2025 MT 289
Appellant’s actions, and refusal to take court-mandated action, resulted in the district court, correctly, finding him in contempt of court. Further, a district court sitting in equity has broad discretion to fairly distribute the marital estate.
After Karen petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Craig, the parties provided property valuation reports. The District Court found Karen’s to be more accurate and ordered Craig to either make monthly equalization payments or transfer shares of his family’s partnership to Karen. Craig missed monthly payments, drained bank accounts, and stalled the process. Craig’s family partnership also restructured, dramatically changing the value of the shares to be distributed to Karen. The District Court held Craig in contempt and ordered him to make up missed and future equalization payments to Karen.
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the contempt ruling after examining the actions Craig took, including restructuring the family’s partnership to siphon earnings away from Karen.
The Court further upheld the District Court’s remedy of amending the property distribution as a contempt sanction. The District Court had broad discretion to equitably apportion the marital estate and Craig did not prove the court abused its discretion. The court’s equitable powers allowed it to modify the distribution to do complete justice.
Points of Interest: dissolution of marriage, marital assets, equity
2025 MT 282
An event must occur after the negligent acts at issue to be considered a superseding cause in negligence. The degree of an expert’s qualifications affects the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility. Trial counsel opens the door to narrow redirect on technical matters by a non-expert witness when they elicit such subjects on cross-examination.
Mullendore was driving with three children in her car, two of whom were improperly secured, when she was rear-ended. The improperly secured children were Mullendore’s and she was not permitted unsupervised contact with them. According to witnesses, Mullendore sped away from the collision at a high rate of speed. Mullendore drove through a ditch and re-entered the roadway, colliding with another vehicle. One of Mullendore’s children died; the other suffered life-altering injuries. Mullendore was charged with several felonies, including vehicular homicide while under the influence.
At trial, the State alleged Mullendore fled because she was not supposed to have her children in her care. Mullendore’s defense asserted the force of the rearend collision pushed Mullendore’s car into the other vehicle. The jury convicted Mullendore of negligent homicide, criminal endangerment, and driving while suspended.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The State offered sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find Mullendore committed negligent homicide. Mullendore’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to seatbelt evidence, and Mullendore could not establish that a different jury instruction on causation would probably have led to a different outcome.
The Court also rejected Mullendore’s argument that the trial court erred in allowing officers to testify about the speed and trajectory of Mullendore’s car. One officer had the minimum training necessary to qualify as an expert under M. R. Evid. 702. Moreover, Mullendore’s counsel subjected him to thorough cross-examination. As to the second officer, although the trial court had limited the scope of her testimony prior to trial, the defense opened the door on cross-examination, eliciting detailed testimony in an attempt to support the defense’s theory.
The District Court also did not err in denying Mullendore’s motion for a mistrial after Mullendore’s mother testified she adopted the surviving child because there was no reasonable possibility that statement contributed to Mullendore’s conviction. Finally, the award of restitution to the father of the deceased child for lost wages was proper because lost wages may be recoverable as restitution.
Points of Interest: sufficiency of evidence, experts, restitution
2025 MT 281
Justified Use of Force precludes lesser-included offense instructions which contain elements inconsistent with those of the charged offense, however, JUOF does not preclude a Mitigated Deliberate Homicide instruction because it contains the same elements as Deliberate Homicide.
In 2021, Smith was charged with deliberate homicide for killing his neighbor. Before trial, he gave notice of his intent to utilize a JUOF defense. The District Court later set a deadline for Smith to disclose all claims related to Mental Disease or Disorder. Smith informed the court he did not intend to raise the issue of mental health.
Later, the State moved to prevent Smith from using mental disease or disorder evidence to support a lesser-included offense of mitigated deliberate homicide. The court granted the motion on grounds that JUOF precludes a lesser-included-offense instruction. The court reasoned that a JUOF argument essentially concedes the elements of the charged offense; therefore, requesting an instruction on a lesser offense was precluded because the elements of the lesser offense are mutually exclusive with those of the charged offense.
After a jury convicted Smith of deliberate homicide, he appealed the court’s order on the motion in limine.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Mitigated deliberate homicide is unlike other lesser-included offenses because it maintains the same elements as deliberate homicide, and the single element that mitigated deliberate homicide contains that is absent from deliberate homicide is not mutually exclusive of the elements of deliberate homicide. Therefore, arguing JUOF does not preclude a mitigated deliberate homicide instruction. However, the District Court’s error was not prejudicial because Smith never made an offer of proof detailing what evidence he would seek to admit to support mitigation, nor did he identify any admissible evidence or evidence he did not voluntarily withdraw.
Points of Interest: lesser-included offense, JUOF, offer of proof
2026 MT 89
District Court correctly denied summary judgment in negligence per se case when disputed facts preceding the collision rendered Plaintiff’s actions material in determining whether Defendant was negligent as a matter of law.
Murray and Steinmetz collided as Steinmetz slowly exited a parking lot to make a left turn onto a street which has a double centerline, indicating a no passing zone. Murray was operating a motorcycle and had passed several stopped vehicles that also obstructed Steinmetz’s sightline toward the direction from which Murray approached. Steinmetz swore to entering the intersection slowly, looking both left and right, and not seeing Murray until he collided with her van.
Murray moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Steinmetz was negligent as a matter of law because she did not yield the right-of-way as required by statute. The District Court denied Murray’s motion after finding several genuine issues of material fact. A jury ultimately found Murray 65% and Steinmetz 35% at fault for the collision.
The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that Steinmetz’s duty to yield required consideration of the relative positions of the vehicles and whether Murray maintained proper lookout and used reasonable care when driving through the congested intersection. Because the relative location of the vehicles prior to the collision, Murray’s speed and visibility, and the general nature of the intersection remained in dispute, summary judgment was inappropriate even when considering § 61-8-343, MCA.
Points of Interest: negligence, summary judgment, disputed facts
2026 MT 86
MHSA must provide sufficient due process to students challenging adverse eligibility determinations by providing notice of the issues to be decided, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and a record and written decision sufficient to permit judicial review.
Hert, a high school basketball player, struggled with online schooling during the Covid pandemic, failing numerous classes during his sophomore year. He was declared academically ineligible to play basketball that season. He repeated his sophomore year and regained eligibility. Prior to his senior year, his fifth year of high school, the MHSA determined he was ineligible to compete under the Semester Rule. Hert appealed the decision to MHSA’s Executive Board, which unanimously voted to uphold the ineligibility determination but did not elaborate on their rationale. Hert sued, seeking a preliminary injunction to be allowed to play and a declaratory judgment that MHSA violated his right to due process. The District Court denied the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the basketball season ended and Hert graduated. Both parties then moved for summary judgment. The District Court determined the matter was moot because Hert had graduated and further found that students do not have a constitutional right to participate in extracurricular sports, ineligible students are not entitled to judicial review of the MHSA’s decision, and MHSA was not required to issue written findings related to its determination on a petition for waiver.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The issue was not moot under the public interest exception as the issue presented—what due process a student challenging an MHSA decision is entitled—was an issue of public importance, was likely to recur, and an answer by the Court would guide public officers in the performance of their duties. Furthermore, when MHSA applies discretionary waiver criteria affecting a student’s constitutionally protected interest in participation in offered extracurricular activities, procedural due process requires, at minimum: (1) notice of the issues to be decided; (2) a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and (3) a record and written decision sufficient to permit judicial review.
Points of Interest: mootness, due process
2026 MT 84
District Court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing briefing on a speedy trial violation and when Defendant failed to preserve the claim prior to pleading guilty.
At Hill’s change-of-plea hearing, the District Court asked Hill if he had any concerns regarding his case. Hill responded that he believed he had a speedy trial violation and wanted to “keep that on the record.” Hill had not filed a speedy trial motion prior to the plea hearing. Without objection, the District Court responded that it was noting the speedy trial claim for the record but would not accept briefs on the issue.
On appeal, Hill argued the District Court abused its discretion when it did not allow briefing on the speedy trial violation. However, a defendant must raise all nonjurisdictional claims for appeal, including constitutional claims, prior to knowingly and voluntarily entering a guilty plea. After pleading guilty, the defendant may only challenge the voluntary and intelligent character that plea.
Here, Hill waived his right to raise a speedy trial issue because he did not raise the claim by appropriate motion before pleading guilty, receive an adverse ruling, and reserve the claim for appeal by proper appellate procedure. The District Court did not have the authority to accept briefing on the issue under established criminal and appellate procedure. It therefore did not abuse its discretion.
Points of Interest: speedy trial, waiver, abuse of discretion
2026 MT 82
A defendant’s trial counsel were not ineffective when they did not file a motion to suppress the defendant’s statements to law enforcement because the defendant did not show the motion to be arguably meritorious.
Hyslop was convicted of felony murder related to the death of a child in his care. He petitioned for postconviction relief and asserted his trial counsel were ineffective when they failed to seek suppression of statements Hyslop made to law enforcement after he was advised of his Miranda rights, agreed to the interview, and signed a waiver. He did not confess to injuring the child during the interview, but suggested various theories as to how she may have been injured. Although the interview was admitted to evidence, the defendant did not testify at trial. The District Court denied the petition for postconviction relief.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. For counsel to be ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress, a defendant must show such a motion to be arguably meritorious. In this case, a motion to suppress the defendant’s statements—given voluntarily after being advised of Miranda and signing a waiver—would not have been arguably meritorious. Furthermore, even if such a motion would have had merit, it would not have been likely to change the outcome since Hyslop did not confess during the interview and steadfastly maintained he did not injure the child. Furthermore, his version of the events given during this interview could not have been presented to the jury without testifying at trial and subjecting himself to the rigors of cross-examination.
