2026 MT 193
McNain Holdings LP v. Wilderness Pres. U.S. LP
Substantial credible evidence supported awarding contract damages for loss of future use of real estate although the damages included loss of use that occurred after the breaching party sold the real estate to a third party.
In August 2015, Homeowners executed identical purchase agreements with Wilderness for fractional interests in a three-bedroom villa at a resort owned by Wilderness. The fractional interests entitled Homeowners to stay at the resort for four weeks per year. The purchase agreements provided Homeowners’ interest would be transferred to a four-bedroom villa once it was constructed and Homeowners would not pay any resort fees until their interests were transferred.
The parties performed in accordance with the purchase agreements until Spring 2023 when Ehlert, Wilderness’s managing partner and part owner, suspended Homeowners from using the resort until they paid the resort fees even though Wilderness had not transferred their interests to a four-bedroom villa. In December 2023, Wilderness sold the resort to Escalante Golf, with Ehlert receiving partial ownership of Escalante.
In September 2023, Homeowners sued Wilderness for breach of contract. The District Court concluded on summary judgment that Wilderness breached the contracts. It then held a trial on damages. The jury awarded $250,000 in contract damages, accounting for approximately 4 years of lost use. The court denied Wilderness’s Rule 59 motion to alter/amend the verdict, concluding that substantial credible evidence supported the verdict.
The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Wilderness’s argument that the evidence did not support awarding Homeowners more than 3 weeks of lost use because Wilderness did not and could not exclude Homeowners from the resort after it sold the resort to Escalante. A jury could find a continuing loss attributable to Wilderness because substantial credible evidence demonstrated Homeowners intended to use the interests into the future, Ehlert remained involved with the resort, certain aspects of the resort’s operations did not change, and neither Ehlert, Wilderness Club or Escalante contacted Homeowners to reschedule their reservations after Escalante’s acquisition.
Points of Interest: contracts, damages, sufficiency of evidence
2026 MT 187
Sufficient evidence exists to convict a defendant of deliberate homicide under the felony-murder rule by accountability for the underlying felony where a reasonable jury could find, from the defendant’s continued presence, participation, and concerted action, that the defendant is legally liable for the acts of another.
Sterling allegedly shot and killed Isaac. Prior to the killing, Sterling and Burghduff exchanged text messages vaguely discussing hurting someone. They met at a bar, brought guns, left their phones behind, drove approximately three hours, filled a gas can, and parked on a street near Isaac’s apartment. Allegedly, while Burghduff remained in the car, Sterling entered Isaac’s apartment, set it on fire, and then shot Isaac in the head, killing him. Later, Burghduff voluntarily admitted to an investigator that he met Sterling at a bar and they brought guns, drove three hours to Isaac’s apartment, filled a gas can along the way, and Burghduff waited in the car while Sterling went inside. Burghduff also admitted that he knew Sterling intended to confront Isaac over a custody dispute involving a child. The State charged Burghduff with deliberate homicide under the felony-murder rule, alleging that he was legally accountable for the underlying forcible felony of assault with a weapon. After conviction, Burghduff challenged the sufficiency of the evidence.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Supreme Court affirmed. The State offered sufficient evidence for a jury to find Burghduff legally liable for Sterling’s assault of Isaac with a weapon. A reasonable jury could infer that Burghduff’s continued presence and participation assisted Sterling and that Burghduff and Sterling acted in concert. Although mere presence is generally insufficient to establish criminal liability, a reasonable jury could find that Burghduff’s conduct went far beyond mere presence.
Points of Interest: accountability, sufficiency of evidence, criminal law
2026 MT 176
A person must have a superior or exclusive legal right over a vehicle to impose a duty of care under the theory of negligent entrustment. A person does not owe a duty of care to refrain from texting unless they know or have reason to know that the text will distract a driver.
Michael Howell was driving when he lost control of his vehicle, killing Janice Graham. Michael’s blood tested around three times the legal limit for marijuana. Michael and his wife Victoria were texting each other immediately prior to the crash. Victoria did not know Michael was under the influence of marijuana when he left their home prior to the crash. She also believed Michael was a safe driver and had never seen him use his phone while driving.
Graham’s estate sued Victoria for negligent entrustment and negligence. The District Court granted summary judgment in Victoria’s favor, determining no duty arose under either of the Estate’s theories.
The Supreme Court affirmed. To “entrust” a vehicle, a person must have more than physical control over the vehicle. A superior or exclusive legal right is a precondition for imposing a duty of care not to entrust. Because Michael and Victoria co-owned the subject vehicle, Victoria did not have superior control. No duty arose under the theory of negligent entrustment.
A duty to refrain from texting arises when the sender knows or has reason to know that the text will distract that driver and cause them to drive negligently. Since Victoria did not know that Michael was intoxicated and had never seen him use his phone while driving, she did not know or have a reason to know that her text message would distract him and thus did not have a duty to refrain from texting Michael, even though she knew he was driving.
Points of Interest: torts, duty, foreseeability
2026 MT 175
Although District Court erred by improperly finding an implied easement without analyzing each parcel's distinct title chain or limiting scope to historical use, the error was mitigated by the court’s subsequent leave to amend, which led to the parties fully adjudicating the claim.
