal.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. Benton argued the same issues on appeal as he argued before both the federal criminal court and the District Court. The same issue had been adjudicated in the prior federal case, a final judgment on the merits had been entered by the federal court, Benton was a party in the prior case, and Benton was afforded full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the federal case.
Points of Interest: negligence, collateral estoppel, ineffective assistance of counsel
2025 MT 276
Mont. Dep’t of Health and Human Svcs. v. Johnson
The Department’s claim was not barred by issue preclusion after the Department had submitted an untimely creditor’s claim under § 72-3-803, MCA, which was denied. Section 53-6-167, MCA, provides a separate cause of action, outside of probate administration, for the Department to recover Medicaid benefits paid to a deceased recipient.
Pound received $5,360.89 in Medicaid benefits paid by the Department when she was 55 or older. Pound’s estate was valued at $200,000, which Johnson inherited. Johnson opened a probate matter and properly published a Notice to Creditors. The Department served its creditor’s notice one day after the 4-month limitation period under § 72-3-803, MCA, which was properly denied by the probate court. The Department personally sued Johnson as an heir to the Pound estate under § 53-6-167(2), MCA, which provides a separate cause of action in a district court “against a person who has received property of the recipient by distribution or survival[.]” The District Court dismissed the case, concluding that the Department’s untimely Notice of Creditor’s Claim precluded recovery.
The Supreme Court reversed. Based on the relevant statutory provisions and definitions, the Legislature intended to give the Department wide latitude to recover Medicaid payments. This separate cause of action is an important public policy tool enacted by the Legislature to provide the Department with flexibility to recover the costs of the Medicaid program. The issue in the probate court, a court of limited jurisdiction, was the timeliness of the Department’s creditor’s claim whereas the issue before the District Court was whether Johnson is “a person who has received property of the recipient by distribution or survival for an amount equal to the recoverable medical assistance paid on behalf of the recipient.” Johnson never contested this fact.
Points of Interest: res judicata, remedies
2025 MT 275
Although jury was incorrectly provided a result-based “knowingly” instruction instead of a conduct-based instruction in a SIWOC case, defendant failed to demonstrate he was entitled to plain error review because defendant failed to prove he was prejudiced given the evidence presented to the jury.
Davisson, age 45, had sex with T.K., age 15, when T.K. was severely intoxicated. Davisson was charged with Sexual Intercourse without Consent. His attorney stipulated to the State’s jury instruction which provided the incorrect “result” definition of “knowingly” instead of the correct, “conduct” definition. Evidence at trial showed Davisson carried a physically incapacitated T.K. into his hotel room and the jury further heard evidence of the extent to T.K.’s intoxication during the event. Davisson admitted to having intercourse with T.K. Davisson was convicted.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. Because Davisson had failed to object at trial,he asked the Court to exercise plain error review. Although an incorrect jury instruction implicates a fundamental right, it does not on its own constitute prejudice. Davisson was unable to show the incorrect instruction prejudiced him because the substantial evidence presented at trial required the jury resolve whether Davisson was aware of T.K.’s inability to consent due to age and intoxication. The jury rendered its verdict on the basis that Davisson was aware T.K. could not consent. Because the Court’s plain error analysis found Davisson was not prejudiced by the incorrect jury instruction, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim likewise failed due to lack of prejudice.
Points of Interest: jury instructions, sexual offenses, mental state
2025 MT 274
Abuse or neglect of a child premised on a parent’s mental health condition requires a causal relationship between the parent’s conduct and actual physical or psychological harm to the child, or a substantial risk of such harm that is supported by evidence of a specific and imminent threat.
A mother was arrested after making multiple inappropriate calls to a sheriff’s department. The Department arranged for her 14-year-old son, J.D., to stay with her sister on an emergency basis. Following the mother’s release, the Department petitioned to adjudicate J.D. as a YINC on the basis that J.D. had been neglected and required immediate protection due to the mother’s mental health. At the adjudication hearing, the Department presented testimony establishing that the mother engaged in delusional conduct that raised concerns regarding the stability of her mental health.
The District Court adjudicated J.D. a YINC based on a general concern about J.D.’s safety and wellbeing if returned to his mother’s care due to her unstable mental health.
The Supreme Court reversed the YINC adjudication and vacated the subsequent guardianship. A generalized and speculative concern over a child’s wellbeing does not support removing a child from their family or a YINC adjudication. Absent actual physical or psychological harm to a child, the Department may pursue adjudication if the parent’s mental health poses a substantial risk of physical or psychological harm to the child that is both specific and imminent. The Department implemented the SAMS model to ensure fulfillment of its statutory duties and to have safety and risk assessments guide all decision making. By ignoring the SAMs model and removing J.D. without any real or imminent danger, the Department abandoned the safeguards it designed to prevent unnecessary family disruption, and it ultimately provided insufficient evidence to establish J.D. as a YINC.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, parental rights, sufficiency of evidence
2025 MT 272
Parent in a dependent-neglect proceeding does not have standing to challenge the effectiveness of the subject child’s appointed counsel in representing the child’s wishes.
DPHHS removed C.M.B. Mother’s care in May 2023. The District Court granted DPHHS temporary legal custody of C.M.B. During the dependent-neglect case, Mother did not engage with her treatment plan, missed drug tests, continued to use illegal substances, and lived out of her car for a prolonged period of time. The District Court ultimately terminated Mother’s parental rights to C.M.B.
On appeal, Mother argued that C.M.B.’s counsel failed to effectively represent the child by disregarding her wishes. The State responded that Mother did not have standing to bring this issue. The Supreme Court agreed with the State; caselaw establishes that a person does not have standing to defend the allegedly violated right of another person. Mother therefore did not have standing to raise this claim on C.M.B.’s behalf.
The Court further concluded that the District Court relied on substantial evidence in terminating Mothers parental rights and did not err in determining that Mother’s unfitness to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, even in light of recent progress Mother had made toward stability. The Court upheld the District Court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in C.M.B.’s best interest.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, parental rights, standing