Points of Interest: ineffective assistance of counsel, suppression, postconviction relief
2026 MT 80
A parent waives the right to challenge the appropriateness of a treatment plan by failing to contemporaneously object, and termination of parental rights is proper where the parent fails to comply with the plan and the conditions rendering the parent unfit are unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
In September 2023, the Department removed four children from Parents after reports of domestic violence and methamphetamine use. Father was given a treatment plan requiring substance abuse treatment, mental health evaluation, stable housing and employment, and cooperation with services. Although Father initially completed an evaluation, he failed to engage in treatment, delayed compliance for nearly a year, continued substance use, and failed to address mental health and parenting deficiencies. Evidence at the termination hearing showed Father minimized his substance abuse, failed to recognize the impact of domestic violence, maintained an unsafe relationship with Mother, and lacked protective capacity despite some late progress in treatment and visitation. The District Court terminated Father’s parental rights on multiple statutory grounds, including failure to comply with the treatment plan.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. Father waived any challenge to the treatment plan’s appropriateness by stipulating to it without objection. Substantial evidence supported the District Court’s finding that Father failed to comply with the plan and that the conditions rendering him unfit—namely inability to protect the children—were unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Late or partial compliance does not outweigh a long history of instability, and children are entitled to permanency without indefinite delay.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, waiver, treatment plans
2026 MT 78
Torgison v. Lincoln Cnty. Port Auth.
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying preliminary injunction where it refused to set aside consecutive property sales challenged by nearby property owner on the basis that the initial sale by Port Authority violated open meeting laws.
The Port Authority sold part of its real property to Noble in 2023. Noble later sold a portion of the purchased property to a third party. Torgison, who resided near the property, sued the Port Authority and the Lincoln County Commissioners in 2025, arguing that the sale to Noble was accomplished in violation of open meeting laws. He sought a preliminary injunction, asking the court to set aside the sale to Noble as well as the sale to the third party. The District Court denied the injunction.
On appeal, Torgison argued that the District Court failed to consider all the statutory injunction factors and improperly reached the ultimate issue of the case. Torgison also argued that equitable tolling should be applied to his claim. The Port Authority argued that the District Court had not erred and asserted that Torgison had failed to preserve his equitable tolling claim.
The Supreme Court concluded the issues of timeliness, mootness, and equitable tolling were not ripe. Additionally, the District Court had not entered a ruling on the ultimate issue of the case. If the District Court found that a violation of the open meeting laws had taken place, it could fashion a remedy. Therefore, the District Court had not manifestly abused its discretion in denying the motion for preliminary injunction.
Points of Interest: preliminary injunction, ripeness, open meetings
2026 MT 77
The District Court imposed a lawful sentence when it suspended the mandatory $5,000 fine for Trombley’s felony DUI conviction. The court could not delegate to the probation and parole office the authority to reimpose suspended fees and fines.
Pursuant to a global plea agreement, Trombley pleaded guilty to several offenses, including driving under the influence—fourth or subsequent offense, under § 61-8-1002, MCA (2021). The District Court sentenced Trombley on that charge to thirteen months to the Department of Corrections, followed by a suspended five-year term in the Montana State Prison. The sentencing court imposed the $5,000 mandatory minimum fine pursuant to § 61-8-1008(1)(a)(i), MCA, and suspended the entire amount. The sentencing judgment included a condition allowing the probation office to reinstate the suspended fees and fines “if they find reason that Defendant is not complying with the terms of his probation.” Trombley appealed.
Relying on its recent decision in State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The Court explained that § 46-18-231(3), MCA, which provides that a sentencing judge “may not sentence an offender to pay a fine unless the offender is or will be able to pay the fine,” may be harmonized with § 46-18-201(2), MCA, which grants a sentencing judge express authority to “suspend execution of [a] sentence.” The District Court complied with § 46-18-231(3), MCA, by considering Trombley’s financial circumstances, prospects for future income, and ability to pay a fine; complied with § 61‑8‑1008(1)(a)(i), MCA, by imposing the $5,000 minimum fine; and followed § 46-18-201(2), MCA, when it suspended the fine in its entirety.
The Supreme Court remanded the case for the District Court to strike from the judgment its provision allowing the probation office to “reinstate” suspended fees and fines. Section 46-18-203(7)(a), MCA, authorizes only a district court, not the office of probation and parole, to revoke a sentence and to continue or modify any of its conditions.
Points of Interest: fines and surcharges, suspended fines, ability to pay
2026 MT 73
The District Court correctly determined Dolans did not have an implied easement because the Certificate of Subdivision Approval, the landowners’ conduct, and the reviewing authorities’ continued disapproval of the ditch presented evidence contrary to the alleged intent that the use would continue after severance of common ownership.
In 2006, Cobb Hill subdivided a tract of land. As part of that process, regulation required that Cobb Hill receive the reviewing authorities’ approval for compliance with sanitation regulations. In return, Cobb Hill received a Certificate of Subdivision Approval. The reviewing authorities placed conditions on subdivision approval, including that Cobb Hill abandon feeder ditches running through the property and build water supply and treatment systems at designated locations.
In 2018, the Dolans filed a complaint against their neighbors, claiming ditch interference when the Guenthers installed two culverts. The Guenthers installed the culverts in response to the reviewing authorities’ disapproval of the ditch. The Guenthers moved for partial summary judgment that the Dolans did not have an easement. The Dolans cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The Dolans argued that Ewing Trust, who bought several lots from Cobb Hill, created an implied easement by existing use when it used the ditch and conveyed Lot 2 giving the impression that subsequent buyers could use the ditch. The District Court decided both motions in the Guenthers’ favor.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Although the COSA did not bind subsequent landowners to Cobb Hill’s intent, it provided evidence contrary to the intent the Dolans alleged. Because subsequent landowners had constructive notice of the COSA’s conditions but failed to amend the COSA or mitigate the sanitation issues, an implied easement by existing use was not established. The reviewing authorities continued to disapprove of the ditch as it existed when common ownership was severed. It was not reasonable of the parties to expect that use of the ditch would continue after conveyance.
Points of Interest: easements and roads, land use, summary judgment
2026 MT 66
Section 72-3-617, MCA, authorizes a court sitting in probate to restrain the conduct of a personal representative, regardless of whether she administers the estate under informal or formal probate.
Jaime was informally appointed personal representative of her husband’s estate and opened an informal probate. Paul, the decedent’s father, initiated a civil action based on various contract and tort theories naming Jaimie and the estate as defendants. While that separate proceeding was pending, Paul sought injunctive relief in the probate proceedings, alleging Jaimie was violating her fiduciary duties and depleting estate assets. The probate court held a formal hearing on Paul’s motion and granted a “preliminary injunction” restraining Jaimie’s conduct under § 72-3-617, MCA, of the probate code.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the court had jurisdiction under the probate code to adjudicate Paul’s request for injunctive relief. Section 72-3-617, MCA, grants a probate court discretion to restrain a personal representative, regardless of whether the probate proceeding is formal or informal. Further, § 72-3-617’s restraining authority is distinct from injunctive relief available in civil actions under §§ 27-19-201 and -314, MCA (“preliminary injunctions” and “temporary restraining orders”). Finally, a probate court is not required to impose a bond under § 27-19-306, MCA, when restraining a personal representative under § 72-3-617, MCA. The Court held that the probate court had authority to restrain Jaimie’s conduct as personal representative and did not abuse its discretion in requiring her to obtain pre-approval from the court for estate distributions.
Points of Interest: estate law, probate, restraining authority
2026 MT 65
The District Court imposed a lawful sentence when it suspended the mandatory $600 fine for Curran’s DUI conviction.
Curran pleaded guilty in August 2020 to first-offense DUI per se under § 61-8-406(1)(a), MCA (2019). The parties’ plea agreement recommended in part that the court impose a combined fine and surcharge of $685, with a proviso that “Defendant requests the court inquire into his ability to pay the fine and suspend the fine and surcharge in the interests of justice if the court finds that he is unable to pay the fine.” At sentencing, the Municipal Court, though sympathetic, did not believe it had discretion to suspend the mandatory fine despite Curran’s inability to pay. In Curran’s first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and directed the Municipal Court to consider statutory alternatives to satisfy Curran’s obligation for the fine. On remand, the sentencing court reimposed the $600 fine and suspended the entire amount. Curran appealed.
Relying on its recent decision in State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The Court explained that § 46-18-231(3), MCA, which provides that a sentencing judge “may not sentence an offender to pay a fine unless the offender is or will be able to pay the fine,” may be harmonized with § 46-18-201(2), MCA, which grants a sentencing judge express authority to “suspend execution of [a] sentence.” The Municipal Court complied with § 46-18-231(3), MCA, by considering Curran’s financial circumstances, prospects for future income, and ability to pay a fine; complied with § 61‑8‑722(1), MCA, by imposing the $600 minimum fine; and followed § 46-18-201(2), MCA, when it suspended the fine in its entirety.
Points of Interest: fines and surcharges, sentencing, ability to pay
2026 MT 64
All Families Healthcare v. State
A state law defining an “abortion clinic” as a health care facility created impermissible discrimination between providers who offer identical medications and procedures, distinguished only by whether the facility offers abortions or miscarriage management. The law also implicated the fundamental right to privacy because it limited the availability of qualified abortion providers. The State failed to demonstrate a compelling interest because the State could not prove abortion care and miscarriage care do not subject patients to different safety risks.
