

MINUTES OF THE MEETING
PUBLIC HEALTH, WELFARE AND SAFETY COMMITTEE
MONTANA STATE SENATE

FEBRUARY 7, 1983

The meeting of the Public Health, Welfare and Safety Committee was called to order by Chairman, Tom Hager on Monday, February 7, 1983 in Room 410 of the State Capitol Building.

ROLL CALL: All members were present. Woody Wright, staff attorney, was also present.

Many, many visitors were also in attendance. (See attachments)

CONSIDERATION OF SENATE BILL 266: Senator Reed Marbut of Senate District 49, chief sponsor of Senate Bill 266, gave a brief resume of the bill. This bill is an act revising the uniform anatomical gift act by broadening the definition of "bank or storage facilities"; removing liabilities for persons acting in good faith under the act; and establishing qualifications for persons performing eye enucleation services under the act.

Senator Marbut stated that this bill was very necessary. An eyebank is needed for Montana. There will no cost to the state. This would provide tissue for corneal transplants. This bill does not open the doors to transplant surgery. Senator Marbut offered a set of amendment to the committee for their review. See exhibit 1.

Dr. John Salisbury of Missoula, representing the Montana Medical Association, stood in support of the bill and the proposed amendments. This bill would establish an eye bank and provide the people of Montana a storage facility for eye tissue. 15,000 eye enucleations are being done in the United States each year. Tissue is drastically need here in Montana.

Sharon Cromain, representing the Lions Clubs of Montana stood in support of the bill. He stated that two years ago the legislature passed a bill which would allow a blank space on one's drivers license in which to put whether or not one wanted to donate an organ from their body after their death. The real need is to have a large number of technicians that would have the previous training to train new technicians. An eye must be used within 6 to 72 hours. This bill will create no costs to the state. Mr. Cromain handed in written pamphlets to the committee for their review. See exhibits 2 and 3.

PAGE TWO
PUBLIC HEALTH
FEBRUARY 7, 1983

Andy Robinson, Lions Site Foundation, stood in support of the bill. He explained the the Lions sight and hearing foundation programs and also the low visision service. He stated that transplants are being done in Denver and Seattle at the present time. It is important that technicians be trained as opthamologists are not alway available.

With no further proponents, the chairman called on the opponents. Hearing none, the meeting was opened to a question and answer period from the Committee.

Senator Stephens asked what fees above the normal medical costs are incurred by the transplant. Only a processing fee is charge. There never is a charge for the organ. The processing fee is aproximately \$250.

Senator Christiaens asked about the arrangements to get the tissue where it needs to go. and if opthamologists train the technicians.

Senator Hims1 asked if one needs to sign a statement saying that he or she is donating their eye tissues.

Senator Marbut closed. He stated that perhaps a statement of intent is needed for the bill. There is a real need for the bill both in Montana and other states. Corneal eye surgery has increased because of so many recent eye injuries.

CONSIDERATION OF SENATE BILL 274: Senator Harold Dover, chief sponsor of SB 274, of Senate District 25 gave a brief resume of the bill. This bill is an act providing for the mandatory licensing and regulation of professional counselors; creating a state board of licensed professional counselors; creating a communications privilege; providing penalties for violations; and allowing disability and health insurance coverage for work done by licensed professional counselors.

Senate Bill 274 will make it possible for more people to get much needed counseling at great savings to the state. This bill will enable counsumers to identify licensed professional counselors and be assured that they have acceptable credentials. Licensing will protect the clients rights to confidentiality. Licensing will protect the clients right to confidentiality. Licensing will further the development of professional counseling by setting standards for counseling personnel. Senator Dover handed in written statement to the committee for their consideration. See exhibit 4.

PAGE THREE
PUBLIC HEALTH
FEBRUARY 7, 1983

Dr. Rowan Conrad, Chairman of the Montana Mental Health Counselors Association, and also the Guidance and Counseling Facility at the University of Montana stood in support of the bill. He stated that the majority of mental health services are provided by other than psychologists and psychiatrists. There is no licensing now to cover these persons. Licensing both affords a criterion for consumers to consider and current legislation provided for third party payments. This should save dollars as counselors fees average about 1/2 those of the currently licensed professions. Over one half of the counselors graduating now go into community settings. There is no way without licensure to either assure their competency or facilitate practice of their skills.

Mr. Bill Riley, representing the Board of Crime Control, stood in support of the bill. Mr. Riley stated that there is a broad range of services available through counselors and he felt that this bill if passed would be beneficial to everyone.

Ron Weaver, of Warm Springs stood in support of the bill. He stated that there is a real need for this kind of service.

Kathy Campbell of Helena stated that she strongly supports this bill to Montanans a broader spectrum of mental health services at lower costs to them.

Del Gustin, representing the Montana Personnel and Guidance Association stood in support of the bill. The Montana Personnel and Guidance Association feels that passage of this bill would provide a base for minimum competency for counseling services.

Irving Dayton, Commissioner of Higher Education, stood in support of the bill. He stated that the benefits of this bill are numerous.

With no further proponents, the chairman called on the opponents.

Dr. David Strobel, representing the Department of Psychology at the University of Montana, stood in opposition to the bill. The bill as proposed is vague on qualifications necessary to achieve licensing, master's level people do not have adequate training to be able to conduct psychotherapy on a private practice. There is a definite lack of specifications in Section 6 as to what allied profession are, open-ended which could include a degree in religion, nursing, and other fields. Training programs for counselors are almost

PAGE FOUR
PUBLIC HEALTH
FEBRUARY 7, 1983

exclusively in education schools and do not train these individuals for private practice. The grandfather clause opens the doors for individuals with little qualifications.

Polly Peterson, Graduate Student Association at the University of Montana, the Department of Psychology, stated her opposition to the bill because it lacks specificity in denoting the training necessary to qualify as a counselor. Also, it does not include provisions for on going supervision. In other words, these people licensed professional counselors, will be performing independently without adequate training to detect complex psychopathology or mental disorder.

Janice VanRiper, representing the Division of Workers' Compensation, stood in opposition to the bill. Mrs. VanRiper offered written testimony to the committee for their review. See exhibit 5.

Dr. Bailey Molineux, representing the Montana Psychological Association, stood in opposition to the bill. He stated the his organization supports the intent of the bill but oppose it as written. Specifically, they are concerned with the two year grandfather clause, the requirements for licensure, and the definition clause. They would recommend that all candidates for licensure have a doctorate in counseling plus two years of supervised experience and sit for examination. This bill, if passed, should apply to all who call themselves counselors in private practice. They could perhaps support the bill if it were amended to handle their concerns.

Les Loble 11, representing the American Council of Life Insurance, stood in opposition to Sections 14 and 15 to exclude reference to policies of disability insurance and health service corporations. People should be able to buy what they want.

Glen Drake, representing the Health Association of American, stated that he supports Mr. Loble's suggestion to strike sections 14 and 15 from the bill.

Senator Dover closed. There has been a lot of input into this bill from different groups that are affected by a good counselor. It was written up by them and given to the Legislative Council

PAGE FIVE
PUBLIC HEALTH
FEBRUARY 7, 1983

to draft. There were a few changes to dress up the bill and make it better. Senator Dover stated that he agrees with deleting the grandfather clause from the bill. He asked for favorable consideration from the committee.

The meeting was opened to a question and answer period from the Committee.

Senator Hims1 asked how many so called masters practitioners there are in the state. There are over 500.

Senator Marbut mentioned the "but not limited to" on page 7, line 2.

Senator Marbut asked about privilege communication confidentiality. This does not effect that clause.

Senator Stephens asked if other states had third party payments and what was their impact. There was no information available on this. However, the rates did go up in one state.

CONSIDERATION OF SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 10: Senator Fred Van Valkenberg of Senate District 50, the chief sponsor of SJR 10, gave a brief resume of the bill. This is a joint resolution of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the State of Montana urging the president and the Congress of the United States to reduce funding for nuclear weapons and the Department of Defense, increase funding for human services and jobs programs, and reduce the federal deficit and requiring the Secretary of State to send copies of this resolution to the President of the United States and Montana's United States Senators and Representatives.

Senator Van Valkenberg stated that social programs are necessary to the economic survival of a great percentage of our population, especially in these economic times. He stated that he did not want to see this resolution become a political issue.

Cathy Campbell, representing the Montana Association of Churches, stood in support of the bill. She stated that the Montana Association of Churches opposes the escalating development and deployment of nuclear weapons by the United States and other nations. There is no more important political or moral question facing the world than that of human survival in the face of nuclear armaments and the threat of a nuclear holocaust. There are many political analyses of the nuclear

PAGE SIX
PUBLIC HEALTH
FEBRUARY 7, 1983

situation, but their common element is despair. The nuclear arms race is a demonic reversal of the Creator's power of giving life. Mrs. Campbell handed in written testimony to the Committee for their consideration. See exhibit 6.

Connie Flaherty Erickson, representing the Women's Lobbyist Fund, stood in support of the resolution. She stated that her groups strongly endorses SJR 10. According to national polls done by the Center for Political Studies the most persistent gap in men's and women's attitudes since the 1950's has been women's lower support for military spending, build-up, and intervention. During the last four years, women diverged strongly from the priorities of the Reagan administration and favored spending less on the military and more on the social programs. This divergence in priorities has been taken to the ballot box and produced the now infamous "generation gap" in voting which has seeped down to the legislative races. Women have also been hit the hardest by the cuts in education and social programs. Mrs. Erickson handed in written testimony for the committees consideration. See exhibit 7.

Jim Murry, executive secretary of the Montana State AFL-CIO, stood in support of the bill. It is very rare when the AFL-CIO agrees with the Heritage Foundation on anything. But on military spending we are agreed---cutting out the enormous amount of waste will be good for our economy, without hurting our defense. Mr. Murry handed in written testimony for the committee to review. See exhibit 8.

Debra DeBoe of Bozeman, representing the Bozeman Fair Housing Coalition, stood in support of the bill because of the fact that social programs are necessary to the economic survival of a great percentage of our population, especially in these economic times and because of the current involvement in the arms race as unnecessary and wasteful. There is a need to balance the federal budget, but not at the expense of social programs. True national security will come only when the basic needs of our population have been met. Mrs. DeBoe handed in written testimony for the committee to consider. See exhibit 9.

Richard Barrett, Associate Professor of the Department of Economics at the University of Montana, spoke on behalf of the bill. Mr. Barrett handed in written testimony for the consideration of the Committee. See exhibit 10.

PAGE SEVEN
PUBLIC HEALTH
FEBRUARY 7, 1983

Charles Cauglan, Montana Citizens to End the Arms Race, stood in support of the bill. He stated that he led the race for the passage of Initiative 91 during the last election. We do not need more defense. Despite the common misconception that the Soviets are ahead of us militarily, our two countries are roughly equal in strength. By many measures, the U.S. and our NATO allies are ahead, and by other measures the USSR and its WARSAW PACT lead.

Rob Bartlett of Billings stood in support of the bill. He stated that he represents that attitude of a growing numbers of businesses. Mr. Bartlett addressed the problem of the Montana economy. He handed out a pamphlet entitled "Questions and Answers on the Soviet Threat and National Security". See exhibit 11.

Because of lack of time Senator Hager called a recess until after the floor session.

Ellen Murphy of Helena stood in support of the bill. She stated that peace is tied to the civilian economy not the military. Ms. Murphy handed in a pamphlet entitled "Bankrupting American, the Tax Burden". See exhibit 12. She also handed in a large folder of information for the record. See exhibit 13.

Rob Sans of Charlo stood in support of the bill.

Jim Senkler stood in support of the bill.

Karl Donovan, representing himself as a concerned citizen and also the low income people of Great Falls, stood in support of the bill. Mr. Donovan stated that 3,000 families have been added to the Cheese Giveaway program in 6 counties recently. Mr. Donovan handed in two sheets in regards to comparison between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. See exhibits 14 and 15. Mr. Donovan also turned in two letters of support for the bill. See exhibits 16 and 17.

Shirley Thennis, representing the Montana Nurses Association, stood in support of the bill. She stated that at the 1982 Convention of the Montana Nurses Association the delegates adopted a resolution which would support SJR 10. See exhibit 18.

PAGE EIGHT
PUBLIC HEALTH
FEBRUARY 7, 1983

John Frankino, director of the Montana Catholic Conference, stood in support of the bill. We are at a time in world history when we must view the world in a new way. The Catholic Church continues to condemn the arms race as a "danger, an injustice, a theft from the poor, and a folly". A joint struggle by people to prevent war must also bring us together to fight poverty, disease, and hunger. Mr. Frankino presented written testimony for the record. See exhibit 19.

Virginia Jellison stood in support of the bill.

John McNamer of Charlo, stood in support of the bill. He stated that more nuclear weapons do not make this nation stronger. More nuclear weapons only serve to make all the people of this nation weaker and less secure by increasing the risk of nuclear war and detracting from other vital areas of our lives. The true strength of a nation is measured by such things as economic vitality, employment, education, housing, morality and confidence that we are moving in the right direction. SJR 10 presents a legitimate and powerful concern in a responsible way.


With no further proponents, the chairman called on the opponents. Hearing none, the meeting was opened to a question and answer period from the committee.

Senator Marbut asked what is the pope's position. Mr. Frankino could not answer this at the present time.

Senator Van Valkenberg closed. He stated that this is not a partisan issue and he hoped that it would not become as such. The legislature has an important role to play in this most important issue facing the United States today. He asked for favorable consideration from the committee on this resolution. He gave the Committee grafts of their individual districts. See exhibits 20, 21 and 22.

ANNOUNCEMENTS: The next meeting of the Public Health, Welfare and Safety Committee will be held on Wednesday, February 9, 1983 in Room 410 of the State Capitol Building.

ADJOURN: With no further business the meeting was adjourned.



CHAIRMAN, SENATOR TOM HAGER

ROLL CALL

PUBLIC HEALTH, WELFARE, SAFETY COMMITTEE

48th LEGISLATIVE SESSION -- 1983

Date 2/7/83

[illegible]

DATE _____

COMMITTEE ON _____

VISITORS' REGISTER

NAME	REPRESENTING	BILL #	Check One	
			Support	Oppose
Cathy Campbell	Montana Assn. of Churches	SSR10	✓	
G. Brian Ellis	MT. Medical Assn	SB266	✓	
John T. Zander	MT. Medical Assn	SB266	✓	
Gayle Salisbury	" " "	SB266		
John Salisbury	" " "	SB266		
John Foster	MT. MHC Assn	SB274	✓	
Pharm. Counselor	Levin Sight Foundation	SB266	✓	
Stephen C. Robinson	Montana Lions Found	SB266	✓	
William Leary	Montana Hosp. Assn	SSR10	✓	
Linda Stetten	Legislative Intern MMH	SB266		
David McKeath	Montana Health Assn	SB274		
David E. Dayton	MT University System	SB266 SB274	✓	
David Shobel	UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA	SB274		✓
Jamie S. Van Riper	Div of Workers' Compensation	SB274		✓
Calinda Lake	Women's Lobby Fund	SSR10	✓	
Cornie Flobeck-Eubank	" "	"	✓	
Charles Campbell	MT. Citizens to End Arms Race	SSR10	✓	
Elynn Murphy	Last Chance Peacemakers	SSR10	✓	
LESTER H. LOBLE, II	Am. Council of Life Ins	SB274		✓
Joe Brownlow	Int'l Rehab. Assoc.	274		
John Duster	MT Personal & Business	274	✓	
Kathleen Campbell	Self	274	✓	
Jeff Peterson	Drummond Association, U. of Mont	274		✓
John Sorenson	Self	274	✓	
Robert S. McCullen	Self	274	✓	
Bill Klig	Board of Arms Control	274	✓	

(Please leave prepared statement with _____)

DATE _____

COMMITTEE ON _____

VISITORS' REGISTER

NAME	REPRESENTING	BILL #	Check One	
			Support	Oppose
Bailey Moloney	MT Psychological Assoc	274		✓
Susan Conrad	MT Mental Health Co.	"	✓	
Ron Wean	Self & A.P.G.A.	"	✓	
Carl J. Donovan	self & M.P.P.	SJR 10	✓	
Debra DeBode	SELF's Bozeman Fair Housing Coalition	10	✓	
Glen Ash	Health Exs Ass'n of America	SB 274		✓
Kathleen Royland	Monta. Cty. Demo. Party	SJR 10	✓	
Richard Barrett	Self	SJR 10	✓	
Marcia Gungman	Bozeman Housing Coalition	SJR 10	✓	
Heidi Tamm	M. N. I.	SJR 10	-	
Lisa Fleischer	Lolo, mt.	SJR 10	✓	
MIKE CRAIG	MAPP			
Virginia Zella	family + MT Citizens Against Arms Race	SJR 10	✓	
Julie Forander	ASUM	SJR 10	✓	
ROB BARTLETT	SELF	SJR 10	✓	
Colice Campbell	Monta. Women for Peace	SJR 10	✓	
Jim Murray	Mont. AFL-CIO	SJR 10	✓	
Raye Jean Saar	Self	SJR 10	✓	
Jones Ann Johnson	Self	SJR 10	✓	
Rob Sand	Self & M.W. Lake, Flotterd Peace Sponsors Local Groups	SJR 10	✓	
Kerin Brann	Central Church - Great Falls	SJR 10	✓	
Kathy Jensen	S.A. C.T.	SJR 10	✓	
LARRY KIMMARTNER	GR. FAWS & SELF	SJR 10	✓	
JIM SEIDLER	SELF & LAST CHANCE PEACEMAKERS	SJR 10	✓	

(Please leave prepared statement with Secretary)

Exhibit 1

AMENDMENTS TO SB 266

1. Page 1, line 17
Following: "72-17-202"
Insert: "(1)(a) or (b)".
2. Page 1
Following: line 19
Insert: "(3) "Department" means the department of health
and environmental sciences provided for in Title 2,
Chapter 15, part 21, MCA."
Renumber: all subsequent subsections.
3. Page 1
Following: line 21
Insert: "(5) "Eyebank association of America" means the
organization nationally recognized by that name with
headquarters in Houston, Texas, that surveys banks or
storage facilities for the storage of eye tissue upon
their requests and grants membership and certification
status to any such bank or storage facility that it
finds meets its standards and requirements."
Renumber: all subsequent subsections.
4. Page 3, line 8.
Following: "facility"
Insert: "licensed, accredited or approved under the laws
of any state,"
5. Page 4
Following: line 9
Insert: "NEW SECTION. Section 4. Approval of eye banks.
Any bank or storage facility that furnishes to the
department written evidence of its membership and
certification, and reports and recommendations for
future compliance, granted by the eyebank association
of America, is approved for receipt and storage of
eye tissue for the term of such membership and certifi-
cation, and is eligible during such term to be a donee
of eye tissue pursuant to 72-17-202(1)(c) MCA."
Renumber: subsequent section.
6. Page 4, line 11.
Following: line 10
Strike: "Section 3 is"
Insert: "Sections 3 and 4 are"
7. Page 4, line 13.
Following: "to"
Strike: "section 3"
Insert: "sections 3 and 4"

NAME: John Salisbury, M.D. DATE: 2-7-83

ADDRESS: Missoula, MT

PHONE: 728-3507

REPRESENTING WHOM? mt. Medical Assn

APPEARING ON WHICH PROPOSAL: S 266

DO YOU: SUPPORT? ☒ AMEND? ☐ OPPOSE? ☐

COMMENTS: _____

PLEASE LEAVE ANY PREPARED STATEMENTS WITH THE COMMITTEE SECRETARY.



MONTANA LOW VISION SERVICE

**715 NORTH FEE
HELENA, MONTANA 59601
PHONE 442-0668**

**A NON PROFIT CORPORATION DEDICATED
TO SERVE INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY NEED
LOW VISION AIDS**

THE GIFT OF SIGHT LIONS EYE BANK DONOR PROGRAM

sponsored by the
**Lions Sight Conservation Foundation
of Washington and Northern Idaho**

**Please complete the back side of this card and
carry it on your person. This is a legal docu-
ment under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.**



**"There is no lovelier way to thank God for your sight
than by giving a helping hand to those in the dark."**

Helen Keller

Exhibit 3

**MONTANA LIONS
SIGHT AND HEARING
FOUNDATION**

EAGLES MANOR
715 NORTH FEE STREET
HELENA, MONTANA 59601
(406) 443-0996



WE SERVE

SENATOR HAROLD L. DOVER

SENATE BILL 274

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MANDATORY LICENSING AND REGULATION OF PROFESSIONAL COUNSELORS; CREATING A STATE BOARD OF LICENSED PROFESSIONAL COUNSELORS; CREATING A COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE; PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS; AND ALLOWING DISABILITY AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR WORK DONE BY LICENSED PROFESSIONAL COUNSELORS; AMENDING SECTIONS 33-22-111 AND 33-30-101, MCA.

SB 274 will make it possible for more people to get much needed counseling at great savings to the state.

This bill will: 1. Enable consumers to identify licensed professional counselors and be assured that they have acceptable credentials.

2. Licensing will protect the clients right to confidentiality.

3. Licensing will further the development of professional counseling by setting standards for counseling personnel.

It's one of the unfortunate realities of our day that the anxieties of day to day living have created an ever expanding need for people to seek counsel and advice in an effort to keep their lives and marriages together. This need has made them increasingly vulnerable to the offerings of unqualified people who willingly relieve the public of its money and do not provide the needed service. Or, to get service they need to go to the state provided services (at the expense of the taxpayer) to get counseling, or to an over-qualified highly paid professional - which costs more than necessary to the individual or their insurance company.

There are many individuals who do not need the services of a psychiatrist and who could obtain help from counselors at a considerably lower hourly rate than is currently paid by third party insurers to physicians. It is estimated that 80% of doctor calls are because of mental and emotional problems. Counselors can often do more to help with these problems, resolve them before they get worse - thus, much more reasonable.

The private sector is preferred in many cases over public services due to the feeling there is increased confidentiality.

In making mental health counselors look to other mental health professionals to "sign off" their work, we are adding an increased cost and more time to the provision of mental health service in our country. Also it denies the small towns and rural areas of this service because the highly paid professional Doctor cannot afford or won't set up a practice in rural areas. The other counselors can't afford to either because they don't have the "big" Doctor or a state agency to sign off for them. The taxpaying public continues to suffer by not getting the care they need (especially rural areas), or they are paying exorbitant prices for mental health services.

If mental health counselors were reimbursed directly for their services, the savings of time and tax dollars could better be spent on additional services to those truly

needing mental health care. Private practice could take care of an awful lot of the counseling services and mental health problems currently provided by the state.

Many counselors have left Montana, who would have rather stayed in private practice in Montana, if the state had law allowing them to get third party payment via licensure.

Section 1 - shows the make up of the board.

Section 2-4 - gives the purpose and duty of the board.

Section 5 - page 5, lines 1-4 - the title does not conflict with common names.

Section 6 - page 6, lines 19-24.

page 7, lines 5-9.

Section 7 - page 8, lines 2 & 3.

Section 14 - page 12, lines 7-15.

A growing number of insurance carriers require the state regulation of a profession as a prerequisite for reimbursement. This change will allow it.

Example of problem. The individual who owns a policy that provides for counseling services - must pay the premium of an otherwise covered service simply because the state has no professional licensure law for counselors.

The client pays twice - once for the insurance premium - and again for services rendered. The taxpayer will pay more because these people often go to a state

supported counselor rather than a private practitioner. The insurance company pays more because if the patient does go to a physician or Doctor in psychology and psychiatry, the charge is higher - the patient delays getting treatment because of high costs - requires more treatments later and thus more costs.

Opposition -

1. Professionals want to protect their turf - many times they are well educated but don't show compassion and concern and ability to deal with real personal problems counselees need.

2. Insurance companies are afraid it will cost them more - it should save in the long run.

This Bill, in Summation:

1. Will provide qualified professional care to more people - in areas of Montana where they need it - not just in large cities or government sponsored clinics.

2. Save the state - thus the taxpayer - money.

3. Save insurance companies money.

There has been a lot of input into this bill from different groups that are affected by a good counselor. It was written up by them and given to the Legislative Council to draft. There were a few changes to dress up the bill and make it better.

Consequently, there are proponents from several different groups to testify today in support of this bill. One group, however, that is not here are the independent insurance companies - we contacted several of them - they did not oppose the bill - in fact they supported it.

STATEMENT OF INTENT
Senate Bill No. 274 [LC 679]

Section 4 requires the Board of Licensed Professional Counselors to adopt rules setting professional, practice, and ethical standards for licensed professional counselors, establish continuing education requirements, and adopt such other rules as are necessary for the regulation of licensed professional counselors. The Legislature perceives a need to regulate persons holding themselves out as having a master's or doctoral degree in counseling or using the title of professional counselor. Consumers of professional counselors' services are entitled to adequate regulation of those services in the public interest. It is contemplated that the Board may promulgate rules that:

(1) protect the public from abuse of the trust placed in professional counselors;

(2) regulate the day-to-day practices of professional counselors;

(3) ensure a professional attitude and professional work in a professional atmosphere;

(4) regulate fees charged for services;

(5) regulate testing devices and methods used by professional counselors;

(6) regulate counseling techniques;

(7) determine the type, amount, and quality of continuing education of professional counselors; and

(8) are otherwise necessary to the regulation of the profession.

AMMENDMENTS

SENATE BILL #274

ISSUE: Board of Professional Counselors:

Page 1, line 16: Delete "seven," substitute "six".

Page 1, lines 17 and 18: Delete entire sentence and add "One member must be a Counselor-Educator with a terminal degree."

Page 1, line 21: Delete "Four" and substitute "three."

Page 10, lines 8 and 9: Delete "all seven," and substitute "five out of six"

ISSUE: Supervised Counseling Experience:

Page 7, line 8, between the words "of" and "practice" add the word "supervised."

Page 7, line 9: Delete "within the past 5 years."

NAME:

LOWAN CONRAD

DATE:

2/7/83

ADDRESS:

STAR RT FRENCHTOWN, MT 59834

PHONE:

h: 626-4463 W: 243-4033

REPRESENTING WHOM?


Chairman, Montana Mental Health Counselors Assn.
& Guidance & Counseling Faculty, U. of MT

APPEARING ON WHICH PROPOSAL:

Counselor Licensure SB 274

DO YOU:

SUPPORT?



AMEND?

OPPOSE?

COMMENTS:

majority of mental health services are provided by other than psychologists & psychiatrists. There is no licensing now to cover these persons. Licensing both affords a criterion for consumers to consider and current legislation provides 3rd party payments. This should save \$ as counselors fees average about 1/2 those of the currently licensed professions. Over half of the counselors graduating ^{now} go into community settings. There is no way without licensure to either assure their competency or facilitate practice of their skills.

PLEASE LEAVE ANY PREPARED STATEMENTS WITH THE COMMITTEE SECRETARY.

NAME

B. Riley

BILL NO.

ADDRESS

103 N. Raleigh

DATE

2/5/50

WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT

Board of Education

SUPPORT

✓

OPPOSE

AMEND

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

NAME: Ron Weaver DATE: 2/7/83

ADDRESS: P.O. Box 15

PHONE: 563-6943

REPRESENTING WHOM? Self & A.P.G.A.

APPEARING ON WHICH PROPOSAL: SB # 274

DO YOU: SUPPORT? ☒ AMEND? ☐ OPPOSE? ☐

COMMENTS: Supporting a Bill to define the prof.
of counseling, increase public access to preventive
mental health services, establish standards for the
competent practice of prof. counseling &
constitutionally protect the right to practice the
profession for which individuals are trained.

PLEASE LEAVE ANY PREPARED STATEMENTS WITH THE COMMITTEE SECRETARY.

NAME: Kathleen & Campbell DATE: 2/2/83
ADDRESS: 2935 Cactus drive - Bkgs. 59102

PHONE: 259-9884

REPRESENTING WHOM? ~~my own~~ my own
private practice in psychotherapy

APPEARING ON WHICH PROPOSAL: Sen Bill 274

DO YOU: SUPPORT? ☒ AMEND? ☐ OPPOSE? ☐

COMMENTS: Strongly support this bill to

give Montanans a broader
spectrum of mental health
services at lower costs
to them.

PLEASE LEAVE ANY PREPARED STATEMENTS WITH THE COMMITTEE SECRETARY.

NAME DEI GUSTIN

BILL NO. SB 274

ADDRESS 225 MOTTE RD HELENA MT DATE 2-7-83

WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT MT. PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE ASSN

SUPPORT ☒ OPPOSE ☐ AMEND ☐

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

THE MT PERSONNEL & GUIDANCE ASSN
WOULD LIKE TO GO ON RECORD IN SUPPORT OF
SB 274.

THE PASSAGE OF THIS BILL WOULD
PROVIDE A BASE FOR MINIMUM COMPETENCY
FOR COUNSELING SERVICES.

NAME DR DAVID STROBEL BILL No. SB274
ADDRESS DEPT OF PSYCHOLOGY, UNIV OF MT DATE 2/4/83
WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT ABOVE
SUPPORT _____ OPPOSE X AMEND _____
PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

The Bill As Proposed is:

1. Vague on qualifications necessary to achieve licencing
 - a. Master's level people do not have adequate training to be able to conduct psychotherapy in a private practice
 - b. lack of specification, section 6, what "allied profession" are. Open-ended which could include a degree in Religion, nursing, etc.
- c. Training programs for counselors are almost exclusively in Education Schools and do not train these individuals for private Practice
- d. Grandfather Clause opens the doors for individuals with little qualification

NAME: POLLY E. PETERSON

BILL NO. 274

ADDRESS 2340 55TH ST. #18, MISSOULA MT DATE 2/7/83
59803

WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT GRADUATE STUDENT ASSN, U OF MONT.
DEPT. OF PSYCHOLOGY
SUPPORT _____ OPPOSE X AMEND _____

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

I OPPOSE THIS BILL BECAUSE IT LACKS SPECIFICITY
IN DENOTING THE TRAINING NECESSARY TO QUALIFY AS A
"COUNSELOR." ~~PROFESSIONAL TREATMENT~~ ALSO, IT DOES NOT
INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR ONGOING SUPERVISION. IN OTHER
WORDS, THESE PEOPLE (LICENSED PROFESSIONAL COUNSELORS) WILL BE
PERFORMING INDEPENDENTLY WITH OUT, ~~THE~~ WHAT I FEEL, IS
ADEQUATE TRAINING, TO DETECT COMPLEX PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OR MENTAL
DISORDER.

NAME Janice S. Van Riper

BILL NO. SP274

ADDRESS 815 Front Helena, MT

DATE 2/7

WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT Div. of Workers Compensation

SUPPORT _____

OPPOSE ☒

AMEND _____


PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

Exhibit 5



**DIVISION OF
WORKERS'
COMPENSATION**



TED SCHWINDEN, GOVERNOR

815 FRONT STREET

STATE OF MONTANA

HELENA, MONTANA 59604

TESTIMONY BY JAN VANRIPER ON SENATE BILL 274, BEFORE THE SENATE PUBLIC HEALTH COMMITTEE, FEBRUARY 7, 1983.

I am Jan VanRiper, Assistant Bureau Chief with the Division of Workers' Compensation, in opposition to Senate Bill 274 which proposes to amend Section 33-22-111, allowing disability and health insurance coverage for work done by licensed professional counselors.

Under the existing statute, insurers providing workers' compensation coverage are required to pay for services rendered to an injured worker by a variety of health care providers. These include physicians, dentists and chiropractors, to name a few. This bill would add "professional counselors" to that list of providers. The Division is concerned that this addition will raise the cost of workers' compensation coverage to Montana employers without justification.

It is obvious that each time a required service is added to insurance coverage, the cost of that coverage potentially goes up. As drafted, this bill has every indication of causing a rise in premiums. This is primarily due to the fact that the service to be provided by the professional counselors is ill-defined. We see, for example, that "professional counselling" means "...the professional practice directed toward helping people achieve more adequate, satisfying, and productive personal and social adjustments."

(Section 3(4)). If a workers' compensation insurer is to be required to fund such services, how will that insurer determine what specific services are necessitated by an industrial injury? For comparison and illustration, consider a situation where dental care is required due to an on-the-job injury. In such a case it is relatively simple to determine whether specific dental care is necessitated by an accident, what care is needed, and when that care is no longer appropriate (or related to the accident). This legislation allows for no such determinations with respect to services provided by professional counsellors. The result is that the workers compensation carrier pays for nebulous services, for undetermined amounts of time, and ultimately passes these costs on to the employer.

It should be noted that there is one service which might fall within the term "professional counselling," and which is appropriately covered by workers' compensation insurance. That service is vocational rehabilitation, and is already addressed specifically in the Workers' Compensation Act, in 39-71-1001, MCA. That section provides for referral of certain disabled workers to the Rehabilitative Services Division of SRS. Employers in this state, through their workers compensation insurance carriers, are currently assessed one percent of compensation benefits paid per year for this service. This figure now approximates \$380,000 annually. Such costs would potentially be duplicated if this bill is passed.

In summary, this proposed amendment to Section 33-22-111 is inappropriate and cost-inefficient, and threatens to raise the cost of workers' compensation premiums for Montana employers. The Division of Workers' Compensation urges that you do not pass this bill.

NAME Bailey Holmney BILL No. SB 274
 ADDRESS Helena MT DATE 2/7/83
 WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT MT. Psychological Association
 SUPPORT _____ OPPOSE ☒ AMEND _____

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

We support the intent of this bill but oppose it as written. Specifically, we are concerned with the two year grandfather clause (section 6, subsection 1), the requirements for licensure (section 6, subsection 2) and the definition clause (section 5, subsection 1). We would recommend that all candidates for licensure have a doctorate in counseling plus two years of supervised experience and sit for examination. We also feel this bill, if passed, should apply to all who call themselves counselors in private practice

NAME

BILL No. SB 274

ADDRESS

LESTER H. LOBLE, II

DATE 2/7/83

WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT

Am. Council of Life Insurance

SUPPORT

OPPOSE

AMEND

X

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

Strike § 15, § 14 to exclude references to policies of disability insurance and health service corporations.

NAME Glen Drake BILL NO. SB-274
ADDRESS Hillman DATE 2/7
WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT Health Ass'n of America
SUPPORT _____ OPPOSE _____ AMEND ✓

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

Sections 14 & 15
should be deleted

NAME:

L. Sorensen

DATE: 2-7-83

ADDRESS:

Rt. 1, Box 212, B. Hedges, MT 59106

PHONE:

656-3001

REPRESENTING WHOM?

Ch. 1

APPEARING ON WHICH PROPOSAL:

SB 274

DO YOU:

SUPPORT?

x

AMEND?

OPPOSE?

COMMENTS:

The majority of services provided to consumers are delivered by practitioners who are below the PhD level.

The effect of the market place will significantly neutralize the practice of poorly practicing therapists beyond any licensing standards. However, this bill will provide a test of competence in which the consumer public and professional community can place a basic trust.

Services to the people of this state will be enhanced by the favorable consideration of this bill.

PLEASE LEAVE ANY PREPARED STATEMENTS WITH THE COMMITTEE SECRETARY.

NAME

BILL NO. SB 274

ADDRESS

John R. Foster

DATE 2/7/84

WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT

AMHC Assn - Lisc Chairman

SUPPORT

☒

OPPOSE

AMEND

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

I strongly support SB274.
Master level people are well
qualified to do professional
counseling.
It is about time the private
sector, via insurance payments,
took some of the cost away
from the state. Most people
prefer a private practitioner
over an agency person.

