|
No.
96-610
IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1997
MARGARET EPPERSON,
Petitioner
and Respondent,
v.
WILLIS
CORROON ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES CORPORATION,
Respondent
and Appellant,
ST.
PETER'S COMMUNITY HOSPITAL,
Employer.
APPEAL
FROM:
Workers'
Compensation Court, State of Montana
The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL
OF RECORD:
For
Appellant:
Norman
H. Grosfield
Utick & Grosfield,
Helena, Montana
For
Respondent:
Joe
Seifert
Keller, Reynolds, Drake, Johnson & Gillespie
Helena, Montana
Submitted
on Briefs: January 9, 1997
Decided:
March 11, 1997
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Willis Corroon Administrative Services Corporation (Corroon),
appeals from the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court
finding respondent, Margaret Epperson's (Epperson), request for
hearing as timely. We affirm.
We address the
following issue on appeal:
Does an Order of Determination only become "final" under
39-72-612, MCA, once an administrative review has been
completed or once the time for seeking review has
expired?
BACKGROUND
In 1993, Epperson,
a long-time employee of St. Peter's
Hospital, began working as a nurse in a newly constructed wing of
the hospital. Over the next two years, Epperson developed upper
respiratory symptoms including, cough, nasal congestion, shortness
of breath, and watery eyes. In May of 1995, Epperson's physician,
Dr. Earl Book, released her from work. In June of 1995, Epperson,
without an attorney, filed a claim for occupational disease
benefits. After receiving Epperson's claim, the Department of
Labor & Industry (the Department), directed Epperson to submit to
a medical examination. In September of 1995, Epperson submitted to
a medical examination conducted by Dr. Michael Sadaj (Dr. Sadaj) to
determine if she suffered from an occupational disease. Although
Dr. Sadaj did not find that Epperson had an occupational disease,
he recommended further testing. Following this examination, the
Department issued an "order referring copy of medical reports to
parties" which indicated that Epperson's occupational disease claim
would be denied. This order also notified Epperson of her right to
a second examination.
Epperson did not
request a second examination and on November
27, 1995, the Employment Relations Division (ERD) issued an "order
of determination" which denied her claim. This order also notified
Epperson of a right to request a hearing within 20 days and stated:
Pursuant to 39-72-612, MCA, the parties are hereby
notified a party adversely affected by this Order of
Determination has twenty (20) days from the date of this
Order to request a hearing before the Department of Labor
& Industry Legal Division.
The November 27,
1995, order also explained that failing to request
a hearing would make the order final.
Epperson did not request a hearing within 20 days. However,
after consulting with counsel, Epperson requested a hearing in
January of 1996. The insurer, Corroon, moved to dismiss this
request as untimely and a Department hearing officer agreed and
dismissed the case. Epperson appealed this decision to the
Workers' Compensation Court which overruled the hearing officer's
decision and remanded the case for a hearing on the merits.
In its holding, the Workers' Compensation Court found that the
hearing officer erred in dismissing Epperson's claim because the
Department's November, 1995 order was not a "final" order of
determination within the meaning of 39-72-612, MCA. The Workers'
Compensation Court explained that a Department order does not
become final until after the Commissioner has completed her
administrative review or after the time for seeking review expires.
The court held that the time for seeking administrative review was
90 days and Epperson had filed her request within that time period.
DISCUSSION
Does an Order
of Determination only become "final" under
39-72-612, MCA, once an administrative review has been
completed or once the time for seeking review has
expired?
In reviewing
Workers' Compensation Court decisions, we review
the findings of fact to determine if they are supported by
substantial, credible evidence and we review conclusions of law to
determine if they are correct. Turjan v. Valley View Estates
(1995), 272 Mont. 386, 390, 901 P.2d 76, 79 (citing Caekaert v.
State Comp. Mut. Ins. Fund (1994), 268 Mont. 105, 111, 885 P.2d
495, 498). As this case exclusively deals with a single question
of law, we will review the Workers' Compensation Court's conclusion
of law to determine if it was correct.