In 2023, the Montana Legislature passed HB 937, which defined “abortion clinics” as facilities performing five or more abortions per year and subjected those facilities to specific DPHHS licensing requirements regulating sanitation, staff qualifications, emergency care procedures, physical layout, and standards for inspections. Reproductive healthcare providers challenged the law as a violation of several provisions of the Montana Constitution on behalf of their staff and patients. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that abortion care utilizes the same medications and procedures as miscarriage care, but the law does not subject miscarriage treatment providers to the same requirements. The State’s lone witness, who supervised the DPHHS licensing scheme, could not identify any specific health or safety concerns distinguishing “abortion clinics” from miscarriage treatment providers. The District Court granted the preliminary injunction.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, determining that the District Court did not abuse its discretion granting the preliminary injunction. HB 937 and DPHHS regulations likely discriminated between two similarly situated types of healthcare providers whose practice included identical medications, procedures, and safety risks. These rules implicated the right to privacy and thus triggered strict scrutiny, and the State was unlikely to justify the regulations with a narrowly tailored, compelling State interest. The likely violation of the Plaintiff’s rights to equal protection and abortion access absent a preliminary injunction constituted an irreparable injury, and the balance of equities and the public interest favored the granting of the preliminary injunction.
Points of Interest: preliminary injunction, right to privacy, equal protection
2026 MT 63
D’Hooge v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.
The version of § 33-18-242, MCA, of the Uniform Trade Practices Act that was effective prior to the 2023 amendment does not prohibit a third-party claimant from suing an insurer based on breach of contract, equity, or tort based on the insurer’s mishandling of an insurance claim.
D’Hooge contacted Cincinnati Insurance Company after sustaining an injury while on the premises of Cincinnati’s insured. D’Hooge requested lost wages and medical bills pursuant to Montana law and forwarded supporting documents to Cincinnati. Cincinnati told D’Hooge “[Cincinnati] [is] accepting liability for your claim” and D’Hooge need not gather additional evidence to support her claim.
D’Hooge sued Cincinnati for breach of contract, equitable causes of action, and tort. The District Court granted Cincinnati summary judgment because it concluded the pre-2023 version of § 33-18-242, MCA, only permitted third-party claimants to sue insurers for statutory or common law bad faith based on the insurer mishandling an insurance claim.
The Supreme Court reversed. The plain language of pre-2023 § 33-18-242, MCA, did not preclude a third-party claimant from asserting causes of action other than statutory or common law bad faith against an insurer based on how the insurer handles an insurance claim. Section 33-18-242, MCA, limited only the causes of action an insured may assert against its insurer while no similar provision limited the causes of action a third-party claimant may assert against an insurer. Federal caselaw also supports this conclusion because federal district courts interpreted the pre-2023 version of § 33-18-242, MCA, to allow third-party claimants to assert common law actions against insurers based on how the insurer handled the claim.
Points of Interest: insurance, torts, breach of contract
2026 MT 61
A district court exceeds its statutory authority in a revocation proceeding when it revokes and converts probationary time remaining on a custodial sentence into a DOC commitment; only suspended time may be revoked.
In 2019, Sanchez was convicted of felony DUI and sentenced to two years with DOC followed by four years suspended. After completing a residential treatment program, the remainder of his custodial sentence was to be served on probation. Sanchez violated probation multiple times, resulting in two revocation proceedings. After the second revocation in January 2024, the District Court imposed a five-year, three-month DOC commitment with credit for time served, effectively including both suspended time and remaining probationary time from the custodial portion of the original sentence. Sanchez appealed, arguing the sentence unlawfully extended his original sentence and improperly included time not subject to revocation.
The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded. Although the total time imposed did not exceed the original sentence, the District Court erred by revoking and converting 206 days of remaining probationary time from the custodial portion of the sentence into a DOC commitment. Under § 61-8-731, MCA, completion of treatment required the remainder of the custodial sentence to be served on probation, and under § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, a court’s revocation authority is limited to suspended time only. Accordingly, the District Court lacked authority to revoke the probationary portion of the custodial sentence. The District Court is instructed on remand to correct the disposition to revoke only the remaining 1,204 days of suspended time, while leaving undisturbed previously awarded credits for time served and unchallenged street time credit determinations.
Points of Interest: revocation, sentencing, illegal sentences
2026 MT 60
Roaring Lion Ranch, LLC, v. YC Props.
The District Court abused its discretion when it converted YC’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without indicating that it considered information outside the Plaintiffs’ complaint other than the parties’ actions in underlying litigation.
Roaring Lion Ranch and other Plaintiffs sued YC Properties for abuse of process and malicious prosecution arising from its conduct in a prior water rights dispute. YC moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief because their complaint misrepresented the facts of the underlying action. The District Court sua sponte converted YC’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, ruled in YC’s favor, and dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.
The Supreme Court reversed. Courts are required to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment only when they consider information outside the complaint. The purpose of this rule is to avoid surprising the parties and afford them an opportunity to present additional facts to avoid summary judgment. In the present case, the District Court did not indicate that it considered any information outside the Plaintiffs’ complaint. The District Court’s references to the underlying action did not require conversion because the parties participated in both cases and could not claim that they were surprised by the inclusion of this information. Because Plaintiffs pleaded facts to support every element of their abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims, the Court concluded that their complaint was sufficient to withstand dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
Points of Interest: summary judgment, abuse of process, malicious prosecution
2026 MT 59
Montana’s bail-jumping statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant, released on condition of appearance at a specified hearing where he then failed to appear, because the mental state element of the crime provided fair notice that his conduct was prohibited, the statute provided adequate safeguards for enforcement, and the “without lawful excuse” element of the statute does not unlawfully shift the burden of proof to the defendant but provides an affirmative defense to the crime charged.
Montana petitioned to revoke Trombley’s probation in January 2023. After his initial appearance, Trombley was released pending an adjudicatory hearing set for February 2023. Trombley did not appear at that hearing and the State then filed bail jumping charges. Trombley did not communicate his whereabouts until he was arrested in May 2023. Trombley moved to dismiss, arguing the lack of a statutory definition for “lawful excuse” rendered the statute void for vagueness and impermissibly shifted the burden to him to prove a “lawful excuse.” After the court denied this motion, Trombley pled guilty but reserved his right to appeal.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The statute was not unconstitutionally vague because it provided fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that failing to appear at the hearing could result in criminal sanctions. The “purposely” mental state element distinguished between intentional absence from circumstances beyond Trombley’s control. Trombley, who knew of his obligation to appear, neither appeared nor offered a lawful excuse for his absence. Second, the bail-jumping statute did not impermissibly shift the burden onto Trombley to prove a “lawful excuse” because the term operates as an affirmative defense, for which he bore the initial burden of production. Finally, the charging documents alleged sufficient facts to establish probable cause that Trombley committed bail jumping because the State has no obligation to allege facts establishing that he did not have a lawful excuse.
Points of Interest: bail-jumping, vagueness, mental state
2026 MT 58
Trial court properly dismissed a charge for failure to register as a sex offender under the 2023 SVORA because the post-2007 SVORA is punitive and cannot be applied retroactively.
Pratt was previously convicted of a sex offense requiring him to register as a sexual offender. When he failed to report in-person as directed, the State charged Pratt with failure to register in violation of the 2023 Sexual of Violent Offender Registration Act, as identified in the affidavit of probable cause and charging documents. The trial court dismissed the charge on Pratt’s motion as violative of the Ex Post Facto clause and State v. Hinman, 2023 MT 116, 412 Mont. 434, 530 P.3d 1271.
The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the State’s argument that it could have charged Pratt under a pre-2007 version of SVORA. Where the State’s charging documents relied exclusively on the 2023 SVORA, which could not be applied retroactively, the prosecution was barred.
Points of Interest: SVORA, ex post facto, dismissal
2026 MT 56
Opening a closed container found in a concealed compartment of a stolen vehicle was beyond the scope of the vehicle owner’s consent.
When police stopped Flores-Reyes on report of a stolen vehicle, he claimed that all the vehicle contents belonged to him. Police obtained the vehicle owner’s consent to search the vehicle and secure it and visible property for return to her. When searching, police manipulated a dashboard panel to reveal a concealed compartment. In the compartment, police found a closed zippered pouch which they opened to discover fentanyl. Police used the drugs as probable cause for a warrant to more thoroughly search the vehicle and Flores-Reyes’ hotel room, where they discovered additional narcotics, the basis for the charged offenses. Flores-Reyes moved to suppress, arguing that the warrantless opening of the concealed compartment and closed pouch violated his constitutional search and seizure rights, and that the subsequently obtained warrants were tainted because they were based on evidence discovered during the unlawful search. The District Court denied suppression and a jury ultimately convicted Flores-Reyes.
The Supreme Court reversed. Although the vehicle owner gave consent to search the stolen car and retrieve her visible property, the scope of her consent did not extend to a closed, concealed pouch that Flores-Reyes said belonged to him. The fruits of the illegal search of the zippered pouch formed the basis for the later search warrants and the drugs obtained under those searches were also subject to the exclusionary rule.
Points of Interest: search and seizure, warrantless searches, suppression
2026 MT 55
Defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated in spite of a 476-day delay where 126 days of the delay were attributable to the defendant, the defendant’s conduct in vacating a trial date for plea negotiations he never completed demonstrated the Defendant did not want a speedy trial, and Defendant failed to establish actual prejudice from the delay.
The State charged Larson with felony DUI, among other charges. Trial was initially set for October 31, 2022, but that date was used for one of Larson’s older pending cases. The matter was then reset to January 9, 2023, which was later vacated at Larson’s request so he could pursue a global plea agreement with another pending case. After the change-of-plea hearings on January 12 and 19, 2023, failed because Larson did not accept the global plea agreement, trial was reset for May 1, 2023, but that date was eventually given to another defendant with higher priority. Larson’s case was then reset for July 10, 2023. On July 6, 2023, Larson moved to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. The next day he entered a no-contest plea, preserving his right to appeal. The total delay from arrest to plea was 476 days.
