

MINUTES

**MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
52nd LEGISLATURE - REGULAR SESSION**

COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

Call to Order: By Chairman Bill Strizich, on January 11, 1991,
at 8 a.m.

ROLL CALL

Members Present:

Bill Strizich, Chairman (D)
Vivian Brooke, Vice-Chairman (D)
Arlene Becker (D)
William Boharski (R)
Dave Brown (D)
Robert Clark (R)
Paula Darko (D)
Budd Gould (R)
Royal Johnson (R)
Vernon Keller (R)
Thomas Lee (R)
Bruce Measure (D)
Charlotte Messmore (R)
Linda Nelson (D)
Jim Rice (R)
Jessica Stickney (D)
Howard Toole (D)
Tim Whalen (D)
Diana Wyatt (D)

Members Excused: Rep. Russell

Staff Present: John MacMaster Legislative Council Staff Attorney
Jeanne Domme, Committee Secretary

Please Note: These are summary minutes. Testimony and
discussion are paraphrased and condensed.

HEARING ON HB #113
REVISE DEFINITION OF WITHOUT CONSENT FOR RAPE

Presentation and Opening Statement by Sponsor:

REP. LEE stated this bill is to enact and define the term "force"
as it relates to sexual intercourse without consent and deviate
sexual conduct.

Proponents' Testimony:

John Conner, Dept. of Justice, appearing on behalf of the Montana County Attorney Association. This bill was requested by the Montana County Attorney's Association to correct a problem in the law relating what constitutes consent in cases of sexual intercourse without consent and to deviate sexual conduct. The problem this bill addresses arose as a result of a case that was prosecuted in Judith Basin County. The case was State of Montana vs. Gerald Roy Thompson. It was regarding a principal telling a student if she didn't perform oral sex on him, she would not graduate. He was charged with two counts of sexual intercourse without consent as a result of these threats. The motion was made in the District Court by the defense to dismiss the case on grounds that the allegations relating to the defense did not fall within the statutory definition of "without consent". The court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the case. It was found that the term "force" in its usual connotation implies physical compulsion or immediate threat to bodily harm or injury and that was not present in this case.

We looked at language that serves to define the terms "force" and threat from other states. We believe that this bill addresses these concerns and problems pointed out by the Thompson case and serves to correct inequitable situations that appear in this statute dealing with a very serious and devastating act of violence.

Amy Pfeifer, Secretary-Treasurer, Women's Section, State Bar of Montana, gave written testimony. EXHIBIT 1

Diane Sands, Executive Director of the Montana Women's Lobby, gave written testimony. EXHIBIT 2

Opponents' Testimony: none

Questions From Committee Members:

REP. BOHARSKI asked John Conner where "commission of another crime by the offender" in Sec. 1 came from and why it should be appropriate to this case? The original language seems to be more appropriate here. Mr. Conner said the language means that bodily injury, per se, is not a crime, but in a crime in which there is some attempted bodily injury or any other attempt of direct action. It is not directed to situations of someone stealing a car or something of that nature. We would agree to correct that section to make it more precise.

REP. TOOLE asked Mr. Conner if the "threat of retaliatory" language will cause any dilemmas for prosecutors? Mr. Conner said it depends on the gravity of retaliation. We are worried about limiting the opportunity for people to be charged in situations where it might be appropriate.

REP. MEASURE asked Mr. Conner if there are provisions within the law that you are aware of that would allow prosecution of individuals for intimidation? Mr. Conner said there is a felony intimidation statute that is very difficult to obtain a conviction on. The language is fairly broad and not very often used.

REP. MEASURE asked Mr. Conner if he was aware what that penalty is? Mr. Conner said he thought it was ten years. The statute in this bill has a penalty of 40 years.

Closing by Sponsor:

REP. LEE stated there is a victim that has not received justice because of the language of this bill. It is imperative that we not allow this particular type of situation to continue to be unaddressed.

EXECUTIVE ACTION ON HB #113

Motion: REP. BOHARSKI MOVED HB 113 DO PASS.

Discussion:

REP. BOHARSKI stated he was worried about the language in Section 1 reading "commission of another crime by the offender". He asked John MacMaster if that language would change the meaning of the bill. Mr. MacMaster said it would not.