NAME: ROBERT S. McCallum DATE: 2/7/83

ADDRESS: 329 Governors BLVD

PHONE: (410) 252-6193

REPRESENTING WHOM? SELF

APPEARING ON WHICH PROPOSAL: SB 274

DO YOU: SUPPORT? ☒ AMEND? ☐ OPPOSE? ☐

COMMENTS: Paraphrase of SB274 does not enhance
the choice of the public when selecting a
Mental Health therapist. As to price,
type of experience, Master's level counselors
have not still to provide quality services.
and to begin act should be given the
opportunity the remuneration for services
and accountability through licensing.

Robert S. McCallum M.S.

PLEASE LEAVE ANY PREPARED STATEMENTS WITH THE COMMITTEE SECRETARY.

PLEASE LEAVE ANY PREPARED STATEMENTS WITH THE COMMITTEE SECRETARY.

Exhibit 6

Montana Association of Churches

MONTANA RELIGIOUS LEGISLATIVE COALITION • P.O. Box 1708 • Helena, MT 59601

February 7, 1983

WORKING TOGETHER:

American Baptist Churches
of the Northwest

American Lutheran Church
Rocky Mountain District

Christian Church
(Disciples of Christ)
in Montana

Episcopal Church
Diocese of Montana

Lutheran Church
in America
Pacific Northwest Synod

Roman Catholic Diocese
of Great Falls

Roman Catholic Diocese
of Helena

United Church
of Christ
Montana Conference

United Presbyterian Church
Glacier Presbytery

United Methodist Church
Yellowstone Conference

United Presbyterian Church
Yellowstone Presbytery

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SENATE PUBLIC HEALTH,
WELFARE AND SAFETY COMMITTEE:

I am Cathy Campbell of Helena, speaking on behalf
of the Montana Association of Churches.

The Montana Association of Churches opposes the
escalating development and deployment of nuclear weapons
by the United States and other nations.

In December, 1982, each of you received a copy of
our resolution on world peace. In it, we called on the
Montana Legislature to request the Congress and agencies
of the Federal Government to stop the development and
deployment of nuclear weapons, missiles, and delivery
systems by the United States and other nations; and to
give much greater weight in their economic and political
deliberations and decision-making to the desire of the
people of the United States and others around the world
for a just and lasting peace and the end of the arms race.

It is our belief that there is no more important
political or moral question facing the world than that of
human survival in the face of nuclear armaments and the
threat of a nuclear holocaust. This belief is rooted in
our Christian faith.

There are many political analyses of the nuclear
situation, but their common element is despair. It is
no wonder. The nuclear arms race is a demonic reversal
of the Creator's power of giving life.

The willingness to destroy life everywhere on earth,
for the sake of our presumed security, is at the root of
the problem. It is creating an undertone of despair and
doom that saps our energy and kills our dreams for the
future.

The arms race enters all of our lives in yet another
way. We are the ones who must pay for these costly weapons.
As a consequence, we diminish our ability and willingness to
respond to the just cries of people everywhere for food, housing,
medical care, and education. The continuing escalation of
the arms race does not seem to make sense ethically, strategically,



WORKING TOGETHER:

American Baptist Churches
of the Northwest

American Lutheran Church
Rocky Mountain District

Christian Church
(Disciples of Christ)
in Montana

Episcopal Church
Diocese of Montana

Lutheran Church
in America
Pacific Northwest Synod

Roman Catholic Diocese
of Great Falls

Roman Catholic Diocese
of Helena

United Church
of Christ
Montana Conference

United Presbyterian Church
Glacier Presbytery

United Methodist Church
Yellowstone Conference

United Presbyterian Church
Yellowstone Presbytery

politically, or economically.

We need to risk some de-esalation initiatives, some steps toward limiting our research and buildup of weapons, and to publicize those limiting steps as a way of announcing our intentions, and as a challenge to the Soviet Union to take similar steps.

SJR 10 reflects the concerns of the Montana Association of Churches. I urge your favorable consideration of this bill.

NAME Connie Flaherty Erickson BILL NO. SJR 10
ADDRESS 903 N. Ewing DATE 2/7/83
WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT Women's Lobbyist Fund
SUPPORT X OPPOSE _____ AMEND _____

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

WOMEN'S LOBBYIST FUND

Box 1099
Helena, MT 59624
449-7917



The Women's Lobbyist Fund strongly endorses Senate Joint Resolution 10. According to national polls done by the Center for Political Studies the most persistent gap in men's and women's attitudes since the 1950's has been women's lower support for military spending, build-up, and intervention. During the last four years, women who are Democrats, Republicans, and Independents alike, diverged strongly from the priorities of the Reagan administration and favored spending less on the military and more on social programs. This divergence in priorities has been taken to the ballot box and produced the now infamous "gender gap" in voting which has seeped down to legislative races.

Women have also been hit hardest by the cuts in education and social programs. The "feminization of poverty" has meant that it is women who are heading up single family households, older women, and women working at low paying jobs who have been hurt by cuts in AFDC, food stamps, legal services, work study money, family planning money, etc. We have seen repeatedly in appropriation hearings in this legislature that an impossible burden has been thrust on state budgets to try to fill the gap created by cuts in truly critical social programs. We may not like to admit but hunger, homelessness, and abject poverty have become realities for literally millions of Americans because of misplaced priorities in our federal budget. Finally, as ~~first~~ hired/first fired, women have been disproportionately hurt by high unemployment and the weakening of our economy with the unprecedented deficit spending produced by our military budgets.

Radical, structural changes are occurring in our society because of the economic dislocation of hundreds of thousands of families. Cuts in social programs and increases in military hardware have brought real suffering to lower and middle class families. The Women's Lobbyist Fund representing a broad coalition of women and women's groups across this state, urges your unanimous passage of SJR 10 to send a clear message to the federal government that the current spending priorities in the federal government are unacceptable to Montanans of all political persuasions.



Box 1176, Helena, Montana

JAMES W. MURRY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ZIP CODE 59624
406/442-1708

TESTIMONY OF JAMES W. MURRY, MONTANA STATE AFL-CIO, BEFORE THE SENATE PUBLIC
HEALTH COMMITTEE, ~~HOUSE~~ ^{Senate} JOINT RESOLUTION 10 -- FEBRUARY 7, 1983

I am Jim Murry, Executive Secretary of the Montana State AFL-CIO.

We support ^S HJR 10. It is often easy to support sweeping generalizations, like this resolution; at the same time it is difficult to agree on specifics.

There is suprising support for the three points of this resolution, which call for reduced nuclear weapon and military spending, increased spending for human services and jobs programs, and reducing the federal deficit.

On reducing military spending, it is not surprising that anti-nuclear groups support this. It is not surprising that virtually every mainline Christian Church, Protestant and Catholic support it. It is not surprising that womens groups and senior citizens support it. It is more surprising that labor unions support it, because we have always stood for a strong defense and still stand for that. It is even more surprising that the National Association of Manufacturers, several Republican U.S. Senators and the ultra-conservative Heritage Foundation are for reduction of military spending.

It is very rare when the AFL-CIO agrees with the Heritage Foundation on anything. But on military spending we are agreed -- cutting out the enormous amount of waste will be good for our economy, without hurting our defense one iota.

The second part of the resolution also has wide support. Church groups, women's groups, senior citizen groups, veteran groups and many others support human service funding at more adequate levels. And when you throw in increased funding

for jobs programs, a large bi-partisan cross-section of the public is supportive, at least of the general idea.

There is also broad agreement on the need to reduce the federal deficit. Once again the labor movement finds itself agreeing with the National Chamber of Commerce and the powers of Wall Street, an unusual position for us. We disagree on the methods by which the budget should be balanced. For us a closing of unfair tax loopholes and doing away with tax cuts for the wealthy is the key.

When you talk specifics, disagreements arise. But on a call for reduced military spending, higher jobs and human service spending and lower federal deficits, there should be wide agreement, perhaps even unanimous agreement.

Thank you.

NAME Debra DeBode

BILL NO. 10

ADDRESS 603 W. Lamme Bozeman 59715 DATE Feb 7, 1983

WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT Bozeman Fair Housing Coalition

SUPPORT X OPPOSE _____ AMEND _____

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments: —

I am representing myself and BFHC as supporting Senate Res. #10 because social programs are necessary to the economic survival of a great percentage of our population — especially in these economic times and because I see our current involvement in the arms race as unnecessary and wasteful. we need to balance the federal budget, but not at the expense of social programs. True national security will come only when the basic needs of our population have been met.

-Exhibit

Feb. 7, 1981

I, as Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to testify in support of Senate Resolution #10 as a low income parent, a member of a parent's cooperative daycare, the Bozeman Fair Housing Coalition and a citizen who is deeply concerned with the arms buildup that our country is involved in. The underlying issue for me, as it is with most parents, whatever their income, is the health and well being of my son.

I am currently employed by the Gallatin County Health Department working with senior citizens. Recent reductions in funding have cut my work hours to the point where I now participate in the Food Stamps and Energy Assistance Programs to make ends meet, thus, the cuts in social programs effect me doubly. I see my use of these programs as a necessary, but temporary solution. For now, they are vital to my economic survival and that of others in similar situations.

Accepting cuts in social spendings what is necessary to regain control of our national budget would not be so difficult to swallow if the same was being done to the military budget. It seems quite evident to me that we have more than enough nuclear weapons to protect our interests. I would argue that when the basic needs of the American population are met, our country will experience a true security that no amount of military spending can come close to creating.

Debra J. DeBode

Bozeman, Montana

NAME Richard Barrett BILL NO. STR 10
ADDRESS 219 AGNES Ave, MISSOULA DATE 2/7/88
WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT self
SUPPORT ✓ OPPOSE AMEND

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

Exhibit 10

Testimony of

Richard N. Barrett
Associate Professor
Department of Economics
University of Montana

on

Senate Joint Resolution 10

Senate Public Health, Welfare and Safety Committee

February 7, 1983

The point I would like to bring to your attention today concerns the impact of military spending on employment, both nationally and in Montana.

It is often said and is widely believed that war is good for the American economy. Historically, and perhaps most notably in the case of World War II, recovery from economic hard times has been associated with wartime military buildups. Does this mean that we need military spending in order to reach acceptable levels of production and employment? I believe the answer is no. Quite the contrary, military spending is economically unhealthful.

The reason military spending has led to economic recovery in the past is that it was an acceptable way of raising total spending in a depressed, spending starved economy. We recognize this fact now and ever since the passage of the Full Employment Act in 1947, the Federal government has tried to manipulate total spending to maintain economic health. But total spending can be increased in a number of ways. One of these is to cut taxes so that household consumption and business investment can rise. Another is to raise the non-military, social component of government spending for highways, schools, health care, agriculture, and other programs.

All this means that when we spend more on the military, we spend less on other things. And if we want to know the effect of military spending on employment, we should compare the employment created by military spending to the employment lost due to lower civilian expenditures.

To measure these effects is difficult, since it is possible to imagine any number of civilian alternatives to military spending. I would like to examine one such analysis, however, because I think it is representative and instructive.

What would happen to employment in Montana if defense spending were cut 30% and the money used for other non-defense programs? We can answer this questions with some accuracy using the results of a study by Roger Bezdek[#] (Journal of Regional Science, Vol, 15, No. 2). Bezdek computed the impact of such a shift in spending on production and employment in each of 86 U.S. industries. If we apply his findings to Montana's important industries, for the year 1980, we find the results given in Table 1.

Table 1

<u>Industry</u>	<u>Montana Employment* in 1980</u>	<u>% Change in Employment resulting from a 30% reduction in military spending and a corresponding rise in non-military expenditures (Bezdek)</u>	<u>Change in Montana Employment</u>
Farming**	10,345	.7	72
Mining	8,774	-.7	-60
Construction	14,578	14.6	2,128
Food Products	4,053	.5	20
Lumber Products	9,120	5.2	474
Transportation	13,980	-1.0	-140
Communications	5,199	.7	36
Public Utilities	4,111	.6	25
Wholesale and Retail Trade	72,322	.1	72
Finance and Insurance	13,577	.8	109
Hotels, Personal and Repair Services	10,297	1.3	134
Business Services	4,199	1.1	46
Household Service	4,488	.9	40
Professional Service	38,202	11.7	4,469
State and Local Government	52,064	.3	156
TOTAL	266,309		7,581

*The industries listed provided 87% of Montana's wage and salary employment in 1980.

**Figure includes only paid farm labor and excludes proprietors.

#Bezdek wrote this article while serving as Chief, Industry GNP Branch, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Overall, diverting 30% of the military budget and spending it on education, housing, medical care, and the like would increase Montana employment by 2.8%.

Why is this so? One reason is that civilian oriented industries tend to create more than technology and capital intensive military industries. Thus Bezdek's study shows that nationwide the \$30 billion shift would increase employment 2%. In addition, we in Montana have, despite the silos and bases, few military industries. The strength of Montana's economy is more directly tied to the strength of the nation's civilian economy.

I should emphasize that this analysis supposes that the impact of the military spending cut falls across all areas of the country in proportion to the current level of military activity in each. It should also be understood that within Montana the effects of the spending shift would not be the same for every community. Those communities that are benefited should be prepared to help those which may be harmed.

But in sum I think the lesson is clear. For an economy like ours, large scale diversion of government spending from social to military programs, such as the President is proposing in his current budget, will be harmful to Montana's production and employment.

Thank you.

NAME Charles M. Caughlan BILL NO. SJR 10
ADDRESS 23 Gondner Park Dr. DATE 2/7/83
WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT Mont. Citizens to End the Arms Race
SUPPORT ☒ OPPOSE ☐ AMEND ☐

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

NAME: ROB BARTLEY DATE: 2/7/87

PHONE: 259-2144

APPEARING ON WHICH PROPOSAL: SJE 10

COMMENTS: _____

PLEASE LEAVE ANY PREPARED STATEMENTS WITH THE COMMITTEE SECRETARY.



Chilton
**Q
&
A**

**QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
ON THE
SOVIET THREAT
AND NATIONAL SECURITY**

Butch

**Disarmament Program
American Friends Service Committee
1501 Cherry Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102**


Questions and Answers on the Soviet Threat and National Security

	Page
1. We do have to provide for national security. A strong military makes us secure doesn't it?	3
2. Without a strong defense wouldn't we be vulnerable to attack and invasion as we were in the early days of World War II?	3
3. But if we don't maintain a strong nuclear deterrent, couldn't the Soviets put us in a position where, if we didn't capitulate to their demands, they'd strike first, wipe out our forces and take over?	4
4. Hasn't our nuclear deterrence policy worked? It's prevented nuclear war so far, hasn't it?	4
5. Aren't the Russians building up their military faster than the U.S.?	7
6. Don't they spend more on arms than the U.S.?	7
7. If we spend more, couldn't we win the arms race?	8
8. Of course we want disarmament, but what about the Russians?	8
9. The Soviet system is different. Even if the Soviet people want peace, the government isn't responsive to the Soviet people.	9
10. But the Soviets have been expanding ever since World War II. Look what happened in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and now in Afghanistan. Aren't they also in Africa and hadn't we better be prepared to stop this Soviet expansionism?	11
11. What about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Doesn't this prove the USSR is seeking to expand its territory?	13
12. Isn't the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a first step toward their eventual goal of gaining control of Middle East oil?	15
13. Doesn't the U.S. have a responsibility to defend freedom and support our allies around the world?	16
14. Everyone wants disarmament, but how would disarmament begin? What about the Soviet Union?	18
15. Even if the Soviets agree to arms limitation or reductions, how do we know they won't cheat? You can't trust the Russians!	19
16. How about the Helsinki Treaty? The Soviets violate human rights, so why should we trust them?	21

17. Even if the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. agree on initial steps towards disarmament, what about the other nuclear powers—China, for example, or the countries which already have or may soon have nuclear capability (Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, for example)? 22
18. Unemployment is a terrible problem. Doesn't military spending provide jobs? 23
19. Isn't military spending good for the economy? World War II got us out of the Depression, didn't it? 24
20. Everything you say sounds very risky. How can we rely on such an untested system when our national security is at stake? 25
21. People have always fought. Isn't it unrealistic to expect us to get rid of war? Can we really change human nature? 26
22. Aren't we powerless - helpless - to do anything to change the situation? It's really in other hands. 26

1. *We do have to provide for national security. A strong military makes us secure, doesn't it?*

A. In the short run, arms may make people feel secure. The problem is that our reliance on nuclear armaments which appears to increase security actually is making us less and less secure. Each day, the United States adds 3 new nuclear warheads to its stockpile of over 9,200 strategic nuclear warheads,¹ enough to destroy every Soviet city of 100,000 or more 35 times.² Just one of the US's 31 Poseidon submarines carries more explosive power than was detonated in all of Europe and Japan in World War II.³



In an attempt to catch up with the US, which has led the nuclear arms race from the start, the Soviet Union is steadily increasing its military power and for the first time, is considered equal to the US in overall strategic nuclear capability.⁴ With its present stockpile of 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads,⁵ the USSR can destroy every American city of 100,000 or more 28 times.⁶ Furthermore, there are already other nations with nuclear weapons, and by 1985, there may be as many as 35 more.⁷

With each escalation of the nuclear arms race our security is actually diminished. Does anyone doubt that we and the Soviets are less secure now than we were in 1945 before nuclear weapons existed? We all experience, almost on a daily basis, a growth in our fears and in our sense that we no longer control our own national destiny or our ability to decide on whether there will be war or peace.

2.

Without a strong defense wouldn't we be vulnerable to attack and invasion as we were in the early days of World War II.

A.

The situation today is totally different than in World War II. There is no real defense against attack by nuclear weapons. It takes 30 minutes or less for a nuclear weapon to travel bet-

On the United States and the Soviet Union. The smallest nuclear bomb in either arsenal is three times the size of the bomb that we dropped on Hiroshima.

Nuclear war is a wholly new kind of war. There would be no winners. In a major nuclear exchange, the US would lose over 165 million people and the Soviet Union almost as many.⁸ A so-called limited war could kill as many as 20 million in each nation.⁹ There can be no quantitative comparison of this kind of war with any in the past.

But if we don't maintain a strong nuclear deterrent, couldn't the Soviets put us in a position where, if we didn't capitulate to their demands, they'd strike first, wipe out our forces and take over?

The "capitulation scenario" has serious flaws. One is the misconception that the US does not already have a strong deterrent.

Just two submarines using their destructive power equal to 1,000 Hiroshima-sized weapons can destroy all the 200 major Soviet cities. In the 1960's Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, demonstrated that 400 nuclear missiles would be an adequate deterrent, since they would be able to destroy 30% of the population and 75% of the industrial capacity of the USSR.¹⁰ So it is virtually impossible that the Soviet Union could ever wipe out our forces without getting wiped out in return. The more important and more difficult question for Americans and Russians is whether our goal should be to threaten each other with mass destruction.

This is exactly the reason that a new alternative to "capitulation" vs. "first strike" must be developed. Instead of a new weapons system (which would surely provoke an equivalent system on the other side) we need to build a security system so that those two unacceptable choices are gradually replaced by a conflict resolution process which, as Robert Johansen writes, can "allow us to avoid war . . . without fear of being bullied or conquered in a world of sometimes selfish and brutal governments."¹¹

Hasn't our nuclear deterrence policy worked? It's prevented nuclear war so far, hasn't it?

It is true, there has not yet been a nuclear war, but this may have been more by luck than by design. The nuclear war that we all fear may have been avoided only because there have been no serious accidents, misunderstandings or miscalculations in the past 35 years. We did come dangerously close during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even more significantly, the

direction of the current global arms race increases the likelihood of nuclear war in at least four ways:


(1) the number of nations with nuclear weapons is increasing (this is called horizontal proliferation). Until recently there were only two nations with nuclear weapons capability. It is estimated that there will be 100 nuclear nations by the year 2000 unless something is done to reverse the trend.¹²

(2) a new generation of nuclear weapons deployed in an atmosphere of increased tension makes a first strike more thinkable. In the past, we and the Soviets shared a policy of deterrence called, "mutual assured destruction", that is, each side possessed nuclear arsenals which threatened such awesome retaliatory destruction of the population centers of the other that it was believed neither side would consider it "worthwhile" to begin a nuclear war. But now both sides are developing counterforce weapons, such as the MX and the Trident II missiles, which focus on military targets and not civilian targets. Such weapons theoretically can first strike and destroy an enemy's weapons before they can be used against us. So it means our weapons must be kept on a hairtrigger alert, in order to "launch on warning", and the danger of nuclear war is greatly increased. In an international crisis where tensions are running high, one nation or another would be that much more likely to "go first", if it believed that its own weapons might be destroyed.

(3) the capacity for miniaturization of nuclear weapons and for pinpoint accuracy leads to the contemplation of a "limited" nuclear war. As technology expands enabling the



'Great news! We've inflicted unacceptable damage on the other side.'



US to build more accurate and smaller warheads, missile homing devices, better data processing, charged particle beam interceptor satellites, etc., the US military defense posture is moving away from the deterrence concept, to a pre-emptive "limited" nuclear war fighting strategy. On August 6, 1980, the Carter administration made this shift in strategy public in Presidential Directive #59. The Directive said that the US would be targeting military sites, not civilian, and that it could then engage in prolonged "limited" nuclear wars with the Soviets.¹³ The President then called for the building of the MX Missile, which is the ultimate in technological development combining the various improvements necessary for "limited" nuclear war fighting.

Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger said, "it is immoral to target cities," and "we have to make the underlying calculations about nuclear war intellectually acceptable."¹⁴ Such beliefs pave the way for certain confrontation and inevitable nuclear war, which have no guarantee of remaining limited.

(4) as technology becomes even more complex and sophisticated, the possibility of accidental war increases enormously. There have already been 50 accidents since 1945 involving American nuclear weapons.¹⁵ The US Air Force has admitted 15 accidents involving planes carrying nuclear bombs and, on one occasion, a B-52 bomber crashed in South Carolina with a 10 megaton bomb on board. The impact of the crash triggered four of the five interlocking safety devices guarding the warhead.¹⁶

The US has been on strategic nuclear alert 16 times since the nuclear arms race began.¹⁷ On several occasions the information provoking the alert was later discovered to be incorrect. Most recently, on June 3 and again on June 8 of 1980, a malfunctioning 46¢ computer circuit chip in a NORAD computer was the cause of a full alert signaling a Soviet missile attack.¹⁸ Fortunately, the error was caught within six minutes. As we and the Soviets move to a "launch on warning" or counterforce policy, the time for

response will be diminished and the likelihood of nuclear war is increased.

Because the risks of nuclear war - and the consequences of such a war - are so profound and unpredictable, it is time to begin considering a reversal of direction towards a security system not based on one nation's ability to destroy another nation.

Aren't the Russians building up their military faster than the US?

5.

A. The Soviet Union's military capability has been increasing. Since 1964 when the Brezhnev era began, a serious Soviet armament program was undertaken as a response to the "humiliation" suffered during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It has proceeded steadily ever since, with the rate of buildup remaining the same over the years.¹⁹ The pattern has been for the US to make an advance in the arms race and for the USSR to match us approximately six years later. There is no question that this steady Soviet military growth (for example, their increasing number of MIRV's - Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles) threatens the invulnerability of our ICBM's - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles - in the same way that our MIRV'd missiles have been able to threaten their ICBM's since the early 70's.

According to the US Department of State, "in terms of overall nuclear power, the two nations are roughly equal".²⁰ This is called "essential equivalence" although the US still maintains significant technologic superiority in such important aspects of accuracy, lethality, readiness and warhead numbers.²¹ The SALT II Treaty reflected this equality or parity in the two Superpower's nuclear capability and many experts believe now is the time to stop the arms race. Such parity may not come again.

Don't they spend more on arms than the US?


While the Soviet Union appears to be spending a higher percentage of it's GNP on armaments, this may be a serious distortion of comparative reality since the Soviet GNP is half as large as the US's.²² In addition, official US estimates of Soviet military spending (where we get the percentages to begin with) are based on CIA figures arrived at by computing

6.

A.

*The US leads in strategic warheads 3 to 2; in MIRV'd ICBMs 2 to 1; in MIRV'd submarines 4 to 1; and in heavy bombers 3 to 1. Soviet missiles are less accurate. They suffer from geographical disadvantages and no overseas bases of any consequence. Fifty percent of the US missile launching sub fleet can operate away from port at one time, only 11% of the Soviet fleet can.

Soviet costs in terms of US dollars.²³ Because the ruble is not convertible on the inflationary international market, those figures grossly overestimate the true cost. For example, the CIA computes the Soviet army pay not at the low Soviet ruble scale for their drafted army, but at our high volunteer army dollar rate, with all the fringe benefits.²⁴



7.

If we spend more, couldn't we win the arms race?

A.

The key question is whether our current military program makes it more or less likely that the Soviet Union will continue to increase its military strength. As former State Department official and consultant to the Pentagon, Richard Barnett says, "It would do well to remember that a generation of periodic tough talk and \$1.75 trillion in military expenditures has not caused the Soviet Union to wilt but rather has encouraged a steady increase in its military power."²⁵

If we realize our expansion has encouraged theirs (and possibly vice versa), we need to ask if there is an alternative strategy we might follow which would provide incentives for the Soviet Union to follow a different kind of US lead - a lead to reduce armaments and to demilitarize our relationship.

8.

Of course we want disarmament, but what about the Russians?

A.

It is difficult to assess Soviet intentions with any certainty. After all they have kept pace with the US and do maintain a formidable nuclear arsenal. Why should they give it up?

As the SALT II Treaty says, the US and the USSR have reached "parity". It is a unique and historic moment in the arms race. The Soviets, previously "behind", wouldn't reduce their arms from such a position of inferiority. The US wouldn't voluntarily give up its "lead". But now, for the first time in 35 years, both sides have agreed to their "equality".

The Soviets are now in a political and psychological position to reduce. It is an opportune moment for a mutual freeze, after which, real reductions of equal value could be made. The Soviets do have good reasons as well as self-interest to engage in nuclear disarmament steps with the US.

From their point of view, since almost all the nuclear weapons in the world not in the Soviet Union are aimed at the Soviet Union, it would be to their advantage to reduce that

disproportion by engaging in mutual reductions with the US, their most significant adversary.

Second, the arms race is a terrible economic drain on the resources of the USSR. Many consumer items we take for granted, such as clothing, appliances, food and automobiles, are simply not available in adequate quantity to Soviet citizenry largely because of the diversion of national resources into arms spending. Any reductions would be desirable, beneficial and welcomed.

Finally, a mutually agreed arms freeze and/or reduction now would stop the superpower move to counterforce weapons - a technologic development that will be made first by the United States. Recognizing the military dangers of such a move, and being behind by several years in this development, the Soviets would see an advantage in stopping this mutual escalation of the arms race.

The Soviet system is different. Even if the people want peace, the government isn't responsive to the Soviet people.

9.

A.

Yes, the Soviet system is different. Imperfect as our system may be, we do have a representative government. The government of the USSR has a centralized authority vested in a small number of men. However, while the USSR is not democratic in our terms, we should also realize that there are opposing points of view within the Soviet government. The policies we follow do affect Soviet policy. By continuing to build up our military, we provide more fuel for those in the Soviet Union who would - and do - use US military power to justify a Soviet buildup.

Many Americans have little appreciation for the historic experiences of the Soviet people as it has to do with war. Three times during this century, the USSR was invaded by Western forces: during the First World War by the Germans, then right after their revolution in 1920 when 14 Western nations including the United States invaded, in an attempt to crush the new revolution, and finally in World War II when the German Nazis penetrated deep into the USSR - destroying 73,000 villages and cities and killing 20 million Soviet citizens.²⁶ No Russian was left unaffected.

These experiences have left deep psychological scars on the Soviet people and its government, creating an almost paranoic fear about war and military threats from the outside. Such a psychological heritage has also been exploited by the Soviet government leaders to justify more arms and to manipulate public opinion when it comes to intervening militarily in nations along the Russian border.

This being the case, what the US does that seems to threaten or inflame Soviet paranoia and insecurity, is likely only to increase a Soviet military response. What we need to do is strengthen those within the Soviet government who also recognize that reversing the arms race builds greater security.

The recent US-NATO plan to deploy 572 new nuclear missiles in Europe, particularly on German soil, caused tremendous anxiety in the Soviet Union. So great was the sentiment against these new "Euro-strategic" weapons, that President Brezhnev took the unprecedented step in October 1979 of announcing a unilateral reduction of Soviet troops (15% of all Soviet Warsaw Pact men) and arms in East Germany, as well as offering a unilateral reduction of the Soviets' most modern medium range nuclear missiles stationed in Russia.²⁷ His offer was dismissed by the US almost without consideration.

The Soviet Union has made other proposals to the West that were never seriously followed up, and so we will never know how serious the Soviets were in making them. These proposals included percentage cuts in military budgets, outlawing weapons of mass destruction, general and complete disarmament frameworks, reduction of armies in central Europe, comprehensive test bans, and pledges to never use nuclear weapons first, or against non-nuclear states.²⁸ Most of these initiatives remain virtually unknown to most American citizens. Those in the Soviet Union who favor more military buildup will remember them and their rejection by the US, and will likely increase the influence they attain in Moscow's ruling circles.



10.

But the Soviets have been expanding ever since World War II. Look what happened in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and now in Afghanistan. Aren't they also in Africa and hadn't we better be prepared to stop this Soviet expansionism?

A.

In recent times, the Soviets have exhibited a greater willingness to project power at a distance where the opportunity presents itself. As in the nuclear arms race, the USSR has been an imitator in acting like a superpower in global affairs—show the flag, naval power, proxy armies, military aid, etc. Compared to the United States's network of 200 bases, alliances, aid programs and covert operations, the Soviet efforts outside its "sphere of influence" are modest. In the spirit of agreements about spheres of influence reached at the end of World War II at Yalta, the Soviet Union annexed a number of countries and still attempts to govern them according to the interests of Moscow. This expansion of territory and power into Eastern Europe by the Soviets was a direct result of their experience with two German invasions that brought incredible death and destruction to the Russians. While the continued maintenance and oppression of these World War II satellite countries as a "buffer zone" is to be condemned, their original annexation occurred in its historical context.

The Soviets have not annexed any new territory since World War II. (It should be noted that the US also did its share of land grabbing after World War II. We held on to Guam and Okinawa, as well Micronesia and the Marshall Islands.) In



Cliphart in The Washington Star

'...and Ivan the Terrible grew bigger and uglier and nastier, but the poor Pentagon had no money to stop him'

Hope the United States directly intervened to shape the post war governments in Greece, Italy and of course, West Germany, though we did not annex any European territory.

Generally, the Russians have been very cautious about their foreign policy moves, but will indeed strike hard when they feel their "buffer zone" or control over that "buffer" is about to give way, as in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. The Soviets do take a special interest in their borders, and are committed, within the constraints of world politics and their own resources, to military and economic support of revolutionary regimes abroad. They will do so where they can, as in Ethiopia and Angola. And where they can't, as in Chile when Allende needed help, they won't. This is not to say that their motives have been pure and consistent. They have also supported fascist governments as in Argentina, Iran (where they sent 25,000 advisors for the Shah) and in Morocco, when it suited their economic or geopolitical interests.

As more and more Third World nations throw off their yoke of colonialism and neo-colonialism, and look around the world for help, the Soviets stand ready and willing. They have given massive military and economic aid and they have been successful in gaining influence primarily among the world's poorest and most desperate countries. But outside the Soviet Union's own border states, the Soviets have not sent troops, or intervened militarily in a direct fashion.

The USSR intervened directly on three occasions between 1948 and 1980 - in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, all border countries. In the same time period, the US directly intervened militarily (sending US troops) on the average of once every 18 months, to such places as Guatemala (1954), Lebanon (1956), Vietnam (1960), Dominican Republic (1965), the Congo (1960), Iran (1953), Laos (1960) and Cambodia (1970).²⁹ All of these interventions, which were carried out to help put down disruptive revolutions, were justified by the US government as efforts to "stop communism". But of the 60 nationalist revolutions that swept the globe after World War II, only two (Vietnam and China) were actually communist-led directly. None were led by the Soviets. The Soviets aided both Vietnam and China, only after long struggles by the rebellious populations themselves.

The simple fact is, the US is the only nation capable of projecting and sustaining its power by military force globally, according to a report made in 1979 by the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁰ At the moment and well into the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union cannot militarily "expand" through the Third World, because it lacks the necessary military capabilities such as a large Marine Corps,

all force transport force, Naval carrier force, air and sea support systems, amphibious assault and lift ships, etc. For these reasons, the Rand Corporation concluded that "gross Soviet capabilities to project power abroad do not remotely equal the US's" and could not sustain an occupation/invasion beyond its own immediate border state areas.³¹

The US is the only nation that has hundreds of thousands of its troops (540,000) stationed on over 200 bases and military installations around the world.³² It uses military aid, training and advisors extensively (currently relating to at least 61 countries, including 9 in Africa).³³ The Soviet Union is mimicking such activity in Angola and Ethiopia. While viewed as serious threats to our economic interests, they should be seen in the light of our own actions.


In fact, the Soviets have experienced major failures even in their relatively limited Third World presence. The Soviets have been kicked out of Egypt (1972), the Sudan and Somalia (1977) and several times out of Guinea Bissau. To lesser degrees, they have overstayed their welcome in India, Iraq and Indonesia.

On a good day, according to the Center for Defense Information headed by Admiral Gene LaRocque, Russia can command the allegiance of only 19 countries (out of 155).³⁴ The Center's careful study, "Soviet Geopolitical Momentum" produced in January, 1980, found that Soviet influence, in fact, has actually decreased since the late 1950's, and their setbacks dwarf marginal Soviet advances in lesser countries. The US, on the other hand, commands 70% of the world's military and economic power.³⁵

In most countries of the Third World there is a growing resentment and resistance to domination by either superpower, whether it be military domination or economic. It is naive and patronizing of us to believe that Third World nations who throw off one form of oppression - neo-colonialism - are going to accept another kind from the Soviets. Iran is a good example. Iranians don't want to be dominated by either superpower. Whatever success policies the USSR or the US achieve in the Third World countries depends mostly on whether the policies serve the purposes of the local governments. In short, indigenous forces set the limits on what the Soviet Union can do in their nation.

What about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Doesn't this prove the USSR is seeking to expand its territory?

The Soviet view that Afghanistan is in its influence sphere is long standing, and there is nothing new or good about Soviet willingness to employ military power in adjacent territory if



they perceive their security threatened. The invasion of Afghanistan will surely go down as a brutal, immoral, tragic adventure. Typical of big power behavior, the Soviets moved into Afghanistan militarily when they were about to lose the political influence they had for many years. Prompted by the failing of the pro-Soviet government in power since 1937 and perhaps fearing the rise of Islamic revolution in the region, as well as Islamic and Chinese aid to Afghan rebels, the USSR invaded to restore its controlling influence. Without implying that the invasion was justified or that it can succeed, the invasion proved no direct threat to the United States.