Under the Ariegwe balancing test, the 476-day delay (276 days beyond the 200-day trigger) weighed in Larson’s favor. 350 days were institutional delay attributable to the State, while 126 days were caused by Larson’s own continuances and unsuccessful plea attempts. Larson’s conduct, vacating a priority trial date for plea negotiations he never completed, showed he did not genuinely want a speedy trial and weighed against him. Larson also failed to establish actual prejudice, as his pretrial incarceration was not oppressive and he showed no impaired defense or unusual anxiety. On balance, no speedy trial violation occurred.
Points of Interest: DUI, speedy trial, prejudice
2026 MT 54
An individual on conditional discharge does not terminate the time remaining on his sentence by moving out of State. Allowing Defendant to remain out of state while on probation is not a banishment condition, and although Defendant should have been required to return to Montana for probation, it wasn’t impossible for him to comply with probation conditions.
In 2019, Emmings was sentenced to a total of 12 years DOC with 10 suspended after he pled guilty to 8 counts of violating an order of protection. After Emmings was later granted conditional discharge, he moved to California. The court revoked Emmings’ discharge after he threatened individuals in California. The court placed Emmings back on probation and reimposed all prior probation conditions except those that required him to be in Montana.
The State later petitioned to revoke Emmings’ suspended sentence for absconding due to failure to comply with probation conditions, for failure to communicate with his probation officer, and explicitly refusing to comply. The judge presiding over the case recused herself. A different judge assumed jurisdiction, dismissed the petition to revoke, and struck the order reimposing probation on two grounds: (1) the time remaining on Emmings’ sentence was terminated when he moved to California, and (2) the prior judge illegally banished Emmings from Montana and imposed impossible probation conditions.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning first that the initial judge’s order was the law of the case because it wasn’t arbitrary or materially or clearly erroneous. Second, the latter judge misconstrued the conditional discharge statute to terminate Emmings’ sentence because he moved out of state. Third, although Emmings should have been required to return to Montana for probation, allowing him to remain in California was not a banishment; because he wasn’t banished, the probationary conditions were not impossible, and Emmings failed to show a good faith effort to comply.
Points of Interest: revocation, probation and parole, conditional discharge
2026 MT 53
Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC v. State
Property owners did not prove public participation or equal protection violations where new legislation allowed for denser development where the statutes allowed for public participation prior to final governmental decisions and the classes identified were not similarly situated.
Property owners in single-family neighborhoods challenged housing reform bills enacted by the 2023 Legislature that allowed higher density development, arguing, in part, that the Montana Land Use Planning Act infringed on citizens’ right to know and participate during the land-use planning and approval process. The District Court denied MAID’s request for injunction.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court concluded the MLUPA did not unconstitutionally limit public participation. Although the MLUPA limits the right to participate during site-specific development decisions, it encourages participation during development of the land use plan, zoning regulations, and subdivision regulations. The site-specific limitations do not violate Montana’s right to participate because the law allows for material participation on the land use plan and regulations that ultimately govern site specific decisions.
The Court further held that the MULPA does not violate equal protection by irrationally burdening landowners not subject to restrictive covenants with the bulk of urban growth and arbitrarily limiting public participation in MLUPA municipalities but not in other localities. MAID was unable to establish that the classes it identified were similarly situated. Those subject to restrictive covenants were parties to a contract; the burdens and benefits MAID identified derived from private contracts and were not statutory. The Court held further that residents of MLUPA municipalities were not similarly situated to those in non-MLUPA municipalities. The distinction between them is related to, and a result of, the MLUPA’s purpose of fostering more comprehensive data collection and public participation during the long-range community planning process in Montana’s more densely populated areas.
Points of Interest: land use, equal protection, public participation
2026 MT 52
Courts must consider a defendant’s ability to pay when imposing a mandatory minimum fine and must suspend the portion of a fine that the defendant is or will be unable to pay.
Cole pled guilty to felony DUI. At sentencing, the District Court inquired into Cole’s financial situation and found Cole had limited income. The District Court imposed the $5,000 mandatory minimum fine, but gave Cole credit for time spent in jail and suspended the $4,900 balance.
Cole appealed the imposition of the suspended fine. Cole argued the fine was unconstitutionally excessive under the U.S. and Montana constitutions, because the statute required the imposition of a minimum fine regardless of a defendant’s ability to pay. Cole asserted State v. Gibbons, 2024 MT 63, which held a similar mandatory minimum fine facially unconstitutional, stripped the District Court of authority to impose a mandatory minimum fine, regardless of its suspension.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The District Court acted under two equal statutory mandates: (1) to impose the $5,000-minimum fine required by § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA (2019); and (2) to consider Cole’s ability to pay and to not require Cole to pay a fine beyond his ability, pursuant to § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019). The court exercised authority expressly granted by § 46-18-201(2), MCA (2019), to suspend the portion of the fine Cole could not pay. The suspended fine demonstrated a set of circumstances under which a mandatory minimum fine does not prohibit the court from considering the proportionality factors necessary to determine whether a fine is unconstitutionally excessive, including a defendant’s ability to pay. Based on these new circumstances, the Supreme Court overruled Gibbons’s holding that a similar mandatory minimum fine provision in § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019), was unconstitutional in all applications. The remainder of Gibbons remains intact, thus § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019) still applies to mandatory fines, and a defendant may still bring an as-applied constitutional challenge based on a sentencing court’s failure to consider the defendant’s ability to pay.
Points of Interest: fines and surcharges, ability to pay, suspended fines
2026 MT 49
Defendant’s guilty plea to one or more counts of an Information does not bar continued prosecution of the remaining count(s).
The State charged Standifur with four offenses arising from a traffic stop, including criminal possession of dangerous drugs and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia. Standifur pleaded guilty to all offenses except the possession charge, which he sought to have dismissed immediately after his pleas as violative of the same-transaction rule and double jeopardy. The trial court denied dismissal and Standifur later pleaded guilty to the possession offense, reserving the right to appeal.
The Supreme Court upheld his conviction. Section 46-11-503, MCA, bars multiple prosecutions for offenses arising out of the same transaction, but only if a “former prosecution” arising out of that transaction “results in a conviction.” Standifur’s partial resolution by guilty pleas did not bar continued prosecution for unresolved counts under the same charging document. Further, separate convictions for possession of drugs and paraphernalia did not violate double jeopardy under the same-elements test. One can possess paraphernalia without possessing drugs and vice versa; therefore, one offense was not included in the other.
Points of Interest: double jeopardy, transaction rule, charges
2026 MT 48
District Court acted within its discretion when it declined to modify the parenting plan based on another child’s sexual abuse allegations against Father, as Mother did not show clear error in the court’s factual findings. The judge’s remote appearance at the hearing was not plain error.
Mother and Father divorced in 2022 and agreed to share parenting of their daughter, A.M. After the divorce, Mother’s daughters from a previous marriage—A.R.M. and E.M.—disclosed that Father had sexually abused them. Mother obtained an order of protection against Father prohibiting his contact with A.R.M. for one year and with A.M. for thirty days. In October 2024, Mother moved in the dissolution case to amend the parenting plan to prohibit Father’s unsupervised contact with A.M.
The District Judge presided over the show cause hearing via Zoom for health and safety reasons. E.M. testified, but A.R.M. opted not to. The court permitted Mother to testify only about her observations of A.R.M. The court found the parties presented insufficient evidence for it to conclude that the allegations were true and that Father posed a risk to A.M.’s safety. The court declined to restrict Father’s parenting.
The Supreme Court concluded the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and it did not abuse its discretion in permitting unsupervised visitation. The record contained little evidence to substantiate the sexual abuse allegations other than the parties’ conflicting testimony, and the Supreme Court could not reweigh the evidence.
The Court rejected Mother’s argument that the District Court’s remote appearance was structural error and prejudiced her right to a fair trial. Mother did not raise this objection in the District Court and thus failed to preserve this claim for appeal. On appeal, Mother failed to convince the Court she was entitled to plain-error review of the unpreserved claim.
Points of Interest: parenting plan, sufficiency of evidence, remote appearance
2026 MT 47
Briggs could not show that his hired counsels’ seeking withdrawal while retaining payments under their fee agreement was a structural denial of counsel under Cronic or actual ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.
After 10 months of representation, Briggs’ relationship with his hired counsel was irretrievably broken. However, Briggs opposed counsel’s motion to withdraw because Briggs did not want to lose payments made in advance under their fixed-fee contract. The trial court permitted withdrawal and immediately appointed new counsel who represented Briggs through his trial and sentencing.
In postconviction proceedings, Briggs claimed ineffective assistance of hired trial counsel. He alleged the fixed-fee contract created a conflict of interest that caused counsel to fail to act as his advocate and the State’s adversary—a presumptively prejudicial denial of counsel under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984). Alternatively, he alleged counsel was constitutionally ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
The Supreme Court disagreed. Cronic error arises out of exceedingly rare circumstances so inherently prejudicial that ineffective assistance may be presumed without considering counsel’s actual performance. Strickland claims establish “actual” ineffective assistance arising out of counsel’s deficient performance and resulting prejudice to outcome of proceedings. Briggs could not demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation under either standard. Counsel’s purported financial conflict of interest did not cause them to totally and completely abandon their duties of loyalty and confidentiality and join the State in obtaining a conviction. There was thus no complete failure of the adversarial process that would give rise to a presumption of prejudice under Cronic. Briggs also did not show that the “financial conflict” actually adversely affected counsels’ performance. There was thus no conflict-based claim under Strickland.
Points of Interest: ineffective assistance of counsel, conflict of interest, attorney fees
2026 MT 46
Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies between a complaining witness’s prior statements to law enforcement and their statements at trial does not establish falsity, as required to establish a claim under Napue.