Brock and the Tompkins disputed access rights over Forgotten Lane, a roadway crossing the Tompkins’ property in Ravalli County that connects to two parcels owned by Brock. Originally pleading only an express easement, Brock later amended her complaint to add implied, public, and prescriptive easement theories. Following a bench trial, the District Court ruled that Brock proved an implied easement by preexisting use across the entire corridor and entered a permanent injunction in her favor.
The Supreme Court reversed the implied-easement judgment. The District Court erred by failing to separately analyze whether all elements of an implied easement, including continuous use, reasonable necessity, and intent at severance, were proven by clear and convincing evidence for each individual parcel under its unique title chain. Additionally, the court erred by expanding the easement’s scope to match a later survey rather than limiting it to historical use at the time of severance.
Because Brock received a full trial on the implied-easement theory, that claim fails permanently and does not return on remand. However, because the trial court improperly dismissed Brock's alternative public and prescriptive-easement claims, the Tompkins’ trespass counterclaim, and extinguishment issues as moot, those dismissals were vacated and the case remanded for the District Court to identify live claims, preserve jury-trial rights, and properly recalculate costs and attorney fees after a final judgment.
Points of Interest: easements and roads, amended pleadings, dismissal
2026 MT 169
Statements made in a SANE Report are evidence compiled as part of an investigation in anticipation of future litigation and thus do not meet the statements made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis exception to hearsay. Further, SANE Reports are testimonial in nature and should not be sent to jury deliberations.
Veltkamp was charged with incest after J.V., his teenaged daughter, disclosed the abuse to her mother in a series of text messages. A Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner examined J.V. and compiled a SANE Report. At trial, the State introduced the SANE Report through the examiner under the medical diagnosis exception to hearsay. A detective who witnessed the SANE exam also testified to the exam. J.V. and her mother also testified. Forensic evidence found J.V.’s menstrual blood on Veltkamp’s penis and Veltkamp’s sperm on J.V.’s bedsheet. J.V.’s texts to her mother were introduced. The court submitted the SANE report to the jury for viewing during deliberations. The jury convicted Veltkamp on two counts of incest.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Although the District Court erred in admitting the SANE report under the medical diagnosis exception to hearsay, the error was harmless because J.V. testified and was cross-examined; the SANE report contents were properly admitted through the detective as a prior inconsistent statement of J.V.; and J.V.’s testimony and the forensic evidence proved cumulative of the facts contained in the SANE Report. The District Court also abused its discretion in allowing the jury to view the SANE Report during deliberations, but this error was harmless because the data in the SANE report was limited in scope, thus avoiding the risk of undue emphasis by the jury on the SANE Report.
Points of Interest: sexual offenses, hearsay, harmless error
2026 MT 168
Summary judgment against the non-movant was proper where the M. R. Civ. P. 56 record evidence could not reasonably support a finding of extinguishment by abandonment.
Vicevich and Kultgen share a property boundary in the Keck Acres subdivision. Kultgen’s deed refers to a recorded plat that depicts and describes a road easement through Vicevich’s property for Kultgen’s access to his lot. Vicevich constructed a fence across the easement and along the shared property line, completely blocking access. Vicevich then sued for extinguishment on two theories: an easement agreement among other subdivision landowners extinguished the platted easement or Kultgen intentionally abandoned it. Kultgen counter-sued for easement existence, non-extinguishment, and removal of the obstructing fence. The District Court granted Kultgen summary judgment on all claims.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed after de novo review of the entire Rule 56 record. First, the deed and reference to the recorded subdivision plat where the easement was depicted and described created an express easement in Kultgen’s favor. Then, under Pearson v. Virginia City Ranches Ass’n, 2000 MT 12, ¶¶ 57-58, 298 Mont. 52, 993 P.2d 688, the easement agreement could not extinguish Kultgen’s express easement without his consent. Third, the Rule 56 record evidence, even viewed most favorably for Vicevich, could not support a reasonable inference that Vicevich established abandonment by clear and convincing evidence and therefore only one conclusion could be had: Vicevich’s extinguishment claim failed. Finally, Vicevich’s Rule 56 admissions established that his fencing was within the easement and obstructing Kultgen’s access. It therefore had to be removed so that Kultgen could access his property.
Points of Interest: civil procedure, summary judgment, property
2026 MT 167
Trial court did not err in denying motion to dismiss one count of sexual assault where the victim had difficulty remembering the details of one of the three charged incidents to the same extent as she was able to recall the other two because the jury has the authority to evaluate witness credibility and weigh the evidence.
In 2020, S.M. disclosed to her school counselor that she had been sexually assaulted by Morrissey in the past. In a later forensic interview, S.M. described three insistences of sexual assault by Morrissey. Morrissey was charged with three counts of sexual assault.
At a jury trial S.M. gave detailed testimony on counts III and II. However, when asked about count I, S.M. had difficulty remembering that incident but testified she remembered “a dirty feeling.” Further, she testified that she was standing during that incident and stated that Morrissey’s hand went to “the same spot.” Later, counsel for the defense questioned S.M. on her statements about counts I and II. He clarified with S.M. that Morrissey’s had touched her vagina in count II and that in count I, she remembered “some sort of contact with the same area[.]” Morrissey moved to dismiss. Ultimately, the jury convicted Morrissey of all three counts of sexual assault.