Motion: REP. TOOLE made a substitute motion to amend HB 113 by deleting subsection C of section 1.

Motion: REP. BROOKE made a substitute motion to amend HB 113 by deleting subsection C of section 1 and include the words "significant" or "substantial".

Discussion:

REP. MEASURE stated even the words significant or substantial are open to interpretational as a retaliatory action. There are other areas of law to address this.

Vote: Motion carried.

Motion: REP. LEE MOVED HB 113 DO PASS AS AMENDED.

Discussion:

REP. WHALEN asked John MacMaster how the intimidation statute reads? John MacMaster read the intimidation statute to the committee. REP. WHALEN asked John MacMaster if the committee should add the word "rape" to the intimidation statute and leave

the rest of the bill as is. John MacMaster said the committee could go into the intimidation statute and amend it to say if a person intimidates somebody into doing something, this is the penalty, and if that something is to submit to a sexual act, the penalty will be greatly enhanced.

REP. JOHNSON said he felt the people who attempted to put this statute together understood it very well. Those of us who are not in the legal fraternity can't understand it as well and we should pass the law as it was written.

REP. BOHARSKI stated, "We are dealing with some of the most emotional cases to come into a court room. The committee should spend the extra time to get the language in the bill exactly the way we want it in order to keep a prosecutor from swaying a jury one way or the other."

Motion: REP. BOHARSKI moved to amend HB 113 by deleting the words "another crime by the defender" and insert the words "a forcible felony" on line 23.

Discussion:

REP. BROOKE asked Mr. Conner if they agree to this proposed amendment. Mr. Conner said yes.

Motion: Motion carried.

Motion/Vote: REP. TOOLE MOVED HB 113 DO PASS AS AMENDED. Motion carried.

HEARING ON HB #69

REVISE ESTABLISHMENT, NUMBER, SALARY, ELEC. OF MUNI. CT. JUDGES

Presentation and Opening Statement by Sponsor:

REP. WHALEN stated this bill provides a mechanism for Municipal Courts around the state.

Proponents' Testimony:

Larry Herman, City Judge of the City of Laurel, gave written testimony for HB #69. EXHIBIT 3

Opponents' Testimony: NONE

Information Testimony:

Patricia Bradley, Lobbyist for the Montana Magistrates Association, gave written testimony for HB #69. EXHIBIT 4

Questions From Committee Members:

REP. CLARK asked Mr. Herman if the Court of Record in the State of Montana requires the defendants to be represented by an attorney? Mr. Herman said no. Anyone can represent themselves in any court. In Municipal Court and City Court defendants represent themselves 90 - 95% of the time.

REP. MESSMORE asked Mr. Herman what type of cases does a Municipal Court hear? Mr. Herman said DUI's, reckless driving, assault, domestic abuse, and civil cases up to \$3500.00.

REP. BOHARSKI asked Mr. Herman if a Municipal Court Judge has to be an attorney? Mr. Herman said yes he does.

Closing by Sponsor:

REP. WHALEN stated that this bill is optional. Cities do not have to establish a Municipal Court Judge. It provides some incentive for a city to establish a Municipal Court Judge.

EXECUTIVE ACTION ON HB #69.

Motion: REP. WHALEN MOVED HB 69 DO PASS.

Motion/Vote: REP. WHALEN moved to amend HB 69 by changing the time of election to be in the same manner as Judicial Court elections, but the timing of election can be with all the Municipal elections. Motion carried.

Motion: REP. DARKO MOVED HB 69 DO PASS AS AMENDED.

Discussion:

REP. BOHARSKI asked John MacMaster if section 2 sub 2 takes away our concern about a non-attorney serving as judge in a District Court? Mr. MacMaster said the section states as city judge whose office is abolished shall serve as municipal court judge. I would recommend amending line 10 to insert "if qualified" after the word shall.

Motion: REP. BOHARSKI moved to amend HB 69 with John MacMaster's amendment.

REP. MEASURE stated if amended that way it would kick a sitting city judge out in the middle of his term and you put a city in position of holding election in mid-term.