Stinger was convicted of multiple PFMA charges arising from two separate incidents involving Stinger and his then-wife Kasondra. Kasondra testified at trial, as did the responding officers and paramedic. Extensive dashboard and body cam footage was also admitted as evidence. Stinger appealed his convictions, asserting the State violated Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, by failing to correct several of Kasondra’s statements at trial that were inconsistent with her prior statements to responding emergency personnel, as evidenced by body cam and dashcam footage.
The Supreme Court affirmed. To succeed on a Napue claim, a defendant must show the testimony at issue was actually false. Generally, mere inconsistencies or honestly mistaken witness recollections do no not satisfy the falsehood requirement. The statements, which specific details of how a physical altercation played out—whether someone had been punched in the head versus punched in the eye, and whether they had been punched in the head before being placed in a headlock or while in the headlock, are not false statements but minor inconsistencies in witness recollection. Accordingly, the State had no duty to correct the witness testimony.
Points of Interest: witnesses, prior inconsistent statements
2026 MT 45
Trial court committed reversible error where it overruled defendant’s objection to repeated use of the word “victim” to refer to the complaining witness and where the court allowed the prosecution to question the defendant about attempting to “wipe” his phone after his arrest as evidence of consciousness of guilt.
Sandberg was charged with several crimes, including sexual intercourse without consent. At trial, the prosecution and several state witnesses repeatedly referred to the complaining witness as “victim.” The trial court granted, but overruled, defense counsel’s standing objection to the reference. Although the court further noted it would be “highly problematic” for the court to make such references, the word “victim” was used in the jury instructions. Additionally, the prosecutor questioned Sandberg about an attempt to “wipe” his phone after his arrest. While Sandberg objected to this questioning, the court ruled that the evidence was admissible to show consciousness of guilt. A jury ultimately convicted Sandberg of the charges.
The Supreme Court reversed on both grounds. The word “victim” is conclusive in nature and connotes a predetermination that a crime occurred. It is improper to refer to a complaining witness as “victim” where the commission of a crime remains in dispute. Pervasive use of the word “victim” at trial deprives a defendant of their right to a fair trial by jury. Pursuant to the transaction rule, subsequent act evidence is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, but only if the evidence demonstrates a consciousness of guilt specific to the crime charged. Like other evidence admissible under the transaction rule, the evidence is subject to Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. The District Court erred in admitting the subsequent act evidence because it demonstrated a consciousness of guilt as to uncharged offenses and because it introduced an improper propensity inference prohibited by Rule 404(b) that was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.
Points of Interest: transaction rule, Rule 404, evidence
2026 MT 42
The presence in the jury pool of two individuals who no longer resided in the county did not impact Hinkle’s rights to an impartial jury because the individuals did not respond to the jury summons. Further the use of testimony from another case was not an error.
Hinkle was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. Her original trial date was postponed due to jury summoning errors in the county. Between the canceled trial date and the rescheduled date, another trial was held in the same district court before a different judge. In that case, the defendant requested a hearing, alleging the jury had been incorrectly summoned. The District Court held a hearing and ultimately concluded the summoning rules had been substantially complied with. In the present case, before the new trial date, Hinkle moved for a hearing regarding jury summoning issues, namely that two people in the jury pool no longer resided in the county. The court denied the motion, citing to testimony given in the other case as support.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court concluded that the presence in the jury pool of two individuals who no longer resided in the county had not implicated the impaneling process. Furthermore, in light of the other case in the same court that dealt with similar issues drawn from the same pool, the District Court did not err in considering the testimony from the other case in its denial of Hinkle’s motion for new trial.
Points of Interest: jury pool, new trial, evidence
2026 MT 41
Trial court erred in dismissing the entire action when summary judgment motion addressed only one of five relevant debt accounts because dismissal of the entire action exceeded the scope of the motion.
Centron filed a complaint for “account stated” against the Hollewijns arising out of five separate debt accounts related to medical services. The Hollewijns sought summary judgment that Centron had not established an account stated, but addressed only one of the five debt accounts in their motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in their favor, deciding that Centron had failed to establish an account stated as a matter of law. The court then dismissed the entire action, including the four unaddressed debt accounts.
The Supreme Court reversed. First, whether Centron had established an account stated remained a question of fact subject to two reasonable inferences—either Hollewijns objected to the debt in a reasonable time, or they did not and therefore acquiesced. The trial court could not decide this material fact question as a matter of law where a genuine dispute existed. Second, the court erroneously dismissed the entire action where summary judgment addressed only one debt account, but not the remaining four. This decision was beyond the scope of Hollewijns’ summary judgment motion and therefore erroneous.
Points of Interest: summary judgment, dismissal, disputed facts
2026 MT 40
A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror when the totality of the juror’s responses does not raise serious doubt about the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial.
The State charged Haacke with possession of dangerous drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. During voir dire, defense counsel emphasized that the State bears the burden of proof and the defendant has no obligation to present evidence or testify. After several other jurors were struck for cause, prospective juror M.W. stated that if the State presented “solid evidence,” it would be “very difficult” to acquit without rebuttal from the defense. He added he would “strongly prefer” Haacke to take the stand. Neither the State nor the court attempted to rehabilitate M.W. However, when defense counsel posed increasingly leading questions, M.W. clarified that the outcome would “depend on the evidence,” he could find Haacke not guilty if the State’s case was weak or circumstantial, and he would honor the presumption of innocence. The District Court denied the for-cause challenge. Haacke used a peremptory strike to remove M.W., was convicted, and appealed.
A prospective juror may be dismissed for cause when his statements raise serious doubt about his ability to be fair and impartial. Spontaneous and unprompted responses to open-ended questions are the most reliable indicators of bias, and a juror’s belief that a defendant must testify or prove his innocence can raise serious concerns. Although M.W.’s initial spontaneous comments raised a close question, he did not express the kind of fixed opinions requiring reversal. All his statements came during defense questioning, which became increasingly leading. His unprompted answers grew more nuanced, emphasizing that the outcome would depend on the strength of the State’s evidence and he would apply the presumption of innocence. The District Court has discretion to assess a juror’s impartiality, and the record did not compel a finding that a serious question arose regarding M.W.’s ability to be fair and impartial.
Points of Interest: jury selection, juror challenges, abuse of discretion
2026 MT 39
Attorney General’s determination of legal insufficiency was overruled regarding a proposed Constitutional initiative to add a section limiting the government’s ability to burden initiative process because the initiative’s provisions did not create the need for separate votes under the implied-effects doctrine.
Proponents of BI-8, a ballot initiative that would amend the Montana Constitution to add a new section that would limit the government’s ability to deny or burden citizens’ right to place initiatives on the ballot, sought declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction after the Attorney General found BI-8 legally insufficient for violating the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, and the AG also appended a fiscal statement that Proponents maintained the AG lacked the authority to append.
The Supreme Court rejected arguments the AG raised as to whether BI-8 would survive post-election constitutional scrutiny because such questions fall outside the AG’s limited pre-ballot legal sufficiency review. The Court further determined that BI-8 did not combine independent constitutional subjects but contained provisions that operate together to define and protect a single constitutional right. It rejected the AG’s argument that BI-8 would implicitly amend other constitutional provisions by imposing judicial timelines because merely interacting with existing guarantees of access to courts and due process does not necessarily amend those provisions. It also disagreed with the AG that BI-8’s limitation on the use of government resources to support or oppose ballot issues would require a separate vote because constraining government action does not in and of itself create the need for a separate vote under the implied-effects doctrine. The Court further disagreed with the AG that a provision that would create procedural safeguards limiting the Legislature’s power would require a separate vote because it would not strip the Legislature of administrative power; the implied-effects doctrine cannot be extended so far that any structural interaction with other constitutional provisions would create a separate amendment.
The Court also agreed with Proponents that the AG’s appended fiscal statement was invalid because the fiscal note did not indicate a fiscal impact.
Points of Interest: ballot initiatives, Art. XIV(11), implied-effects doctrine
2026 MT 34
Petrich Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Trout Unlimited
Water Court correctly determined Claimants’ water rights from a 1964 court decree were limited to May 1 to July 15, but erred when it generated implied use claims for dates exceeding the decreed period of use because it must further consider the implied claims after providing notice to other water users.
In 1964, a district court entered the Petrich Decree, pronouncing water rights to excess waters flowing in Mill Creek, including Claimants’ disputed claims. That court found that excess waters flowed in Mill Creek “during . . . May and June until approximately July 15.”
In their statements of claim, Claimants claimed periods of use from as early as April 1 to as late as November 1, attaching the Petrich Decree as the sole document supporting their period of use. Trout Unlimited objected to several of Claimants’ rights decreed in 43B’s Preliminary Decree. On summary judgment, the Water Court limited the periods of use from May 1 to July 15. Before trial, Claimants requested the Water Court generate implied claims.
Claimants testified they had not understood the Petrich Decree as decreeing a period of use but a right to water so long as it was available. The Water Court found from witness testimony that water was historically diverted outside of the Petrich Decree’s period of use and generated implied claims for use rights.
The Supreme Court agreed the Water Court had authority to generate use rights on finding Claimants had perfected those rights prior to July 1973. But the court erred when it failed to consider a stipulation made during the Petrich Decree litigation (agreeing water was available “no later than July 15”) and water diversion improvements made on Mill Creek. It also erred when it failed to give notice before generating the implied claims. The Court reversed and remanded, instructing the Water Court to more thoroughly consider when Claimants perfected their water rights and the effect the implied claims would have on other water users.
Points of Interest: water rights, water law
2026 MT 33
Bluebird Prop. Rentals, LLC v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC
A contract containing conflicting provisions both mandating a bench trial and allowing one party to compel arbitration is ambiguous. If Montana’s hierarchical framework for resolving ambiguity by determining the parties’ intent fails, the contract will be interpreted in favor of the non-drafting party’s interpretation.