Since 1977, Afghanistan has had an overtly Marxist government. The current rebellion is led by landlords and tribal chieftans who resisted the Marxist attempts at land reform and efforts to halt ancient religious and cultural customs. In Afghanistan, the literacy rate is 5%; the per capita income per year is \$120; infant mortality is running 253 per 1000. The revolution begun in 1977 to change these facts happened without the support of the Afghan people and was, therefore, doomed to failure.³⁶

The rebels who opposed the unpopular, pro-Soviet government began receiving massive aid from Egypt, Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia and China in 1978.³⁷ Later, the CIA admitted that it too, had sent guns and supplies.³⁸ Late in 1979, the Soviets watched the fervent Muslim nationalism sweep up the Persian Gulf, into Afghanistan. The Soviets have 50 million Muslims in Central Russia, just above the Afghan border, who could have been influenced to challenge Soviet central authority, further destabilizing the situation.

Add to these internal developments a considerable US military activity, including the formation of a NATO-like structure, in the Persian Gulf region that occurred in response to the hostage taking in Iran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred precisely at the moment the US had its largest military presence in the Persian Gulf - two aircraft carrier Task Forces with 25 destroyers, 150 fighter bombers, 590 helicopters and 40,000 combat troops. From a Soviet perspective, it may have occurred to them that the US might have been tempted to seize a destabilized Afghanistan and

turn it into a new listening post on Russia's southern border. Would the US have reacted differently if the Soviets had massed a similar military force in the Gulf of Mexico?

The Soviet Union had its own reasons for invading Afghanistan. At the same time, United States actions toward the USSR in 1979 gave little cause for Soviet restraint. US talk of a military alliance with China, failure to ratify the SALT II Treaty, the large military budget increases, plans to install new nuclear weapons in Europe and the general failure of detente weakened whatever inhibitions the Soviets might have had to stay out of Afghanistan.



12. A.

Isn't the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a first step toward their eventual goal of gaining control of Middle East oil?

A look at the map reveals that the Soviets wouldn't need to go through Afghanistan to get to the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan and Turkmen and the Soviet controlled Caspian Sea provide much closer and more direct access to Middle East oil fields than the treacherous passes of Afghanistan.

The Soviets are interested in access to raw materials, and according to the CIA, will be net importers of oil by the year 2000. But at the moment, the Soviets are the largest producers of the oil in the world—11.7 million barrels every day—from their own wells, with no evidence of the oil diminishing yet.³⁹ They are net exporters of oil with 71 billion barrels in reserve, 11% of the world total.⁴⁰ They also have one-third of the world's gas reserves and 57% of the world's coal.⁴¹ If the US is concerned about the Soviet need for oil, then the last thing we should do is cut off our supply of oil drilling bits to the Soviets which we did last winter. That technology will help them remain self sufficient in oil.

Even if one were to ignore these facts and assume that the Soviets do contemplate invading the Middle East for oil, the idea that either the USSR or the United States could take con-

control and "protect" the flow of oil by military force has been shown to be practically impossible. The flow of Middle East oil can only be protected if there is peace and stability. At every stage—from extraction to storage, to shipment, to distillation—oil is the most vulnerable of resources. The fragile oil technology—including wells, rigs, pipelines and tankers—cannot be permanently protected or acquired intact by any outside military force, no matter how well trained and equipped.

Doesn't the US have a responsibility to defend freedom and support our allies around the world?

Certainly "defending freedom" and "standing by our friends" are principles that most Americans support. Moreover, most Americans recognize that the US is deeply involved in world affairs: politically, economically, socially and culturally. Like it or not, the US cannot become "isolationist" again. The debate begins over what "freedom" and what "friends" our government defends. Frequently, our "national interests" turn out to be the economic interest of the few.

The US has military pacts with 42 countries and treaties, executive agreements, arms sales, military associations and alliances with 92 countries.⁴³ The US has given massive quantities (\$176 billion since 1945) in foreign military and economic aid,⁴³ and sold \$13 billion worth of arms to 90 foreign countries in FY '79.⁴⁴ This represents 56% of the world's arms trade - more than Russia, France, Britain and China combined.

Many Americans believe that the US has engaged in such military and economic commitments for the main purpose of preserving freedom and democracy. But the reality is that the top ten recipients of US military and economic aid, according to Amnesty International, are also the world's top ten dictators or violators of human rights: South Korea, The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Haiti, Brazil and formerly, Iran.⁴⁵ Is there any way to justify US support to these governments as "defending freedom"? According to testimony by Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA), 51 countries or 69% of the nations receiving military grants from the US are classified as "repressive regimes". These governments allow US air and naval bases on their soil and offer a "favorable investment climate" for the US multinational corporations: low wages, no unions, no strikes, cheap raw materials and no government regulations. All these countries have conditions "favorable" to US business.⁴⁶

Eugene Black, former president of the World Bank and later President Johnson's advisor on Asian development, summed up the advantages of foreign aid to US business, thus:

The three major benefits are: (1) foreign aid provides a substantial and immediate market for US goods and services; (2) foreign aid stimulates the development of new overseas markets for US companies; (3) foreign aid orients national economies towards a free enterprise system in which US firms can prosper.⁴⁷

The Annual Report presented by our Secretary of Defense every year says that protection of \$168 billion worth of US private corporate investments, along with the "free access to" and the "continued flow" of raw materials, is one major assumption behind and purpose for our military forces.⁴⁸

Since mid-century, the US has not been self-sufficient in its raw materials needs. As a matter of fact, a former Secretary of the Navy said that "69 of 72 vital raw materials without which our businesses could not function, are wholly or in part imported into the US."⁴⁹ The US, as 6% of the world's population, actually uses 40% of the world's supply of basic commodities and raw materials, mainly acquired from the Third World.⁵⁰

It is for this reason that the bulk of the US military budget (80%) goes into "power projection" forces to distant places, while only 20% goes for the actual defense of the US continent.⁵¹

Since 1945, according to the Brookings Institute, the US has used military force 215 times to gain political or economic ends.⁵² In the name of national security, or the protection of areas of "vital interests", the US has also threatened the use of nuclear weapons 19 times.⁵³ (Truman and Eisenhower during the Korean War; Kennedy during the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis; Nixon during the Vietnam War; and most recently, Carter's explicit nuclear threat in his commitment to defend the Persian Gulf oil fields.)

The question for Americans is first, should we continue to "need" all the resources we gather, use and maintain in the Third World by our military might, and second, whether our military forces, or unused nuclear threats, or economic payoffs can "win friends" and protect our interests in the long run?

Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union and the US have both jockeyed for more favorable positions in the Third World. But neither superpower has been able to use its military to control indigenous movements totally, in for example, Iran (US) or Iraq and Egypt (USSR).

The Soviet presence in the Third World may have less to do with economics, but rather with superpower rivalry. The Soviet Union produces most of its energy sources and minerals it needs from the huge land mass under its direct control. They have few - if any - investments around the globe.

As many experts have pointed out, the Soviet military establishment is designed for different purposes than that of the US, with far more of its budget directed toward internal security and defense and virtually no "power projection" forces.³⁴


The crisis in Iran and Afghanistan demonstrated the ineffectiveness of military force to resolve what are basically political problems. Military strength could not free the American hostages nor could it prevent the Soviet Union from invading Afghanistan. Both conflicts confirm the increasing need to develop adequate diplomatic and political means of resolving the kinds of problems we are likely to face in the 1980's - as raw materials dwindle and as massive military arsenals make the idea of "being #1" more and more meaningless.

Many people would agree that we need a new foreign policy that recognizes the legitimate rights of indigenous populations and the need for just compensation for extracted raw materials. To ensure friendly, cooperative relations with the Third World, the US should be in favor of, and help build, a strong, non-aligned independent movement, free of super-power intervention. Such a movement will provide the strongest barrier to Soviet moves in the Third World.

14. *Everyone wants nuclear disarmament, but how would disarmament begin? What about the Soviet Union?*

Of course, stopping the nuclear arms race must involve the Soviet Union as well as the United States, and the other countries which possess nuclear weapons. Although Costa Rica actually did abolish its military to save resources for social development, most nations are not going to disarm unilaterally. In the long run our goal must be general and complete disarmament. But how to begin?

One proposal receiving more and more attention is for a nuclear moratorium or "freeze". Since experts agree that currently there is parity or essential equivalence and both sides possess overkill capacity, now is the time for both nations to agree to a mutual 3 to 5 year freeze or moratorium on the pro-



curement, testing, production and deployment of all new nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers. Such a freeze or moratorium would begin when the President of the United States and the leaders of the Soviet Union announced simultaneously, or in close succession, a halt to new nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

The United States or the Soviet Union could start progress toward this agreement by taking minimal, independent initiatives before mutual agreement on the moratorium is reached. Initiatives might include a cessation of underground nuclear tests for three months; a ban on some or all missile firings; the announcement that military spending in the next fiscal year would not exceed that of the current year (with evidence of compliance submitted to the UN Center for Disarmament); the halt of further deployment, for a specific period, of one new strategic weapon, or improvement of an existing weapon. Each of these independent actions would need to be highly publicized and would be accompanied by an invitation for reciprocity. Failure to respond to an initiative would entail a loss of prestige or international influence in the international community, especially among non-nuclear nations.

This procedure follows precisely the precedent of the 1963 atmospheric test ban. In 1963 President John Kennedy took an independent initiative by proclaiming that the US would cease atmospheric nuclear testing so long as the Soviet Union did not test. A few days later the Soviet Union reciprocated, beginning a process of peaceful response and counter response which led to the negotiation of a successful treaty banning above ground nuclear tests.³⁵

Even if the Soviets agree to arms limitation or reduction, how do we know they won't cheat? You can't trust the Russians!

We can never be 100% sure that one side or the other will not somehow find a way to subvert the very sophisticated mechanisms used to verify agreements on arms limitations. Called "national technical means" these mechanisms include photographic reconnaissance satellites and various other types of monitoring devices which do not require US physical presence on Soviet soil in order to check whether the Soviet Union is abiding by the agreement in question.³⁶ The Soviet Union uses similar mechanisms to make sure the US is not cheating. Another reason to support a freeze on new nuclear weapons is that according to experts on both sides, the current nuclear weapons are verifiable by available monitoring devices. New weapons may not be verifiable and will cause new problems for arms control.

If cheating did take place in any phase of arms limitations, (by either side), on a scale large enough to alter the strategic

15.

A.

be, it would be discovered in time to make appropriate response. The real risk is in continuing the arms race.

When it comes to arms control treaties and agreements, history tells a clear story about Soviet violations. In the past 21 years, the US and the USSR have signed 14 constructive and lasting agreements which have not been violated by the Soviets.⁵⁶ The Dept. of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Dept. and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in response to allegations that the Soviets have broken agreements, stated in the summer of 1980 in their joint position paper that "Soviet compliance performance under 14 arms control agreements has been good."⁵⁷

These agreements include:

- the 1959 Antarctic Treaty internationalizing and demilitarizing that continent
- 1963 nuclear test ban
- 1967 ban on nuclear weapons in outer space
- 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty
- 1971 ban on placing nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor
- 1972 convention forbidding changing the environment for military purposes
- 1972 SALT II Treaty

The SALT I Treaty was signed in 1972 and, even though it expired in 1977, it has not been violated by the USSR to date.⁵⁸ Even the unratified SALT II Treaty the Soviets signed with the US in June '79 has been upheld. Under the terms of that agreement, the Soviets were to dismantle a number of their Delta-class submarines by May '80 and they have done so.

No nation will keep a treaty unless it is in its interest to do so.⁵⁹ It has been in the Soviet interest to keep its arms treaties.

* When the US did suspect some type of Soviet violation, the question was brought before a US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission created by the agreement; each time, the question was answered to the stated satisfaction of the US, according to the State Department.


** Over the years, the US has not kept some of its treaty agreements. We signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 renouncing war, but committed aggression within its definition of aggression more than a dozen times during the next decade. We invaded Nicaragua, but excused our action as defensible under the Monroe Doctrine. We joined the Organization of American States in agreeing not to interfere in the domestic affairs of American states, and then sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965. We signed the Potsdam Agreement to break up German corporations and make German rearmament impossible and proceeded to violate it right up to today with the placement of US nuclear missiles on German soil. We committed the Japanese to a constitution guaranteeing a non-military status, and are now pressuring for a change.

16. But how about the Helsinki Treaty? The Soviets violate human rights, so why should we trust them?

A.

The Helsinki Accord was not an arms control treaty. In fact, it was not even a treaty, legally binding all parties. Nevertheless, the Soviets didn't find it in their interest to honor the human rights aspects of the Helsinki document (which actually consolidated the post World War II boundaries in Europe.) The human rights provisions of the accords affected their domestic internal policies, which should not be confused with international arms control treaties.

It is still in their perceived self "interest" as a government to repress internal political expression and freedom of movement. These are political rights, and highly valued in the United States. The Soviets emphasize economic and social rights. Many Americans are not satisfied with the definition limiting rights only to political and civil ones, and we are gradually seeing the need to support economic rights as well. At the same time, here in the US, we have a responsibility to do what we can to support those within the Soviet Union who struggle for their political and civil rights. But it is important how we do it.



For example, when, out of concern for the oppression of Jews in the USSR, Senator Henry Jackson attached the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Bill in 1974 requiring a certain quota of Jewish emigration from Russia in exchange for conferring "most favored nation" trade status on the USSR, the anger of the Soviet government at what it considered interference in its domestic affairs, made the number of Jews allowed to emigrate fall to an all-time low—10,000 in 1975. When relations were good—at the height of détente in late '78-'79—emigration was the highest ever—51,000.³⁹

Internal oppression seems to increase when external events threaten the Kremlin's sense of security. When the US tightened the economic screws on Moscow over Afghanistan late in 1979, the Kremlin cracked down on Sakarov and other "dissidents." Threatening the Kremlin economically or with enormous destructive nuclear capabilities will not force them into a more acceptable human rights policy. The opposite seems to be the case.

Even if the USSR and the US agree on initial steps toward disarmament, what about the other nuclear powers - China, for example, or the countries which already have or may soon have nuclear capability (Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, for example)?

There are six known nuclear powers today. Unless there is a world wide effort to reverse the arms race, it is estimated that by 1985 there will be more than 35 nations with nuclear weapons capability, and perhaps 100 nuclear nations by the year 2000. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was signed in 1968 and was revised in 1980, prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states. It also prohibits the sale of nuclear materials which can be used for making weapons to those countries not signing the agreement. But not all potential nuclear powers have signed the NPT. Until those nations with huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons (principally the US and the USSR) begin to reduce those stockpiles as required by Article VI of the treaty, and until there are better guarantees that nuclear weapons won't be used against non-nuclear states, the treaty will lack appeal. If the superpowers continue to act as though they feel more secure with nuclear weapons than without them then there is very little incentive for other nations not to follow suit.

The decision by President Carter to sell 40 tons of enriched uranium to India—which has not yet signed the NPT or agreed to nuclear safeguards, and which has demonstrated a nuclear capability—diminishes the effectiveness of other non-proliferation efforts.

Developing nations actually have a great deal to gain from

disarmament. Many of these nations initiated the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament. Part of their reason for helping convene this world gathering on disarmament was their own unmet needs: since 1960, donor nations have spent a yearly average of \$5.00 per capita to aid poorer nations, and \$95.00 per capita for their own military forces. In developing nations there is one soldier for each 250 inhabitants and one doctor for every 3,700. Developing nations use five times as much foreign exchange for the import of arms as for agricultural machinery. And for the estimated cost of a new ICBM (the MX), 50 million malnourished children in developing countries could be adequately fed, 65,000 health care centers and 34,000 primary schools built.⁴⁰


There is certainly heated controversy over "who should go first" in the disarmament process - the military haves or the military have-lesses? What gets ignored in the controversy is the need for both superpowers to stop thinking that either side can "call the shots" any longer. We will find it much easier, both morally and politically, to address the militarization of other societies if we simultaneously address the militarization of our own nations.

Unemployment is a terrible problem. Doesn't military spending provide jobs?

First, military spending actually provides us with many fewer jobs annually than would be created if the same amount of funds were spent in the civilian sector. A US Department of Labor study found that each \$1 billion spent on such national needs as environmental control, alternative energy development or mass transport would yield, on the average, 20,000 more jobs per \$1 billion spent, than if spent on military programs.⁴¹

Second, as William Winsinger, President of the International Association of Machinists, one of the largest defense worker unions in the country, has said, "The Pentagon is a perpetual inflation machine. It drives up prices by pumping dollars, but not goods and services, into the economy, by siphoning scarce resources and raw materials into non-productive purposes, by condoning waste, cost over-runs and inefficiency among prime contractors who maximize profits by inflating costs, and by fueling ever larger deficits in the federal budget. More than half the present national debt is directly traceable to the Pentagon."⁴²

Third, since more than half of all Federal Research and Development funds are devoted to the military,⁴³ our military technology is now becoming the only area in which the US can still "compete" in the world economy. Unfortunately in the process, our civilian technological progress has become cor-



"Bring it past the Senate windows; they're discussing the military budget."

respondingly retarded, since about 50% of all the engineers and scientists in this country are employed by the defense establishment.⁶⁴

There is an alternative to this wasteful and dangerous military dependency. It's called economic conversion. The Machinists Union and the Auto Workers Union, who together make up more than half of all defense workers in the nation, have called for such a change and advocate legislation on economic conversion.

Senator Mathias has introduced the Defense Economic Adjustment Act in the Senate (and Cong. Weiss has introduced a House version). The bill would establish alternative use planning committees at major factories, create a contractor-financed trust fund to provide income payments to laid off workers and finance retraining.

The process of economic conversion (which could be funded in part by the significant savings which would follow real reductions in military spending) could help rebuild some of our past strengths: a civilian oriented economy with more available jobs, creating more life supporting goods and services.

Isn't military spending good for the economy? World War II got us out of the Depression, didn't it?

World II may have generated economic momentum that helped us out of the Depression, but ever since, the high rate of military spending has placed a heavy burden on the economy.

Ever since World War II, the DOD has been the largest single user of capital and technology and this, in turn, has

20.

A.

Everything you say sounds very risky. How can we rely on such an untested system when our security is at stake?

The present untested system of security is based on raising the risks of disaster. It is because our security is at stake that a non-military security system makes so much sense. Our present insecurity - military, economic and political - is due in large part to our failure to develop a workable and practical method to resolve conflicts.

Pentagon planners tend to think that our current system - one based on military force and threat - is tested and proven. Yet our experience with the unpredictability of conventional war and the danger of nuclear accidents is anything but reassuring. A large nuclear bomb test in the Pacific unexpectedly contaminated 8000 square miles of ocean. We continually take enormous risks with our military system.

For many people, the issue gets down to the balancing of risks. They hope that by building more weapons the situation will somehow stabilize, that we will learn to live with the balance of terror. We can hope that the 35 or more countries likely to possess nuclear weapons soon, unless something is done to reverse this trend, will not miscalculate one day, and in an international crisis situation, deliberately begin a nuclear exchange. Or we can begin now to examine and support steps to reverse the arms race and develop alternative international security systems.

19.

A.

It is no ~~fairer~~ to expect the advocates of an alternative security system to be able to predict exactly the future of human affairs than to expect the advocates of the military security to prove humanity will be secure with nuclear proliferation, the wasting of scarce resources, and continued military rivalry. To be sure, both paths are risky and fraught with danger. Yet, the risks for global community and genuine security are not unattractive when compared to the risks of perpetuating a system based on the threat of mass destruction."⁴⁸

21. *People have always fought. Isn't it unrealistic to expect us to get rid of war? Can we really change human nature?*

A. The views expressed in this pamphlet are hopeful views based on facts and on an unwillingness to settle for business as usual. We do not accept the formula that because something is now it must always be. It is useful to remember that people were convinced that slavery could never be abolished because it was a "natural part of life" and that "you couldn't change people". The Abolitionists were called "crazy" and "idealistic" and "naive".

To say that people have always fought is one thing. To say that because there has always been war there will always be war is another. People who support an alternative security system are not naive. They have decided that to continue on the old path of believing that nuclear weapons will not be used or that to prepare for war is the way to prepare for peace is the naive view.

It may be hard to imagine disarmament - a world without war - but is it not equally difficult to imagine a world after a nuclear war has occurred? Choices made today will surely effect which world greets our children tomorrow.


22. *Aren't we powerless - helpless - to do anything to change the situation? It's really in other hands.*

A. We are powerless and helpless only if we believe we are. In failing to act to change something, because the odds seem overwhelming, we create our own powerlessness. Yet to expect instant results - proof of our effectiveness - is to expect immediate gratification for actions which must be taken not just once but many times.

Remember, every great stride made in human progress was made through long, hard struggle which always seemed overwhelming to those doing the struggling. In our own history the labor movement, the struggle for women's suffrage, the freedom struggle, the movement to end the war in Vietnam - all these took years of concerted effort against great odds.

The issue comes back to whether we see ourselves as "predictors" or "creators". If we sit back and predict doom-day; if we decide that nuclear war is inevitable; if we say that the time is so short that the situation is basically hopeless; then we will know at least one thing for sure: we are powerless and helpless. But if we focus on what can be created and changed, if we perhaps gain inspiration from similar efforts undertaken by people who also had no recognition for their efforts for many years (the Abolition movement against slavery, for example), then we begin to challenge the feeling of powerlessness and we begin to empower ourselves.

The situation will remain in other hands unless those who recognize the bankruptcy of our current direction begin to register their concern. One specific way to do this is to focus on the independent initiatives process. This could be done within the context of a nuclear moratorium. Increasingly, religious, civic and national organizations are advocating a nuclear moratorium which would include a ban or halt on all new weapons production, testing, developing and research. Such a move would need to be an independent action by the US, one which does not require Soviet approval as a precondition. However, it would be vital for the US to invite Soviet response, and, if such responses were not forthcoming, to explore other non-military methods which might provide incentives for reciprocity. Such independent assertions in a new direction can begin to break down the image that a nation cannot aggressively wage peace.



Footnotes on Questions and Answers on the Soviet Threat

1. US Dept. of Defense, *Annual Report for FY 1981*, Harold Brown, Sec. of Defense, Jan. 1, 1979, p. 89
2. Admiral Gene LaRocque, "Survival: The Most Important Issue of Our Times", *ESA Forum* - 44, Washington, DC, p. 25
3. US Dept. of State Publication 8947, released June, 1978, p. 1
4. US Dept. of State Publication, "SALT and American Security", released Nov. 1978 p. 3
5. Same as #1
6. Same as #2
7. US Energy, Resources and Development Agency (now DOE), as quoted in *The Defense Monitor*, Center for Defense Information, Feb. 1979 also, William Epstein, "The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", *Scientific American*, April, 1975
8. US Office of Technology Assessment Report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as quoted in the *New York Times*, May 1979
9. Same as #8
10. US Joint Committee on Defense Production of the Congress Study, "Economic and Social Consequences of Nuclear Attacks on the US", March, 1989 p. 23-24
11. Robert Johansen, *Toward A Dependable Peace*, Working paper #8, World Order Models Project, Institute For World Order, 1978
12. US Committee for Economic Development Report as quoted by Sid Lens, *The Day Before Doomsday*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1977, p. 218-219
13. "Carter Said To Back A Plan For Limiting Any Nuclear War," Richard Burt, *New York Times*, August 6, 1980
14. Testimony of James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, before the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 4, 1974. Schlesinger's views are spelled out in the FY '75 Annual Defense Dept. report and two reports by the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control. "US-USSR Strategic Policies", May 1974 and "Briefings on Counterforce", January, 1975
15. "Accidents of Nuclear Weapons Systems", Chapter 3, *World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook* of the Swedish Government's Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1979
16. "The Day The Bomb Dropped on America", Clyde Burleson, *New York Post*, Nov. 26, 1978
17. "The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument", Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, the Brookings Institute

18. "Two False Alerts Traced to 46¢ Item", *New York Times*, June 18, 1980
19. "What Are The Russians Up To?" Congressman Les Aspin, *International Security*, Vol. 3, 1978, quoting from a CIA report, "A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1966-76", SR 77-10001U, Jan., 1977
20. Same as #4, p. 3
21. Testimony of Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, before Congress, January, 1979 as quoted in *The Defense Monitor*, Center For Defense Information, Feb. 1979, p. 4
22. "US and USSR Comparisons of GNP", Imogene Edwards, Margaret Hughes, James Noren, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Vol. 1, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the US, Washington, October 10, 1979, p. 378. (the authors are CIA economists). Also see *Price of Defense*, p. 35 for specific GNP figures.
23. US Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1970-1979: A Dollar Comparison", SR 80-1005, Washington, DC, January, 1980 p. 2
24. Same as #23, p. 2
25. "Showin' Them Commies", Richard Barnet, *New York Times*, June 6, 1978
26. *The Unknown War*, 20 part US documentary film produced by Central Studio of Documentaries for Air Time International Company, premiered at the US National Archives and the JFK Center and shown on TV across the country in May, 1979
27. "Soviet - East German Communique Affirms Plans to Cut Moscow's Forces", *New York Times*, Oct. 9, 1979; and "Moscow Repeats Pledge on Cutback in Missiles", *New York Times*, Nov. 17, 1979. Both news accounts based on a speech delivered by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in Berlin, Oct. 6, 1979
28. "Disarmament: Soviet Initiatives", Second Edition revised, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1979
29. "Challenging the Myths of National Security", Richard Barnet, *New York Times Magazine*, April 1, 1979
30. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *US Military Posture FY 79*, Statement to Congress, General George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Jan., 1978, p. 19
31. Rand Corporation Report, as quoted by Michael Klare, "The Power Projection Gap", *The Nation*, June 9, 1979, p. 676
32. The Boston Study Group, *The Price of Defense*, Times Books, NY, NY, 1979 p. 204 & 210; figures from the US Dept. of Defense, "Selected Manpower Statistics, FY 77"
33. The US Dept. of Defense, *Annual Report*, FY 81, Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Jan. 29, 1980, p. 223
34. "Soviet Geopolitical Influence Around the World from 1945 to 1980", Admiral Gene LaRocque, *The Defense Monitor*, Center for

35. Same as #34.
36. "On Afghanistan, With Skepticism", Fred Halliday, *New York Times* March 4, 1980
37. "Wrong Moves On Afghanistan", Fred Halliday, *The Nation*, Jan. 26, 1980
38. "US Supplying Afghan Insurgents With Arms in a Covert Operation", David Binder, *New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1980
39. "US Aides Say Soviet May Look to Persian Gulf For Oil in 1980's", Richard Burt, *New York Times*, April 15, 1980; "Studies See Oil Promise for Soviets", Youssef M. Iherhim, *New York Times*, May 17, 1980
40. Alexander Sulatov, *Mineral Resources and the Economy of the USSR*, as quoted in Richards Barnett's *The Giants*, Touchstone Press, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1977, p. 143-144
41. Same as #40
42. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and The Center Defense Information, as quoted by E. Raymond Wilson, "The Arms Race and Human Race", *ESA Forum-27*, March 1977, p. 21
43. US Agency for International Development Summary, FY 77 and prior years as quoted by the Campaign for a Democratic Foreign Policy, "US Foreign and Military Policy", *ESA Forum-27*, March 1977, p. 34
44. Same as #33, p. 224
45. Michael Klare, *Supplying Repression*, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC, p. 8
46. Testimony of Senator Alan Cranston, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 24, 1974
47. *Columbia Journal of World Business*, Vol. 1, Fall, 1965, p. 23
48. US Dept. of Defense, *Annual Report for FY '81*, Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, p. 26
49. US Secretary of the Navy, speech to the National Security Industrial Association, 1972, as quoted by Richard Barnett, *The Giants*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1977, p. 123
50. Richard Barnett, *The Economy of Death*, Atheneum Books, NY, NY, 1970, p. 46
51. The Boston Study Group, *The Price of Defense*, Times Books, NY, NY, 1979 p. 13. The Boston Study Group is composed of Randall Forsberg, MIT; Phyllis Morrison; George Sommaripa; Paul Walker, Harvard.
52. "Study Says US Showed Force 215 Times Since '45", Don Oberdorfer, *Washington Post*, January 3, 1977, quoting from the *Brookings Institute Study* by Barry Blechman and Stephan Kaplan, authors. Study was funded by DOD Advanced Research Projects Agency.
53. "Study Says Military Force Buys Negotiation Time", *Drew Middleton*, *New York Times*, Dec. 11, 1978, quoting from "Force Without War", by Blechman and Kaplan of the Brookings In-

54. Same as #51, p. 36 and, "The Power Projection Gap", Michael Klare, *The Nation*, June 9, 1979, p. 673
55. Same as #4, p. 6
56. SIPRI Brochure, 1980, "Armament or Disarmament", Stockholm Research Institute, June, 1980
57. *Congressional Record*, June 27, 1980, p. H5839
58. "The Last Clear Chance For SALT II", J. William Fulbright and Carl Marcy, *New York Times*, July 22, 1980
59. "Emigration of Soviet Jews Has Slowed To a Trickle", Craig Whitney, *New York Times*, July 11, 1980
60. *Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures*, 1978, World Priorities, Leesburg, VA 1978
61. US Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "The Structure of the US Economy, 1980-1985" US Government Printing Office, 1975
62. "Planned Economic Conversion; Getting Off the Hook of Defense Dependency", William Winpisinger, *New York Times*, March 4, 1979
63. Office of Management and Budget, *US Government Budget FY 79*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1979
64. Richard Barnett, *The Economy of Death*, Atheneum, NY, NY, 1970, p. 50
65. "Beating 'Swords' Into Subways", Seymour Melman, *New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 9, 1978
66. Same as #64
67. Same as #64
68. Robert C. Johansen, *Toward A Dependable Peace*, Institute For World Order, 1978, p. 25

This pamphlet was researched and written by Marta Daniels, Conn. field staff of AFSC, and Wendy Moge, former disarmament director of the NY AFSC office. Criticism and editorial help were provided by Terry Provance, Patsy Leake, Glenda Poole, and Ron Young of the AFSC Disarmament Program.

Original Printing—January, 1981

Second Printing—July, 1981

Third Printing—October, 1981

Fourth Printing—December, 1981

Fifth Printing—March, 1982

AFSC
317 East 25th Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

AFSC
2161 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02140

AFSC
407 South Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois 60605

AFSC
4211 Grand Avenue
Des Moines, Iowa 50312

AFSC
915 Salem Avenue
Dayton, Ohio 45406

AFSC
92 Piedmont Avenue NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

AFSC
15 Rutherford Place
New York, New York 10003

AFSC
980 North Fair Oaks Avenue
Pasadena, California 91103

AFSC
2160 Lake Street
San Francisco, California 94121

AFSC
814 N.E. 40th Street
Seattle, Washington 98105

AFSC
1022 West 6th Street
Austin, Texas 78703

PRICE

1—10: \$1.00
11—50: 80¢ each
51 or more: 70¢ each

Please add 15% for postage and handling.

BANKRUPTING AMERICA

The Tax Burden and Expenditures of the
Pentagon by Congressional District

By Dr. James R. Anderson

1982 Edition

Contents

	Page
Introduction	1
Impact on Congressional Districts	1
Impact on the Economy	2
Cause of Inflation	4
Interest Rates	5
Federal Shift From Civilian to Military Expenditures	5
Conclusion	5
Table 1: The Pentagon Tax Gain or Loss by Congressional District 1980	6
Table 2: The Pentagon Tax Gain or Loss by Congressional District 1982	9

Prices

Single copies	\$3.00
Quantity Prices:	
5 copies	\$7.50
10 copies	\$10.00
25 copies	\$20.00
100 copies	\$60.00

Add 15% for all orders under \$20.00

Additional Publications

The Empty Pork Barrel	
Unemployment and the Pentagon Budget	\$2.00
Converting the Work Force	
Where the Jobs Would Be	\$3.00
The Impact of Military Spending on the Machinists Union	\$2.00

Quantity Prices same as those listed above

Checks payable to:

Employment Research Associates
400 South Washington Ave.
Lansing, Michigan 48933
517/485-7655

Introduction

Seventy percent of the U.S. public live in Congressional Districts which suffer a net loss of tax money when the Pentagon budget goes up. Of the 435 Congressional Districts, 302 have a net loss in their balance of payments with the Pentagon. This means that the Federal government acts as a giant syphon funneling tax money out of over 300 Congressional Districts into those which have large military bases or very high military contracts.

This fact is not generally known. The majority of Congressmen put out press releases and announcements when their District gets a military contract. But they do not tell the whole story in these releases. For that would mean informing their constituents as to how much money leaves their District to go to the Pentagon.

This report seeks to complete the picture. It documents for 1980 and projects for 1982 the Pentagon Tax burden borne by each Congressional District, and the amount of money returning through military contracts and military salaries.

The Impact On Congressional Districts

The Pentagon's budget is the largest item in the Federal Program budget. It creates a drastic imbalance in the tax burdens imposed on major regions and Congressional Districts.

The Pentagon Tax measures the portion of the U.S. military tax burden imposed upon a given area, in this case, a Congressional District. It is paid by the taxpayers of an area through federal taxes. This study shows exactly how the Pentagon Tax burden was distributed among Congressional Districts for Fiscal Year 1980 and where military spending is distributed and concentrated. It further projects the tax burden distribution by

Congressional Districts for the Fiscal 1982 military budget.

Taxpayers would be startled if their Congresspersons announced that they were routinely voting for measures that drained hundreds of millions of dollars from their Congressional Districts. Yet, an analysis of the impact of the military budget on Congressional Districts indicates that for a majority of Congresspersons this is precisely the case.

A total of 302 of the nation's 435 Congressional Districts are suffering net losses each year from the budgetary impact of military spending. Only 133 Congressional Districts are receiving more from the Pentagon budget than they pay out in taxes going to the military. (See Table I, page 6). This means that the Pentagon budget is draining resources from 302 Congressional Districts and funneling them into only 133 Districts. Thus, military spending is a principal source of drastic imbalance and inequity in the Federal tax burden and budget allocation.

Every major industrial state in the country but California has more Congressional Districts which lose than gain. Of New York's 39 Districts, 32 lose. Of Pennsylvania's 25, 20 lose. Of Illinois' 24, 23 lose, of Michigan's 20, 19 lose. Of the 100 Congressional Districts in the upper Midwest (Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio), 94 are net losers. This means that almost 95% of the upper Midwest is drained by the Pentagon Tax.

The Northeast is also hard hit, with 78 of its 104 Congressional Districts losing. Even Texas, long regarded as a major recipient of Pentagon spending, has 14 Congressional Districts which are drained by military spending, and only 10 which gain.

A clear majority of the House of Representatives, 232 Congressional Districts, suffered a net Pentagon Tax loss of \$100

million or more in 1980. This number will increase in 1982 and beyond, indicating that the depletion of the U.S. economic base by military spending is spreading.

The Illinois Tenth District (Porter-R), comprising the northern suburbs of Chicago, has the dubious distinction of suffering the largest Pentagon Tax drain in the U.S., with a net loss of \$513.3 million for 1980. The Texas Seventh, in Houston (Archer-R), is close behind with a net loss of \$513.2 million. The Illinois Ninth, Chicago's North Shore (Yates-D), is third among heavy losers with an annual drain of \$432.3 million. A disturbing 142 Congressional Districts have net losses of \$200 million or more per year.