Motion: REP. MEASURE made a substitute motion to amend HB 69 by providing language that if a City Judge office is abolished he shall serve as a city judge until such time as his term expires,


at which time a Municipality that has adopted a Municipal Court judge position will hold an election to elect a Municipal Court Judge qualified under the provision of this section.

Vote: Motion carried 16 to 4. EXHIBIT 5


Motion: REP. DARKO MOVED HB 69 DO PASS AS AMENDED. Motion carried 16 to 4. EXHIBIT 6

ADJOURNMENT

Adjournment: 9:40 a.m.



BILL STRIZICH, Chairman



JEANNE DOMME, Secretary

BS/jmd

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

ROLL CALL

DATE 1-11-91

NAME	PRESENT	ABSENT	EXCUSED
REP. VIVIAN BROOKE, VICE-CHAIR	/		
REP. ARLENE BECKER	/		
REP. WILLIAM BOHARSKI	/		
REP. DAVE BROWN	/		
REP. ROBERT CLARK	/		
REP. PAULA DARKO	/		
REP. BUDD GOULD	/		
REP. ROYAL JOHNSON	/		
REP. VERNON KELLER	/		
REP. THOMAS LEE	/		
REP. BRUCE MEASURE	/		
REP. CHARLOTTE MESSMORE	/		
REP. LINDA NELSON	/		
REP. JIM RICE	/		
REP. ANGELA RUSSELL			/
REP. JESSICA STICKNEY	/		
REP. HOWARD TOOLE	/		
REP. TIM WHALEN	/		
REP. DIANA WYATT	/		
REP. BILL STRIZICH, CHAIRMAN	/		


5:05 PM
11/11/91
LWS

STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT

January 11, 1991

Page 1 of 1

Mr. Speaker: We, the committee on Judiciary report that House Bill 113 (first reading copy -- white) do pass as amended .

Signed: 
Bill Strizich, Chairman

And, that such amendments read:

1. Page 1, line 23.
Strike: "another crime"
Insert: "a forcible felony"

2. Page 2, line 3.
Following: "threat of"
Insert: "significant or substantial"

STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT

January 11, 1991

Page 1 of 1

Mr. Speaker: We, the committee on Judiciary report that House Bill 69 (first reading copy -- white) do pass as amended.

Signed: 
Bill Strizich, Chairman

And, that such amendments read:

1. Page 2, line 4.

Following: "cases."

Insert: "If a city judge is not an attorney and his office is abolished because a municipal court is established, the ordinance must provide that the time when the establishment of the municipal court takes effect is the date on which the municipal court judge elected at the next election held under 3-6-201 begins his term of office."

2. Page 2, line 10.

Strike: "A"

Insert: "Except as provided in 3-6-101(2), a"

3. Page 2, line 22.

Following: "13-1-104"

Insert: "(2)"

4. Page 3, line 1.

Strike: "All"

Insert: "Except as provided in subsection (2), all"

5:05 pm
1/11/91
lme

1-11-91
Exhibit 1

EXHIBIT 1
DATE 1-11-91
HB 113

January 11, 1990

To: House Judiciary Committee
From: K. Amy Pfeifer, Secretary-Treasurer, Women's Section,
State Bar of Montana on behalf of Women's Section
Re: House Bill 113 - An Act to Define the Term "Force" as it
Relates to Sexual Intercourse Without Consent and to
Deviate Sexual Conduct

The Women's Section of the State Bar of Montana supports HB 113. The need for a definition of the term "force" was brought to the attention of the Women's Section of the State Bar and the public with the Montana Supreme Court's decision in State of Montana v. Gerald Roy Thompson, 47 St. Rptr. 1065, decided May 24, 1990.

The following information is presented when reviewing that case and its' district court history. In May 1989 Gerald Roy Thompson was charged in Judith Basin County with two counts of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of sexual assault. Mr. Thompson was principal and boys basketball coach of Hobson High School. The charges stem from the allegations of a former high school student at Hobson High, since graduated, who alleged that on more than one occasion while she was a student, Mr. Thompson forced her to engage in oral sexual intercourse by threatening that she would not graduate from high school. The affidavits supporting the charges alleged that the threats caused the victim great psychological pain and fear.