WBL issued a business loan to Bluebird with an 84.57% APR secured by Bluebird’s real property. The loan was comprised of three agreements that contained both arbitration agreement provisions and jury waiver provisions. The arbitration agreement provision asserted parties “may choose to arbitrate any or all disputes. . . arising out of or relating to this Loan Agreement. . . .” One of the jury waivers stated, on a separate page in bold capitalized letters, that any disputes resulting from the Loan Documents “SHALL BE DECIDED BY TRIAL TO THE COURT WITHOUT A JURY.” Bluebird signed an acknowledgement below that text, but no acknowledgement was required under any of the arbitration provisions. Bluebird eventually defaulted and sued WBL, alleging WBL used a rent-a-bank scheme to evade Montana’s 15% usury cap. WBL moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The District Court denied the motion, concluding the arbitration provision was unenforceable because the ambiguous loan documents were intentionally misleading.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. Montana’s Constitution defines access to a trial by jury as a fundamental right, which may only be waived if done knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. While the Federal Arbitration Act encourages the scope of an arbitration agreement be resolved in favor of arbitration, the provision must still be found enforceable under state law. WBL’s contract language was susceptible to at least two reasonable but conflicting meanings. The contract itself, and later objective extrinsic evidence, could not determine the parties’ intent at the time of signing. Construing the ambiguous contract in favor of the non-drafting party, Bluebird could not have waived its fundamental right to jury trial.
Points of Interest: contracts, arbitration, waiver
2026 MT 32
Trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify via videoconference where the defendant’s actions delayed trial until such time as the witness’ personal circumstances prevented him from attending the trial in person and the trial court took steps to ensure the reliability of the witness’ testimony.
After learning that law enforcement was searching for a suspect in a stolen-vehicle incident, Maw discovered Johnson hiding in his garage. Johnson was subsequently apprehended and charged with several felonies. Prior to Johnson’s trial, Maw moved to Washington.
Before trial, the State moved to allow Maw to testify by live, two-way videoconference. It alleged: Johnson caused the trial’s delay and in the interim Maw relocated; Maw was 86 years old, the primary caregiver to young children, and his wife required his presence due to her health issues; Maw was eager to testify to hold Johnson accountable for his conduct; and it was impractical to secure Maw’s physical presence at trial. The District Court granted the motion over Johnson’s objection. A jury convicted Johnson of criminal mischief, burglary, and bail jumping.
The Supreme Court affirmed The Court clarified that, prior case law discussing the unavailability of a witness notwithstanding, the Confrontation Clause requires that remote testimony be (1) supported by case-specific findings that remote testimony is necessary to further an important public policy, and (2) the remote testimony does not impinge upon the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Here, the case-specific findings support the trial court’s determination that trial was delayed due to Johnson’s failure to appear, and Maw’s family circumstances, location, and travel difficulties prevented him from testifying in-person. Permitting Maw to testify remotely furthered an important public policy. Furthermore, the court took steps necessary to ensure that Maw’s testimony was reliable and the remote testimony thus did not impinge upon truth-seeking.
Points of Interest: remote witnesses, confrontation clause
2026 MT 31
District Court’s comments at sentencing criticizing the defendant for “wasting” court time for taking the case to trial and refusing to admit guilt illegally punished the defendant for exercising constitutional trial rights in violation of due process. Jail staff’s refusal to provide medication to Defendant before scheduled administration time, despite his demands, did not constitute outrageous government conduct warranting reversal because the defendant’s own actions disrupted his medication schedule.
While in custody at the CSKT detention center, Matt demanded he receive his medication from staff shortly before the 9:00 a.m. medication schedule. When he splashed water in a detention officer’s face, he was restrained by jail staff and began self-harming. Staff attempted to restrain him and Matt kicked an officer in the face. Matt was charged with Assault on a Peace Officer and convicted following a jury trial. At sentencing, the District Court criticized him for “wasting” court time and taxpayer money despite clear video evidence and further faulted him for refusing to take responsibility while maintaining his innocence. The District Court then sentenced him to 24 years in MSP.
The Supreme Court vacated Matt’s sentence and remanded for resentencing before a new judge. The District Court’s comments violated Matt’s right to due process by predicating his sentence on his exercise of his right to a jury trial and his right to maintain his innocence, rendering his sentence illegal. The Supreme Court affirmed Matt’s conviction, however, and declined to exercise plain error review of his treatment by CSKT detention center staff, finding Matt initiated the physical confrontation and disrupted the medication schedule. Thus, Matt could not demonstrate he experienced outrageous government conduct because law enforcement did not manufacture the crime or violate his constitutional rights.
Points of Interest: due process, sentencing, plain error review
2026 MT 30
State could not secure Defendant for trial because he was in federal custody for a separate offense. The resulting delay, and delay from untimely counsel substitutions, is attributable to Defendant’s conduct, creating no speedy trial violation.
Redd was found guilty of aggravated assault after severely injuring a child. When the State charged Redd, he was in federal custody for violating his supervised release. The State petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, but Redd remained in federal custody for several months until his federal sentence was revoked. After 91 days, Redd was made available for arrest by the State. 522 more days passed before Redd’s trial. During this time, Redd made multiple untimely motions and counsel substitutions which contributed to the delay. On appeal, Redd argued the District Court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial asserting the delay was mostly attributable to the State.
The Supreme Court found the speedy trial provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers did not apply because Redd was awaiting sentencing and not serving a sentence when the court issued the writ. The Court conducted its analysis under the speedy trial guarantees of the United States and Montana Constitutions and found that, although the 613‑delay was significant, most of the delay was attributable to Redd’s own conduct. Additionally, the Court concluded that Redd demonstrated insincerity in his desire for a speedy trial through untimely counsel substitution and failure to act in furtherance of a speedy trial.
Points of Interest: speedy trial
2026 MT 26
District Court abused its discretion by ignoring and reweighing evidence when substantial evidence supported administrative hearing findings that hospital selected the winning job candidate based on his interview performance.
Difolco, Spear, Martin, and two others applied for a Treatment Rehabilitation Manager position at Montana State Hospital. Although Difolco and Spear had bachelor’s degrees and prior experience in the field, MSH hired Martin based on his demonstrated management skills during the interview process.
Difolco and Spear filed claims with the Montana Human Rights Bureau, alleging MSH discriminated against them based on sex during the hiring process. After a contested case hearing, the administrative hearing officer concluded that although Difolco and Spear established prima facie cases of discrimination, they could not prove MSH used Martin’s interview performance as a hiring pretext. The Human Rights Commission affirmed. Spear and Difolco appealed to the District Court. The court determined five of the administrative findings were clearly erroneous and MSH’s hiring justification was pretext for discrimination.
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the District Court and reinstated the final agency decision. MAPA only grants a reviewing court authority to reverse an agency if it determines that the administrative findings lack substantial evidentiary support. Although MSH’s hiring process may have been imperfect, there was no evidence to suggest MSH was motivated by discriminatory animus. Uncontradicted witness testimony established that Martin outperformed Spear and Difolco during the interview process; therefore, MSH had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for hiring him. The District Court abused its discretion by ignoring and reweighing evidence that supported the agency’s findings.
Points of Interest: weight of evidence, abuse of discretion, administrative appeals
2026 MT 21
Atkinson v. City of Livingston
Ten-year statute of repose under § 27-2-208, MCA, barred Atkinsons’ negligence-based claims against the City for damages arising out of “expansive and collapsible” soils in their subdivision.
In 2012, the Atkinsons received a building permit from the City to construct a home on a lot in the Ridgeview Trails subdivision. The permit did not disclose a 2006 geotechnical evaluation identifying the subdivision soils as “expansive and collapsible,” requiring additional measures for stabilizing construction. In 2013, the City issued a “Statement of Substantial Completion,” indicating the Atkinsons’ residence complied with inspection requirements. In 2021, the Atkinsons observed cracking in their home which led to their 2024 lawsuit against the City for negligence and negligent misrepresentation, which they alleged arose out of the failure to disclose the 2006 report when inspecting and approving their new construction. The trial court dismissed the action on the City’s motion as time-barred by the § 27-2-208, MCA, 10-year statute of repose.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Based on the “gravamen” of Atkinsons’ complaint, the alleged negligent conduct arose out of the City’s “planning” and “inspection” of improvements to real property, bringing it within the conduct contemplated under § 27-2-208, MCA. Because the claim accrued upon the City’s issuance of the “Statement of Substantial Completion” in 2013, the Atkinsons’ 2024 complaint was beyond the 10-year statute of repose and thus time-barred.
Points of Interest: statute of repose, negligence, civil procedure
2026 MT 20
Because Father’s parental rights were appropriately terminated in a YINC proceeding, he lacked standing on appeal to bring an ICWA violation claim on behalf of Indian tribes related to tribal preferences for guardianships rather than terminations.
The Department removed Mother and Father’s children (both under the age of 2) after a report of methamphetamine use in the home. Both children are Indian children subject to ICWA, but the Department was unable to find an ICWA-compliant foster care placement and the children were placed into a noncompliant foster home, where the children remained for the next five years. Eventually, the Department petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights. At a hearing, tribal representatives explained the tribes generally preferred guardianships over termination of parental rights. The District Court terminated Mother’s parental rights at that time, but allowed Father more time to complete his treatment plan. Months later, after Father was facing felony charges, the Department again petitioned to terminate his parental rights. Tribal representatives did not participate at the termination hearing and the District Court terminated Father’s parental rights.