The principal gainers are concentrated in the South and Southwest. The Southern California Districts are mostly gainers, but the Northern California Congressional Districts have a surprisingly high proportion of losers. Twenty-eight states are losers, 22 (generally small) gain. California has six Congressional Districts with a net gain of \$500 million or more each year as a result of the Pentagon budget, while Virginia has four. The Virginia First, comprising Newport News and Hampton (Trible-R), where major Navy bases are located, had an incredible net gain of almost exactly \$2.0 billion for 1980. This means that every Congressional District in the country contributed an average of \$4,600,000 for their Pentagon Tax bonanza.

The nearby Virginia Second (Whitehurst-R-) encompassing Norfolk, another major Navy base area, had a net gain of \$1.4 billion. The billion dollar Pentagon budget club also includes the Missouri Third, in South St. Louis and St. Louis County (Gephardt-D), with a gain of \$1.5 billion. The Missouri First, in North St. Louis and St. Louis County (Clay-D), had a net gain of \$1.3 billion, the Virginia Tenth (Wolf-R), home of the Pentagon, gained \$1.3 billion, and the Texas Twelfth (Wright-D), in Fort Worth, gained \$1.2 billion.

Table 2 (page 9) provides projections of net gains and losses for Congressional Dis-

tricts for 1982, based on a military budget increased by over 30% from 1980 to \$186.1 billion for 1982, and assuming the same rate of change for all Congressional Districts. This table shows the accelerating drain of the military budget on extensive areas of the U.S.

The analysis of the tax impact of the Pentagon budget by Congressional District has an important advantage over calculating the breakdown by states. As the study area is reduced, it becomes evident that disparities in the impact of Pentagon spending are extreme even within states with large overall military outlays.

For example, Mississippi has overall Pentagon expenditures of just over \$1.5 billion, with a Pentagon Tax burden of \$977.4 million, for a net Pentagon Tax gain of \$534 million. It would appear that the entire state of Mississippi shares in a sizable net inflow of Pentagon dollars. Yet when the pattern of Pentagon spending in Mississippi is analyzed by Congressional District a surprise emerges. Four of its five Congressional Districts, comprising the northern four-fifths of the state's population and land area, suffer a net drain when their Pentagon Tax burdens are compared with Pentagon spending in them. About \$1.0 billion of Pentagon spending is concentrated entirely within the southeastern corner of the state, along the Gulf Coast. A similar pattern can be seen in Texas, a major gain state in dollars, where 14 of its 24 Congressional Districts are in the net loss category.

In terms of tax dollars, the Pentagon budget draws from the many and gives to the few. The military budget is taken from all taxpayers, but it is funneled to a relatively narrow group of military contractors and employees. The net gain or loss per family equivalent illustrates this point. Although the Mississippi Fifth Congressional District has a net gain of \$4,900 per family equivalent, the families in eleven of its twelve counties experience a net drain of tax dollars to finance

military spending. Only in Jackson County, where Litton Industries operates naval shipbuilding facilities, is there any sizable number of families or households which gain substantially from military spending.

In the figures in Tables 1 and 2 (pages 6-12), the net gain per family appears higher for the majority of families in the Congressional District than it is in reality, for included are salaries and expenses for all armed forces personnel as well as the military contracts. So averaged on a per family basis, the amount can look quite large whereas only a relatively small number of people may be benefitting.

Despite the bias of Pentagon spending in favor of states in the South and West, a large number of southern Congressional Districts are in the net loss category. In the Sun Belt states, 86 Congressional Districts experience net losses. Among Southern states, North Carolina has 8 net loss Districts, Florida has 10, Georgia 6, Alabama 4, Louisiana 7, and Arkansas 4, in addition to the 18 losers in Mississippi and Texas.

Four major findings emerge from this data:

First, when examined closely, by Congressional District, the Pentagon budget shows up as a major source of inequity and imbalance in the Federal budget and the Federal tax burden.

Second, the drain from the Midwest and Northeast is severe, even spectacular, and contributes substantially to the economic stagnation of these regions.

Third, the fact that 302 Congressional Districts, representing almost 70% of the nation's population, are suffering net drains on their community's economic re-

sources, is an indication that military spending is a continuing source of economic drain, thus undermining civilian industry, generating unemployment and leading to political instability.

Fourth, as Pentagon spending adds relatively little to the productive capital base, private and public, of a community and consumes rather than creates equity, even the Congressional Districts with sizable net gains should find little comfort in this analysis. Although St. Louis has a major net inflow of military spending, the city is nevertheless under severe financial stress.

Impact on the Economy

The capital base of the United States, which is the foundation upon which both jobs and real income ultimately rest, is eroding at an accelerating pace, relative both to other major industrial nations and to the domestic demands being placed upon it. Our capital base, both public and private, is not equal to the demands being placed upon it. For 302 Congressional Districts, the Pentagon budget is an immediate and direct threat to their economic and political well-being.

A Pentagon Tax burden of this magnitude will make impossible the achievement of higher industrial employment, higher productivity, lower inflation rates, and lower interest rates.

Substantial capital outlays are needed to improve industrial productivity and expand job opportunities. Major outlays of capital are also needed to build and maintain homes, as well as to build and maintain an efficient transportation network and adequate public facilities. The simplest conclusion which one may draw about this military budget, is that at a time of an acute and growing capital shortage in the U.S., and at a time of declining U.S. productivity, more than \$200

billion per year of U.S. capital resources will be expended for unproductive and destructive purposes in the name of national security. It might be pointed out that if peace prevailed, the United States could double the basic capitalization of every firm on the New York Stock Exchange over the next five years.

The economic dislocation from this level of peace-time expenditure will be substantial. If the U.S. becomes involved in a war, especially a prolonged one, the breakdown of our financial and industrial structure is a real possibility.

Cause of Inflation

The level of inflation is one of the principal symptoms of severe dislocation under way in the economy. This level of military expenditure threatens to accelerate the inflation that continues at a persistent level in excess of 10 percent and which is eroding the fabric of American society.

It is no longer possible to pretend that inflation is being accelerated solely by social or non-defense spending, because the budget that President Reagan recently announced allows for real, i.e. inflation adjusted, increases only for the Pentagon. All other major categories of the Federal budget are being reduced in real terms through a combination of direct cuts and reductions in real outlays through inflation.

Increased military spending means that more demands are placed on increasingly scarce resources: skilled labor, key materials, and advanced industrial capacity. This inflation, which would be made permanent by high levels of military spending, reveals an underlying, deep-seated weakness to our allies and antagonists alike, thus undercutting the image of steadfast power which the U.S. government seeks to project by military means.¹

The military threat to U.S. economic health is stressed by Wassily Leontief, a Nobel-Prize-winning economist:

If handled improperly, these huge jumps in military spending will mean higher inflation, a worsening balance of payments gap, a drain on productive investment, soaring interest rates, increasing taxes, a debased currency and, in the longer run, more unemployment. Reagan hopes our gross national product will expand so much that we will be able to pay for higher defense spending without raising taxes. **This is not likely to happen. In fact, I personally guarantee that it will not happen.**²

Although fretting about inflation has now become quite fashionable, there is virtually no willingness within the Reagan Administration circles to admit the direct and dominant contribution of military spending to the inflationary pattern. However, even conservatives have begun to consider this possibility, as they view the havoc being wreaked on the American economy. The *Wall Street Journal* carried an article on its editorial page entitled "Burning Up \$1 Trillion." Contained in that article is the following statement:

Government spending of any kind tends to be more inflationary than private spending: it increases incomes without increasing the supply of goods that consumers can buy. **Defense spending, in this sense, is the worst kind of government outlay, since it eats up materials and other resources that otherwise would be used to produce consumer goods.**³ (Emphasis added)

It is clear that the only major investment the United States will make in the next five years will be in military production. Investment capital is being diverted from the productive sectors of the economy, as the serious weaknesses in the automobile, construction, and steel industries show.

Interest Rates

The record-high levels of the U.S. interest rates are another major symptom of economic dislocation. Within 48 hours after President Carter announced his military spending intentions in a State of the Union address in early 1980, interest rates began a sharp rise in anticipation of further inflation. This interest rate rise has continued, and represents the worst collapse in the history of the American bond and financial markets. Interest rates now are at or near all-time highs, and very few experts are willing to predict that their ultimate peak has been reached.

Notwithstanding President Reagan's talk about getting interest rates down from the high level of Carter's last year in office, their levels have remained high. There are fears that as military spending adds to inflationary pressures, interest rates could be pushed still higher to reflect the steadily declining value of paper assets, such as government and corporate bonds.

The heavy priority being given to the Pentagon is requiring a massive drain of the resources available for human and social needs through Federal, state and local government channels. Starvation is already underway for many city and state governments. A major national newspaper carried the following headline in early 1980: "Municipal Snarl: Cities and States Recoil as Costs of Borrowing in Bond Markets Soar: Many Cannot or Won't Pay the Rates of 8% or More." The lead paragraph stated: "The collapse of the Wall Street bond market is sending financial tremors across the land as state, cities, school districts and other municipal agencies find themselves temporarily shut out of the market and unable to raise money."⁴

Federal Shift From Civilian to Military Expenditures

Reagan's budget cuts are designed to take resources from the human resources and public capital segments of the Federal budget, such as health, nutrition, and trans-

portation, and transfer them to Pentagon programs, rather than to achieve a genuine **overall net** reduction in the scope of Federal spending. A Congressional Budget Office analysis of the Fiscal 1982 Federal Budget reports:

If the Administration's proposals for reducing spending are enacted, programs that now account for about 30 percent of the Federal budget will absorb essentially all of the effects. The major share of the reductions would affect areas such as education, employment and training, nutrition, health and social services; there would also be a profound impact on transportation and energy programs.⁵

A subsequent study by the Congressional Budget Office, reported in the **Washington Post** indicated "at least 20 to 25 million people, most of them living below the poverty line, would have their incomes cut as a result of President Reagan's proposed reductions in welfare, public service jobs, food stamps, and the school lunch programs."⁶

Conclusion

The conclusion is inescapable: accelerated military spending will result in the impoverishment of major sectors of American society and worsening budget problems for over 300 Congressional Districts. Inflation will continue to reduce the real incomes of most working Americans. Inflation will keep interest rates at levels where only the government, the military industries, and the largest American corporations will have access to capital and credit. Unemployment will probably continue to rise, although it may be somewhat masked if the draft is renewed. In short, sustained high military budgets will make the United States a poorer, weaker, and more divided nation than it is today.

TABLE I

The Pentagon Tax Gain or Loss by Congressional District Fiscal Year 1980

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
Alabama				
Heflin-D, Denton-R	\$2,092.0	\$1,841.5	+\$250.5	
1 Edwards-R	242.0	252.0	-10.0	-\$100
2 Dickinson-R	640.3	256.8	+383.5	+2,600
3 Nichols-D	318.2	234.4	+83.8	+600
4 Beville-D	100.6	233.6	-133.0	-900
5 Filppo-D	561.7	296.2	+265.5	+1,800
6 Smith-R	123.5	335.9	-212.4	-1,400
7 Shelby-D	105.7	263.1	-157.4	-1,100
Alaska				
Stevens-R, Murkowski-R	762.3	410.8	+351.5	
1 Young-R	762.3	410.5	+351.5	+2,400
Arizona				
DeConcini-D, Goldwater-R	1,648.4	1,402.3	+246.1	
1 Rhodes-R	404.6	352.0	+52.6	+300
2 Udall-D	615.6	344.6	+271.0	+1,800
3 Stump-D	342.3	322.5	+19.8	+100
4 Rudd-R	285.9	383.2	-97.3	-600
Arkansas				
Pryor-D, Bumpers-D	610.2	977.4	-367.2	
1 Alexander-D	100.0	212.6	-112.6	-800
2 Bethune-R	238.2	285.2	-47.0	-300
3 Schmidt-R	123.9	249.0	-125.1	-800
4 Anthony-D	147.4	230.7	-83.3	-600
California				
Hayakawa-R, Cranston-D	22,571.7	16,445.7	+6,126.0	
1 Chapple-R	163.4	315.5	-152.1	-1,000
2 Clausen-R	75.2	322.0	-246.8	-1,700
3 Matsui-D	743.0	376.0	+367.0	+2,500
4 Fazio-D	929.3	315.1	+614.2	+4,100
5 J. Burton-D	245.5	532.8	-287.3	-1,900
6 P. Burton-D	343.8	387.0	-43.2	-300
7 Miller-D	105.8	421.5	-315.7	-2,100
8 Dellums-D	360.3	431.8	-71.5	-500
9 Stark-D	379.9	393.5	-13.6	-100
10 Edwards-D	683.7	335.4	+348.3	+2,300
11 Lantos-D	259.1	441.0	-181.9	-1,200
12 McCloskey-R	1,024.5	473.5	+551.0	+3,700
13 Mineta-D	1,143.6	444.8	+698.8	+4,700
14 Shumway-R	156.8	312.9	-156.1	-1,000
15 Coelho-D	164.2	282.6	-118.4	-800
16 Panetta-D	495.4	326.2	+169.2	+1,100
17 Pashayan-R	494.9	284.9	+210.0	+1,400
18 Thomas-R	570.9	293.7	+277.2	+1,900
19 Lagomarsino-R	1,018.9	367.5	+651.4	+4,400
20 Goldwater-R	567.6	451.7	+115.9	+800
21 Fiedler-R	442.2	378.6	+63.6	+400
22 Moorhead-R	510.2	491.5	+18.7	+100
23 Bellenson-D	612.3	644.1	-31.8	-200
24 Waxman-D	510.2	320.5	+189.7	+1,300
25 Roybal-D	374.2	337.3	+36.9	+200
26 Rousselot-R	476.2	431.8	+44.4	+300
27 Dornan-R	544.3	600.5	-56.2	-400
28 Dixon-D	442.2	371.4	+70.8	+500
29 Hawkins-D	374.2	245.5	+128.7	+900
30 Danielson-D	442.2	329.7	+112.5	+800
31 Dymally-D	374.2	382.8	-8.6	-100
32 Anderson-D	510.2	340.4	+169.8	+1,100
33 Grisham-R	374.2	373.7	+0.5	+
34 Lungren-R	511.4	443.3	+68.1	+500
35 Dreier-R	476.5	365.6	+110.9	+700
36 Brown-D	404.1	276.1	+128.0	+900
37 Lewis-R	496.1	322.4	+173.7	+1,100
38 Patterson-D	597.9	341.9	+256.0	+1,700
39 Danner-Meyer-R	637.1	410.8	+226.3	+1,500
40 Badham-R	744.8	431.4	+313.4	+2,100
41 Lowery-R	1,191.7	418.0	+773.7	+5,200
42 Hunter-R	1,028.5	301.0	+727.5	+4,900
43 Burgener-R	922.7	396.2	+526.5	+3,500
Colorado				
Armstrong-R, Hart-D	1,774.6	1,798.9	-24.3	
1 Schroeder-D	504.6	428.9	+75.7	+500
2 Wirth-D	101.6	395.8	-294.2	-2,000
3 Kogovsek-D	278.4	272.4	+6.0	+
4 Brown-R	74.6	323.1	-248.5	-1,700
5 Kramer-R	631.0	378.8	+252.2	+1,700

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
Connecticut				
Welcker-R, Dodd-D	\$4,239.3	\$2,478.9	+\$1,760.4	
1 Cotter-D	1,383.9	422.7	+961.2	+\$6,500
2 Gajdenson-D	843.5	350.8	+492.7	+3,300
3 DeNardis-R	127.8	388.8	-261.0	-1,800
4 McKinney-R	667.0	507.8	+159.2	+1,100
5 Ratchford-D	317.2	418.1	-100.9	-700
6 Moffett-D	906.1	392.9	+513.2	+3,400
D.C.	2,348.0	552.4	+1,795.6	+9,500
Delaware				
Roth-R, Biden-D	409.4	425.0	-15.6	
1 Evans-R	409.4	425.0	-15.6	-100
Florida				
Chiles-D, Hawkins-R	5,105.3	5,425.3	-320.0	
1 Hutto-D	1,097.3	293.0	+804.3	+5,400
2 Fuqua-D	121.3	268.7	-147.4	-1,000
3 Bennett-D	548.7	315.8	+232.9	+1,600
4 Chappel-D	291.7	332.0	-40.3	-300
5 McCollum-R	369.5	312.9	+56.6	+400
6 Young-R	286.7	388.1	-101.4	-700
7 Gibbons-D	392.0	334.6	+57.4	+400
8 Ireland-D	94.1	332.0	-237.9	-1,600
9 Nelson-D	1,019.7	388.8	+630.9	+4,200
10 Bafalis-R	159.9	347.2	-187.3	-1,300
11 Mica-D	296.2	453.6	-157.4	-1,100
12 Shaw-R	78.3	447.4	-369.1	-2,500
13 Lehman-D	100.5	381.9	-281.4	-1,900
14 Pepper-D	107.5	401.8	-294.3	-2,000
15 Fassel-D	142.4	426.8	-284.4	-1,800
Georgia				
Nunn-D, Mattingly-R	2,953.8	2,677.2	+276.6	
1 Ginn-D	537.0	228.9	+308.1	+2,100
2 Hatcher-D	180.5	204.3	-23.8	-?
3 Brinkley-D	772.2	243.1	+529.1	+3,600
4 Levitas-D	93.8	385.2	-291.4	-2,000
5 Fowler-D	44.7	360.6	-315.9	-2,200
6 Gingrich-R	217.2	283.5	-66.3	-400
7 McDonald-D	452.3	302.5	+149.8	+1,000
8 Evans-D	62.0	221.1	-159.1	-1,100
9 Jenkins-D	71.4	243.1	-171.7	-1,100
10 Barnard-D	408.9	234.0	+174.9	+1,200
Hawaii				
Matsunaga-D, Inouye-D	1,648.3	623.3	+1,025.0	
1 Hattel-D	982.3	358.7	+623.6	+4,200
2 Akaka-D	666.0	269.9	+396.1	+2,700
Idaho				
McClure-R, Symms-R	360.6	467.5	-106.9	
1 Craig-R	68.7	238.9	-170.2	-1,100
2 Hansen-R	292.3	228.6	+63.7	+400
Illinois				
Percy-R, Dixon-D	2,306.2	8,725.7	-6,419.5	
1 Washington-D	48.7	303.2	-254.5	-1,700
2 Savage-D	52.6	348.7	-296.1	-2,000
3 Russo-D	55.2	391.9	-336.7	-2,300
4 Derwinski-R	57.2	415.9	-358.7	-2,400
5 Fary-D	50.0	306.9	-256.9	-1,700
6 Hyde-R	62.6	445.4	-382.8	-2,600
7 Collins-D	46.7	264.3	-217.6	-1,500
8 Rostenkowski-D	50.0	322.5	-272.5	-1,800
9 Yates-D	61.8	494.1	-432.3	-2,900
10 Porter-R	68.4	581.7	-513.3	-3,400
11 Annunzio-D	57.2	422.5	-365.3	-2,500
12 Crane-R	187.2	473.4	-286.2	-1,900
13 McClory-R	280.7	371.2	-90.5	-600
14 Erlenborn-R	88.4	446.5	-358.1	-2,400
15 Corcoran-R	20.1	331.9	-311.8	-2,100
16 Martin-R	95.7	336.3	-240.6	-1,600
17 O'Brien-R	52.5	333.8	-281.3	-1,900
18 Michel-R	67.4	337.8	-270.4	-1,900
19 Railsback-R	227.8	311.6	-83.8	-600
20 Findley-R	56.2	310.1	-253.9	-1,700
21 Madigan-R	225.9	333.0	-107.1	-700
22 Crane-R	23.8	282.5	-258.7	-1,700
23 Price-D	323.2	305.4	+17.8	+100
24 Simon-D	45.4	249.0	-203.6	-1,400

*less than \$50

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
Indiana				
<i>Lugar-R, Quayle-R</i>	\$1,864.8	\$3,470.5	-\$1,605.9	
1 Benjamin-D	124.1	320.2	-196.1	-\$1,300
2 Fithian-D	56.3	317.4	-261.1	-1,800
3 Hiler-R	233.5	338.2	-104.7	-700
4 Coats-R	264.6	323.4	-58.8	-400
5 Hillis-R	156.4	338.5	-182.1	-1,200
6 Evans-D	229.8	319.6	-89.8	-600
7 Myers-R	76.1	288.1	-212.0	-1,400
8 Deckard-R	153.7	274.5	-120.8	-800
9 Hamilton-R	146.9	283.3	-136.4	-900
10 Sharp-D	22.4	305.1	-282.7	-1,900
11 Jacobs-D	401.2	361.9	+39.3	+300
Iowa				
<i>Jepsen-R, Grassley-R</i>	425.4	1,869.8	-1,444.4	
1 Leach-R	112.5	326.9	-214.4	-1,400
2 Tauke-R	173.2	306.6	-133.4	-900
3 Evans-R	39.4	309.1	-269.7	-1,800
4 Smith-D	51.9	339.4	-287.5	-1,900
5 Harkin-D	23.0	296.7	-273.7	-1,800
6 Bedell-D	25.3	291.1	-265.8	-1,800
Kansas				
<i>Kassenbaum-R, Dole-R</i>	1,407.7	1,515.6	-107.9	
1 Roberts-R	73.4	274.9	-201.5	-1,400
2 Jeffries-R	247.6	289.5	-41.9	-300
3 Winn-R	299.4	371.6	-72.2	-500
4 Glickman-D	640.4	319.5	+320.9	+2,100
5 Whittaker-R	147.3	260.4	-113.1	-800
Kentucky				
<i>Huddleston-D, Ford-D</i>	1,181.4	1,813.1	-631.7	
1 Hubbard-D	355.9	242.2	+113.7	+800
2 Natcher-D	435.9	245.0	+190.9	+1,300
3 Mazzoli-D	110.3	315.2	-204.9	-1,400
4 Snyder-R	71.2	341.1	-269.9	-1,800
5 Rogers-R	45.9	178.2	-132.3	-900
6 Hopkins-R	66.0	297.9	-231.9	-1,600
7 Perkins-D	96.2	193.7	-97.5	-700
Louisiana				
<i>Johnston-D, R. Long-D</i>	1,478.3	2,181.5	-703.2	
1 Livingston-R	221.0	315.5	-94.5	-600
2 Boggs-D	185.2	308.4	-123.2	-800
3 Tauzin-D	85.7	307.3	-221.6	-1,500
4 Roemer-D	540.6	277.1	+263.5	+1,800
5 Huckaby-D	60.1	220.9	-160.8	-1,100
6 Moore-R	125.1	286.6	-161.5	-1,100
7 Breaux-D	85.4	257.7	-172.3	-1,200
8 G. Long-D	169.7	208.3	-38.6	-300
Maine				
<i>Mitchell-D, Cohen-R</i>	684.7	524.1	+160.6	
1 Emery-R	555.9	281.2	+274.7	+1,800
2 Snowe-R	128.9	242.9	-114.0	-800
Maryland				
<i>Sarbanes-D, Mathias-R</i>	3,910.4	3,017.2	+893.2	
1 Dyson-D	646.9	297.9	+349.0	+2,300
2 Long-D	148.7	433.7	-285.0	-1,900
3 Mikulski-D	328.6	353.4	-24.8	-200
4 Holt-R	865.0	381.3	+483.7	+3,200
5 Spellman-D	379.8	395.6	-15.8	-100
6 Byron-D	362.0	321.7	+40.3	+300
7 Mitchell-D	365.5	265.9	+99.6	+700
8 Barnes-D	811.4	566.1	+245.3	+1,600
Massachusetts				
<i>Kennedy-D, Tsongas-D</i>	4,453.3	3,711.3	+742.0	
1 Conte-R	154.9	283.6	-128.7	-900
2 Boland-D	65.7	286.7	-221.0	-1,500
3 Early-D	166.6	292.3	-125.7	-800
4 Frank-D	503.6	390.0	+113.6	+800
5 Shannon-D	761.5	288.6	+472.9	+3,200
6 Mavroules-D	1,097.9	312.4	+785.5	+5,300
7 Markey-D	597.8	317.3	+280.5	+1,900
8 O'Neill-D	500.4	334.9	+165.5	+1,100
9 Moakley-D	148.5	296.9	-148.4	-1,000
10 Heckler-R	175.0	297.2	-122.2	-800
11 Donnelly-D	139.0	300.0	-161.0	-1,100
12 Studds-D	140.7	292.9	-152.2	-1,000

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
Michigan				
<i>Riegle-D, Levin-D</i>	\$2,338.9	\$6,615.1	-\$4,276.2	
1 Conyers-D	37.4	315.4	-278.0	-\$1,900
2 Pursell-R	58.6	383.0	-324.4	-2,200
3 Wolpe-D	88.8	340.9	-252.1	-1,700
4 Siljander-R	21.0	305.7	-284.7	-1,900
5 Sawyer-R	77.6	329.7	-252.1	-1,700
6 Dunn-R	73.6	347.5	-273.9	-1,800
7 Kildee-D	17.8	339.5	-321.7	-2,200
8 Traxler-D	33.2	307.1	-273.9	-1,800
9 Vander Jagt-R	186.5	289.7	-103.2	-700
10 Albosta-D	70.9	283.4	-212.5	-1,400
11 Davis-R	205.9	249.5	-43.6	-300
12 Bonior-D	575.1	353.7	+221.4	+1,500
13 Crockett-D	32.6	264.3	-231.7	-1,600
14 Hertel-D	366.4	427.9	-61.5	-400
15 Ford-D	37.7	356.5	-318.8	-2,100
16 Dingell-D	38.7	377.8	-339.1	-2,300
17 Brodhead-D	44.3	446.7	-402.4	-2,700
18 Blanchard-D	315.5	420.9	-105.4	-700
19 Broomfield-R	47.5	456.4	-408.9	-2,700
Minnesota				
<i>Durenberger-R, Boschwitz-R</i>	1,313.1	2,634.7	-1,321.6	
1 Erdahl-R	24.4	319.8	-295.4	-2,000
2 Hagedorn-R	68.1	322.1	-254.0	-1,700
3 Frenzel-R	400.4	445.6	-45.2	-300
4 Vento-D	308.0	377.1	-69.1	-500
5 Sabo-D	348.8	380.4	-31.6	-200
6 Weber-R	44.6	256.2	-211.6	-1,400
7 Stangeland-R	35.2	244.0	-208.8	-1,400
8 Oberstar-D	83.5	289.8	-206.3	-1,400
Mississippi				
<i>Stennis-D, Cochran-R</i>	1,511.4	977.4	+534.0	
1 Whitten-D	130.9	180.2	-49.3	-300
2 Bowen-D	175.2	177.1	-1.9	-
3 Montgomery-D	92.1	173.0	-80.9	-500
4 Hinson-R	166.6	218.9	-52.3	-400
5 Lott-R	946.9	221.7	+725.2	+4,900
Missouri				
<i>Danforth-R, Eagleton-D</i>	4,446.5	2,918.0	+1,528.5	
1 Clay-D	1,568.4	285.7	+1,282.7	+8,600
2 Young-D	30.7	420.5	-389.8	-2,600
3 Gephardt-D	1,838.2	327.7	+1,510.5	+10,100
4 Skelton-D	232.3	280.7	-48.4	-300
5 Bolling-D	270.9	327.4	-56.5	-400
6 Coleman-R	67.9	277.8	-209.9	-1,400
7 Taylor-R	75.1	237.8	-162.7	-1,100
8 Bailey-R	276.1	258.0	+18.1	+100
9 Volkmer-D	57.5	284.5	-227.0	-1,500
10 Emerson-R	29.4	221.2	-191.8	-1,300
Montana				
<i>Melcher-D, Baucus-D</i>	179.9	453.3	-273.4	
1 Williams-D	37.6	225.1	-187.5	-1,300
2 Marlenee-R	142.5	228.2	-85.7	-600
Nebraska				
<i>Zorinsky-D, Exon-D</i>	549.5	963.2	-413.7	
1 Bereuter-R	56.3	307.6	-251.3	-1,700
2 Daub-R	460.7	366.0	+94.7	+600
3 Smith-R	31.3	289.6	-258.3	-1,700
Nevada				
<i>Cannon-D, Laxalt-R</i>	567.8	552.4	+15.4	
1 Santini-D	567.8	552.4	+15.4	+100
New Hampshire				
<i>Humphrey-R, Rudman-R</i>	649.4	551.9	+97.5	
1 D'Amours-D	190.4	271.0	-80.6	-500
2 Gregg-R	459.0	280.9	+178.1	+1,200
New Jersey				
<i>Williams-D, Bradley-D</i>	2,677.5	5,581.1	-2,903.6	
1 Florio-D	113.7	307.3	-193.6	-1,300
2 Hughes-D	106.9	303.6	-196.7	-1,300
3 Howard-D	387.2	364.3	+22.9	+100
4 Smith-R	320.8	327.5	-6.7	-
5 Fenwick-R	173.7	475.5	-301.8	-2,000
6 Forsythe-R	579.9	360.2	+219.7	+1,500
7 Roukema-R	87.9	469.6	-381.7	-2,600
8 Roe-D	157.0	348.3	-191.3	-1,300
9 Hollenbeck-R	93.9	430.9	-337.0	-2,300
10 Rodino-D	87.6	281.3	-193.7	-1,300

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
New Jersey continued				
11 Minish-D	\$107.9	\$443.5	-\$335.6	-\$2,300
12 Rinaldo-R	103.8	430.5	-326.7	-2,300
13 Courter-R	178.1	362.8	-184.7	-1,900
14 Guarini-D	123.4	319.6	-196.2	-1,300
15 Dwyer-D	55.4	357.9	-302.5	-2,000
New Mexico				
<i>Domenici-R, Schmitt-R</i>	1,490.8	623.3	+867.5	
1 Lujan-R	962.7	332.5	+630.2	+4,200
2 Skeen-R	528.1	290.8	+237.3	+1,600
New York				
<i>Moynihan-D, D'Amato-R</i>	6,885.4	11,898.6	-5,013.2	
1 Carney-R	142.6	277.6	-135.0	-900
2 Downey-D	134.0	268.7	-132.7	-900
3 Carman-R	548.5	353.0	+195.5	+1,300
4 Lent-R	789.2	356.3	+432.9	+2,900
5 McGrath-R	818.5	388.7	+429.8	+2,900
6 LeBoutillier-R	380.9	439.9	-59.0	-400
7 Addabbo-D	43.5	327.7	-284.2	-1,900
8 Rosenthal-D	46.4	380.5	-334.1	-2,200
9 Ferraro-D	44.1	317.0	-272.9	-1,800
10 Biaggi-D	43.4	274.6	-231.2	-1,600
11 Scheuer-D	40.2	279.5	-239.3	-1,600
12 Chisholm-D	31.3	175.4	-144.1	-1,000
13 Solarz-D	42.1	315.5	-273.4	-1,800
14 Richmond-D	34.7	206.9	-172.2	-1,200
15 Zeferetti-D	39.3	279.5	-240.2	-1,600
16 Schumer-D	41.7	310.6	-268.9	-1,800
17 Molinari-R	133.0	292.6	-159.6	-1,100
18 Green-R	514.4	749.3	-234.9	-1,600
19 Rangel-D	320.5	262.1	+58.4	+400
20 Weiss-D	214.4	376.5	-162.1	-1,100
21 Garcia-D	32.2	154.7	-122.5	-800
22 Bingham-D	44.0	276.7	-232.7	-1,600
23 Peyser-D	56.4	377.7	-321.3	-2,200
24 Ottinger-D	53.9	450.0	-396.1	-2,700
25 Fish-R	38.5	298.1	-259.6	-1,700
26 Gilman-R	134.5	285.3	-150.8	-1,000
27 McHugh-D	470.9	256.9	+214.0	+1,400
28 Stratton-D	408.7	299.6	+109.1	+700
29 Solomon-R	55.8	244.4	-188.6	-1,300
30 Martin-R	163.4	212.0	-48.6	-300
31 Mitchell-R	336.7	242.5	+94.2	+600
32 Wortley-R	132.4	269.7	-137.3	-900
33 Lee-R	128.4	252.6	-124.2	-800
34 Horton-R	69.2	329.5	-260.3	-1,700
35 Conable-R	49.6	279.5	-229.9	-1,500
36 LaFalce-D	128.2	275.5	-147.3	-1,000
37 Nowak-D	60.8	237.7	-176.9	-1,200
38 Kemp-R	65.9	296.5	-230.6	-1,500
39 Lundine-D	80.4	231.6	-151.2	-1,000
North Carolina				
<i>Helms-R, East-R</i>	2,387.9	2,847.2	-459.3	
1 Jones-D	278.6	213.0	+65.6	+400
2 Fountain-D	30.9	212.8	-181.9	+1,200
3 Whitley-D	552.4	206.6	+345.8	+2,300
4 Andrews-D	90.9	300.0	-209.1	-1,400
5 Neal-D	69.1	280.8	-211.7	-1,400
6 Johnston-R	264.8	315.0	-50.2	-300
7 Rose-D	890.5	228.3	+662.2	+4,400
8 Hefner-D	46.7	252.9	-206.2	-1,400
9 Martin-R	52.7	328.5	-275.8	-1,800
10 Broyhill-R	31.3	270.2	-238.9	-1,600
11 Hendon-R	79.8	238.1	-158.3	-1,100
North Dakota				
<i>Burdick-D, Andrews-R</i>	309.0	368.3	-59.3	
1 Dorgan-D	309.0	368.3	-59.3	-400
Ohio				
<i>Metzenbaum-D, Glenn-D</i>	3,850.9	7,139.3	-3,288.4	
1 Gradison-R	278.8	348.9	-70.1	-500
2 Luken-D	261.5	308.5	-47.0	-300
3 Hall-D	434.2	360.1	+74.1	+500
4 Guyer-R	140.2	283.1	-142.9	-1,000
5 Latta-R	48.9	278.1	-229.2	-1,500
6 McEwen-R	421.3	244.6	+176.7	+1,200
7 Brown-R	752.4	298.6	+453.8	+3,000
8 Kindness-R	107.7	300.5	-192.8	-1,300
9 Weber-R	62.3	332.4	-270.1	-1,800
10 Miller-R	24.6	230.0	-205.4	-1,400
11 Stanton-R	43.1	316.3	-273.2	-1,800
12 Shamansky-D	246.8	316.9	-70.1	-500
13 Pease-D	43.0	302.0	-259.0	-1,700