Mr. Thompson moved in the district court to dismiss the two charges of sexual intercourse without consent, arguing that the state had failed to state an offense. This argument was based upon reference to the definition of "without consent" which, in pertinent part, provides that the term means the victim is compelled to submit by force or threat of imminent death, bodily injury, or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone. The word "force" is not defined in MCA §§ 45-5-501, 45-5-503, or 45-5-505, but the district court adopted as a definition, by stating that it is used in its ordinary and normal connotation, "physical compulsion, the use or immediate threat of bodily harm, injury."

The district court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the two counts of sexual intercourse without consent. In so dismissing, the district court stated that the threat must be a threat of death or imminent bodily injury; that psychological impact is not sufficient, although it commented that "maybe it should be."

The state appealed the dismissal of these two counts of sexual intercourse without consent. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, again looking to the specific definition of "without consent", and adopting the district court's definition of "force" as requiring

Ex. 1

1-11-91

HB 113

physical compulsion, or use or threat of bodily harm; injury. The court stated that it agreed that Mr. Thompson intimidated the victim, and that "until the legislature adopts a definition of the word 'force', we must adopt the ordinary and normal definition of the word 'force' as set forth by the District Court."

The court also sent a message to the legislature to take a look at this problem when it stated,

The alleged facts, if true, show disgusting acts of taking advantage of a young person by an adult who occupied a position of authority over the young person. If we could rewrite the statutes to define the alleged acts here as sexual intercourse without consent, we would willingly do so. The business of the courts, however, is to interpret statutes, not to rewrite them, nor to insert words not put there by the legislature.

A copy of the Montana Supreme Court opinion is attached.

A number of states have broadened their definitions of force or coercion to include a threat of retaliatory action, a threat to harm a third person, or to commit a criminal act against the victim in the future. Included within this list are the states of Virginia, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, California, Minnesota and New York.

The Women's Section of the State Bar of Montana believes that HB 112 offers to Montana's citizens the best of the criminal law protections offered by all these states. We hope you agree, as we believe the citizens of this state do, that the type of behavior alleged in the Thompson case is rape, sexual intercourse without consent. The Women's Section of the State Bar of Montana wholeheartedly urges the passage of HB 112.

STATE REPORTER
Box 749
Helena, Montana 59624
VOLUME 47
No. 89-533

Ex. 1
1-11-91
HB 113
p. 1065-1070

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff & Appellant,

v.

Submitted: Feb. 22, 1990

Decided: May 24, 1990

GERALD ROY THOMPSON,

Defendant & Respondent.

CRIMINAL LAW, Sexual Intercourse Without Consent and Sexual Assault, Appeal by State from dismissal of Counts I and II for lack of probable cause in the supporting affidavit. The Supreme Court held:

1. The element of "without consent" is satisfied if submission of the victim is obtained either by force or by threat of imminent death, bodily injury, or kidnapping. No other circumstances relating to force or threat eliminate consent under the statute.

2. A threat that eventually leads to psychological impairment is not sufficient under the statute.

Appeal from the Tenth Judicial District Court, Judith Basin County, Hon. Peter J. Rapkoch, Judge

For Appellant: Mark Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, Helena
Patti Powell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena
Sarah Arnott, Judith Basin County Atty., Stanford

For Respondent: Torger Oaas, Attorney at Law, Lewistown

Submitted on briefs.

Opinion by Justice Sheehy; Chief Justice Turnage and Justices Harrison, Hunt and McDonough concur.

Affirmed.

____ Mont. ____

____ P.2d ____

MONTANA WOMEN'S LOBBY

P.O. Box 1099

Helena, MT 59624

406/449-7917

1-11-91
Exhibit 2

House Judiciary
EXHIBIT 2
DATE 1-11-91
HB 113

HOUSE BILL 113
RECOMMEND: DO PASS

1/11/91

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, my name is Diane Sands, Executive Director of the Montana Women's Lobby. We rise in support of HB 113.