In this appeal,
Corroon contends that Epperson failed to
request a hearing within the 20-day limit imposed by 39-72-
612(1), MCA. Section 39-72-612(1), MCA, states:
(1) Within 20 days after the department has issued its
order of determination as to whether the claimant is
entitled to benefits under this chapter, a party may
request a hearing. In order to perfect an appeal to the
workers' compensation judge, the appealing party shall
request a hearing before the department. The department
shall grant a hearing, which may be conducted by
telephone or by videoconference. The department's final
determination may not be issued until after the hearing.
This section establishes
the time frame within which to request a
hearing. An untimely request for hearing must be dismissed. Cf.
First Security Bank of Havre v. Harmon (1992), 255 Mont. 168, 172,
841 P.2d 521, 524 (time limits fixed for appeal are mandatory and
jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal within the time
allowed requires dismissal of the appeal).
Epperson sought
to avoid the consequences of the above statute
by arguing that she should receive the benefit of the more liberal
90-day time frame for requesting a hearing under the Department's
administrative regulations. Section 24.29.215(2), ARM (1987).
While recognizing that Epperson had properly read 24.29.215(2)
ARM (1987), (read in conjunction with 24.29.207(6), ARM (1983))
as granting her 90 days to request a hearing, the Workers'
Compensation Court rejected this argument noting that this 90-day
provision conflicts with the 20-day statutory period for requesting
a hearing under 39-72-612 MCA. The Department cannot adopt
regulations contrary to or conflicting with an express statute,
Bick v. Montana Department of Justice (1986), 224 Mont. 455, 457,
730 P.2d 418, 420. Thus, since the administrative grant of a 90-
day period within which to request a hearing directly conflicts
with the statutory limit of 20 days, the administrative regulation
is void as applied to an occupational disease determination.
Michels v. Dept. of Social & Rehab. Services (1980), 187 Mont. 173,
177, 609 P.2d 271, 273.
The court then
focused on the provisions of subsection (1) of
24.29.215, ARM (1987), which provides as follows:
(1) A party seeking administrative review under ARM
24.29.206 must make a written request for administrative
review to the division [Department] within ninety days of
notice of adverse action.
Contrary to subsection
(2) which pertains to requests for hearings,
subsection (1) pertains to requests for administrative review.
Requests for administrative review do not conflict with the
"request for hearing" language of 39-72-612, MCA, and thus
subsection (1), unlike subsection (2), is not void.
The Workers' Compensation
Court reasoned, as we agree, that
the Department's November 27th order was not an order of
determination within the meaning of 39-72-612, MCA. This section
refers to the Department and "its order of determination." As
the
court noted, "[t]he quoted section connotes finality, with a
hearing as the next recourse. The order contemplated by the
section is the last and final order issued by the Department
without hearing, and not some initial or non-final order." In this
case, ERD's November 27, 1995 Order of Determination was not a
final order so long as it was subject to administrative review
without a hearing under subsection (1) of 24.29.215, ARM (1987).
"Administrative review" is an informal review of "any division
[Department] order" by the Commissioner of Labor or her designee
and is governed by 24.29.206, ARM (1983).
Under 24.29.215(1),
ARM (1987), Epperson had 90 days from
the November 27, 1995 "adverse action" to request an administrative
review. Epperson's January 30, 1996, request was filed 64 days
after the ERD's order, well within that 90-day time period.
Epperson's January 30, 1996, filing was both a request for a
hearing and, effectively, a waiver of her right to seek
administrative review. With her right to administrative review
having been waived, the ERD order became final on January 30, 1996,
and her appeal was timely under 39-72-612, MCA, since it was
filed that same date.
The ERD notice
to Epperson of its November 27, 1995 order
erroneously stated that a failure to request a hearing within 20
days would make the order final. We hold that under 39-72-612,
MCA, the 20-day period for requesting a hearing does not commence
until the order is "final" and that an order is not final until
the
Commissioner has completed her administrative review or until the
time for seeking review expires.
Affirmed.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM REGNIER
|