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
14 Seiberling-D	\$184.0	\$328.4	-\$144.4	-\$1,000
15 Wiley-R	243.2	317.9	-74.7	-500
16 Regula-R	46.0	302.3	-256.3	-1,700
17 Ashbrook-R	97.6	275.6	-178.0	-1,200
18 Applegate-D	20.7	256.1	-235.4	-1,600
19 Williams-R	17.2	308.9	-291.7	-2,000
20 Oaker-D	82.8	306.4	-223.6	-1,500
21 Stokes-D	77.5	265.7	-188.2	-1,300
22 Eckart-D	95.0	451.3	-356.3	-2,400
23 Mott-D	95.3	406.0	-310.7	-2,100
Oklahoma				
<i>Boren-D, Nickles-R</i>	1,675.6	1,657.3	+18.3	
1 Jones-D	147.6	338.1	-190.5	-1,300
2 Synar-D	102.1	234.5	-132.4	-900
3 Watkins-D	90.4	214.6	-124.2	-800
4 McCurdy-D	574.7	258.5	+316.2	+2,100
5 Edwards-R	508.3	339.2	+169.1	+1,200
6 English-D	235.3	272.6	-37.3	-200
Oregon				
<i>Hatfield-R, Packwood-R</i>	448.2	1,685.6	-1,237.4	
1 Aucoin-D	116.4	480.8	-364.4	-2,400
2 D. Smith-R	91.6	375.9	-284.3	-1,900
3 Wyden-D	139.7	439.5	-299.8	-2,000
4 Weaver-D	100.2	389.0	-288.8	-1,900
Pennsylvania				
<i>Heinz-R, Specter-R</i>	4,473.4	7,465.0	-2,991.6	
1 Foglietta-D	359.4	265.5	+93.9	+600
2 Gray-D	351.9	307.0	+44.9	+300
3 Lederer-D	359.4	261.9	+97.5	+600
4 Dougherty-R	381.8	331.1	+50.7	+300
5 Schulze-R	192.2	374.1	-181.9	+1,200
6 Yatron-D	83.2	283.1	-199.9	-1,300
7 Edgar-D	240.3	343.4	-103.1	-700
8 J. Coyne-R	177.5	340.1	-162.6	-1,100
9 Shuster-R	206.3	245.2	-38.9	-300
10 McDade-R	174.4	256.2	-81.8	-500
11 Nelligan-R	42.4	254.7	-212.3	-1,400
12 Murtha-D	38.2	238.9	-200.7	-1,300
13 Coughlin-R	213.9	459.2	-245.3	-1,600
14 W. Coyne-D	155.6	316.8	+161.2	+1,100
15 Ritter-R	42.0	321.9	-279.9	-1,900
16 Walker-R	120.0	298.3	-178.3	-1,200
17 Ertel-D	94.4	280.4	-186.0	-1,200
18 Walgren-D	163.6	350.6	-187.0	-1,200
19 Goodling-R	681.9	316.5	+365.4	+2,500
20 Gaydos-D	150.2	300.1	-149.9	-1,000
21 Bailey-D	65.0	284.6	-219.6	-1,500
22 Murphy-D	43.6	253.8	-210.2	-1,400
23 Clinger-R	62.4	242.8	-180.4	-1,200
24 Marks-R	40.6	268.4	-227.8	-1,500
25 Atkinson-D	35.8	268.1	-232.3	-1,600
Rhode Island				
<i>Pell-D, Chafee-R</i>	486.2	566.6	-80.4	
1 St. Germain-D	382.4	288.4	+94.0	+600
2 Schneider-R	103.8	278.2	-174.4	-1,200
South Carolina				
<i>Thurmond-R, Hollings-D</i>	2,242.0	1,410.5	+831.5	
1 Hartnett-R	954.4	234.1	+720.3	+4,800
2 Spence-R	329.7	243.1	+86.6	+600
3 Derrick-D	401.9	247.8	+154.1	+1,000
4 Campbell-R	62.1	269.6	-207.5	-1,400
5 Holland-D	151.3	224.0	-72.7	-500
6 Napier-R	126.4	191.4	-65.0	-400
South Dakota				
<i>Pressler-R, Abdnor-R</i>	188.5	340.0	-151.5	
1 Daschle-D	31.0	173.4	-142.4	-1,000
2 Roberts-R	157.5	166.4	-8.9	-100
Tennessee				
<i>Baker-R, Sasser-D</i>	1,297.6	2,294.8	-997.2	
1 Quillen-R	136.0	259.0	-123.0	-800
2 Duncan-R	71.6	283.7	-212.1	-1,400
3 Bouquard-D	275.7	300.0	-24.3	-200
4 Gore-D	258.0	251.0	+7.0	+100
5 Boner-D	97.6	357.1	-259.5	-1,700
6 Beard-R	76.5	282.0	-205.5	-1,400
7 Jones-D	155.2	262.2	-107.0	-700
8 Ford-D	227.0	299.2	-72.2	-500

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
Texas				
<i>Tower-R, Bentsen-D</i>	\$10,117.4	\$8,669.1	+\$1,448.3	
1 S. Hall-D	236.2	289.7	-53.5	-\$400
2 Wilson-D	77.2	291.9	-214.7	-1,400
3 Collins-R	437.6	580.8	-143.2	-1,000
4 R. Hall-D	309.5	347.1	-37.6	-300
5 Mattox-D	378.5	441.0	-62.5	-400
6 Gramm-D	600.9	392.6	+208.3	+1,400
7 Archer-R	122.9	636.1	-513.2	-3,400
8 Fields-R	94.5	348.2	-253.7	-1,700
9 Brooks-D	359.7	376.4	-16.7	-100
10 Pickle-D	282.7	340.6	-57.9	-400
11 Leath-D	724.6	309.9	+414.7	+2,800
12 Wright-D	1,559.8	394.8	+1,165.0	+7,800
13 Hightower-D	430.3	363.4	+66.9	+400
14 Patman-D	380.7	310.6	+70.1	+500
15 De La Garza-D	151.7	205.2	-53.5	-400
16 White-D	482.8	308.5	+174.3	+1,200
17 Stenholm-D	245.8	318.2	-72.4	-500
18 Leland-D	90.1	326.2	-236.1	-1,600
19 Hance-D	92.1	352.2	-260.1	-1,700
20 Gonzalez-D	1,025.0	260.4	+764.6	+5,100
21 Loeffler-R	790.5	407.4	+383.1	+2,600
22 Paul-R	62.5	425.9	-363.4	-2,400
23 Kazen-D	449.5	249.6	+199.9	+1,300
24 Frost-D	815.2	397.7	+417.5	+2,800
Utah				
<i>Gam-R, Hatch-R</i>	895.4	679.9	+215.5	
1 Hansen-R	629.5	316.8	+312.7	+2,100
2 Marriott-R	265.8	363.1	-97.3	-700
Vermont				
<i>Stafford-R, Leahy-D</i>	168.6	240.8	-72.2	
1 Jeffords-R	168.6	240.8	-72.2	-500
Virginia				
<i>Byrd-I, Warner-R</i>	8,648.7	3,272.1	+5,376.6	
1 Tribble-R	2,266.2	293.5	+1,972.7	+13,300
2 Whitehurst-R	1,764.1	319.4	+1,444.7	+9,700
3 Bliley-R	284.0	363.9	-79.9	-500

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
Washington				
4 R. Daniel-R	\$897.2	\$268.3	+\$628.9	+\$4,200
5 D. Daniel-D	54.6	248.7	-194.1	-1,300
6 Butler-R	72.7	300.7	-228.0	-1,500
7 Robinson-R	136.9	281.1	-144.2	-1,000
8 Parris-R	921.5	435.5	+486.0	+3,300
9 Wampler-R	243.3	226.8	+16.5	+100
10 Wolf-R	1,824.0	533.7	+1,290.3	+8,700
Washington				
<i>Jackson-D, Slade-R</i>	4,098.0	2,762.2	1,335.8	
1 Pritchard-R	839.3	503.5	+335.8	+2,300
2 Swift-D	334.1	382.4	-48.3	-300
3 Bonker-D	384.5	353.6	+30.9	+200
4 Morrison-R	382.5	339.0	+43.5	+400
5 Foley-D	190.0	343.0	-153.0	-1,000
6 Dicks-D	1,357.0	393.0	+964.0	+6,500
7 Lowry-D	825.0	451.4	+373.6	+2,500
West Virginia				
<i>Randolph-D, Byrd-D</i>	238.6	977.4	-738.8	
1 Mollohan-D	25.4	278.8	-253.4	-1,700
2 Benedict-R	115.6	215.8	-100.2	-700
3 Staton-R	38.0	251.7	-213.7	-1,400
4 Rahall-D	59.6	231.2	-171.6	-1,100
Wisconsin				
<i>Proxmire-D, Kasten-R</i>	592.9	2,818.8	-2,225.9	
1 Aspin-D	33.1	319.2	-286.1	-1,900
2 Kastenmeier-D	74.3	332.0	-257.7	-1,700
3 Gunderson-R	76.2	263.7	-187.5	-1,300
4 Zablocki-D	77.7	355.5	-277.8	-1,900
5 Reuss-D	73.7	328.5	-254.8	-1,700
6 Petri-R	14.8	301.6	-286.8	-1,900
7 Obey-D	49.3	256.8	-207.5	-1,400
8 Roth-R	92.4	277.5	-185.1	-1,200
9 Sensenbrenner-R	60.7	390.2	-329.5	-2,200
Wyoming				
<i>Wallop-R, Simpson-R</i>	139.5	325.8	-186.3	
1 Cheney-R	139.5	325.8	-186.3	-1,200

TABLE 2
The Pentagon Tax Gain or Loss by Congressional District Fiscal Year 1982†

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
Alabama				
<i>Heflin-D, Denton-R</i>	\$2,748.5	\$2,419.3	+\$329.2	
1 Edwards-R	317.9	331.0	-13.1	-\$100
2 Dickinson-R	841.2	337.4	+503.8	+3,400
3 Nichols-D	418.0	308.0	+110.0	+700
4 Bevil-D	132.2	306.9	-174.7	-1,200
5 Flippo-D	738.0	389.1	+348.9	+2,300
6 Smith-R	162.2	441.3	-279.1	-1,900
7 Shelby-D	138.9	345.7	-206.8	-1,400
Alaska				
<i>Stevens-R, Murkowski-R</i> ..	1,001.5	539.7	+461.8	
1 Young-R	1,001.5	539.7	+461.8	+3,100
Arizona				
<i>DeConcini-D, Goldwater-R</i> ..	2,165.7	1,842.3	+323.4	
1 Rhodes-R	531.6	462.5	+69.1	+500
2 Udall-D	808.8	452.7	+356.1	+2,400
3 Stump-D	449.7	423.7	+26.0	+200
4 Rudd-R	375.6	503.4	-127.8	-900
Arkansas				
<i>Pryor-D, Bumpers-D</i>	801.7	1,284.1	-482.4	
1 Alexander-D	131.4	279.3	-147.9	-1,000
2 Bethune-R	312.9	374.7	-61.8	-400
3 Schmidt-R	162.8	327.1	-164.3	-1,100
4 Anthony-D	193.7	303.1	-109.4	-700

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
California				
<i>Hayakawa-R, Cranston-D</i> ..	\$29,654.5	\$21,606.2	+\$8,048.3	
1 Chapple-R	214.7	414.5	-199.8	-\$1,300
2 Clausen-R	98.8	423.0	-324.2	-2,200
3 Matsui-D	976.1	494.0	+482.1	+3,200
4 Fazio-D	1,220.9	414.0	+806.9	+5,400
5 J. Burton-D	322.5	700.0	-377.5	-2,500
6 P. Burton-D	451.7	508.4	-56.7	-400
7 Miller-R	139.0	553.8	-414.8	-2,800
8 Dellums-D	473.4	567.3	-93.9	-600
9 Stark-D	499.1	517.0	-17.9	-100
10 Edwards-D	898.2	440.6	+457.6	+3,100
11 Lantos-D	340.4	579.4	-239.0	-1,600
12 McCloskey-R	1,346.0	622.1	+723.9	+4,900
13 Mineta-D	1,502.5	584.4	+918.1	+6,200
14 Shumway-R	206.0	411.1	-205.1	-1,400
15 Coelho-D	215.7	371.3	-155.6	-1,000
16 Panetta-D	650.9	428.6	+222.3	+1,500
17 Pashayan-R	650.1	374.3	+275.8	+1,900
18 Thomas-R	750.0	385.9	+364.1	+2,400
19 Lagomarsino-R	1,338.6	482.8	+855.8	+5,800
20 Goldwater-R	745.7	593.4	+152.3	+1,000
21 Fiedler-R	581.0	497.4	+83.6	+600
22 Moorhead-R	670.3	645.7	+24.6	+200
23 Bellenson-D	804.4	846.2	-41.8	-300
24 Waxman-D	670.3	421.1	+249.2	+1,700
25 Roybal-D	491.6	443.1	+48.5	+300
26 Rousselot-R	625.6	567.3	+58.3	+400
27 Dornan-R	715.1	788.9	-73.8	-500
28 Dixon-D	580.9	487.9	+93.0	+600
29 Hawkins-D	491.6	322.5	+169.1	+1,100

†Projected from 1980 data

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
California continued				
30 Danielson-D	\$581.0	\$433.2	+\$147.8	+\$1,000
31 Dymally-D	491.6	502.9	-11.3	-100
32 Anderson-D	670.3	447.2	+223.1	+1,500
33 Grisham-R	491.6	491.0	+6	+
34 Lungren-R	671.9	582.4	+89.5	+600
35 Dreier-R	628.0	480.3	+145.7	+1,000
36 Brown-D	530.9	362.7	+168.2	+1,100
37 Lewis-R	651.8	423.6	+228.2	+1,500
38 Patterson-D	785.5	449.2	+336.3	+2,300
39 Dannemeyer-R	837.0	539.7	+297.3	+2,000
40 Badham-R	978.5	566.8	+411.7	+2,800
41 Lowery-R	1,565.6	549.2	+1,016.4	+7,000
42 Hunter-R	1,351.2	395.5	+955.7	+6,400
43 Burgener-R	1,212.2	520.5	+691.7	+4,600

Colorado				
Armstrong-R, Hart-D	2,331.5	2,363.4	-31.9	
1 Schroeder-D	662.9	563.5	+99.4	+700
2 Wirth-D	133.5	520.0	-386.5	-2,600
3 Kogovsek-D	365.8	357.9	+7.9	+100
4 Brown-R	98.0	424.5	-326.5	-300
5 Kramer-R	829.0	497.7	+331.3	+300

Connecticut				
Weicker-R, Dodd-D	5,569.6	3,256.8	+2,312.8	
1 Cotter-D	1,818.2	555.3	+1,262.9	+8,500
2 Gajdenson-D	1,108.2	460.9	+647.3	+4,300
3 DeNardis-R	167.9	510.8	-342.9	-2,300
4 McKinney-R	876.3	667.1	+209.2	+1,400
5 Ratchford-D	416.7	549.3	-132.6	-900
6 Moffett-D	1,190.4	516.2	+674.2	+4,500

D.C.	3,084.8	725.7	+2,359.1	+9,500
------	---------	-------	----------	--------

Delaware				
Roth-R, Biden-D	537.9	558.4	-20.5	-100
1 Evans-R	537.9	558.4	-20.5	-100

Florida				
Chiles-D, Hawkins-R	6,707.3	7,127.7	-420.4	
1 Hutto-D	1,441.6	384.9	+1,056.7	+7,100
2 Fuqua-D	159.4	353.0	-193.6	-1,300
3 Bennett-D	720.9	414.9	+306.0	+2,100
4 Chappel-D	383.2	436.2	-53.0	-400
5 McCollum-R	485.4	411.1	+74.3	+500
6 Young-R	376.7	509.9	-133.2	-900
7 Gibbons-D	515.0	439.6	+75.4	+500
8 Ireland-D	123.6	436.2	-312.6	-2,100
9 Nelson-D	1,339.7	510.8	+828.9	+5,600
10 Bafalis-R	210.2	456.1	-246.0	-1,700
11 Mica-D	389.1	595.9	-206.8	-1,400
12 Shaw-R	102.9	587.8	-484.9	-3,300
13 Lehman-D	132.0	501.7	-369.7	-2,500
14 Pepper-D	141.2	527.9	-386.6	-2,600
15 Fascell-D	187.1	560.7	-373.6	-2,500

Georgia				
Nunn-D, Mattingly-R	3,880.7	3,517.3	+363.4	
1 Ginn-D	705.5	300.7	+404.8	+2,700
2 Hatcher-D	237.1	268.4	-31.3	-200
3 Brinkley-D	1,014.5	319.4	+695.1	+4,700
4 Levitas-D	123.2	506.1	-382.9	-2,600
5 Fowler-D	58.7	473.8	-415.1	-2,800
6 Gingrich-R	285.4	372.5	-87.1	-600
7 McDonald-D	594.2	397.4	+196.8	+1,300
8 Evans-D	81.5	290.5	-209.0	-1,400
9 Jenkins-D	93.8	319.4	-225.6	-1,500
10 Barnard-D	537.2	307.4	+229.8	+1,500

Hawaii				
Matsunaga-D, Inouye-D	2,165.5	818.9	+1,346.6	
1 Haftel-D	1,290.5	471.3	+819.2	+5,500
2 Akaka-D	874.9	354.6	+520.3	+3,500

Idaho				
McClure-R, Symms-R	474.3	614.2	-139.9	
1 Craig-R	90.3	313.9	-223.6	-1,500
2 Hansen-R	384.0	300.3	+83.7	+600

Illinois				
Percy-R, Dixon-D	3,029.9	11,463.8	-8,433.9	
1 Washington-D	64.0	398.3	-334.3	-2,200
2 Savage-D	69.1	458.1	-389.0	-2,600
3 Russo-D	72.5	514.9	-442.4	-3,000
4 Derwinski-R	75.1	546.4	-471.3	-3,200

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
5 Fary-D	\$65.7	\$403.2	-\$337.5	-\$2,300
6 Hyde-R	82.2	585.2	-503.0	-3,400
7 Collins-D	61.4	347.2	-285.8	-1,900
8 Rostenkowski-D	65.7	423.7	-358.0	-2,500
9 Yates-D	81.2	649.1	-567.9	-3,800
10 Porter-R	89.9	764.2	-674.3	-4,500
11 Annunzio-D	75.1	555.1	-480.0	-3,200
12 Crane-R	245.9	621.9	-376.0	-2,500
13 McClory-R	368.8	487.7	-118.9	-800
14 Erlenborn-R	116.1	586.8	-470.5	-3,200
15 Corcoran-R	28.4	436.0	-407.6	-2,800
16 Martin-R	125.7	441.8	-316.1	-2,100
17 O'Brien-R	69.0	438.5	-369.5	-2,500
18 Michel-R	88.5	443.8	-355.3	-2,400
19 Railsback-R	299.3	409.4	-110.1	-700
20 Findley-R	73.8	407.4	-333.6	-2,200
21 Madigan-R	296.8	437.5	-140.7	-900
22 Crane-R	31.3	371.1	-339.8	-2,300
23 Price-D	424.6	401.2	+23.4	+200
24 Simon-D	59.6	327.1	-267.5	-1,800

Indiana				
Lugar-R, Quayle-R	2,449.7	4,559.5	-2,109.8	
1 Benjamin-D	163.0	420.7	-257.7	-1,700
2 Fithian-D	74.0	417.0	-343.0	-2,300
3 Hiler-R	306.8	444.3	-137.5	-900
4 Coats-R	347.6	424.9	-77.3	-500
5 Hillis-R	205.5	444.7	-239.2	-1,600
6 Evans-D	301.9	419.9	-118.0	-800
7 Myers-R	100.0	378.5	-278.5	-1,900
8 Deckard-R	201.9	360.6	-158.7	-1,100
9 Hamilton-R	193.0	372.2	-179.2	-1,200
10 Sharp-D	29.4	400.8	-371.4	-2,500
11 Jacobs-D	527.1	475.5	+51.6	+300

Iowa				
Jepsen-R, Grassley-R	558.9	2,456.5	-1,897.6	
1 Leach-R	147.8	429.5	-281.7	-1,900
2 Tauke-R	227.5	402.8	-175.3	-1,200
3 Evans-R	51.8	406.1	-354.3	-2,400
4 Smith-D	68.2	445.9	-377.7	-2,500
5 Harkin-D	30.2	389.8	-359.6	-2,500
6 Bedell-D	33.2	382.4	-349.2	-2,500

Kansas				
Kassenbaum-R, Dole-R	1,849.4	1,991.2	-141.8	
1 Roberts-R	96.4	361.2	-264.8	-1,800
2 Jeffries-R	325.3	380.3	-55.0	-400
3 Winn-R	393.3	488.2	-94.9	-600
4 Glickman-D	841.4	419.8	+421.6	+2,800
5 Whittaker-R	193.5	342.1	-148.6	-1,000

Kentucky				
Huddleston-D, Ford-D	1,552.1	2,382.0	-829.9	
1 Hubbard-D	467.6	318.2	+149.4	+1,000
2 Natcher-D	572.7	321.9	+250.8	+1,700
3 Mazzoli-D	144.9	414.1	-269.2	-1,800
4 Snyder-R	93.5	448.1	-354.6	-2,400
5 Rogers-R	60.3	234.1	-173.8	-1,200
6 Hopkins-R	86.7	391.4	-304.7	-2,000
7 Perkins-D	126.4	254.5	-128.1	-900

Louisiana				
Johnson-D, R. Long-D	1,942.2	2,866.0	-923.8	
1 Livingston-R	290.3	414.5	-124.2	-800
2 Boggs-D	243.3	405.2	-161.9	-1,100
3 Tauzin-D	112.6	403.7	-291.1	-2,000
4 Roemer-D	710.2	364.1	+346.1	+2,300
5 Huckaby-D	79.0	290.2	-211.2	-1,400
6 Moore-R	164.4	376.5	-212.1	-1,400
7 Breaux-D	112.2	338.6	-226.4	-1,500
8 G. Long-D	223.0	273.7	-50.7	-300

Maine				
Mitchell-D, Cohen-R	899.6	688.6	+211.0	
1 Emery-R	730.3	369.4	+360.9	+2,400
2 Snowe-R	169.3	319.1	-149.8	-1,000

Maryland				
Sarbanes-D, Mathias-R	5,137.5	3,964.0	+1,173.5	
1 Dyson-D	849.9	391.4	+458.5	+3,000
2 Long-D	195.4	569.8	-374.4	-2,500
3 Mikulski-D	431.7	464.3	-32.6	-200
4 Holt-R	1,136.4	500.9	+635.5	+4,300
5 Spellman-D	499.0	519.7	-20.7	-100

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
------------------------	---	---	--------------------------------------	-----------------------------------

Maryland continued

6 Byron-D	\$475.8	\$422.6	+\$53.0	+\$400
7 Mitchell-D	480.2	349.3	+130.9	+900
8 Barnes-D	1,066.0	743.7	+322.3	+2,200

Massachusetts

<i>Kennedy-D, Tsongas-D</i>	5,850.7	4,875.9	+974.8	
1 Conte-R	203.5	372.6	-169.1	-1,100
2 Boland-D	86.3	376.7	-290.3	-2,000
3 Early-D	218.9	384.0	-165.1	-1,100
4 Frank-D	661.6	512.4	+149.2	+1,000
5 Shannon-D	1,000.5	379.2	+621.3	+4,200
6 Mavroules-D	1,442.4	410.4	+1,032.0	+6,900
7 Markey-D	785.4	416.9	+368.5	+2,500
8 O'Neill-D	657.4	440.0	+217.4	+1,500
9 Moakley-D	195.1	390.1	-195.0	-1,300
10 Heckler-R	229.9	390.5	-160.5	-1,100
11 Donnelly-D	182.6	394.1	-211.5	-1,400
12 Studds-D	184.9	384.8	-199.9	-1,300

Michigan

<i>Riegle-D, Levin-D</i>	3,072.8	8,690.9	-5,618.1	
1 Conyers-D	49.1	414.4	-365.3	-2,500
2 Pursell-R	77.0	503.2	-426.2	-2,900
3 Wolpe-D	116.7	447.9	-331.2	-2,200
4 Siljander-R	27.6	401.6	-374.0	-2,500
5 Sawyer-R	102.0	433.2	-331.2	-2,200
6 Dunn-R	96.7	456.5	-359.8	-2,400
7 Kildee-D	23.4	446.0	-422.6	-2,800
8 Traxler-D	43.6	403.5	-359.9	-2,400
9 Vander Jagt-R	245.0	380.6	-135.6	-900
10 Albosta-D	93.1	372.3	-279.2	-1,900
11 Davis-R	270.5	327.8	-57.3	-400
12 Bonior-D	755.6	464.7	+290.9	+2,000
13 Crockett-D	42.8	347.2	-304.4	-2,000
14 Hertel-D	481.4	562.2	-80.8	-500
15 Ford-D	49.5	468.4	-418.9	-2,800
16 Dingell-D	50.8	496.4	-445.6	-3,000
17 Brodhead-D	58.2	586.9	-528.7	-3,600
18 Blanchard-D	414.5	553.0	-138.5	-900
19 Broomfield-R	62.4	599.6	-537.2	-3,600

Minnesota

<i>Durenberger-R, Boschwitz-R</i>	1,725.1	3,461.4	-1,736.3	
1 Erdahl-R	32.1	420.2	-388.1	-2,600
2 Hagedorn-R	89.5	423.2	-333.7	-2,200
3 Frenzel-R	526.0	585.4	-59.4	-400
4 Vento-D	404.6	495.4	-90.8	-600
5 Sabo-D	458.3	499.8	-41.5	-300
6 Weber-R	58.6	336.6	-278.0	-1,900
7 Stangeland-R	46.2	320.6	-274.4	-1,800
8 Oberstar-D	109.7	380.7	-271.0	-1,800

Mississippi

<i>Stennis-D, Cochran-R</i>	1,985.7	1,284.1	+701.6	
1 Whitten-D	172.0	236.7	-64.7	-400
2 Bowen-D	230.2	232.7	-2.5	0
3 Montgomery-D	121.0	227.3	-106.3	-700
4 Hinson-R	218.9	287.6	-68.7	-500
5 Lott-R	1,244.0	291.3	+952.7	+6,400

Missouri

<i>Danforth-R, Eagleton-D</i>	5,841.8	3,833.6	+2,008.2	
1 Clay-D	2,060.6	375.4	+1,685.2	+11,300
2 Young-D	40.3	552.4	-512.1	-3,400
3 Gephardt-D	2,415.0	430.5	+1,984.5	+13,300
4 Skelton-D	305.2	368.8	-63.6	-400
5 Bolling-D	355.9	430.1	-74.2	-500
6 Coleman-R	89.2	365.0	-275.8	-1,900
7 Taylor-R	98.7	312.4	-213.7	-1,400
8 Bailey-R	362.7	339.0	+23.7	+200
9 Volkmer-D	75.5	373.8	-298.3	-2,000
10 Emerson-R	38.6	290.6	-252.0	-1,700

Montana

<i>Melcher-D, Baucus-D</i>	236.6	595.5	-358.9	
1 Williams-D	49.4	295.7	-246.3	-1,700
2 Marlenee-R	187.2	299.8	-112.6	-800

Nebraska

<i>Zorinsky-D, Exon-D</i>	721.9	1,265.4	-543.5	
1 Bereuter-R	74.0	404.1	-330.1	-2,200
2 Daub-R	605.3	480.8	+124.5	+800
3 Smith-R	41.1	380.5	-339.4	-2,300

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
------------------------	---	---	--------------------------------------	-----------------------------------

Nevada

<i>Cannon-D, Laxalt-R</i>	\$746.0	\$725.7	+\$20.3	+\$100
1 Santini-D	746.0	725.7	+20.3	+100

New Hampshire

<i>Humphrey-R, Rudman-R</i>	853.2	725.1	+128.1	
1 D'Amours-D	250.1	356.0	-105.9	-700
2 Gregg-R	603.0	369.0	+234.0	+1,600

New Jersey

<i>Williams-D, Bradley-D</i>	3,517.7	7,332.4	-3,814.7	
1 Florio-D	149.4	403.7	-254.3	-1,700
2 Hughes-D	140.4	398.9	-258.5	-1,700
3 Howard-D	508.7	478.6	+30.1	+200
4 Smith-R	421.5	430.3	-8.8	-100
5 Fenwick-R	228.2	624.7	-396.5	-2,700
6 Forsythe-R	761.9	473.2	+288.7	+1,900
7 Roukema-R	115.5	617.0	-501.5	-3,400
8 Roe-D	206.3	457.6	-251.3	-1,700
9 Hollenbeck-R	123.4	566.1	-442.7	-3,000
10 Rodino-D	115.1	369.6	-254.4	-1,700
11 Minish-D	141.8	582.7	-440.9	-3,000
12 Rinaldo-R	136.4	565.6	-429.2	-2,900
13 Courter-R	234.0	476.6	-242.6	-1,600
14 Guarini-D	162.1	419.9	-257.8	-1,800
15 Dwyer-D	72.8	470.2	-397.4	-2,700

New Mexico

<i>Domenici-R, Schmitt-R</i>	1,958.6	818.9	+1,139.7	
1 Lujan-R	1,264.8	436.8	+828.0	+5,500
2 Skeen-R	693.8	382.1	+311.7	+2,100

New York

<i>Moynihan-D, D'Amato-R</i>	9,046.0	15,632.3	-6,586.3	
1 Carney-D	187.3	364.7	-177.4	-1,200
2 Downey-D	176.0	350.4	-174.4	-1,200
3 Carman-R	720.6	463.8	+256.8	+1,700
4 Lent-R	1,036.8	468.1	+568.7	+3,800
5 McGrath-R	1,075.3	510.7	+564.6	+3,800
6 LaBoutillier-R	500.4	577.9	-77.5	-500
7 Addabbo-D	57.1	430.5	-373.4	-2,500
8 Rosenthal-D	61.0	499.9	-438.9	-2,900
9 Ferraro-D	57.9	416.5	-358.6	-2,400
10 Biaggi-D	57.0	360.8	-303.8	-2,000
11 Scheuer-D	52.8	367.2	-314.4	-2,100
12 Chisholm-D	41.1	230.4	-189.3	-1,300
13 Solarz-D	55.3	414.5	-359.2	-2,400
14 Richmond-D	45.6	271.8	-226.2	-1,500
15 Zeferetti-D	51.6	367.2	-315.6	-2,100
16 Schumer-D	54.8	408.1	-353.3	-2,400
17 Molinari-R	174.7	384.4	-209.7	-1,400
18 Green-R	675.8	984.4	-308.6	-2,100
19 Rangel-D	421.1	344.3	+76.8	+500
20 Weiss-D	281.7	494.6	-212.9	-1,400
21 Garcia-D	42.3	203.2	-160.9	-1,100
22 Bingham-D	57.8	363.5	-305.7	-2,100
23 Peyser-D	74.1	496.2	-422.1	-2,800
24 Ottinger-D	70.8	591.2	-520.4	-3,500
25 Fish-R	50.6	391.6	-341.0	-2,300
26 Gilman-R	176.7	374.8	-198.1	-1,300
27 McHugh-D	618.7	337.5	+281.2	+1,900
28 Stratton-D	536.9	393.6	+143.3	+1,000
29 Solomon-R	73.3	321.1	-247.8	-1,700
30 Martin-R	214.7	278.5	-63.8	-400
31 Mitchell-R	442.4	318.6	+123.8	+800
32 Wortley-R	173.9	354.3	-180.4	-1,200
33 Lee-R	168.7	331.9	-163.2	-1,100
34 Horton-R	90.9	432.9	-342.0	-2,300
35 Conable-R	65.2	367.2	-302.0	-2,000
36 LaFalce-D	168.4	361.9	-193.5	-1,300
37 Nowak-D	79.9	312.3	-232.4	-1,600
38 Kemp-R	86.6	389.5	-302.9	-2,000
39 Lundine-D	105.6	304.3	-198.7	-1,300

North Carolina

<i>Helms-R, East-R</i>	3,137.2	3,740.6	-603.4	
1 Jones-D	366.0	279.8	+86.2	+600
2 Fountain-D	40.6	279.6	-239.0	-1,600
3 Whitley-D	725.7	271.4	+454.3	+3,100
4 Andrews-D	119.4	394.1	-274.7	-1,800
5 Neal-D	90.8	368.9	-278.1	-1,900
6 Johnston-R	347.9	413.8	-65.9	-400
7 Rose-D	1,169.9	299.9	+870.0	+5,800
8 Helfer-D	61.4	332.3	-270.9	-1,800
9 Martin-R	69.2	431.6	-362.3	-2,400
10 Broyhill-R	41.1	355.0	-313.9	-2,100
11 Hendon-R	104.8	312.8	-208.0	-1,400

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
North Dakota				
<i>Burdick-D, Andrews-R</i>	\$406.0	\$483.9	-\$77.9	
1 Dorgan-D	406.0	483.9	-77.9	-\$500
Ohio				
<i>Metzenbaum-D, Glenn-D</i> ..	5,059.3	9,379.8	-4,320.3	
1 Gradison-R	366.3	458.4	-82.1	-600
2 Luken-D	343.6	405.3	-61.7	-400
3 Hall-D	570.4	473.1	+97.3	+700
4 Guyer-R	184.2	371.9	-187.7	-1,300
5 Latta-R	64.2	365.4	-301.2	-2,000
6 McEwen-R	553.5	321.4	+232.1	+1,600
7 Brown-R	988.5	392.3	+596.2	+4,000
8 Kindness-R	141.5	394.8	-253.3	-1,700
9 Weber-R	81.8	436.7	-354.9	-2,400
10 Miller-R	32.3	302.2	-269.9	-1,800
11 Stanton-R	56.6	415.6	-359.0	-2,400
12 Shamansky-D	324.2	416.3	-82.1	-600
13 Pease-D	56.5	396.8	-340.3	-2,300
14 Seiberling-D	241.7	431.4	-189.7	-1,300
15 Wiley-R	319.5	417.7	-88.2	-700
16 Regula-R	60.4	397.2	-336.8	-2,300
17 Ashbrook-R	128.2	362.1	-233.9	-1,600
18 Applegate-D	27.2	336.5	-309.3	-2,100
19 Williams-R	22.6	405.8	-383.2	-2,600
20 Oaker-D	108.8	402.5	-293.7	-2,000
21 Stokes-D	101.8	349.1	-247.3	-1,700
22 Eckart-D	124.8	592.9	-468.1	-3,100
23 Mottl-D	125.2	533.4	-408.2	-2,700
Oklahoma				
<i>Boren-D, Nickles-R</i>	2,201.4	2,177.3	+24.1	
1 Jones-D	193.9	444.2	-250.3	-1,700
2 Synar-D	134.1	308.1	-174.0	-1,200
3 Watkins-D	118.8	281.9	-163.1	-1,100
4 McCurdy-D	755.0	339.6	+415.4	+2,800
5 Edwards-R	667.8	445.6	+222.2	+1,500
6 English-D	309.1	358.1	-49.0	-300
Oregon				
<i>Hatfield-R, Packwood-R</i> ...	588.8	2,214.5	-1,625.7	
1 Aucoin-D	152.9	631.7	-478.8	-3,200
2 D. Smith-R	120.3	493.9	-373.6	-2,500
3 Wyden-D	183.5	577.4	-393.9	-2,600
4 Weaver-D	131.6	511.1	-379.5	-2,500
Pennsylvania				
<i>Heinz-R, Specter-R</i>	5,877.1	9,807.5	-3,930.4	
1 Foglietta-D	472.2	348.8	+123.4	+800
2 Gray-D	462.3	403.3	+59.0	+400
3 Lederer-D	472.2	344.1	+128.1	+900
4 Dougherty-R	501.6	435.0	+66.6	+400
5 Schulze-R	252.5	491.5	-239.0	-1,600
6 Yatron-D	109.3	371.9	-262.6	-1,800
7 Edgar-D	315.7	451.2	-135.5	-900
8 J. Coyne-R	233.2	446.8	-213.6	-1,400
9 Shuster-R	271.0	322.1	-51.1	-300
10 McDade-R	229.1	336.6	-107.5	-700
11 Nelligan-R	55.7	334.6	-278.9	-1,900
12 Murtha-D	50.2	313.9	-263.7	-1,800
13 Coughlin-R	281.0	603.3	-322.3	-2,200
14 W. Coyne-D	204.4	416.2	-211.8	-1,400
15 Ritter-R	55.2	422.9	-367.7	-2,500
16 Walker-R	157.7	391.9	-234.2	-1,600
17 Ertel-D	124.0	368.4	-244.4	-1,600
18 Walgren-D	214.9	460.6	-245.7	-1,600
19 Goodling-R	895.9	415.8	+480.1	+3,200
20 Gaydos-D	197.3	394.3	-197.0	-1,300
21 Bailey-D	85.4	373.9	-288.5	-1,900
22 Murphy-D	57.3	333.4	-276.1	-1,900
23 Clinger-R	82.0	319.0	-237.0	-1,600
24 Marks-R	53.3	352.6	-299.3	-2,000
25 Atkinson-D	47.0	352.1	-305.1	-2,100
Rhode Island				
<i>Pell-D, Chafee-R</i>	638.8	744.4	-105.6	
1 St. Germain-D	502.4	378.8	+123.5	+800
2 Schneider-R	136.4	365.5	-229.1	-1,500
South Carolina				
<i>Thurmond-R, Hollings-D</i> ...	2,945.5	1,853.1	+1,092.4	
1 Hartnett-R	1,253.9	307.6	+946.3	+6,400
2 Spence-R	433.2	319.4	+113.8	+800
3 Derrick-D	528.0	325.6	+202.4	+1,400
4 Campbell-R	81.6	354.2	-272.6	-1,800
5 Holland-D	198.8	294.3	-95.5	-600
6 Napier-R	166.1	251.5	-85.4	-600