On appeal, Father asserted the District Court violated ICWA by not pursuing guardianship in accordance with the stated preferences of the children’s tribes. However, Father lacked standing to bring a claim related to a general tribal preference for guardianships because the termination of his parental rights was appropriate. In such a situation, the claim related to a tribal preference for guardianship belongs to the children and/or the tribes themselves. The tribes could have intervened to assert their interests related to guardianships, but instead only sporadically participated during the pendency of the case and did not seek to intervene at any point.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, ICWA, standing
2026 MT 19
Collins v. Whitefish Hous. Auth.
A party cannot structure its entire litigation strategy around a piece of evidence and then object to the evidence admittance at trial. Further, the statutory cap cannot be applied to these proceedings because the issue is not ripe for judicial review.
Collins left her job at the Whitefish Housing Authority because she felt unsupported by the WHA board after she was accused of preferentially treating certain tenants. Collins’ replacement participated in an interview with a reporter. The article published after the interview was titled “After scandal, Whitefish Housing Authority strives to rebuild trust.” The article, which was later republished and widely disseminated, stated that Collins had acted with malfeasance and engaged in unethical practices. Collins sued for defamation. WHA used the article throughout its pretrial preparation and listed it as an exhibit in the pretrial order. WHA then objected to the article’s admission on hearsay grounds at trial. The District Court admitted the article over objection. Further, the District Court did not apply statutory caps on damages in the award granted to Collins.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court rejected WHA’s argument that the District Court erred in admitting the article into evidence. WHA’s pretrial strategy had focused on the article and thus WHA consented to its introduction at trial. As to the question of whether the trial court erred by not applying the statutory cap to the damages awarded by the jury, the Court held the damages question was not ripe for judicial review because WHA’s insurer was not a party to the litigation and the claim between WHA and the insurer was ongoing.
Points of Interest: evidence, ripeness, hearsay
2026 MT 18
Trial court’s reference to a “change of circumstances” standard in its order denying Grandmother’s request for placement was not error where it applied the correct legal standard and determined deviation from the placement preference was warranted under the facts of the case.
Intervenor Grandmother sought placement of M.L.O.-L. with her instead of a foster family. However, M.L.O.-L.’s brother, who allegedly abused M.L.O.-L., lived with Grandmother. After hearing expert testimony that M.L.O.-L. had developed a strong attachment to her foster care provider, the court decided that departure from the statutory preference for kinship placement was in the child’s best interests and denied Grandmother’s placement request.
On appeal, Grandmother pointed to the court’s use of “change of circumstances” language in its order as evidence that the court applied the incorrect legal standard for departing from a kinship placement. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court referred to a change in circumstances in a different context and had, in fact, stated and applied the correct standard under §§ 41-3-450 and -451, MCA. Although relative placements are preferred under the statutes, a court may deviate from that statutory preference upon finding the child’s “extraordinary physical, mental, or emotional needs require a particular placement.” Where removing M.L.O.-L. from her foster placement would be detrimental to her mental and emotional health, deviation under §§ 41-3-450 and -451, MCA, was warranted.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, changed circumstances, foster placement
2026 MT 17
Admission of inadmissible hearsay text messages is not harmless error where the messages undermine a defendant’s credibility and support key elements of an offense.
In April 2022, Henderson was implicated in the removal of property from Zeman’s storage unit. Surveillance footage showed Henderson and a co-defendant accessing the unit and removing items multiple times. Zeman reported approximately $12,000 in missing property, most of which was recently purchased clothing. She testified extensively at trial regarding ownership and value, relying on a self-prepared list and presenting no receipts. Henderson maintained she had permission to access the unit, that she was retrieving her own belongings, and that any removal of Zeman’s property was inadvertent and largely returned. Over defense objection, the District Court admitted a series of text exchanges between Zeman and the co-defendant, which included accusations of theft and statements undermining Henderson’s version of events. A jury convicted Henderson of felony theft of property valued between $1,500 and $5,000.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The admitted text messages were inadmissible hearsay, as conceded by the State, and admission constituted reversible trial error. Applying the harmless error analysis from State v. Van Kirk, the error was not harmless because the State relied on the texts to establish key elements of the offense, including ownership, unauthorized control, and value of the property. The messages also bolstered the complaining witness’s credibility while undermining Henderson’s defense in what was essentially a credibility contest. Although Henderson admitted to removing some property, this admission did not establish the value element of felony theft. Because there was a reasonable possibility the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, the State failed to meet its burden of proving harmless error, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.
Points of Interest: hearsay, co-defendants, harmless error
2026 MT 16
Water Comm’r to Measure & Distribute Water on Beaver Creek Within
Bason 41I v. Dodge
District Court erroneously dismissed a dissatisfied water user complaint and affirmed the Water Commissioner’s distribution without considering whether she was administering water under the controlling decree.
Hoeffner, a Beaver Creek water rights holder, filed a dissatisfied water user complaint under § 85-5-301, MCA, alleging the new Water Commissioner was illegally reducing his water right. Years before, Hoeffner and his neighbors, who also have an equal-priority right on Beaver Creek, stipulated that the neighbors’ rights were subject to distribution under a 1973 conveyance by which they were created, but Hoeffner’s right was not similarly limited because it was created by a separate chain of title. The Water Court ordered the neighbors’ water rights claims amended to reflect the stipulation. In 2022, the Water Court issued a preliminary decree for Basin 41I which reflected these stipulation-based distribution restrictions.
During the 2024 irrigation season, the Water Commissioner began reducing Hoeffner’s water alongside his neighbors’, so Hoeffner complained to the District Court. The court concluded that Hoeffner was not a party to the 1973 conveyance creating the distribution restriction, and therefore could not enforce it, and that the Water Commissioner took appropriate management measures during times of low flow.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the District Court erroneously framed the dissatisfied water user complaint as a contract dispute. The proper legal framework was to decide whether the Water Commissioner was administering the Beaver Creek water rights under the controlling 2022 preliminary decree for the basin that incorporated the parties’ stipulations regarding distribution as reflected in their respective water rights claims abstracts. The Court remanded the matter for consideration of Hoeffner’s complaint under the correct legal standard.
Points of Interest: water law, water rights, contracts
2026 MT 15
Sufficient evidence supported conviction for obstruction of a peace officer where defendant, a bystander filming a traffic stop, was repeatedly asked to move further away, and defendant did not preserve a constitutional argument related to the obstruction charge.
Doman was riding his bicycle in Kalispell when he saw a vehicle that Officer Willey had pulled over. Doman stopped next to the vehicle, began filming with his cell phone, and gestured to the vehicle’s occupants to roll down the window. Officer Minaglia arrived to provide backup and asked Doman to move. Doman responded that he was engaging in protected activity under the First Amendment. Minaglia agreed but directed him to stand further back. Doman refused and began to argue, prompting Willey to assist Minaglia. Doman eventually began to back away while asking, “How far? How far, tyrant?” The officers arrested Doman and the City charged him with obstructing a peace officer.
At trial, Doman argued his activity did not obstruct the officers’ ability to conduct the traffic stop. The trial court instructed the jury that citizens have a First Amendment right to film a peace officer but this right is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. As provided in the statute, the court also instructed the jury, “It is no defense to a prosecution under this section that the peace officer was acting in an illegal manner, provided that the peace officer was acting under the peace officer’s official authority.” Doman did not ask the court to dismiss the obstruction charge or otherwise argue it violated his First Amendment rights. The jury found Doman guilty.
The Supreme Court held there was sufficient evidence to support Doman’s conviction. Although no one disputed Doman had a right to record the officers’ activities, Doman became increasingly aggressive and argumentative as Minaglia ordered him to back away. Willey had testified that Doman’s conduct took his attention “completely off of the traffic stop.” The Court did not consider Doman’s constitutional claims because he failed to raise them in the Municipal Court.
Points of Interest: sufficiency of evidence, 1st Amendment, obstruction
2026 MT 14
Trial court’s failure to sua sponte consider lesser-included mitigated deliberate homicide was not plain error where defendant did not request it and it would have contradicted the defendant’s denial defense.
At bench trial on the offense of deliberate homicide, the defendant’s theory was that he was not the shooter. He did not argue for or present any evidence to support findings on mitigation, extreme emotional stress, or any other lesser-included offense. The trial court found him guilty. The defendant asserted on appeal that the trial court committed plain, reversible error.
The Supreme Court declined to exercise plain error review. The trial court was not required to make a finding on mitigation sua sponte when no evidence would support it and when a lesser-included mitigated deliberate homicide theory contradicted the defendant’s denial defense.
Points of Interest: plain error review, lesser-included offense
2026 MT 13
West failed to show that the State prejudiced his substantial rights when it played an overlay video of two admitted exhibits during closing argument where the overlay video was not included in the record and thus could not be reviewed on appeal and where the available record supported the conclusion that the State’s use of the overlay video did not prejudice the defense.
After a pharmacy employee identified West as the person who demanded medication and then forced the pharmacy’s employees to hide in the bathroom while he fled, the State charged West with robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and possession of dangerous drugs.
At trial, the State played surveillance footage of the robber and of West entering a pawn shop. The court admitted both video exhibits into evidence without objection. The State informed the court that it intended to use an overlay of the two exhibits during closing argument to argue that the robber walked with a limp like West. West objected. The court reviewed the overlay and allowed the State to play it as an illustrative aid but did not admit it into evidence. Neither party requested that the overlay be put in the record for preservation purposes.
On appeal, West claimed that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he played the overlay video and argued that the underlying videos showed the same person. However, the Supreme Court could not review the overlay because it was not included in the record. Without speculating about the overlay’s contents, the Court concluded that, after reviewing the two admitted exhibits and the trial transcript, the State’s use of the overlay did not prejudice West’s defense. The District Court viewed the overlay before allowing the prosecutor to play it; the overlay consisted of two video exhibits that were admitted without objection; the court instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence; and West had the opportunity to rebut the State’s argument.
