Our standard of review of a district court's ruling on a motion pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) depends on the nature of the final judgment and the specific basis of the Rule 60(b) motion. See In re Marriage of Barnes, 251 Mont. 334, 336, 825 P.2d 201, 203 (1992) ("The scope of our review of a decision to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion depends on the issues involved."). As a general rule, the district court's ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Heller v. Gremaux, 2002 MT 199, ¶ 7, 311 Mont. 178, 53 P.3d 1259; Hall v. Heckerman, 2000 MT 300, ¶ 12, 302 Mont. 345, 15 P.3d 869. But where, for instance, the movant sought relief under subsection (2) of Rule 60(b) based on newly discovered evidence, we have stated that we will review the district court's ruling for manifest abuse of discretion. See Fjelstad v. State, Through Dept. of Highways, 267 Mont. 211, 220, 883 P.2d 106, 111 (1994). By contrast, where the movant sought relief under subsection (4) of Rule 60(b) on the ground that the judgment is void, the standard of review is de novo, since the determination that a judgment is or is not void is a conclusion of law. Essex Ins. Co. v. Moose's Saloon, Inc., 2007 MT 202, ¶ 16, 338 Mont. 423, 428-29, 166 P.3d 451, 455-56; see also Hicklin v. CSC Logic, Inc., 283 Mont. 298, 301, 940 P.2d 447, 449 (1997).
Another exception to the general rule applies in cases where the movant sought relief from a default judgment. There are two standards of review with respect to such motions. Lords v. Newman, 212 Mont. 359, 363, 688 P.2d 290, 293 (1984). When a trial court has granted a motion to set aside the default and opened up the action for a trial on the merits, the court's ruling "will only be set aside upon a showing of manifest abuse"; but when the trial court has denied a motion to set aside the default, "no great abuse of discretion need be shown to warrant reversal" (i.e., "only 'slight abuse' is sufficient to reverse an order refusing to set aside a default"). Lords, 212 Mont. at 363-64, 688 P.2d at 293; Matthews v. Don K Chevrolet, 2005 MT 164, ¶ 9, 327 Mont. 456, 115 P.3d 201; Empire Lath & Plaster v. American Cas., 256 Mont. 413, 416, 847 P.2d 276, 278 (1993); Blume v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 242 Mont. 465, 467, 791 P.2d 784, 785 (1990); cf. Skogen v. Murray, 2007 MT 104, P11, 337 Mont. 139, P11, 157 P.3d 1143, P11; Karlen v. Evans, 276 Mont. 181, 185, 915 P.2d 232, 235 (1996). Essex Ins. Co., ¶ 17.
The denial of a motion for relief under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Essex Ins. Co., ¶ 16.
This Court reviews a district court's denial of a M. R. Civ. P. 59(g) motion to amend for abuse of discretion. Lee v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2001 MT 59, P 27, 304 Mont. 356, P 27, 22 P.3d 631, P 27 (citation omitted); see also Stockman Bank of Mont. v. Mon-Kota, Inc., 2008 MT 74, ¶ 12, 342 Mont. 115, 122, 180 P.3d 1125, 1130.
The reopening of a case for the introduction of further evidence after it has been closed is within the discretion of the trial court. Its ruling upon the request to reopen will not be disturbed by the appellate court, unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Stavenjord v. Mont. St. Fund, 2003 MT 67, P 19, 314 Mont. 466, P 19, 67 P.3d 229, P 19 (citation and quotation omitted); see also Pinnacle Gas Res., Inc. v. Diamond Cross Props., LLC, 2009 MT 12, ¶ 17, 349 Mont. 17, 22, 201 P.3d 160, 164.