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (\$ MILLIONS)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS (\$ MILLIONS)	NET GAIN OR LOSS PER FAMILY
South Dakota				
<i>Pressler-R, Abdnor-R</i>	\$247.6	\$448.7	-\$199.1	
1 Daschle-D	40.7	227.8	-187.1	-\$1,200
2 Roberts-R	206.9	218.8	-11.7	
Tennessee				
<i>Baker-R, Sasser-D</i>	1,704.8	3,014.9	-1,310.1	
1 Quillen-R	178.7	340.3	-161.6	-1,100
2 Duncan-R	94.1	372.7	-278.6	-1,900
3 Bouquard-D	362.2	394.1	-31.9	-200
4 Gore-D	339.0	329.8	+9.2	+100
5 Borer-D	128.2	469.2	-341.0	-2,300
6 Beard-R	100.5	370.5	-270.0	-1,800
7 Jones-D	203.9	344.5	-140.6	-900
8 Ford-D	298.2	393.1	-94.9	-600
Texas				
<i>Tower-R, Bentsen-D</i>	13,292.2	11,389.4	+1,902.8	
1 S. Hall-D	310.3	380.6	-70.3	-500
2 Wilson-D	101.4	383.5	-282.1	-1,900
3 Collins-R	574.9	763.1	-188.2	-1,300
4 R. Hall-D	406.6	456.0	-49.4	-300
5 Mattox-D	497.3	579.4	-82.1	-600
6 Gramm-D	789.5	515.8	+273.7	+1,800
7 Archer-R	161.5	835.7	-674.2	-4,500
8 Fields-R	124.2	457.5	-333.3	-2,200
9 Brooks-D	472.6	494.5	-21.9	-100
10 Pickle-D	371.4	447.5	-76.1	-500
11 Leath-D	952.0	407.1	+544.9	+3,700
12 Wright-D	2,049.3	518.7	+1,530.6	+10,300
13 Hightower-D	565.3	477.4	+87.9	+600
14 Patman-D	500.2	408.1	+92.1	+600
15 De La Garza-D	199.3	269.6	-70.3	-500
16 White-D	634.3	405.3	+229.0	+1,500
17 Stenholm-D	322.9	418.0	-85.1	-600
18 Leland-D	118.4	428.6	-310.2	-2,100
19 Hance-D	121.0	462.7	-341.7	-2,300
20 Gonzalez-D	1,346.6	342.1	+1,004.5	+6,700
21 Loeffler-R	1,038.6	535.2	+503.4	+3,400
22 Paul-R	82.1	559.5	-477.4	-3,200
23 Kazen-D	590.5	327.9	+262.6	+1,800
24 Frost-D	1,071.0	522.5	+548.5	+3,700
Utah				
<i>Garn-R, Hatch-R</i>	1,176.3	893.2	+283.1	
1 Hansen-R	827.0	416.2	+410.8	+2,800
2 Marmott-R	349.2	477.0	-127.8	-900
Vermont				
<i>Stafford-R, Leahy-D</i>	221.5	316.4	-84.9	
1 Jeffords-R	221.5	316.4	-84.9	-600
Virginia				
<i>Byrd-I, Warner-R</i>	11,362.6	4,298.9	+7,063.7	
1 Triple-R	2,977.3	385.6	+2,591.7	+17,400
2 Whitehurst-R	2,317.7	419.6	+1,898.1	+12,800
3 Bliley-R	373.1	478.1	-105.0	-700
4 R. Daniel-R	1,178.7	352.5	+826.2	+5,600
5 D. Daniel-D	71.7	326.7	-255.0	-1,700
6 Butler-R	95.5	395.1	-299.6	-2,000
7 Robinson-R	179.9	369.3	-189.4	-1,300
8 Parris-R	1,210.7	572.2	+638.5	+4,300
9 Wampler-R	319.6	298.0	+21.6	+100
10 Wolf-R	2,396.4	701.2	+1,695.2	+11,400
Washington				
<i>Jackson-D, Slade-R</i>	5,383.9	3,629.0	1,754.9	
1 Pritchard-R	1,102.7	661.5	+441.2	+3,000
2 Swift-D	438.9	502.4	-63.5	-400
3 Bonker-D	505.2	464.6	+40.6	+300
4 Morrison-R	502.5	445.4	+57.1	+400
5 Foley-D	249.6	450.6	-201.0	-1,300
6 Dicks-D	1,782.8	516.3	+1,266.5	+8,500
7 Lowry-D	1,083.9	593.0	+490.9	+3,300
West Virginia				
<i>Randolph-D, Byrd-D</i>	317.7	1,284.1	-966.4	
1 Mollohan-D	33.4	366.3	-332.9	-2,200
2 Benedict-R	151.9	283.5	-131.6	-900
3 Staton-R	49.9	330.7	-280.8	-1,900
4 Rahall-D	78.3	303.7	-225.4	-1,500

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (Millions)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (Millions)	NET GAIN ON LOSS (Millions)	NET GAIN ON LOSS (% FAMILIES)
Wisconsin				
1. Dan Rostenkowski	2,739	3,503	2,524	
2. Joseph P. Kamp	815	1,024	875	2,500
3. Keith S. Thompson	748	952	838	2,300
4. Clement F. Frazier	1,004	1,262	1,063	1,700
5. Zelig E. Isakov	1,024	1,272	1,050	2,400
6. Bruce A. Vento	948	1,183	1,028	2,300
7. P. J. P. J. P.	194	252	216	2,800

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT	PENTAGON EXPENDITURES (Millions)	PENTAGON TAX BURDEN (Millions)	NET GAIN ON LOSS (Millions)	NET GAIN ON LOSS (% FAMILIES)
8. David E. Bonior	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
9. Robert H. Dornan	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
10. Robert H. Dornan	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
11. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
12. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
13. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
14. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
15. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
16. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
17. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
18. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
19. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
20. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
21. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
22. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
23. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
24. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
25. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
26. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
27. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
28. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
29. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
30. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
31. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
32. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
33. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
34. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
35. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
36. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
37. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
38. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
39. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
40. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
41. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
42. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
43. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
44. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
45. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
46. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
47. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
48. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
49. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
50. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
51. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
52. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
53. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
54. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
55. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
56. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
57. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
58. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
59. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
60. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
61. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
62. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
63. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
64. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
65. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
66. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
67. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
68. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
69. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
70. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
71. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
72. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
73. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
74. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
75. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
76. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
77. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
78. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
79. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
80. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
81. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
82. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
83. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
84. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
85. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
86. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
87. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
88. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
89. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
90. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
91. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
92. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
93. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
94. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
95. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
96. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
97. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
98. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
99. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600
100. William H. J. J.	1,245	1,572	1,372	2,600

METHODOLOGY

The concept of the Pentagon tax is designed to determine the amount of direct U.S. military spending whose cost, or tax burden, should be assigned to a particular geographical area. In this study, we are primarily concerned with Congressional Districts. The base year is fiscal 1980.

The Department of Defense reported domestic outlays of \$130.3 billion and \$11.4 billion in overseas direct defense expenditures and military grants. The total Pentagon tax burden is thus \$141.7 billion. This tax burden is allocated to each state in accord with a percentage distribution computed and published by the Tax Foundation. The tax burden for each state is in turn allocated to each county in accord with its proportion of state population and ratio of per capita income to the per capita income of the entire state. Projections for Fiscal Year 1982 are based on the assumption that the 1982 outlays and tax burden will increase by a factor of 1.313792 for each Congressional District; the ratio of a 1982 budget of \$186.1 billion to the 1980 total military expenditures of \$141.0 billion.

The tax burden for the county or counties comprising the Congressional District is then tabulated. If all or part of more than one Congressional District is contained within a county, then city and/or census tract population and income levels for the Congressional District portion are totaled and then averaged to determine the portion of the county's net tax burden which should be assigned to each Congressional District or fraction thereof.

Pentagon outlays for each county and principal city of the United States are published in the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds: Fiscal Year 1980 series published by the Community Services Administration. Where a county includes all or part of more than one Congressional District, city and/or census tract population and income levels for the Congressional District portion are totaled and then averaged to determine the portion of the county's military outlays which should

be assigned to the Congressional District or part thereof. Both tax burdens and outlays for aplit counties are thus divided according to the same percentages.

The net Pentagon tax gain or loss is then computed by subtracting the Pentagon tax burden from Pentagon outlays.

REFERENCES - TEXT

1. Rosenfield, S.S. "The Defense Numbers Have to Add Up." Washington Post, April 17, 1981, p. A1.
2. Kaiser, R.G. "Reagan's Defense Spending Could Turn Into Economic Nightmare." Washington Post, April 25, 1981, p. A1.
3. "Burning Up \$1 Trillion." Wall Street Journal, January 22, 1980.
4. "Municipal Share." Wall Street Journal, February 23, 1980, p. 1.
5. Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the United States. "An Analysis of President Reagan's Budget Revisions for Fiscal Year 1982." U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1981.
6. "Study Sees 20 Million Losing Some Income Under Reagan's Plan." Washington Post, April 18, 1981, p. A1.


REFERENCES - METHODOLOGY

1. Community Services Administration. "Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds In Summary, Fiscal Year 1980."
2. Survey of Current Business, June 1981.
3. Tax Foundation. "Facts and Figures on Government Finance, 1981," Table 101.

November 1, 1982

FRIENDS JOURNAL

Quaker
Thought
and
Life
Today



Firepower to Destroy a World . . . Plus

The dot in the center square represents all the firepower of World War II—3 megatons. The other dots represent the firepower in existing nuclear weapons—18,000 megatons (equal to 6,000 WW IIs). About half belong to the Soviet Union, the other half to the U.S.

The top left circle represents the weapons on just

one Poseidon submarine—9 megatons (equal to the firepower of 3 WW IIs)—enough to destroy over 200 of the largest Soviet cities. The U.S. has 31 such subs and 10 similar Polaris subs. The lower left circle represents one new Trident sub—24 megatons (equal to the firepower of 8 WW IIs)—enough to destroy every

major city in the northern hemisphere. The Soviets have similar levels of destructive power.

Place a dime on the chart; the covered dots represent enough firepower to destroy all the large and medium-size cities in the entire world. What are you going to do with the rest of your coins?

BEYOND WAR

The technological genius of the human mind has made war obsolete. Full-scale nuclear war would destroy civilization as we know it and could cause the extinction of life itself. In the past we have attempted to avoid this final war by an ever-escalating weapons race. Public opinion is now recognizing that we are reaching a point of no return. The production of arms must stop and the massive stockpiles must be reduced.

The only lasting solution to the threat of extinction is for the human species to move BEYOND WAR. War can no longer resolve differences between nations. We are technologically beyond war already. What must now move beyond war is the human mind.

The precedent for such a shift in thinking has been established. There was a time when slavery was an institution supported by powerful religious, economic and political forces. People could not have imagined society existing without slavery. Yet today, we are beyond slavery.

The mind can change, evolve and mature. In fact, human nature includes the ability to change. All significant changes in history have been produced by the accumulated effects of individual changes in attitude and action.

The next crucial step in human history must also begin with individuals - individuals who are willing to change and who hold a vision of the future. We must move beyond conquering, violence and force to hope, acceptance and understanding of our interrelatedness. This vision must be shared with every nation, race, and religion as we work together to bring about a world BEYOND WAR.

"When you go around the earth in an hour and a half you begin to recognize that your identity is with that whole thing. And that makes a change.

You look down and you can't imagine how many borders and boundaries you cross again and again and again. From where you see it, the earth is a whole...and it is so beautiful.

There are no frames. There are no boundaries."

RUSSELL SCHWEICKART
Apollo 9 astronaut



CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

August 4, 1982

Dear Republican Colleague:

Arms control discussions hold a precariously brief place in mankind's history. Uniquely, however, in an American context leadership in arms control has been largely Republican. It would be a tragedy to allow the recent debate on the issue to cause a public policy debacle for the political party which has heretofore been the driving force for responsible restraint in the security arena.

Many aspects of the nuclear freeze movement are highly emotive. Some liberals seem to support any arms control initiative without concern for practicality or verification. Some conservatives, on the other hand, object to anything that implies agreement with the Soviets or concomitant restraint on the United States. It is imperative as we vote on the freeze to look not at the constellations of political groupings supporting one approach or another, but at the precise words of the resolutions before us and the ideas that underpin their crafting. In this regard, I challenge serious students of arms control to find objection to the nuclear freeze approach passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee by a vote of 28 to 8, including majority support of Republican committee members. The failure of the Republican Party to identify with the philosophy of the freeze would appear imprudent. As conservative columnist James Kilpatrick has said:

Kennedy and Hatfield have seized on an issue of life-or-death meaning to the whole planet, and there is not a sentence in their resolution that thoughtful conservatives could not support.

The problem with anti-freeze partisans is that their position hinges on two assumptions: 1) that the Soviets will stand still as we develop more weapons. This is nonsense. History shows that the Soviet Union will commit at least as much as we do to further weapons development. 2) anti-freeze partisans assume that more nuclear weapons really matter. This, too, is nonsense. In a world of nuclear overkill and redundancy, the U. S. and the Soviet Union are like two rivals locked in a small room in a dual to the death where one has 1,400 pistols and the other 1,200. The one with 1,400 has no advantage. One or both of the parties are likely to be killed or maimed with the first pistols used.

In addition, H.J. Res. 521, the House Foreign Affairs Committee Resolution, adopts language supportive of SALT II. In my judgment this strengthens and enhances the resolution. While SALT II may be imperfect, it is better than nothing. It is an essential building block for more comprehensive agreements. The fruit of years of negotiations, SALT II so serves our mutual interest that it has thus far been informally observed by both sides even in the absence of formal ratification. But as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has recently observed, it is difficult to understand why it is safe to adhere to a non-ratified agreement while it's unsafe formally to ratify what one is already observing.

over

For a more detailed analysis of the problems we may face if we do not adhere to SALT II, I refer to the July 30 "Dear Colleague" sent by Congressman Downey and myself. Suffice it to stress here my profound belief that SALT II is in the national interest and that it complements any substantive nuclear freeze proposal.

Perhaps the most mischievous notion in modern politics is that the United States may be in a position of nuclear inferiority with the Soviet Union and that American security is somehow jeopardized by a "window of vulnerability."

As Dickens might have said: "this is humbug." When American armed forces have the capacity to destroy the Soviet Union many times over there is no such conceptualization as inferiority. Death is death. A human being cannot die twice.

Finally, it should be stressed that the nuclear freeze movement is not a fad. A fad in American politics might be defined as an idea without a constituency. The monumental difference between the arms control movement today compared to a year ago or twenty-six years ago is that it has become quintessentially middle-class. It is not a liberal movement, nor a youth movement, nor a partisan undertaking.


For the first time in American politics arms control initiatives are grassroots; they are pushing energetically from the bottom up, from the hamlets and cities of America to our government here in Washington.

In no uncertain terms the American people are saying that issues of survival cannot be allowed to stultify in the demagoguery of Presidential campaign rhetoric. Expressions of concern have become institutionalized in churches, synagogues, business, unions, professional associations of doctors, lawyers, scientists, and teachers. Middle-class America is taking a stand.

The surprise isn't how rapidly the arms control issue has materialized as a popular national movement, but how late it has been in blooming.

Let's not as a Congress or political party fail our constituencies on this the most important issue of our age.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jim Leach". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping "J" and a cursive "Leach".

Jim Leach
Member of Congress

MONTANA

CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY
Residence Data

(In Thousands)	Dec '82 Forecast	Nov '82 Prelim	Oct '82 Revised	Nov '81 Revised
Civilian Labor Force-Persons	390.4	389.4	387.7	380.2
Employed Persons	353.1	352.6	355.6	355.7
Persons Employed In Agriculture	21.0	24.4	28.3	25.0
Unemployed Persons	37.3	36.8	32.1	24.5
% of Labor Force Unadjusted	9.6%	9.4%	8.3%	6.4%
Seas. adj.	9.3%	9.9%	9.4%	6.9%

Employment by Industry
Establishment Data

	Montana Nov '82	Nov '81	Nov '82	Nov '81	Nov '82	Nov '81
Non-farm Wage & Salary Jobs	281.7	291.4	28.9	30.0	49.3	49.6
Manufacturing	20.8	24.3	1.3	1.5	4.1	4.4
Unadjusted	9.8	11.9	*	*	*	*
Contract Construction	12.7	14.7	1.4	1.4	2.3	2.7
Transportation & Public Util	21.9	22.4	2.1	2.0	4.3	4.7
Trade	77.0	76.4	9.7	10.0	16.5	16.3
Wholesale	18.2	18.5	3.0	3.1	5.3	5.5
Retail	58.7	57.9	6.7	6.9	11.2	10.8
Finance	12.0	12.7	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.4
Services	57.4	57.3	*	*	*	*
Servs Mining	67.2	69.2	7.3	7.4	11.5	11.6
Government	70.2	71.7	5.2	5.7	8.1	7.4
Federal	13.7	14.1	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7
State & Local	56.6	57.7	3.5	4.0	6.3	5.9

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Average Weekly Earnings

	1976	1977	1979	1980	1981	1982
	\$171.24	\$189.38	\$229.22	\$237.36	\$250.63	\$272.57

Real Spendable Average Weekly Earnings

	1976	1977	1979	1980	1981	1982
	\$85.68	\$88.68	\$88.96	\$81.05	\$76.93	\$77.70

Unemployment Rates

	U.S.	Montana	Not Seas. Adj	U.S.	MT
	7.7%	6.1%	10.4%	10.4%	9.4%
	7.0%	6.4%	7.7%	7.7%	9.9%
	6.0%	6.0%	5.8%	5.8%	5.1%
	5.1%	5.1%	7.1%	7.1%	6.1%
	6.9%	6.9%	7.6%	7.6%	6.9%

New Business Firms

	Montana	SMSA	GF	BLNGS	SMSA	MT	Nov '82	Date
	3654	310	583	481	5901	5901	481	5901
	4770	508	781	GF SMSA	28	369	28	369
	5200	441	876	BLNGS SMSA	60	773	60	773
	5369	352	821					
	5433	333	727					
	6699	427	909					

Consumer Price Index, CPI-U

(All Items: 1967=100)

% Change from Year Ago
(Annual Averages)

	1976	1977	1979	11.3%	Nov.	Oct.	Nov.
	5.8%	6.5%	1980	13.5%	1982	1982	1981
	1976	1977	1978	10.4%	From	293.6	294.1
	1978	1979	1981	-0.2%	4.6%		

(P) = Preliminary GF = Great Falls BLNGS = Billings

1980 Popu-

County

lation

CLF

EMP

UNEMP

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

RATE

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

1980 Population

NOVEMBER LABOR FORCE (Preliminary)

MONTANA
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY
Residence Data

(In Thousands)	Dec '82 Forecast	Nov '82 Prelim	Oct '82 Revised	Nov '81 Revised	Current Population Survey Data	
					1980 Population	Nov '82
Statewide	786690	389350	352577	36773	9.4%	9.4%
Cascade	80696	35477	32210	3267	9.2%	9.2%
Yellowstone	108035	62037	57988	4049	6.5%	6.5%
Beaverhead	8186	4403	4063	340	7.7%	7.7%
Big Horn	11096	5380	4884	496	9.2%	9.2%
Blaine	6999	2933	2621	312	10.6%	10.6%
Broadwater	1701	1551	150	3267	8.8%	8.8%
Carbon	8099	3234	2991	243	7.5%	7.5%
Carter	1799	801	771	30	3.7%	3.7%
Chouteau	6092	2755	2650	105	6.9%	6.9%
Custer	13109	6135	5780	353	5.8%	5.8%
Daniels	2835	1502	1461	41	2.7%	2.7%
Dawson	11805	6749	6163	586	8.7%	8.7%
Deer Lodge	12518	4943	4219	724	14.6%	14.6%
Fallon	13076	6003	5512	491	8.2%	8.2%
Fergus	3763	2401	2289	112	4.7%	4.7%
Flathead	51966	24095	20813	3282	13.6%	13.6%
Gallatin	42865	21941	20170	1771	8.1%	8.1%
Garfield	1656	847	829	18	2.1%	2.1%
Glacier	10828	5787	5012	775	13.4%	13.4%
Golden Valley	1026	394	375	19	4.8%	4.8%
Granite	2700	1148	984	164	14.3%	14.3%
Hill	17985	9093	8351	742	8.2%	8.2%
Jefferson	7029	2731	2420	311	11.4%	11.4%
Judith Basin	2846	1157	1075	82	7.1%	7.1%
Lake	19056	8029	7149	880	11.0%	11.0%
Lewis & Clark	43039	26806	25510	2096	7.9%	7.9%
Liberty	2329	1036	992	44	4.2%	4.2%
Lincoln	17752	7122	5836	1286	18.1%	18.1%
McCone	2702	1329	1270	59	4.4%	4.4%
Madison	5448	2498	2265	233	9.3%	9.3%
Meagher	2154	1120	984	136	12.1%	12.1%
Mineral	3675	1769	1292	477	27.0%	27.0%
Missoula	76016	35855	32318	3537	9.9%	9.9%
Musselshell	4428	2224	2019	205	9.2%	9.2%
Park	12869	5825	5067	758	13.0%	13.0%

(In Thousands)	Dec '82 Forecast	Nov '82 Prelim	Oct '82 Revised	Nov '81 Revised	Current Population Survey Data	
					1980 Population	Nov '82
Statewide	786690	389350	352577	36773	9.4%	9.4%
Cascade	80696	35477	32210	3267	9.2%	9.2%
Yellowstone	108035	62037	57988	4049	6.5%	6.5%
Beaverhead	8186	4403	4063	340	7.7%	7.7%
Big Horn	11096	5380	4884	496	9.2%	9.2%
Blaine	6999	2933	2621	312	10.6%	10.6%
Broadwater	1701	1551	150	3267	8.8%	8.8%
Carbon	8099	3234	2991	243	7.5%	7.5%
Carter	1799	801	771	30	3.7%	3.7%
Chouteau	6092	2755	2650	105	6.9%	6.9%
Custer	13109	6135	5780	353	5.8%	5.8%
Daniels	2835	1502	1461	41	2.7%	2.7%
Dawson	11805	6749	6163	586	8.7%	8.7%
Deer Lodge	12518	4943	4219	724	14.6%	14.6%
Fallon	13076	6003	5512	491	8.2%	8.2%
Fergus	3763	2401	2289	112	4.7%	4.7%
Flathead	51966	24095	20813	3282	13.6%	13.6%
Gallatin	42865	21941	20170	1771	8.1%	8.1%
Garfield	1656	847	829	18	2.1%	2.1%
Glacier	10828	5787	5012	775	13.4%	13.4%
Golden Valley	1026	394	375	19	4.8%	4.8%
Granite	2700	1148	984	164	14.3%	14.3%
Hill	17985	9093	8351	742	8.2%	8.2%
Jefferson	7029	2731	2420	311	11.4%	11.4%
Judith Basin	2846	1157	1075	82	7.1%	7.1%
Lake	19056	8029	7149	880	11.0%	11.0%
Lewis & Clark	43039	26806	25510	2096	7.9%	7.9%
Liberty	2329	1036	992	44	4.2%	4.2%
Lincoln	17752	7122	5836	1286	18.1%	18.1%
McCone	2702	1329	1270	59	4.4%	4.4%
Madison	5448	2498	2265	233	9.3%	9.3%
Meagher	2154	1120	984	136	12.1%	12.1%
Mineral	3675	1769	1292	477	27.0%	27.0%
Missoula	76016	35855	32318	3537	9.9%	9.9%
Musselshell	4428	2224	2019	205	9.2%	9.2%
Park	12869	5825	5067	758	13.0%	13.0%


(In Thousands)	Dec '82 Forecast	Nov '82 Prelim	Oct '82 Revised	Nov '81 Revised	Current Population Survey Data	
					1980 Population	Nov '82
Statewide	786690	389350	352577	36773	9.4%	9.4%
Cascade	80696	35477	32210	3267	9.2%	9.2%
Yellowstone	108035	62037	57988	4049	6.5%	6.5%
Beaverhead	8186	4403	4063	340	7.7%	7.7%
Big Horn	11096	5380	4884	496	9.2%	9.2%
Blaine	6999	2933	2621	312	10.6%	10.6%
Broadwater	1701	1551	150	3267	8.8%	8.8%
Carbon	8099	3234	2991	243	7.5%	7.5%
Carter	1799	801	771	30	3.7%	3.7%
Chouteau	6092	2755	2650	105	6.9%	6.9%
Custer	13109	6135	5780	353	5.8%	5.8%
Daniels	2835	1502	1461	41	2.7%	2.7%
Dawson	11805	6749	6163	586	8.7%	8.7%
Deer Lodge	12518	4943	4219	724	14.6%	14.6%
Fallon	13076	6003	5512	491	8.2%	8.2%
Fergus	3763	2401	2289	112	4.7%	4.7%
Flathead	51966	24095	20813	3282	13.6%	13.6%
Gallatin	42865	21941	20170	1771	8.1%	8.1%
Garfield	1656	847	829	18	2.1%	2.1%
Glacier	10828	5787	5012	775	13.4%	13.4%
Golden Valley	1026	394	375	19	4.8%	4.8%
Granite	2700	1148	984	164	14.3%	14.3%
Hill	17985	9093	8351	742	8.2%	8.2%
Jefferson	7029	2731	2420	311	11.4%	11.4%
Judith Basin	2846	1157	1075	82	7.1%	7.1%
Lake	19056	8029	7149	880	11.0%	11.0%
Lewis & Clark	43039	26806	25510	2096	7.9%	7.9%
Liberty	2329	1036	992	44	4.2%	4.2%
Lincoln	17752	7122	5836	1286	18.1%	18.1%
McCone	2702	1329	1270	59	4.4%	4.4%
Madison	5448	2498	2265	233	9.3%	9.3%
Meagher	2154	1120	984	136	12.1%	12.1%
Mineral	3675	1769	1292	477	27.0%	27.0%
Missoula	76016	35855	32318	3537	9.9%	9.9%
Musselshell	4428	2224	2019	205	9.2%	9.2%
Park	12869	5825	5067	758	13.0%	13.0%

(In Thousands)	Dec '82 Forecast	Nov '82 Prelim	Oct '82 Revised	Nov '81 Revised	Current Population Survey Data	
					1980 Population	Nov '82
Statewide	786690	389350	352577	36773	9.4%	9.4%
Cascade	80696	35477	32210	3267	9.2%	9.2%
Yellowstone	108035	62037	57988	4049	6.5%	6.5%
Beaverhead	8186	4403	4063	340	7.7%	7.7%
Big Horn	11096	5380	4884	496	9.2%	9.2%
Blaine	6999	2933	2621	312	10.6%	10.6%
Broadwater	1701	1551	150	3267	8.8%	8.8%
Carbon	8099	3234	2991	243	7.5%	7.5%
Carter	1799	801	771	30	3.7%	3.7%
Chouteau	6092	2755	2650	105	6.9%	6.9%
Custer	13109	6135	5780	353	5.8%	5.8%
Daniels	2835	1502	1461	41	2.7%	2.7%
Dawson	11805	6749	6163	586	8.7%	8.7%
Deer Lodge	12518	4943	4219	724	14.6%	14.6%
Fallon	13076	6003	5512	491	8.2%	8.2%
Fergus	3763	2401	2289	112	4.7%	4.7%
Flathead	51966	24095	20813	3282	13.6%	13.6%
Gallatin	42865	21941	20170	1771	8.1%	8.1%
Garfield	1656	847	829	18	2.1%	2.1%
Glacier	10828	5787	5012	775	13.4%	13.4%
Golden Valley	1026	394	375	19	4.8%	4.8%
Granite	2700	1148	984	164	14.3%	14.3%
Hill	17985	9093	8351	742	8.2%	8.2%
Jefferson	7029	2731	2420	311	11.4%	11.4%
Judith Basin	2846	1157	1075	82	7.1%	7.1%
Lake	19056	8029	7149	880	11.0%	11.0%
Lewis & Clark	43039	26806	25510	2096	7.9%	7.9%
Liberty	2329	1036	992	44	4.2%	4.2%
Lincoln	17752	7122	5836	1286	18.1%	18.1%
McCone	2702	1329	1270	59	4.4%	4.4%
Madison	5448	2498	2265	233	9.3%	9.3%
Meagher	2154	1120	984	136	12.1%	12.1%
Mineral	3675	1769	1292	477	27.0%	27.0%
Missoula	76016	35855	32318	3537	9.9%	9.9%
Musselshell	4428	2224	2019	205	9.2%	9.2%
Park	12869	5825	5067	758	13.0%	13.0%

(In Thousands)	Nov '82 Prelim	Nov '81 Revised	Current Population Survey Data	
			1980 Population	Nov '82
Statewide	786690	389350	352577	9.4%
Cascade	80696	35477	32210	9.2%
Yellowstone	108035	62037	57988	6.5%
Beaverhead	8186	4403	4063	7.7%
Big Horn	11096	5380	4884	9.2%
Blaine	6999	2933	2621	10.6%
Broadwater	1701	1551	150	8.8%
Carbon	8099	3234	2991	7.5%
Carter	1799	801	771	3.7%
Chouteau	6092	2755	2650	6.9%
Custer	13109	6135	5780	5.8%
Daniels	2835	1502	1461	2.7%
Dawson	11805	6749	6163	8.7%
Deer Lodge	12518	4943	4219	14.6%
Fallon	13076	6003	5512	8.2%
Fergus	3763	2401	2289	4.7%
Flathead	51966	24095	20813	13.6%
Gallatin	42865	21941	20170	8.1%
Garfield	1656	847	829	2.1%
Glacier	10828	5787	5012	13.4%
Golden Valley	1026	394	375	4.8%
Granite	2700	1148	984	14.3%
Hill	17985	9093	8351	8.2%
Jefferson	7029	2731	2420	11.4%
Judith Basin	2846	1157	1075	7.1%
Lake	19056	8029	7149	11.0%
Lewis & Clark	43039	26806	25510	7.9%
Liberty	2329	1036	992	4.2%
Lincoln	17752	7122	5836	18.1%
McCone	2702	1329	1270	4.4%
Madison	5448	2498	2265	7.9%
Mineral	1000	450	420	4.0%
Missoula	10000	4500	4000	4.0%
Nez Perce	1000	450	420	4.0%
Okanogan	1000	450	420	4.0%
Ottawa	1000	450	420	4.0%
Shoshone	1000	450	420	4.0%
Silver Bow	1000	450	420	4.0%
Snowflake	1000	450	420	4.0%
Stillwater	1000	450	420	4.0%
Teton	1000	450	420	4.0%
Trail	1000	450	420	4.0%
Valley	1000	450	420	4.0%
Walla Walla	1000	450	420	4.0%
West	1000	450	420	4.0%
White	1000	450	420	4.0%
Yellow	1000	450	420	4.0%
Unadjusted				
Seasonally Adjusted				
Non-farm Wage & Salary Jobs				
Manufacturing				
Mining				
Contract				
Construction				
Transportation				
& Public Util				
Trade				
Wholesale				
Retail				
Food				
Services				
Service				
Servicing				
Government				
Federal				
State & Local				

UNEMPLOYMENT

FALLOUT OF THE ARMS RACE



THE HEALTHY PERSONALITY



By BAILEY MOLINEUX, Ph.D.
Family Teaching Center

Nobody likes to deal with a difficult problem. Most would prefer to avoid a situation that is frightening or upsetting. The human mind defends itself against a painful reality through self-deception.

Mental health professionals have a simple name for this type of psychological process. They call it denial and see it operate, sometimes tragically, in many situations.

The classic and most powerful example of denial is seen in the alcoholic and his family. Even though he suffers from a progressive, fatal disease, the alcoholic refuses to admit he has a serious drinking problem, as does his family. Alcohol has become his best friend, and he wants to keep that friend at all costs, including his job, his family and his life.

Everyone denies to a certain extent the possible reality of a thermonuclear holocaust. It's not something people think about often, if at all. Thoughts of the destruction and agony of a nuclear exchange are simply too painful to bear for any length of time.

Even though I have never met the man, I do not like what I have allowed Jonathan Schell to do to me. He has broken through my denial, leaving me frightened and sad.

Schell is the author of the recent, and to some, controversial book, "The Fate of the Earth" (Alfred A. Knopf, 1982). In it, he describes vividly — all too vividly — what would happen in a nuclear war. It does not make for easy reading.

For many, death will be swift and sure. They will either be pulverized by the initial blast, incinerated by the heat or shattered by the blast wave. To others, death will come more slowly, of wounds, of radiation or of disease, with no medical treatment available. Still others might die even more slowly of starvation due to contaminated food or a climatic or atmospheric alteration that would destroy the food chain.

What makes a nuclear holocaust so tragic, writes Schell, is that the death of many individuals might eventually be followed by the extinction of the human species. When an individual dies, there are usually others to mourn and remember him. If an entire race were to die, however, who would there be to remember or care?

Denial or not, a nuclear war could happen, and the chances of it happening increase as the arms race continues to spiral. It's doubtful that a nuclear exchange would be started by a deliberate first strike by one major power against another. That would be to commit national

Denial ineffectual with holocaust

suicide.

But it could happen by accident or be triggered by a smaller nuclear nation or a terrorist group. And the more nuclear weapons there are in the world, the greater the chances these possibilities could become terrible actualities.

I want my denial back. I don't want to think about the consequences of a nuclear war. I don't want to deal with my fear and sense of tragedy.

But I have to face these feelings. Everyone does if they are going to be motivated to insure that a nuclear exchange never comes to pass.


Lincoln residents

WHAT MAKES AMERICA STRONG?