The technical provisions of this bill have been addressed by those who have gone before me. This needed addition to the definition of "force" is one of several changes in the Sexual Crimes section of MCA that the Montana Women's Lobby will be supporting this session. We urge adoption of HB113 on behalf of 2 of our constituencies. First, the rape crisis programs across the state that provide services to victims. Secondly, we urge adoption on behalf of the victims of sexual crimes. One in three women and one in five men are victims of a sexual assault during their lifetime. I wish I could tell you that passing this law will change those statistics, but it will not. What it will do, however, is expand the likelihood that a few more perpetrators will be brought to justice. That end result is a worthy one. We urge your support of HB 113.

1-11-91

EXHIBIT 3
DATE 1-11-91
HB 109

TESTIMONY HOUSE BILL 69

LARRY D. HERMAN

My name is Larry Herman. I am the incumbent city judge of the City of Laurel. I am a former mayor, alderman, and city attorney of the City of Laurel. I am a practicing attorney and the vice chairman of the commission on courts of limited jurisdiction. I am appearing in support of House Bill 69.

The municipal court is not a new court. It was first provided for by the legislature in 1935 as a court of record in cities. There is presently only one municipal court established in the state which is in Missoula. The cities have generally not adopted the municipal court because of the costs that were associated with maintaining a court reporter. Also with the passage of the 1972 constitution there was some concern whether or not the appeal from the municipal court was as trial anew. This bill addresses these problems. The passage of the bill will prove to be beneficial to the cities and their respective counties and district courts.

The problem associated with the cost of a court reporter for limited courts of record has been eliminated with the advent of the tape recorder and other electronic media. A record can now be maintained in the municipal court by means of a relatively inexpensive electronic recorder. This is the method that is now being used in the Missoula Municipal court.

The problem associated with the appeal from a limited court of record to the district court has been addressed in this bill. The record on appeal will be confined to the record and questions of law and not tried a second time in the district court. The bill provides the district court with sufficient latitude to provide justice and could if the appeal warranted it order a new trial. The district court would be able to hear appeals on orders of the municipal court. Under present law the only recourse is to seek a writ of supervisory control from the supreme court or a writ of mandamus.

By confining the appeal to the record, the municipal court will not be used as a discovery court and then appealed to the district court to be tried anew.

The saving to the cities will be in the elimination of the additional expenses incurred in a trial anew, that is excessive police hours to attend trial (usually overtime), city attorney or prosecutors time to try cases a second time, public defender hours to try a case a second time, witness fees, and jury costs. The district court's case load will be eased because the pressure to try misdemeanors within 6 months will not clog the dockets. The district court will be able to dispose of the appeals from the municipal court and devote more time to pressing felony and civil matters.

Under this bill the cities as they grow will be able to increase the number of judges needed to operate the municipal court. Presently the cities can have only one city or municipal judge. This allows for growth and a more efficient court in the large cities. The courts in some cities are under heavy pressure due to their case loads, this in turn places

pressure upon the district courts. This bill will save time for city/municipal judges, district court judges, prosecutors, and public defenders.

This bill eliminates the provision that the clerk of the city must be the clerk of court. This provision had applied to both city and municipal courts. It certainly was not a duty which most city clerks wanted in light of all of their other duties. However the bill does not prohibit a city clerk from being the clerk of the court.

This bill does not increase or decrease the jurisdiction of the municipal courts. It remains the same as city courts. The difference being that the municipal court being a court of record and is appealable on the record. Nor does this bill change the qualifications for a municipal court judge.

Local government, in particular in the more densely populated counties, need a means of operating their courts in a more economical manner and should not be required to wait 5 years or even 2 years when an immediate result can be had under this bill. The establishment of the municipal court under this bill will provide immediate relief to the cities with a high volume case load and to their respective counties and district courts through the saving of pure dollars and cents. This bill makes good sense.

This bill makes good dollars and cents for both the cities and their respective counties. I would urge this committee to give it a close review in light of the savings by the elimination of man hours of the police, prosecuting attorneys, and district court judges needed in handling two trials instead of one.

Keep in mind that this bill does not mandate a municipal court, but provides a means a city may use to reduce the costs of its courts and the appeals to the district court. This bill does make good sense, and I urge this committee to recommend its passage and approval.

Edmond
1-11-91

EXHIBIT 4
DATE 1-11-91
HB 69

January 11, 1991 BEFORE THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

Concerning HB 69, An act revising provisions regarding the establishment of municipal court judges.