Points of Interest: evidence, record on appeal, prosecutorial misconduct
2026 MT 12
An officer did not unconstitutionally seize an individual by requesting his name and address because he possessed particularized suspicion to conduct an investigative stop for the offense of trespass.
Fish and Torres were asleep in a car outside a casino. Noticing the two had been asleep for several hours, a casino employee called the police and requested a welfare check and to ask the couple to leave the parking lot. Two deputies awoke Fish and Torres. After Fish informed one of the deputies that he was alright, the officer requested his name and date of birth. The deputy then relayed this information to dispatch, which then informed him of a possible warrant. The deputy requested dispatch to confirm the warrant’s existence. Once confirmed, the deputies arrested Fish, searched him incident to the arrest, and found a baggie containing less than 0.1 gram of methamphetamine in his possession.
The State charged Fish with felony possession. Fish moved to suppress on grounds that the deputies effectuated a Terry stop without sufficient justification by asking for his name absent a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. The court denied Fish’s motion. A jury found Fish guilty.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning the deputy possessed particularized suspicion justifying the request of Fish’s name and date of birth. The Court rejected Fish’s arguments that the deputies needed to either know Fish had previously refused to leave or intentionally disobeyed a “no trespassing” sign, and found such requirements would exceed the data necessary to justify a particularized suspicion.
Points of Interest: search and seizure, Terry stop, particularized suspicion
2026 MT 9A
Sapphire Coal. v. Ravalli Cnty.
Even though county subdivision regulations did not expressly require the county planning department to provide public notice before rendering decisions on subdivision exemption applications, the regulations require public notice and it would be an absurd result to interpret the regulations that notice after decision fulfilled the objective of allowing public comment.
The Ravalli County Subdivision Regulations require the County Planning Department to receive public comments on subdivision exemption applications, but the Regulations do not expressly require the Planning Department to provide notice before rendering a decision on the application. After the Department approved a subdivision exemption application without providing any notice, Sapphire Coalition sued the County, alleging the Department failed to comply with the Regulations by approving the subdivision exemption without providing notice. The District Court dismissed Sapphire’s complaint for failure to state a claim because it concluded the Regulations did not require the Department to provide notice.
The Supreme Court reversed. The County intended to incorporate public participation into the subdivision exemption application process by requiring the Department to receive public comments on exemption applications. The Court construed the County Regulations to require the Department to provide notice because it gave effect to the purpose of facilitating public participation through public comment. The Court rejected the County’s argument that the Regulations did not require the Department to provide notice because it would lead to an absurd result (i.e., the public cannot comment on matters they do not know about).
Points of Interest: property, local ordinances, notice
2026 MT 8
Thompson Chain of Lakes Stewardship Coal. v. Lincoln Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs
RV Park’s environmental assessment satisfied criteria of § 46-3-603, MCA, because it provided “available ground water information” and was not required to include information that was, at the time, still the subject of an ongoing hydrogeological study of the Thompson Chain of Lakes area.
After contested review, the Lincoln County Board of Commissioners approved a preliminary subdivision plat creating an RV and tent-camping park in the Thompson Chain of Lakes area. The Thompson Chain of Lakes Stewardship Coalition appealed the decision to district court, which affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, TCLSC argued the RV Park’s environmental assessment was deficient for failure to identify and describe area groundwater hydrology that would be affected by the development, and the County erred in approving the plat without considering the “specific, documentable, and clearly defined impact” of the development on area groundwater, among other things, as § 76-3-608, MCA, required.
The Supreme Court held that the environmental assessment was legally sufficient because it correctly identified no waters likely to be affected by the landlocked development. As for likely groundwater impacts, the Chain of Lakes area hydrology was the subject of an ongoing scientific study, years from completion, and that information was therefore not “available” yet for inclusion in the environmental assessment. Nor were the groundwater effects TCLSC alleged “specific, documentable, or clearly defined.” Because the County properly considered the statutory requirements of §§ 76-3-603 and -608, MCA, the Court affirmed its plat approval decision.
Points of Interest: natural resources, environmental law, property
2026 MT 4
Cooper v. Mont. Dep’t of Justice
Where the defendant pled guilty to an offense in North Dakota whose equivalent Montana statute did not trigger a duty to register, the defendant had no duty to register as a sexual offender after moving to Montana.
In 2017, Cooper was charged with Gross Sexual Imposition in North Dakota, a sexual offense including an element that the offender must be three or more years older than the victim. Cooper ultimately pled guilty to Sexual Assault, which does not contain an age element, and his plea agreement explicitly exempted him from a duty to register. In 2019, Cooper moved to Montana. The DOJ sent Cooper letter advising him that had a duty to register based on the 2019 statutes. Cooper petitioned for a writ of prohibition, which the District Court denied, agreeing with DOJ that Cooper had a duty to register based on the allegations raised in the charging documents.
The Supreme Court reversed. Because the sex offender registry requirements are punitive in nature, any facts triggering a duty to register must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted to by the defendant. Cooper did not admit to the age of the victim in his plea agreement, and it was the State’s burden to prove this fact. The relevant statutes were those in effect in 2017, when Cooper admitted to his offensive conduct, not 2019. Here, the relevant Montana statute triggering a duty to register contains a necessary age element, which is not contained in the North Dakota statute under which Cooper was convicted. Therefore, the two statutes are not reasonably equivalent to each other.
Points of Interest: SVORA, plea agreements
2026 MT 3
Medical malpractice claims were properly dismissed as time-barred where the original complaint was timely filed but never served on defendants and the “amended complaint” was filed after expiration of the limitations period.
Days before expiration of the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, Athy filed claims for personal injury arising from his mother’s illness and death while a resident of Defendants’ long-term memory care facility. Athy never served the complaint. A year later, he filed an “amended complaint,” which the District Court dismissed with prejudice as untimely.
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied Estate of Phillips, 2024 MT 174, and held that, because Athy’s original complaint was never served, it was subject to mandatory summary dismissal without prejudice under § 25-3-106, MCA. But, because Athy recommenced the action beyond the § 27-2-205(1), MCA, two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, his “amended complaint” was subject to dismissal with prejudice as time-barred. The Court remanded for further proceedings on two claims that were not medical malpractice claims.
The Court also rejected Athy’s relation-back arguments, holding that M. R. Civ. P. 15(c) would not operate to permit the “amended complaint” to relate back to the timely-filed original complaint where the original complaint was never served and defendants had no notice of the lawsuit.
Points of Interest: medical malpractice, statute of limitations, amended pleadings
2026 MT 2
Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen
Supreme Court upheld Attorney General’s determination that ballot initiative that would have defined “artificial person,” revoked all artificial person powers, and then allowed Legislature to regrant powers except for the right to engage in election or ballot issue activity violated the separate-vote requirement because it would have forced voters who supported the narrow goal to more broadly limit the rights of artificial persons in significant but unspecified ways.
TEI, proponents of BI-4, sought declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction after the Attorney General determined BI-4 was legally insufficient because it violated the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. BI-4 would have created a new section in Article XIII that would have revoked and regranted powers to artificial persons, prohibiting the reinstatement of the right to engage in election or ballot issue activity, and requiring the forfeit of all charter privileges if the artificial person engaged in such activity.
The Supreme Court upheld the Attorney General’s determination. BI-4 would have, at a minimum, effectuated two changes to the Montana Constitution. Although its intent was to prohibit artificial persons from having the power to spend money or anything of value on elections or ballot-issue activities, its effect would have been significantly broader, revoking all powers and privileges and then regranting only those that fell within BI-4’s definition of “artificial person powers.” BI-4 would have eliminated all artificial person powers upon enactment and artificial persons would have no powers until and unless the Legislature conferred them. Although BI-4 did not engage in “logrolling” as Article XIV, Section 11, prohibits, it would have forced voters who support the abolishing corporate spending on elections to, more broadly, limit the rights of corporations and other entities that fall within BI-4’s definition of “artificial persons” in significant but unspecified other ways.
Points of Interest: ballot initiatives, declaratory judgment, Art. XIV(11)
2026 MT 1
S.L. v Mont. Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct.
Minor who was charged in District Court via Information had right to substitute judge under § 3-1-804, MCA, prior to court ruling on whether to transfer the matter to Youth Court; filing the motion prior to arraignment was not premature.
S.L., a minor, appeared before the District Court after the State charged her with several felonies. She was not arraigned at that hearing and the court set a future hearing to determine whether S.L.’s case should be transferred to Youth Court. The court further ruled that an evaluation would be completed prior to the transfer hearing. The court issued a written order but it was misfiled in another case. S.L. then moved to substitute judge under § 3-1-804, MCA. The court then filed its evaluation order under the correct cause number. The court denied the motion without prejudice, explaining that it would grant substitution if the case remained in District Court after the transfer hearing.
S.L. petitioned for writ of supervisory control under M. R. App. P. 14(3)(c), arguing that the District Court lacked the authority to deny her motion to substitute and that the order for evaluation was void because the court lacked the authority to issue it once she moved to substitute.
The Supreme Court granted the writ. Although the District Court maintained S.L. could not move to substitute because substitution is prohibited in Youth Court actions, S.L.’s case remained a pending criminal case in the District Court at the time she moved to substitute. Because the State charged S.L. via information, the Youth Court did not have jurisdiction at that juncture. The Court further rejected the State’s argument that S.L.’s substitution motion was untimely because it was prematurely filed prior to arraignment. The substitution rule is intended to allow substitution prior to a ruling on a “substantial matter,” and the question of whether to transfer to Youth Court is such. However, S.L.’s request to vacate the evaluation order was denied because it was issued, albeit misfiled, prior to S.L. moving to substitute and thus the District Court had the authority to issue the order at that time.
Points of Interest: supervisory control, substitution, Youth Court