While the Administration and Congress respond to events in Iran and Afghanistan with proposals for a massive military build-up, the critical problems at home—chronic unemployment, soaring inflation, the energy crisis—remain unaddressed. To make America strong again we need far reaching proposals to put people to work solving the energy problem and rebuilding our cities. But instead moves are underway to:


- boost military spending by at least 5% over inflation
- establish new bases and naval forces overseas
- register young men for the draft
- postpone efforts towards arms control and arms reduction

These military actions will not make America stronger. Instead they will further erode America's traditional strength, the vitality of its industrial economy, by siphoning off economic resources.



The Real Danger: A Weakened US Economy

**Military Burden and Productivity
1960-1978**



World Military and Social Expenditures 1980, by Ruth Leger Sivard


In almost every measure of a strong economy, the US now trails Japan and Germany. Since 1967, US productivity has increased 1/4 that of Japan and 1/3 that of Germany. As US military spending increases, we fall further behind our major trading partners; making fewer goods they need, while increasing our dependence on them for imports.

Since 1976, the US inflation rate has tripled—making double-digit inflation not a dreaded possibility but a fact of daily life. Inflation clocked in at over 13% for 1980, and is not expected to drop measurably in the years ahead. American wage increases are not keeping pace with price hikes, resulting in a net decline in the US standard of living.

The sluggish US economy has cut off millions of Americans, especially minorities and women, from job opportunities. The official unemployment rate in 1980 surpassed 7.5%—nearly double the goal set by the Humphrey/Hawkins Full Employment Act.

(over)

Military Spending: Small Boom, Big Bust



Bombs Away, by Greg Speeter

The major defense contractors, anticipating lavish new weapons contracts, are touting the latest military buildup as a shot in the arm for the American economy. But increased military spending will worsen, not cure, our economic ills.

More Inflation. Even Carter's own chief "inflation fighter," Alfred Kahn, has admitted that the jump in military spending will be highly inflationary. The assessment of military spending as the most inflationary form of federal procurement is now widely accepted by economists and politicians of many different persuasions.

Further Productivity Decline. If America's best engineering brains were all at work on rebuilding our industrial base, our sluggish economy would start to move again. But since the lion's share of our research talent (and funds) is now diverted to military projects, our civilian economy goes nowhere.

Fewer Jobs. Dollars spent on weapons systems create far fewer jobs than those spent on civilian projects. Increased military spending will contribute to unemployment by robbing other job-generating programs of needed funds.

FOR A STRONG AMERICA: CONVERSION

Let's save tax dollars here:


\$1.5 billion Research and Development on the MX nuclear missile, destined to become the most expensive and lethal "boondoggle" in the history of mankind.

\$2.5 billion for new hydrogen bombs, when our nuclear arsenal can already destroy every major Soviet city 50 times over.

And spend them here:

The same amount would cover nearly half the construction costs of a modern subway system for a major US city and would create 70,000 jobs.

That sum could buy energy conservation for 4.6 million housing units saving the equivalent of 22 million barrels of oil and create 87,000 jobs.



REAL STRENGTH AND SECURITY: CONVERSION TO AN ECONOMY THAT MEETS HUMAN NEEDS

Additional copies of this leaflet cost \$4.00 for 100; \$16.00 for 500.

SANE

A CITIZEN'S ORGANIZATION
FOR A SANE WORLD
514 C. St., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: (202) 545-7100

Q: WHY ARE MILLIONS OUT OF WORK?

\$1 billion spent on

EDUCATION



creates 187,299 jobs

HEALTH CARE



creates 138,939 jobs

CONSTRUCTION



creates 100,072 jobs

MASS TRANSIT



creates 92,071 jobs

THE MILITARY



creates 75,710 jobs


(Figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Structure of the U.S. Economy in 1980 and 1985.)

WRITE YOUR REPRESENTATIVE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515. TELL YOUR REPRESENTATIVE THAT
YOU WANT LESS MONEY SPENT ON THE MILITARY AND MORE
MONEY TO COME BACK TO YOUR COMMUNITY. ASK OTHERS TO
WRITE. PLEASE POST THIS LEAFLET.

A: BECAUSE MILITARY SPENDING COSTS JOBS

Forty-six percent of our federal tax dollars are spent on the military,
and military spending produces fewer jobs than money spent on human needs.

Looting the Means Of Production



David Suter

By Seymour Melman

SOUTH WELFLEET, Mass. — "America in Ruins" is both the title and forecast of a 1981 report by the Council of State Planning Agencies, an organization of the planning and policy staffs of the nation's governors. The Council finds major deterioration in parts of the country's infrastructure — that is, vital services such as clean water, reliable transportation, efficient ports, and competent waste disposal, which are indispensable underpinnings for an industrial system. The report finds — as any traveler on United States railroads knows — that "the maintenance of public facilities essential to national economic renewal has been deferred."

Simultaneously, the means of production of United States industry have been deteriorating.

Production incompetence, now endemic, is spreading fast, not only in the well-publicized case of automobile firms but also in the following industries: steel, machine tools, radio and television manufacturing, railroad equipment, precision optics, fine cameras, men's shoes, flatware, hi-fi electronics, etc., etc., etc.

As private and public managers become better at making money without making economically useful goods, a new sense finally will have to be confronted: Will American industry reach a condition of "no return," making the achievement of industrial renewal problematic?

The way that an economy uses its capital — its production resources — is a crucial determinant of its productivity and economic well-being.

By 1977, for every \$100 of new (producers') fixed capital formation, the United States applied \$15 to the military economy. In Japan, the ratio was \$3.70 for the military. The concentration of Japan's capital on productive economic growth goes far to explain the current success of that country's industry, where productivity grew 6.2 percent in 1980. By contrast, with the United States' aging machinery stock, the average output per person in manufacturing industry decreased 0.5 percent in 1980.

The United States has "achieved" its present state of industrial deterioration by assigning to the military economy large quantities of machinery, tools, engineers, energy, raw materials, skilled labor, and managers — resources identified everywhere as the "fixed and working capital" that is vital for production.

Since a modern military budget is used to purchase such resources, it is, effectively, a capital fund. A large ratio of military to civilian capital formation drains the civilian economy. The viability of the United States as an industrial society is threatened by the concentration of capital in a fund that yields no product useful for consumption or for further production. This looting of the means of production on behalf of the military economy can only be accelerated as a consequence of the unprecedented size of the war budgets advocated by the Reagan Administration.

Seven percent of the military outlays from fiscal 1981 to 1986

— \$100 billion

— the cost of rehabilitating the United States' steel industry so that it is again the most efficient in the world

The cost overrun, to 1981, on the Navy's Aegis-cruiser program

— \$8.4 billion

— the comprehensive research-and-development effort needed to produce 80- to 100-mile-per-gallon cars

The cost overrun, to 1981, on the Navy's current submarine, frigate, and destroyer programs

— \$42 billion

— for California, a 10-year investment to spur solar energy for space water-, and industrial-process heating; this would involve 378,000 new jobs and lead to vast fuel savings

Sixty-three percent of the cost overruns, to 1981, on 50 current major weapons systems

— \$110 billion

— the 20-year cost of solar device and energy-conservation equipment in commercial buildings, saving 3 million barrels of oil per day

The cruise-missile programs

— \$11 billion

— the cost of bringing the annual rate of investment in public works to the 1965 level

Two B-1 bombers

— \$400 million

— the cost of rebuilding Cleveland's water-supply system

Cost overruns, to 1981, on the Navy's Trident and the Air Force's F-16 programs

— \$22 billion

— the cost of rehabilitating or reconstructing one out of five United States bridges

The Navy's F-18 fighter program

— \$34 billion

— the cost of modernizing America's machine-tool stock to bring it to the average level of Japan's

Seventy-five percent of the cost overrun, to 1981, on the Navy's 5-inch guided-projectile program

— \$263 million

— President's Reagan's proposed fiscal 1981 and 1982 cuts in the Northeast rail-corridor improvement program and in the alcohol-fuels development program

Two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers

— \$5.8 billion

— the cost of converting 77 oil-using power plants to coal, saving 320,000 barrels of oil per day


cannot be enlarged by waving a budgetary wand. Neither can manufacturing facilities be multiplied by ever richer subsidies to the managers of military industry. Basic machinery, skilled labor, engineers and scientists — all are finite in number and difficult to increase.

The concentration of capital on the military portends sharply diminished opportunity for a productive livelihood for most Americans. Clearly, a choice must be made as to where these resources will be used.

The accompanying list of trade-offs illustrates the kinds of choices that the Reagan Administration and the Congress are now making with their budget and tax plans, intended or not.

The following are principal sources of these data: military-program and unit costs, and cost changes (overruns), the Department of Defense; "SAR Program Acquisition Cost Summary (Unclassified)," Dec. 31, 1980, and related reports, and "Procurement Programs (P-1)," March 10, 1981; and news media reports. The civilian capital-cost data range from reported prices (machine tools, buses, trolleys) and reported Federal budget items to informed estimates of industrial-research and project costs and of costs of public works. Economic and engineering estimates are from Representative Les Aspin (Congressional Record, April 27, 1981), Prof. John E. Ullmann of Hofstra University; Mark Papp, a Columbia University doctoral candidate; the Council on Economic Priorities, the city of San Diego, and the California Public Policy Center.

Norman Melman, professor of industrial engineering at Columbia University and national co-chairman of the peace organization SANE, is author of "The Permanent War Economy" and is writing a book, "Profits Without Production."



Eighty-eight percent of the cost overrun, to 1981, of the Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile	= \$444 million	= President Reagan's proposed fiscal 1981 and 1982 cuts in the Federal solar-energy budget
Three Army AH-64 helicopters	= \$32 million	= 100 top-quality, energy-efficient electric trolleys (made in West Germany)
One F-15A airplane	= \$29 million	= the cost of training 200 engineers to design and produce electric trolleys in the United States
48 Army heavy (XM-1) tanks	= \$120 million	= 500 top-quality city buses (West German-made)
The cost overrun, to 1981, on Navy frigates (FFG-7)	= \$5 billion	= the minimum additional annual investment needed to prevent water pollution in the United States from exceeding present standards
The cost of unjustified non-combat Pentagon aircraft	= \$8.8 billion	= six years of capital investment that is needed to rehabilitate New York City transit
The cost overrun, to 1981, on the Army's heavy-tank (XM-1) program	= \$13 billion	= the shortfall of capital needed for maintaining water supplies of 150 United States cities for the next 20 years
The MX missile system, first cost	= \$34 billion	= the cost of a comprehensive 10-year energy-efficiency effort to save 25 percent to 50 percent of United States oil imports
Reactivating two World War II mothballed battleships	= \$376 million	= President Reagan's fiscal 1981 and fiscal 1982 cut in energy-conservation investment
The cost overrun, to 1981, on the Navy's F-18 aircraft program	= \$28.4 billion	= the cost of electrifying 55,000 miles of mainline railroads, and the cost of new locomotives
The fiscal 1981 nuclear-weapons funding, adding to more than 20,000 on hand	= \$5.06 billion	= eight years of capital costs for rehabilitating New York City's sewers
The cost of excessive, non-standardized military aircraft service equipment	= \$300 million	= President Reagan's fiscal 1981 and fiscal 1982 reduction in capital grants for mass transit
The cost overrun, to 1981, of the Army's UH-60A helicopter program	= \$4.7 billion	= the annual capital investment for restoring New York City's roads, bridges, aqueducts, subways and buses
One nuclear (SSN-688) attack submarine	= \$582 million	= the cost of 100 miles of electrified rail right-of-way
Ten B-1 bombers	= \$2 billion	= the cost of dredging six Gulf Coast and Atlantic Coast harbors to handle 150,000-ton cargo vessels
One A-6E Intruder (attack plane)	= \$23 million	= the annual cost of a staff of 200 to plan mutual reversal of the arms race, and conversion of the military economy to a civilian economy

Secret plan outlines N-war with Soviets

WASHINGTON (UPI) — A chilling Defense Department blueprint for rearming America urges preparations for winning an extended nuclear war against the Soviet Union and for waging war "effectively" from outer space.

The 136-page secret document, directing a significant U.S. policy shift, is laced with references for the need to "prevail" in a prolonged nuclear war and, as "an essential element of U.S. strategy," clearly plans for expanding any conventional conflict with the Soviets to a global scale.

The difference between previous nuclear and conventional strategic policies and the directive of the Reagan administration outlined in the document is the difference between conducting a defensive or an offensive military campaign.

Titled "Fiscal 1984-1988 Defense Guidance," the document is accompanied by a covering memorandum dated March 22, 1982, signed by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. It was made available to United Press International by sources familiar with defense issues.

"The document speaks for itself," said Pentagon spokesman Henry Catto when asked for comment about the papers. "Pretty well everything has been said" by Weinberger in reaction earlier to publication of portions of the document, he said.

"We regret that people leak this kind of thing," Catto said.

Some elements of the study appeared in late May and June in The New York Times and the Washington Post.

The document, a key component of President Reagan's strategy for countering the Soviets, reflects the thinking of the Pentagon and the National Security Council about the specific directions of military policy over the next five years and its general trend through the decade.

It sets priorities in policy, strategy, force and resource planning, and forms the basis for Pentagon spending projected at \$1.556 trillion for that five-year period. As a general guideline for America's defense, it ignores the possibility of accommodation or peaceful coexistence with the Soviets.

The Pentagon's civilian leadership, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, heads of military commands throughout the world and National Security Council officials contributed to the document.

Thus, it represents a thorough outline for achieving defense goals within what Weinberger cautioned in his memo will be "the limited resources likely to be available" to the Pentagon during the five-year period.


The document makes these other major points:

- A Soviet invasion of the vital Persian Gulf would initiate a "major conflict"

NUCLEAR NUMBERS Comparing Superpower Weapons Systems


Land-Based Missiles (ICBMs)

U.S. 2,152 U.S.S.R. 5,540




Weapons on Strategic Submarines

U.S. 4,744 U.S.S.R. 1,970




Weapons on Strategic Bombers

U.S. 2,640 U.S.S.R. 290



Total Strategic Nuclear Weapons

U.S. 9,536 U.S.S.R. 7,800



■ U.S. ■ U.S.S.R.

SOURCE: Center for Defense Information

Union. It projects China as a possible U.S. ally in such a conflict.

- Far-reaching plans should be mapped to provide U.S. forces with manpower and equipment necessary to fight the Soviets on several fronts for an "indefinite period."

- Preparations should be made to "project force" and "wage war effectively" from outer space, and treaties will not be signed that prevent the United States from developing space-based weapons which "add a new dimension to our military capabilities."

- An anti-satellite weapon "should

- The United States will redress the imbalance of power with the Soviets and protect security interests, "if need be without air control."

- Modifying the Anti-Ballistic Treaty with Moscow, which bans more than one ABM site, should not be ruled out seeking basing options for the MX missile.

- A nuclear war begun at sea "will necessarily remain limited to the sea."

- "Major economic difficulties" will confront the Soviets in the mid-1980s, and Ar

**World
Military
and
Social
Expenditures
1982**

Ruth Leger Sivard




Herman J. Kokojan—Black Star

U.S. troops in chemical-warfare gear with missile: Seeing through the 'fog of war'

Where to Cut Defense

Budget cuts can actually leave America stronger. The key is careful analysis of long-term U.S. strategy.



Karl von Clausewitz, the great 19th-century military theorist, liked to speak of the "fog of war": the clamor and confusion as massed men hurl themselves at each other, the smoke and rain that often obscure the field

of battle, the fear that at times clouds all but the most obtuse minds. It is difficult to see war whole, even from the distance of command. "A general never knows anything with certainty, never sees his enemy clearly, never knows positively where he is," said Napoleon.

As with war itself, so with the annual defense budget of the United States. It is hard to see whole, even for those who write it. Preoccupied with their own shares of the budget, the individual armed services slight each other's needs. Interservice programs critical to national security, such as airlift and sealift, are always shortchanged. Congress often treats defense as just another public-works program—only bigger—with the decision to purchase one weapons system instead of another turning not on the relative merits of each, but rather on whose district will get the money and jobs.

'Calamity': Perhaps worst of all, the military budget seems driven by a technological imperative. Costly but sophisticated weapons are outward signs of American military might and American political will and thus are necessary for their own sake or as bargaining chips in future arms negotiations. They precede the formulation of strategy

and to some extent determine it. This is no mere academic problem. "If the strategy comes first," says Thomas Powers, author of "Thinking About the Next War," "then the nature of the Soviet-American military confrontation is something we have chosen deliberately, and we may be said to be in control of our own fate. But if the weapons

NATIONAL AFFAIRS


come first, spawned by man's sheer technological inventiveness, then the confrontation with all its attendant dangers, is something that has happened to us—a kind of natural calamity, like a hurricane, or a drought, the beginning of a new ice age."

The strategy should come first, if only budgetary reasons. John M. Collins, a tired Army colonel who is now a defense analyst at the Library of Congress, points out: "Until you have a strategy you don't know what forces are needed. And until you know that, you cannot spend \$1.6 trillion intelligently."

Policy: Ever since the cold war began in Central Europe, the underlying aim of U.S. national-security policy has been containment of the Soviet Union within the sphere of influence it established following World War II. The principal strategic vehicles of the policy have been the U.S. nuclear deterrent and conventional armed forces operating in tandem with allies, through arrangements like NATO.

Until the late 1970s, that dual strategy worked reasonably well. Soviet military power made no conquests besides the suppression of revolts within the Eastern bloc itself, and even the successful ideological inroads—Cuba, for example—were few. On the other hand, the U.S. strategy had done little to deter aggression by other communist states, such as North Vietnam and North Korea. And recently both the nuclear deterrent and NATO's conventional forces in Europe began to lose their credibility. Theoretically vulnerable to attack from new Russian missiles, America's land-based Titans and Minutemen could no longer guarantee a successful retaliation in the

Nimitz-class aircraft carrier: Increasingly, long-range aircraft are a



event of a Soviet strike. The manned B-52 bombers, too, seemed less threatening if they had to fly into the teeth of massed Soviet air defenses. Only the ballistic-missile submarines remained invulnerable. But their missiles lacked the accuracy to be of value against hardened military targets, and there were grounds for doubting whether a U.S. president would authorize their use against civilian populations, knowing the terrible cost of Russian revenge.



At the same time, an unmistakable Soviet buildup of conventional forces was well under way. Although the number of Russian divisions forward deployed in Central Europe has remained constant at 30 since the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, those divisions have been fleshed out by the addition of some 75,000 men. Those 30 Soviet divisions are augmented by 28 non-Soviet Warsaw Pact divisions. The number of tanks in the combined Warsaw Pact divisions has increased from 12,000 to 16,000 since 1964, and—more important—their quality has improved with the introduction of T-64 and T-72 tanks.

Nervous Allies: The NATO allies, with the conspicuous exception of the United States, did beef up defense budgets during the last decade. But by 1980 NATO forces readily available for service on the front still totaled just 27 divisions—740,000 troops. Some nervous Europeans, hearing American talk of “limited” nuclear war and suspecting that it meant war limited to them, began to wonder if some sort of accommodation with the Soviet Union, economic or political, might not be advisable. This was exactly the process of “Finlandization” that American policy had aimed to prevent.

After they took office two years ago, Ronald Reagan and his secretary of defense,

to perform the same mission

Herman J. Kokojan—Black Star



James L. Long Associates

B-1 bomber: Why spend \$23 billion or more on an interim airplane?

Caspar Weinberger, surveyed the military landscape and decreed change. The money came first. During Jimmy Carter's administration, the Pentagon had won its first real budget gains after eight straight years of decline, and Reagan upped the ante to 7 percent real spending growth a year. The B-1 bomber, killed by Carter as part of the trade-off in which he agreed to the cruise missile, would now be revived. There would be a 600-ship Navy.

Then came the search for a strategy that would make maximum use of the money—and justify the weapons. At the escalated level of nuclear war, the evolving strategy, designed by former Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger and Harold Brown and continued under Caspar Weinberger, went beyond traditional deterrence theory. Under the new doctrine, the United States should be able to fight a protracted nuclear war—and win. This means having less vulnerable intercontinental missiles, as well as an array of forward-based intermediate-range weapons like the Pershing II missile. The strategy, made possible by innovations in missile accuracy and communications systems, has raised fears that for the first time an American government finds the unthinkable thinkable. The Reagan administration does not “endorse the concept” of nuclear-war fighting, Weinberger insists—but, he asks, “what is the alternative to planning to prevail? . . . If there has to be a war, if all our deterrent efforts fail . . . I'm not going to plan to lose.”

Reform: At the same time, Weinberger is carrying out what he calls “the intellectual reform of our policy regarding conventional warfare.” In recent years conventional strategy has called for the United States to maintain a “one and a half war” capability—meaning that U.S. forces should be prepared to fight, in concert with NATO allies, a full

war of short duration in Central Europe and a smaller conflict somewhere like the Persian Gulf. Weinberger's intellectual reform contemplates fighting an all-out conventional war longer than the 30 days traditionally used as a U.S. planning objective. Even more ambitious, it envisions “horizontal escalation” in hostilities with the Soviet Union—counterattack at Soviet targets of value remote from the field of battle.

In theory, horizontal escalation finesses the difficulties of defeating a Soviet land

Abrams (M-1) main battle tank: 'General Motors would have issued a recall notice for them'

Herman J. Kokojan—Black Star






F-15 long-range interceptor:
The plane is too hot—and the Air Force does not need it to defend the continental United States

army in the Middle East by relying on American maritime supremacy (enter the 600-ship Navy) to attack surrogate nations elsewhere. In practice, as former Defense Secretary Harold Brown points out, horizontal escalation would lack credibility as a deterrent even if the Navy had the ability to carry it out, because there is no target other than the Russian homeland that the Navy could attack that would be more valuable to the Soviets than the Persian Gulf oilfields are to the United States. "Cuba doesn't equate to Southwest Asia," says Brown. "If the Soviets attack the . . . oilfields, how much good does it do for us to relieve them of the burden of a \$3 billion-a-year subsidy in Cuba?"

At bottom, all U.S. military strategy, and thus all major budgetary commitments for defense, must begin by confronting the harsh reality of geography: the United States is at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to leaning on other nations. Merely by massing its troops along one or another of its borders, the Soviet Union can influence events in all three of the areas most vital to U.S. interests—Western Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific environs of Japan and the Koreans. The United States,



Photos by Herman J. Kokojan—Black Star

DIVAD anti-aircraft gun: 'We have turned an inexpensive, inaccurate Soviet weapon into a very expensive, inaccurate American weapon'

by contrast, is a maritime nation isolated by two vast oceans, yet with sea lanes and overseas interests to protect. In order to influence events in countries like West Germany or Saudi Arabia, it must be able to project power over thousands of miles, with all the attendant logistical problems.

Periodically there are cries for a scaling down of commitments overseas. Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, writing with George Thibault in the magazine *Foreign Affairs*, said, "It is difficult to believe that the degree to which Europe has dominated our procurement of equipment, doctrine and training did not contribute heavily to our shortcomings" in Korea, Vietnam and the Iranian hostage-rescue mission. The Senate Appropriations Committee, noting that more than half the defense budget is devoted to the NATO commitment, recently voted to force the withdrawal of 23,000 American soldiers from Europe. It also cut back funding requests for the Rapid Deployment Force now being assembled to meet military contingencies in the Persian Gulf. In both cases the panel made plain its resentment over the allies' alleged unwillingness to shoulder a greater part of the burden of their own defense.

Battlefields: But if the underlying aim of U.S. security policy is containment of Soviet expansionism, then the basic commitments to the defense of Europe, the Persian Gulf and Japan cannot be abandoned. "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies," as Churchill said, "and that is fighting without them." In Europe the NATO countries provide more than 60 percent of allied ground-combat capability and about 55 percent of combat aircraft. Moreover, in an item that doesn't show up in the defense budget, West Germany supplies free real estate and facilities for American forces. In

wartime, as former Under Secretary of Defense Robert Komer notes, West Germany "would even provide the battlefields."

Moreover, the allies are irreplaceable trading partners. America's international commerce, most of it with the industrial democracies and the oil producers, accounts for one-sixth of all domestic jobs and one-third of all profits. Forty percent of U.S. farm production is sold overseas. As a mer-

C-5A cargo plane: Neglecting glamourless items like airlift capacity seriously endangers the national security



cantile nation, the United States cannot afford the loss of markets that would follow an American withdrawal from overseas defense. Nor can the country afford to lose what Komer calls "perhaps our most important remaining strategic advantage over the U.S.S.R. . . . that we are blessed with many rich allies, while the Soviets have only a few poor ones." And the United States would not welcome the rise in West German and Japanese militarism that might follow a U.S. pullback. West Germany could even develop independent nuclear forces. As former National Security Council staffer Morton Halperin warns, "Massive German rearmament would dramatically increase the chances of war with the Soviet Union."

If the U.S. strategy of containment through alliances is to remain intact, there are certain inevitable consequences. For a start, the Weinberger policy of horizontal escalation should be dropped. Horizontal escalation fails the first test of deterrence—reminding a potential enemy that aggression will cost more than it gains. It also undermines the alliances. By proposing to punish an aggressor elsewhere rather than confront it directly at the point of attack, horizontal escalation implicitly abandons potential battlefields like the Persian Gulf. The citizens of Europe, whose lights were fading because they had lost Persian Gulf oil, would take no cheer from the news that in retaliation U.S. Marines had captured Havana.

Kilotons: The United States must also recognize the deterioration of nuclear weaponry's credibility as an option in the defense of allies. Europeans doubt—with good reason—that the United States would invite attack on its own cities by using nuclear weapons. Nor does anyone believe that the Europeans would beg for the use of tactical nuclear weapons on their own territories (in northern Germany, it is sometimes said, the towns are only a couple of kilotons apart). While America cannot now afford to give up the capacity to ride out a Soviet first strike and retaliate in full force, the solution to weaknesses in Western defenses is better conventional capabilities—not Weinberger's theory of protracted nuclear war.

Therefore, as a minimum first step, Congress should restore all of the funds it cut for redeploying U.S. troops closer to the forward defense positions on the East German border and for improving allied airfields. It should lift the ceiling it imposed on troop strength in Europe. And it should restore its 50 percent cut in funds to improve facilities in the Indian Ocean area. Cuts should not come from the budget for NATO readiness. The axe should fall elsewhere.

If the United States is ever to shake free from its dependence on nuclear weapons, it must begin looking for cuts in the strategic arsenal. Not doing so invites danger. As the respected Sen. Sam Nunn suggested not long ago, increasing the portion of the budget devoted to nuclear programs also increases the risk of a nuclear confrontation. Having slighted conventional forces, he said, "we will inadvertently decrease our options to protect vital interests without having to resort to the use of nuclear weapons."

The best-known candidate for elimination is the MX missile. The case in its favor has never been wholly persuasive. By itself, the 192,000-pound behemoth adds little or nothing to the nuclear deterrent; with its

rines, would usurp the Air Force role as prime bearer of the nuclear deterrent. As one defense specialist on Capitol Hill notes, one of the MX's chief attractions to the Air Force is that it's "so big the sonofabitch won't fit in a Trident submarine."


In any case, it is time to rethink the larger question of whether the United States should continue to sink billions of dollars into preserving the land-based leg of the strategic triad. Just as Richard Nixon could get away with a trip to China when more liberal presidents could not, so a defense hard-liner like Ronald Reagan could make palatable a decision to live with a weakened land-based leg—what some proponents call an "isosceles triad" with two strong legs and one weak one.

On the other hand, the Trident submarine program, plagued by prodigious cost overruns, should be continued. Mobile and invisible, it is deceptive basing in practice, not just theory. Until the Soviet Union develops much better antisubmarine-warfare technology than it now has, this sea leg is by far the safest part of America's strategic triad. And the Trident II missile, which like the MX has the capacity to destroy hardened Soviet targets, is scheduled to go into service in 1989.

Bomber: The Lazarus-like B-1 bomber, killed once already by the Carter administration, can be earmarked for reburial. The case for manned strategic bombers remains strong—as Sen. John Tower, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, emphasizes, they can be recalled in the event of a mistaken order to proceed to target. But the B-1 is too expensive to make sense for the few years it would perform its primary function. The current long-range bomber is the venerable B-52, which is thought able to penetrate Soviet air defenses until the late 1980s. By the early 1990s, if not sooner, the new advanced-technology bomber (known as "Stealth" for its radar-evading abilities) should be in service. Why, then, spend at least \$23 billion through fiscal 1987 on

an interim airplane? One argument is that forcing the Soviets to modify their air defenses to defeat the B-1 will divert billions that would otherwise go to developing offensive weapons. But once they did so, the B-1 would be no more effective than B-52s equipped with cruise missiles.

Conventional-force reductions are harder to recommend—these forces have for so long been neglected. Some highly visible systems are overdesigned and overburdened with expensive technology, but to criticize complex weaponry across the board is to miss an important point: America's chief military advantage over the Sovi-



CUTTING THE BUDGET


NEWSWEEK suggests cuts that will save billions without harming national security.

System or program	Fiscal 1983 savings	Total savings over 5 years
• Cancel B-1 bomber	\$859.5 million	\$22.9 billion
• Cancel MX missile unless administration comes up with a believable basing mode	1.1 billion	14.9 billion
• Cancel two Nimitz-class aircraft carriers	164.9 million	4.7 billion
• Cancel AV-8B Harrier jump jet	181.3 million	4.5 billion
• Cancel DIVAD air defense system	34.8 million	2.7 billion
• Eliminate F-15s for continental air defense	72.8 million	2.4 billion
• Cut funding for Maverick missile by two-thirds	47.2 million	1.2 billion
• Cancel Viper antitank gun	123 million	1 billion
• Cancel reactivation of battleships Missouri and Wisconsin	15 million	909.5 million
• Cancel Army Helicopter Improvement Program	49.4 million	786.8 million
• Terminate A-10 anti-armor airplane	40.8 million	386.3 million
TOTALS	\$2.7 billion	\$56.4 billion

Christoph Blumrich, Jerry Eitelberg—NEWSWEEK

high accuracy and 10 warheads, it has more firepower than the U.S. strategy of maintaining retaliatory capability would require. It was the idea of a deceptive basing mode that originally made the MX a plausible replacement for the Minuteman III missiles. With deceptive basing—Carter's plan to shuffle 200 missiles among 4,600 shelters—now abandoned, the MX becomes expendable. Cutting it from the budget would save \$14.9 billion by the end of fiscal 1987. Besides, there are reasons to suspect that its real reason for being is the Air Force's fear that the Navy, with multiwarhead missiles aboard near-invulnerable Trident subma-

NATIONAL AFFAIRS



Wally McNamee—Newsweek

AV-8B Harrier jump jet: The Marines want special planes that the Air Force can't control

et Union is precisely its technological supremacy. In an era when microelectronics are making it possible for opposing forces to clash without ever coming within visual range of one another, it makes no sense for the United States to give up its edge.

'Quantum Leap': At the same time, a certain skepticism about high technology is appropriate. One reason the Soviets consistently put more new weapons in the field than the United States is that, as John Collins notes, they settle for "incremental improvements," constantly updating weapons in actual use. The American tendency, on the other hand, is to strive for "the quantum leap forward." Typically, new systems come loaded with "bells and whistles"—Pentagon slang for technological frills—which often fail to work at first, leading to production delays and cost overruns. At that point, as Sen. Gary Hart likes to say, "better becomes the enemy of good." It also becomes the enemy of efficiency. Technology is giving each service the ability to perform the mission of another: increasingly, long-range aircraft are able to perform the same duties as aircraft carriers. But the services are so traditionbound that they don't adjust to the changing implications.

There are some troubled high-tech

weapons under development that deserve a chance—if the bugs can be worked out of them. One is the Abrams (M-1) main battle tank, a "high risk" design that has given critics a field day. The tank proved "allergic" to dust, a commodity often found on battlefields. Its transmission failed so often that one Senate tank expert observed, "General Motors would have issued a recall notice for all of them." But since 1979 the Abrams has been performing much better, and it is now winning applause from allied tank experts. Another troubled system with a future is the F-18 fighter-bomber, which carries a total program cost of \$40 billion—more than either the MX or the B-1. It was adopted by the Navy at least in part because the Navy didn't want to take an Air Force plane. Among the F-18's problems was the fact that in its attack mode the missiles it carried weighted it down so much that it could not achieve its specified range of 550 miles. But the most recent classified-test results indicate that the \$22.5 million-per-copy airplane is now within striking distance of passing grades.

Deadly Fire: But the argument for building two new Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers is less than compelling. They are the centerpieces of Navy Secretary John Lehman's plans for a 600-ship fleet, but their strategic value doesn't justify their total cost of \$7 billion—\$4.7 billion by 1987—not to mention the additional \$30 billion or so needed to deck out two carriers with full complements of aircraft and support ships. The task forces include four air wings over the life of the two carriers (total cost: \$18.6 billion), four Aegis-class cruisers (\$6.2 billion) and eight destroyers (\$4.2 billion); some of these support craft might be necessary for other missions, but if the two carriers are canceled, several billions of dollars extra could be saved.

The main mission of the carriers, it appears, would be to provide platforms for airplanes to attack the Soviet land mass, which Sam Nunn dryly describes as "not a very well-thought-out strategy." As one congressional staff defense specialist says, "No admiral in his right mind is going to want to go tearing up [through the Arctic Circle] into the Kola Peninsula to bash hell out of it." The big ships would draw deadly fire from Soviet Backfire bombers carrying cruise missiles, and even if they survived, their bombers—only 35 per carrier—would be unlikely to penetrate Soviet air defenses in great numbers. Indeed, the vulnerability of Nimitz-class carriers to humiliatingly cheap missiles is a strong argument against building any more than the 13 the Navy now has. It is worth recalling that during the Iranian hostage crisis when a little gunboat diplomacy might have helped, the admirals declined to send a supercarrier into the Persian Gulf. Not wanting to lose it, they didn't use it.

Similar considerations apply to the Navy's plans to bring four vintage battleships

out of mothballs. One, the New Jersey, will be commissioned this month, and another, the Iowa, should be available for sea duty late next year. The Navy should stop there. Equipped with cruise missiles for land attack, the main mission of the revitalized battleships apparently would be to strike at the Soviet heartland. They, like the carriers, would be in harm's way. Alternative possibilities are to deploy one battleship in the Caribbean, with air support based on land in Texas or Florida, and one in the western Pacific, with air cover out of South Korea, the Philippines or Okinawa. A carrier could then be relieved for Indian Ocean patrol. For this purpose, though, the battleships already reactivated are enough. Savings: \$909.5 million.