Testimony of Patricia Bradley, Lobbyist for the Montana Magistrates Assn.

Mr. Chairman, Members of Committee:

The Montana Magistrates Assn. is neither for nor against this bill, but view it as perhaps premature at this time, and possibly unnecessary eventually, for the following reason:

New Section 6 of this bill calls for the record on appeal to consist of an electronic recording or stenographic transcription of the case tried. We are aware of potential legislation being considered for filing this session that would provide for all courts of limited jurisdiction to use electronic recordings, such as courts now use in Small Claims matters, and which are reviewed on appeal. This would allow Justice and City courts the same appeal process, without trial de novo, as is being proposed in this legislation, HB 69.

We contend it would be more expensive for cities to operate municipal courts rather than city courts, but, of course, that option rests with the city.

We suggest holding any action on HB 69 until the aforementioned legislation can be reviewed to compare the merits of the apparent primary intent of Bill 69, the appeal process.

Thank you.



Patricia Bradley, MMA

EXHIBIT 5
DATE 1-11-91
HB 69

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

ROLL CALL VOTE

DATE 1-11-91 BILL NO. HB 69 NUMBER _____

MOTION: Rep. Darko moved Do Pass As Amended

NAME	AYE	NO
REP. VIVIAN BROOKE, VICE-CHAIR	/	
REP. ARLENE BECKER	/	
REP. WILLIAM BOHARSKI	/	
REP. DAVE BROWN	/	
REP. ROBERT CLARK		/
REP. PAULA DARKO	/	
REP. BUDD GOULD		/
REP. ROYAL JOHNSON	/	
REP. VERNON KELLER		/
REP. THOMAS LEE	/	1
REP. BRUCE MEASURE		/
REP. CHARLOTTE MESSMORE	/	
REP. LINDA NELSON	/	
REP. JIM RICE	/	
REP. ANGELA RUSSELL	/	
REP. JESSICA STICKNEY	/	
REP. HOWARD TOOLE	/	
REP. TIM WHALEN	/	
REP. DIANA WYATT	/	
REP. BILL STRIZICH, CHAIRMAN	/	
TOTAL	16	4

EXHIBIT 69
 DATE 1-11-91
 HB 69

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

ROLL CALL VOTE

DATE 1-11-91 BILL NO. HB 69 NUMBER _____

MOTION: Rep. Measure moved a substitute motion to amend 69.

NAME _____ AYE _____ NO _____

REP. VIVIAN BROOKE, VICE-CHAIR		/
REP. ARLENE BECKER	/	
REP. WILLIAM BOHARSKI		/
REP. DAVE BROWN	/	
REP. ROBERT CLARK		/
REP. PAULA DARKO	/	
REP. BUDD GOULD	/	
REP. ROYAL JOHNSON	/	
REP. VERNON KELLER	/	
REP. THOMAS LEE	/	
REP. BRUCE MEASURE	/	
REP. CHARLOTTE MESSMORE	/	
REP. LINDA NELSON	/	
REP. JIM RICE		/
REP. ANGELA RUSSELL	/	
REP. JESSICA STICKNEY	/	
REP. HOWARD TOOLE	/	
REP. TIM WHALEN	/	
REP. DIANA WYATT	/	
REP. BILL STRIZICH, CHAIRMAN	/	
TOTAL	16	4

VISITORS' REGISTER

House Judiciary

COMMITTEE

BILL NO.

113

DATE

Jan - 11, 1991

SPONSOR

Rep. Lee

NAME (please print)	RESIDENCE	SUPPORT	OPPOSE
DANE SANDS	MT Women's Lobby	✓	
Thomas Lee	HD 49	✓	
Holly Franz	Women's Law Section	✓	
K. Ann Pfeifer	637 N Fwing, Helena - ^{women's} Law Section	✓	
John Connor	Dept of Justice MT. County Atty's Assn.		
Jack Conroy Uzzment	Swanton, MT	✓	
Nancy McCaffree	Forsyth	✓	
Stephen R. Grayson	Helena		
Gretta Arendt	Helena	✓	

IF YOU CARE TO WRITE COMMENTS, ASK SECRETARY FOR WITNESS STATEMENT FORM.

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