Another candidate for removal from the Navy's budget is the fleet of 342 AV-8B Harrier jump jets now being purchased for the Marines. The Harrier is a short-take-off-and-landing aircraft designed for close air support of ground troops from forward bases. It is a capable plane, but its duties could be handled by the attack version of the dual-mission F-18 fighter-bomber called the Hornet. The Marines could buy the F-18 in place of the AV-8B without any increase in F-18 orders, since the Navy's production plans include planes for reserve units and for the task forces planned for the two Nimitz-class supercarriers. It would save \$4.5 billion by the end of fiscal

REAGAN'S WISH LIST	
The defense budget for fiscal year 1983 authorizes spending that will grow by billions in the years ahead.	
Program	Fiscal 1983 Budget Authority In billions of dollars
Strategic forces	\$23.1
General-purpose forces	106.5
Intelligence and-communications	18.0
Airlift and sealift	4.4
Guard and Reserve forces	14.3
Research and development	20.1
Central supply and maintenance	22.2
Training, medical, other general personnel activities	44.2
Support of other nations (Excluding military-assistance programs)	.9
Administration and associated activities	4.3
TOTAL	\$258 billion
Source: Department of Defense	

Christoph Blumrich—Newsweek

NATIONAL AFFAIRS


1987 and eliminate the need for the Marines to develop two quite different training and logistical systems. The Marines point out that the Harrier can do things the Hornet cannot, but there is nonetheless enough overlap to justify the cut. Besides, suggests former Pentagon analyst Russell Murray II, the real reason the Marines want the Harrier is to avoid a repeat of their experience in Korea, when the Air Force tried to take over Marine planes and convert them to deep interdiction missions. Murray says the Marines want "to tie their future aircraft so closely to their ground forces that it would simply be infeasible to transfer their control to the Air Force."

No Threat: Another capable aircraft that should be cut back is the F-15 long-range interceptor known as the Eagle. As part of a total buy of the 1,395 F-15s, the Air Force wants 144 for air defense of the continental United States against Soviet bombers—an almost nonexistent threat that is far less important than that posed by the Soviet ICBM's. The F-15 is indeed a hot plane—too hot, since its top speed of more than Mach 2.5 squanders fuel and is rarely if ever used by pilots—but it is not needed for continental air defense. Reducing the F-15 purchase by 108 aircraft would yield \$2.4 billion in savings by fiscal 1987.

Even the Air Force has offered to stop buying the A-10 Thunderbolt, another attack plane intended for close support for ground troops. That job can, however, be handled by the Army's new AH-64 Apache helicopter. The A-10 has been kept alive mainly by New York Sen. Alfonse D'Amato; it is built in his state. Cutting it would produce a savings of \$386.3 million over the Reagan budget cycle.

One even more criticized high-tech weapon is the DIVAD (for Division Air Defense) computer-operated, radar-guided antiaircraft gun, which was inspired by a Soviet antiaircraft gun captured during the Yom Kippur war of 1973. At a demonstration last February the DIVAD trained its sights on a drone Huey helicopter hovering nearby—and failed to fire. After repairs to a disconnected cable, the DIVAD fired—this time, directly into the ground 300 yards away. The Soviet version of the weapon doesn't perform well, either. Says one congressional staff specialist: "We have taken a relatively inexpensive, inaccurate Soviet weapon and turned it into a relatively very expensive, inaccurate American weapon." Canceling it would save \$2.7 billion by fiscal 1987.

Viper: An equally troubled weapon is the hand-held Viper antitank gun—essentially a high-tech version of the bazooka. Its main problem is its ineffectiveness against the frontal armor of the new Soviet T-72 tanks. U.S. soldiers would have to let the T-72 go by and fire from behind—a questionable practice. The Marines have already rejected it. "You want something that hurts the



Den Cooke—Picture Group

AH-64 (Apache) attack helicopter: In a matter of months, the cost of procuring a single helicopter rose from \$9 million to \$12 million

enemy, not just pisses him off," says Sen. Warren Rudman, who calls the Viper "a turkey with characteristics of a cat, because it has nine lives." No senator "would hesitate to give soldiers the best weapon even at the highest cost," he adds. "But no one, starting with me, is going to give him the worst at the highest cost." Canceling it would save \$1 billion by fiscal 1987.

Further assorted savings:

- The Army's Helicopter Improvement Program, an unnecessary interim retooling of the OH-58 Scout helicopter until a new

Scout is in the field; \$786.8 million saved.

- Two-thirds of the production of the heat-seeking version of the air-to-surface Maverick missile, which is intended for night use in place of the optically guided Maverick. Any alert enemy who wants to divert the missile can easily do so, however—simply by setting fires to pull it off course. "It would probably get more pilots killed than would kill targets," says Anthony Battista of the House Armed Services Committee; \$1.2 billion saved.

- Half the civil-defense budget. This is not technically Pentagon money, but should be construed as national-security spending. Savings: \$1.2 billion.

All told, these cuts would lower the defense budget by only \$2.7 billion in the current fiscal year. But starting next year, the "bow wave" of spending will start to hit, set in motion by programs authorized last year and this. By the end of fiscal 1987 *NEWSWEEK's* defense-budget cuts of \$56.4 billion, plus the civil-defense savings, would total \$57.6 billion, with minimal impact on national security. This would still represent a growth in spending higher than 5 percent annual real growth—the figure endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Carter administration. It will not, however, narrow the gap between expenditures and strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will have to come up with a coherent way to integrate the four services into a single fighting force before that gap will fully close. Cuts along these lines should be made now, while there is still time. Otherwise, they will surely be made later, and they will come out of the basic operating funds for keeping American armed forces ready. That would harm national security.

PETER McGRATH with DAVID C. MARTIN and JOHN J. LINDSAY in Washington


Viper antitank weapon:
One critic calls it 'a turkey with characteristics of a cat because it has nine lives'



Department of Defense

Defending the United States

Spending more money on defense does not necessarily guarantee greater national security. In a wide-ranging analysis, NEWSWEEK explores the serious flaws in the Pentagon's budget-making process and calls for immediate cuts in defense spending for fiscal 1983.



It was the 41st anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the speeches rang heavy with the lessons of history. But in Washington they played to a nearly empty House. Most congressmen had long since made up their minds about MX, the proposed new intercontinental ballistic missile—and when the vote came, it was stunning: by 245 to 176, the House said no to building the first five MX missiles this fiscal year. The vote was much more than a blow to one controversial defense system. It was a direct challenge to Ronald Reagan's five-year, \$1.6 trillion defense buildup, to the make-America-strong-again message that helped bring him to office. Warning ominously that the vote was a "grave mistake"—a threat to the national security—the president accused the House of "sleepwalking into the future." But congressmen disagreed. "The sleepwalkers are in the Pentagon," countered Democrat Joseph Addabbo of New York, chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the chief opponent of MX. "The majority of Congress is wide awake."

That is not necessarily true. In the next few months Congress will continue to vote on the hundreds of programs and billions of dollars involved in Reagan's unprecedented buildup. But will the United States emerge any more secure? An exhaustive analysis of the issues and the system behind them, presented on the following pages, suggests that the answer is no. America's defense system—from the strategic planning that ought to define it to the congressional debate that bestows the taxpayers' blessing—is in need of serious reform. More money does not necessarily guarantee greater national security: in fact, Reagan's enormous demands could be harmful. National security also rests on economic health, and with the federal deficit already at an alarming level, higher defense spending—for spending's sake—threatens to leave the United

States in an even more precarious position than before.

Congress is well aware of that fact, and there are clear signs that the consensus for increased military spending is eroding. "In 1980... there was an enormous liability in being antidefense. The liability now is in being blindly prodefense," said Rep. Newt Gingrich, a Georgia conservative. Sen. Dan Quayle, an Indiana conservative, put it even more bluntly to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger: "The perception," he said, "is that the Pentagon is out of control."

To its critics, the MX provides a glaring example of misguided Pentagon planning. The defense establishment itself was not unanimous on "dense pack"—the close-packed basing mode that was only the last of some 30 suggested systems. The day after the vote, Gen. John W. Vessey Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that three of the five service chiefs had advised against the plan. Indeed, as Rep. Paul Simon of Illinois reminded his colleagues, "Many of us have also had these quiet telephone calls from top military people who have said, 'This is an unwise use of defense dollars.'"

Time to Sell: Still, the House did not kill MX entirely. It left \$2.5 billion in the 1983 budget for continued research and development of the missile. It also approved a \$231.6 billion defense appropriation for fiscal 1983, including virtually everything else Reagan wanted. The Republican-controlled Senate is likely to go along with most, if not all, of those items—perhaps even "fencing off" the MX funds, giving the administration more time to try to sell Congress on dense pack or come up with yet another basing mode.

Both Houses should reconsider. As the NEWSWEEK analysis shows, many of the new weapons in the proposed budget—including the MX, the B-1 bomber, two Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and a host of other aircraft and guns—could be scrapped without harming national security (page 24). Deleting them now will do little to reduce

the current budget deficit; most of the bill won't come due for several years. But the cuts would save \$56.4 billion by 1988, and once production starts, the weapons will be nearly impossible to kill without wasting money and throwing people out of work.

Before the nation can rearm effectively, it must address a far more basic problem. "Putting out a hit list on individual weapon systems is like chasing bumblebees with sticks," says Larry Smith, a private defense consultant. "You have to go after the hive—the system." As that system currently works, the individual services recommend their own weapons, and deeply entrenched rivalries virtually ensure incompatibility and duplication. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide little coordination, since each service chief remains loyal to his own service (page 32). Meanwhile, congressional committees that oversee the budget-making process too often are swayed by home-district interests. As a result, coherent planning is almost always lost in the scramble for available funds. Says John Collins, Library of Congress defense expert, "If you do not plan effectively, the only way you can spend money effectively is by accident."

Strategy for What? Before the Pentagon can plan effectively, before Congress can determine "how much is enough," both must address the question: "Enough for what?" Without a realistic assessment of America's military goals, its limitations and its most present dangers, its *weapons* too often determine its strategy, instead of the other way around. The United States must protect its vital interests, such as the NATO allies (page 34), and reasonably ensure against attacks on its own shores. Beyond that, it has chosen to try to "contain" the spread of communism elsewhere in the world. But given the relative nuclear parity between the superpowers, and the use of Soviet "proxies" and aggressions by smaller nations, it is increasingly clear that the United States is unprepared for conventional conflicts and overprepared for nuclear war.



Even within its strategic arsenal, the Pentagon has placed too much emphasis on preserving the survivability of its land-based ICBM force. Long considered the most reliable leg of the land, sea and air triad, it is now the most vulnerable, given the increasing accuracy of Soviet missiles. That fact should be recognized and accepted. As Rep. Charles Bennett, a Florida Democrat, told the House last week, "Mr. Chairman, the triad is not the Trinity."

Continuing improvements to the sea- and air-based legs now coming on line will ensure the United States a credible first- and second-strike capability. Each of the 15 Trident submarines—the first of which went to station last month—will eventually be armed with 24 Trident II missiles, each with accuracy and silo-busting power superior to the current U.S. Minuteman force. This week the first 16 B-52 bombers rebuilt

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

carry cruise missiles will go on daily alert, giving the United States the capability of striking deep within the Soviet Union from a "standoff" position. And the current fleet of 1,000 Minuteman missiles is not inconsequential. Hardening their silos would force the Soviets to target up to three warheads against each one—a costly challenge to Soviet military resources.

No Glamour: Meanwhile, the Pentagon must correct the glaring weaknesses in its "general purpose" forces, including personnel, operations, maintenance, spare parts and training—the items that ensure "readiness" for conventional war. Those items are more expensive than nuclear missiles. They lack the glamour of aircraft carriers or new bombers. And unlike "big ticket" weapons systems, they must be paid for in current outlays, not paper authorizations, so they have traditionally been the



Fierman J. Kokojan—Black Star

B-52s loaded with cruise missiles (above), 'e
(X): Is the Pentagon out of control?

best to go when defense budgets are cut. Congress must avoid that temptation. It also must not be deluded that it can have it all. As Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia points out—correctly: "The Reagan budget cannot buy all that the president is trying to buy even if it got every dollar." That fact will inevitably become clear if Congress "buys into" the major weapons programs now; "readiness" will again suffer in the scramble to cut the deficit and the nation will end up, Gingrich says, "slightly weaker, slightly more confused, with slightly less momentum, having unnerved the Russians, irritated our allies and all without having substantially increased the security of the American people." Cuts can and should be made in the defense budget without harming national security, and the time to act is now.

MELINDA BECK with JOHN J. LINDSAY, DAVID C. MARTIN and MARY LORD in Washington

Courtesy Martin Marietta

IS THE U.S. BEHIND IN THE ARMS RACE?

What Are the Facts?

Despite the common misconception that the Soviets are ahead of us militarily, our two countries are roughly equal in strength. By many measures, the U.S. and our NATO allies are ahead, and by other measures, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact lead. According to the Defense Department: "... while the era of U.S. superiority is long past, parity — not U.S. inferiority — has replaced it, and the United States and the Soviet Union are roughly equal in strategic nuclear power."¹

The Current Military Balance

MEASURES OF MILITARY STRENGTH	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S. IS:
Nuclear Warheads			
All warheads, on long, mid, or short-range systems, or in inventory, NATO vs. Warsaw Pact, approximate ¹	30,000	16,000	AHEAD
Strategic warheads (long-range)			
on ICMBs, SLBMs, or long-range bombers ¹	9,536	7,730	AHEAD
on "tactical" aircraft able to reach enemy homeland ¹	2,600	140	AHEAD
Total (not including 500 belonging to Great Britain & France)	12,136	7,870	AHEAD
Megatonnage (explosive power), strategic warheads ¹	4,078	7,936	Behind
<i>(Total on both sides is equivalent to 800,000 Hiroshima bombs. Only 400 of our bombs are needed to destroy 1/2 the Soviet population and 1/4 of its industry.)</i>			
Delivery Systems (launchers)			
Accuracy, hence lethality ⁴			AHEAD
Payload able to be carried (in millions of pounds)			
on ICMBs and submarines ⁷	3.4	11.8	Behind
on Intercontinental bombers ⁷	21.0	5.0	AHEAD
Intercontinental bombers ¹	407	215	AHEAD
(Warheads on bombers) ¹	2,640	290	AHEAD
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) ¹	520	950	Behind
(Warheads on SLBMs) ¹	4,744	1,900	AHEAD
(Warheads at sea, ready to fire) ⁸	2,530	300	AHEAD
Land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) ¹	1,052	1,398	Behind
(Warheads on ICBMs) ¹	2,152	5,540	Behind
Reliability of missiles ¹⁰			AHEAD
Vulnerability			
Percentage of warheads on vulnerable ICBMs ¹	23	70	AHEAD
Percentage of warheads on invulnerable subs ¹	50	24	AHEAD

The "Window of Vulnerability" theory assumes the Russians would launch half their ICBMs in a difficult, untested surprise attack on our ICBM silos believing the U.S. would not launch its more than 2500 warheads from invulnerable subs, obliterating Russian civilization. The Office of Technology Assessment estimates such a surprise attack would kill 20 million Americans;¹¹ the Russians surely know we would retaliate.

Armed Forces

Personnel in uniform, in millions ¹⁴	2.0	3.7	Behind
Personnel in uniform, NATO v. Warsaw Pact in millions ¹⁴	4.9	4.8	AHEAD
Navy - We have more major surface ships, less detectable subs, and better anti-submarine warfare. The 1982 Annual Report of the Defense Department states, "Our Navy Remains the best in the world." ¹⁵			AHEAD
European Theater (NATO v. Warsaw Pact)	NATO	WARSAW PACT	NATO IS
SS-20 type midrange land-based mobile missiles ¹²	0	200-300	Behind
SS-20 type deliverable warheads	0	600-900	Behind
All midrange deliverable warheads (from subs, bombers, missiles) ¹²	1,168	2,004	Behind
All midrange warheads likely to arrive at targets ¹²	553	872	Behind
Short-range and tactical nuclear warheads, approx. ¹¹	6,000	4,000	AHEAD
Ground Troops, millions ¹²	2.1	1.7	AHEAD
Tanks ¹²	17,053	26,300	Behind
Anti-tank missiles, advanced types ¹⁴	193,000	NA	AHEAD

While the Warsaw Pact is ahead in certain quantitative measures, the Defense Department has said, "NATO still retains its qualitative edge."¹⁶ Further, as NATO Commander General Bernard Rogers has said, "The use of theater nuclear weapons would in fact escalate to the strategic level. Two of our invulnerable subs in Europe could destroy all 200 major Soviet cities."

MEASURES OF MILITARY STRENGTH	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S. IS:
Spending			
Percentage of GNP for defense ¹¹	3-8	12-14	Behind
1980-81 outlays, per DOD and OMB, in billions of dollars ¹²	156	221	Behind
→ 1980-81 outlays, NATO v. Warsaw Pact, per CDI, in billions of dollars ⁴ (These are estimates and vary widely with assumptions.)	241	202	AHEAD
Facing Russia			
China, NATO and the U.S. vs. Warsaw Pact ¹³			
⇒ Military spending, in billions of dollars	298	202	Anti-Soviet
Military personnel, in millions	9.7	4.8	Forces
Major surface ships	435	281	AHEAD
Strategic Nuclear Weapons	10,500	7,800	
Technological Base			
→ Of 20 key areas, leading in ¹⁴	12	2	AHEAD
Civil Defense			
Secretary of Defense Brown said, "The American nuclear arsenal is more than adequate to overcome any civil defense..." ¹⁵			
Verification Technology			
Both sides are capable of monitoring weapons testing and deployments. U.S. satellites can photograph objects 6" in diameter. ¹⁶			

Summary

We have more warheads. Theirs are bigger, but ours are more accurate and hence more lethal. They have more launchers, but ours have more warheads and are more reliable. Our ICBMs are vulnerable, as are theirs, but ours can be launched more quickly. Fewer of our warheads are on ICBMs, more on invulnerable subs, containing vast deterrent power. We don't have SS-20 type missiles in Europe, but we have more than enough other warheads in Europe to destroy Russia. Any measures in which we are behind are adequately compensated by other measures. Don't be misled by measures cited in isolation.

ON BALANCE, WE ARE NOT BEHIND

The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously stated in 1981 that THEY WOULD NOT TRADE THEIR ARMED FORCES for the Soviet counterparts.¹⁷

Both sides could retaliate with vast destruction. BOTH ARE NOW DETERRED FROM NUCLEAR WAR.

If We Don't Freeze Now

In the 1980's the U.S. is planning:²⁰

- 100 MX missiles, capable of a highly accurate first strike at USSR silos.
- Trident II missiles, accurate enough to turn subs into first strike launchers.
- Thousands of cruise missiles which can evade radar and hit with pin-point accuracy, starting with air-launched missiles in 1982.
- Pershing II missiles, in Europe, able to hit Moscow in 10 minutes.
- About 100 B-1 bombers, and later, "Stealth" bombers.
- Anti-satellite weapons, which could be destabilizing.
- Anti-ballistic missile systems, which could violate the ABM treaty.
- 17,000 new nuclear warheads.

The Soviets are improving the accuracy of SS-18s, are planning cruise missiles, and will surely try to catch up in areas where the U.S. leads. During another "Cuban Missile Crisis" each side, knowing the first strike potential of the other, will be tempted to "use 'em, not lose 'em." The speed and accuracy of the new systems will demand that the decision to "launch on warning" will be made by computer. World War III could be a computer error.

WE WILL BE LESS SECURE. THE TIME TO STOP IS NOW.

References


The prime source of much of the above data, at least indirectly, is the U.S. Dept. of Defense. However, the data are interpreted somewhat differently by different secondary sources. The figures chosen here represent widely respected opinion.

1. U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1982, p. 41.
2. Graph by SANE, based on data from the Center for Defense Information (CDI).
3. CDI 4/82 estimate compiled largely from standard data provided by the Department of Defense. Figures for warheads and launchers are commensurate with data in the Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 83 and the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 82.
4. CDI The Defense Monitor, XI/1, 1982.
5. Based on Secretary of Defense McNamara's estimates, cited by U.S. Joint Committee Defense Production, Economic & Social Consequences of a Nuclear Attack on the U.S., 1/78, pp. 21-24.
6. Congressional Record, Senate, 7/20/79, and Michael Heylin, "Nuclear arms race gearing for speedup," Chemical and Engineering News, 1/16/81, pp. 26-19.
7. New York Times, 2/24/82, p. E1, based primarily on DOD data, IJSS, and CDI.
8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Military Posture, 1981.
9. CDI, 4/82.
10. Based on data from CDI and J. Military Balance, 1981-1982, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (IJSS).
11. The Effects of Nuclear War, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1979.
12. Op. cit., IJSS, pp. 126-129. IJSS estimates that only 200 of the 300 SS-20's are within striking distance in Europe, the rest being aimed at China. CDI estimates NATO and U.S. have 2600 warheads deliverable to USSR.
13. Estimates from Dnd, IJSS, and CDI figures.
14. CDI estimate, commensurate with U.S. Military Posture, 1982.
15. Op. cit., Dnd FY 1982 Annual Report, pp. 75-79.
16. Op. cit., IJSS, pp. 124-125.
17. Op. cit., IJSS, p. 112.
18. The U.S. Budget in Brief, FY 1983, Office of Management and Budget, p. 30, and Dnd Annual Report, FY 1983, pp. 14-15.
19. Dr. W. Perry, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, to Congress, 1981, cited in Defense Monitor, XI/1, p. 11.
20. Department of Defense Annual Report, FY 1983, 140-45, III 57-70. Heylin, op. cit., and the New York Times, 2/28/82, p. 1.


Strategic Warhead

Comparisons


Warheads on Submarines



Total Warheads



Long-Range Bombers



Land Based Warheads




Exhibit 16

TESTIMONY ON SJR 10

If there is one elementary fact that begs to be heard in the nuclear arms debate, it is that more nuclear weapons do not make this nation stronger. More nuclear weapons, in fact, only serve to make all the people of this nation weaker and less secure by increasing the risk of nuclear war and detracting from other vital areas of our lives.

The true strength of a nation is measured by such things as economic vitality, employment, education, housing, morality and confidence that we are moving in the right direction. A continued reliance on the never-ending growth of non-productive nuclear weaponry, with its massive economic, social, moral and environmental costs, will surely sap our true strength to the point that this nation will soon be but a shadow of its former great self.

Senate Joint Resolution 10 presents a legitimate and powerful concern in a responsible way and I support its passage.

John McNamer

JOHN McNAMER
Author, Initiative 91
Route 1, Box 104
Charlo, Montana 59824

February 7, 1983

Exhibit 17

L.I.G.H.T., Inc.
147 W. Main
Missoula, Montana 59802
(406) 549-0212
Hugh Standley, Chairman

February 7, 1983

Senator Tom Hager, Chairman
Senate Public Health, Welfare & Safty Committee
Senate Chambers
State Capitol
Helena, Montana 59601

Dear Senator Hager and Members of the Committee:

L.I.G.H.T., Low Income Group for Human Treatment, strongly supports SJR 10, sponsored by Senator Van Valkenburg.

Our organization has a membership of approx. 350 people who are concerned about social issues affecting low income, elderly and handicapped people.

We are vehemently opposed to President Reagan's policy of funding nuclear weapons and the Defense Department at the expense of social programs and jobs. Because of Reagan's policies, our people are suffering. They can't find jobs, many don't qualify for welfare and when they do, are facing extreme hardship with services being cut. Please remember the poor and destitute in these hard times.

L.I.G.H.T. requests that you vote for a "do pass" for S.J.R. 10 and urge the President and Congress to reduce funding of nuclear weapons and the Department of Defence and increase funding for Human Services and Jobs programs.

Thank you.

Yours Truly,

Virginia Jellison

Virginia Jellison, Project Director

NAME

BILL No.

ADDRESS

DATE

WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT

SUPPORT

OPPOSE

AMEND

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

E. Philitt



Montana Nurses' Association

2001 ELEVENTH AVENUE

(406) 442-6710

P.O. BOX 5718 • HELENA, MONTANA 59604

TESTIMONY ON SJR 10

The Montana Nurses' Association would like to speak in support of Senate Joint Resolution 10. The 1982 Convention of the Montana Nurses' Association's House of Delegates adopted the following resolution:

Resolution #3 ANTI-NUCLEAR WAR (Co-sponsored by the E&GW and NSF Commissions)

WHEREAS:	Nurses are committed to preservation and the improvement of the quality of life, and
WHEREAS:	Nurses are in a position to understand the far reaching and irreversable effects of a nuclear war, and
WHEREAS:	Nurses have a responsibility to be in the forefront in helping the public understand the aftermath of nuclear war, therefore,
BE IT RESOLVED:	That the House of Delegates oppose nuclear war as an option in international conflict.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED:	That the House of Delegates oppose the presence of MX missiles in Montana, and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED:	That MNA will take an active role in preventing nuclear war and weapons buildup in the state.

John Frankino
Montana Catholic Conference

Exhibit 19

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is John Frankino, Director of the Montana Catholic Conference.

On behalf of the Conference, I extend our support for SJR 10.

We are at a time in world history when we must view the world in a new way. The Catholic Church continues to condemn the arms race as a "danger, an injustice, a theft from the poor, and a folly."

In a letter by the Roman Catholic Bishops of Montana to the people of Montana at Christmas, 1982, they stated: "Church teaching upholds a nation's right to legitimate self-defense. However, in the words of Pope John Paul II:

'...this right, which is very real in principle, only underlines the urgency for world society to equip itself with effective means of negotiation. In this way the nuclear terror that haunts our time can encourage us to enrich our common heritage with a very simple discovery that is within our reach, namely that war is the most barbarous and least effective way of resolving conflicts.'"

The letter continues,

"Such action calls us to view the world in a new way. It calls us further to a more demanding patriotism. We must begin to recognize that the world today is interdependent, and the solution to our problems, if we are to survive, must be worked out together. Dialogue will yield understanding-- and hopefully, peace!"

A joint struggle by people of peace to prevent war must also bring us together to fight poverty, disease, and hunger. The resources of the earth call for a new stewardship by those who possess them for the sake of those who do not. Such unity among people of peace is rooted in the recognition we give to the human rights of each person in the world today.

We recommend your favorable consideration of SJR 10.

John Frankino

VOTE FOR I-91 BY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT

*-wide margin

Senate

<u>District</u>	<u>Senator</u>	<u>Vote FOR I-91</u>	<u>Vote AGAINST I-91</u>	<u>Passed?</u>
1	Smith	3184	1840	*Yes
2	Etchart	2623	2289	Yes
3	Hammond	3109	2359	*Yes
4	Stephens	2504	1720	*Yes
5	Kolstad	2927	2478	Yes
6	Aklestad	3454	3024	Yes
7	Gage	2436	2246	Yes
8	Elliot	4498	3129	*Yes
9	Himsl	4485	2927	*Yes
10	Brown	4179	2658	*Yes
11	Mohar	2535	2136	Yes
12	McCallum	4474	2974	*Yes
13	Turnage	4680	2998	*Yes
14	Daniels	3203	2739	Yes
15	Fuller	5756	3593	*Yes
16	Mazurek	3885	2252	*Yes
17	Lee	2411	2848	No
18	Dick Manning	2146	2535	No
19	Christiaens	1545	1751	No
20	Thomas	1913	2191	No
21	Berg	2120	2617	No
22	Goodover	1171	1845	*No

VOTE FOR I-91 BY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT

*-wide margin

Senate

<u>District</u>	<u>Senator</u>	<u>Vote FOR I-91</u>	<u>Vote AGAINST I-91</u>	<u>Passed?</u>
23	Galt	3566	3054	Yes
24	Dover	3376	3184	Yes
25	Dave Manning	34005	3355	*Yes
26	Oshsner	2680	2126	Yes
27	Tveit	3629	2430	*Yes
28	Shaw	3083	2074	*Yes
29	Graham	3470	2267	*Yes
30	Hager	4595	3580	*Yes
31	Regan	1694	1097	*Yes
32	Keating	3513	1775	*Yes
33	Crippen	2777	1703	*Yes
34	Towe	2667	1985	*Yes
35	Blaylock	3149	2315	*Yes
36	Conover	3486	2116	*Yes
37	Story	4091	2976	*Yes
38	Boylan	5422	3530	*Yes
39	Eck	3514	1398	*Yes
40	Lane	4760	3940	Yes
41	Hazelbaker	3158	2841	Yes
42	Jacobson	3483	2894	Yes
43	Stimatz	2750	2002	*Yes
44	Lynch	2529	1893	*Yes
45	Haffey	2070	1760	Yes
46	Severson	5273	4126	*Yes

<u>District</u>	<u>Senator</u>	<u>Vote FOR I-91</u>	<u>Vote AGAINST I-91</u>	<u>Passed?</u>
47	Norman	3909	1739	*Yes
48	Halligan	3914	1552	*Yes
49	Marbut	3002	1680	*Yes
50	Van Valkenburg	4231	2458	*Yes

Initiative 91 failed in 6 districts. All of these were in Cascade County.

NAME Bailey Molineux
ADDRESS Alema
WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT my children, ages 7 & 4
SUPPORT ☒ OPPOSE ☐ AMEND ☐
BILL NO. SJR 10
DATE 2/7/83

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

Increased spending on nuclear weapons reduces our security for two reasons:

- 1) It ~~increases~~ propels the nuclear arms race
- 2) It increases the risk of accidental war.

We and the Russians both have enough weapons to deter each other. We both could use the money better in other ways.


I want my children
and grandchildren to have
a future!

NAME Celine Campbell BILL NO. SJR 10
ADDRESS 1618 Sherwood DATE 2-7-83
WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT Ms. Women for Peace
SUPPORT X OPPOSE _____ AMEND _____

PLEASE LEAVE PREPARED STATEMENT WITH SECRETARY.

Comments:

CALL TO HALT THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE



To improve national and international security, the United States and the Soviet Union should stop the nuclear arms race. Specifically, they should adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons. This is an essential, verifiable first step toward lessening the risk of nuclear war and reducing the nuclear arsenals.

The horror of a nuclear holocaust is universally acknowledged. Today, the United States and the Soviet Union possess 50,000 nuclear weapons. In half an hour, a fraction of these weapons can destroy all cities in the northern hemisphere. Yet over the next decade, the USA and USSR plan to build over 20,000 more nuclear warheads, along with a new generation of nuclear missiles and aircraft.

The weapon programs of the next decade, if not stopped, will pull the nuclear tripwire tighter. Counterforce and other "nuclear warfighting" systems will improve the ability of the USA and USSR to attack the opponent's nuclear forces and other military targets. This will increase the pressure on both sides to use their nuclear weapons in a crisis, rather than risk losing them in a first strike.

Such developments will increase hairtrigger readiness for a massive nuclear exchange at a time when economic difficulties, political dissension, revolution and competition for energy supplies may be rising worldwide. At the same time, more countries may acquire nuclear weapons. Unless we change this combination of trends, the danger of nuclear war will be greater in the late 1980s and 1990s than ever before.

Rather than permit this dangerous future to evolve, the United States and the Soviet Union should stop the nuclear arms race.

A freeze on nuclear missiles and aircraft can be verified by existing national means. A total freeze can be verified more easily than the complex SALT I and II agreements. The freeze on warhead production could be verified by the Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Stopping the production of nuclear weapons and weapon-grade material and applying the Safeguards to US and Soviet nuclear programs would increase the incentive of other countries to adhere to the Nonproliferation Treaty, renouncing acquisition of their own nuclear weapons, and to accept the same Safeguards.

A freeze would hold constant the existing nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. By precluding production of counterforce weaponry on either side, it would eliminate excuses for further arming on both sides. Later, following the immediate adoption of the freeze, its terms should be negotiated into the more durable form of a treaty.

A nuclear-weapon freeze, accompanied by government-aided conversion of nuclear industries, would save at least \$100 billion each in US and Soviet military spending (at today's prices) in 1981-1990. This would reduce inflation. The savings could be applied to balance the budget, reduce taxes, improve services, subsidize renewable energy, or increase aid to poverty-stricken third world regions. By shifting personnel to more labor-intensive civilian jobs, a nuclear-weapon freeze would also raise employment.

Stopping the US-Soviet nuclear arms race is the single most useful step that can be taken now to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries. This step is a necessary prelude to creating international conditions in which:

- further steps can be taken toward a stable, peaceful international order;
- the threat of first use of nuclear weaponry can be ended;
- the freeze can be extended to other nations; and
- the nuclear arsenals on all sides can be drastically reduced or eliminated, making the world truly safe from nuclear destruction.

For list of endorsers and to endorse the Call, see last page.

Endorsers of a Bilateral Nuclear-Weapon Freeze

American Friends Service Committee
 Richard Barnet, co-founder
*Institute for Policy Studies**
 Catholic, Episcopal, Jewish, and Presbyterian
 Peace Fellowships
 Church Women United
 Clergy and Laity Concerned
 Representative Ron Dellums, CA
 Disarmament Working Group, Coalition for a New
 Foreign and Military Policy
 Fellowship of Reconciliation
 Randall Forsberg, Director
*Institute for Defense & Disarmament Studies**
 Rabbi Daniel Freeland
*Union of American Hebrew Congregations**
 Executive Committee, Leadership Conference of
 Women Religious
 Mennonite Central Committee
 Mobilization for Survival
 Representative Toby Moffett, CT
 National Council of Churches
 Network
 New Call to Peacemaking
 Pax Christi
 Riverside Church Disarmament Program
 Victor Sidel, M.D.
*Physicians for Social Responsibility**
 Sisters of Loretto
 Sojourners
 Office for Church in Society,
 United Church of Christ
 Representative Howard Washington, IL
 Representative Ted Weiss, NY
 Women's International League
 for Peace and Freedom
 World Peacemakers

*Organizations for identification only
 (partial list)

FOR Endorses Call for Initiatives

The Fellowship of Reconciliation endorses this "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race" as a first step toward worldwide disarmament. The unilateral initiatives listed on the bottom of page three are the kind of steps that the F.O.R. supports to stimulate negotiations for a multi-lateral nuclear weapons moratorium.

A unilateral initiative is an independent action taken by one nation to signal its willingness to negotiate disarmament agreements with another nation or nations. It may or may not involve actual disarmament. However, the ultimate aim of unilateral initiatives is the achievement of universal disarmament and world peace.

A freeze on further testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems would not in itself involve disarming nuclear weapons that now exist. The F.O.R. sees such a moratorium on nuclear weapons as only the first step toward reversing the arms race.

Our faith commitment to the achieving of a peaceful world community calls us also to advocate initiatives for unilateral disarmament. The time has come for the human race to find a way to divest itself of *all* nuclear weapons.

Local Contact

ACTION SUGGESTIONS

1. Endorse the Call by checking the box below and sending in the coupon. Make copies of the Call and send them to three friends.
2. Identify three leaders in your community. Send them the Call and follow up by telephone or in person. Send names of prominent endorsers to the address below.
3. Get the organizations to which you belong to endorse the Call and send a letter stating support to the address below.
4. Use a petition format of the Call for a bilateral freeze for house-to-house and large-meeting canvassing and to gather names and funds for local newspaper ads calling for a bilateral nuclear-weapon freeze.
5. Initiate city or town government resolutions, state government resolutions, or statewide election referendum questions in support of the freeze.
6. Create a citizens' group to take petitions, resolutions, and other expressions of support for a freeze to discuss with your Representative, Senators, and Governor. Learn their opinions and work for their support and endorsement of the freeze.

☐ Yes, I endorse the Call for a US-Soviet Nuclear-Weapon Freeze.

☐ I also support the United States' taking one or more of the independent initiatives to start a movement toward a Freeze.

☐ You may use my name in printing and publicizing the Freeze and/or the initiatives as listed above.

Please sendadditional copies of the Call. Cost: 10¢ each / 50 or more 8¢ each, plus postage.

Name Congressperson or District

Address

City, State, Zip

Organization and Title, if any

Please clip and mail to: Fellowship of Reconciliation, Box 271, Nyack, NY 10960—914/358-4601