On appeal, Morrissey argued that the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss count I because the jury had insufficient evidence to convict him. The Court determined that the trial testimony and other evidence offered at trial, combined with the jury’s authority to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence, was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.
Points of Interest: sexual offenses, sufficiency of evidence, jury
2026 MT 166
Insufficient evidence existed to support a misdemeanor criminal mischief conviction when a defendant spit in an officer’s car but caused no damage.
After Martinez was arrested, he was placed in the back of a patrol car where he proceeded to spit throughout the interior of the car. When the officer returned to the car, he briefly cleaned up the spit in the front of the car and drove Martinez to the detention center. After dropping Martinez off, he spent a bit more time cleaning the back seat. The State charged Martinez with criminal mischief under § 45-6-101(1)(a), MCA, for injuring, damaging, or destroying the vehicle due to his spit. Martinez was convicted at trial.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the misdemeanor criminal mischief conviction and remanded for judgment of acquittal. Neither the value nor the usefulness of the officer’s vehicle was diminished by the spit; it merely necessitated a brief cleanup. Because the spit did not constitute “damage” and caused no pecuniary loss, no rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of criminal mischief beyond a reasonable doubt and insufficient evidence existed to support the conviction.
Points of Interest: sufficiency of evidence, criminal law
2026 MT 165
The State, as the alleged tortfeasor, should not have been allowed to proceed in interpleader in an attempt to cap its liability.
A state employee was involved in a traffic accident which killed both himself and Haley Wilson. Thomas Wilson, Haley’s husband, filed claims for survivorship and wrongful death on behalf of Haley’s Estate and a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of J.M.W., their minor child, with the Department of Administration. The State sought to settle all claims for $750,000, the “per claim” limit under the Tort Claims Act. When Thomas rejected the settlement offer, the State filed a petition for interpleader in the District Court, seeking the court’s permission to deposit $750,000 and be discharged from any and all further liability to both Haley’s Estate and J.M.W. Thomas, on behalf of both parties, opposed the petition and sought a declaration the $750,000 cap was unconstitutional. After briefing and a hearing, the District Court issued a summary judgment order which granted the State’s petition and further determined the $750,000 cap was constitutional.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. Interpleader may not be used by an alleged tortfeasor to cap its liability. The State was wrongly using the device to cap its liability as it admitted it only sought to interplead the $750,000 “for purposes of resolving this issue” and would challenge what happened in the accident if not given a release of liability. In addition, Haley’s Estate and J.M.W. were not parties adverse to one another, which is a prerequisite for allowing interpleader.
Points of Interest: torts, interpleader, civil procedure
2026 MT 164
A street light maintained by a city could be considered as part of a plaintiff’s premises-liability theory because the city owes pedestrians a duty of ordinary care to maintain the crosswalk and it was foreseeable that pedestrians could be harmed by inadequate lighting.
Sara Da’ was hit by a car while walking across an intersection in Bozeman. The intersection lacked painted markings, had inadequate signage, and the streetlight over it was inoperative. Sara Da’ brought premises liability claims against Bozeman, the driver, and the utility company which owned the streetlight. Bozeman moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Public Duty Doctrine did not apply to a premises liability claim. The District Court denied the motion, but agreed with Bozeman’s public duty argument. The matter proceeded to trial with Sara Da’ barred from presenting expert testimony on a link between Bozeman’s inoperable streetlight and the accident. The jury returned a verdict of $1.6 million in damages, distributing 35% of comparative fault to Sara Da’.
The Supreme Court reversed. The District Court erred by concluding that an inoperable streetlight could not be considered as part of a premises-liability theory against Bozeman because a pedestrian using an unlit crosswalk at night was foreseeably exposed to an increased risk of being struck by a motor vehicle. Because Bozeman owed a duty of care to maintain the crosswalk, it was foreseeable that inadequate lighting could cause harm to pedestrians, and the scope of Sara Da’’s evidence regarding Bozeman’s duty to maintain proper lighting of the intersection should not have been limited.
Points of Interest: duty, torts, foreseeability
2026 MT 158
Exigent circumstances justified officers’ forced entry into an apartment where a 911 caller indicated that Defendant had locked himself inside with his partner’s infant, two witnesses disclosed they heard shouting from inside the unit, and Defendant behaved in a bizarre and erratic manner when conversing with officers prior to retreating into his apartment unit.
A frantic woman called 9-1-1, stating that her partner, Friscia, had locked her out of the apartment with her baby inside with him. When police arrived at the apartment complex, they spoke with a neighbor and Friscia’s brother, who both disclosed that shouting had been coming from Friscia’s unit. The police entered a door which opened to an interior staircase leading up to Friscia’s unit door. The police then spoke with Friscia through the unit door. Friscia displayed erratic behaviors including opening and closing the door several times and telling the police that he had a right to defend himself from people who came into his house. The police perceived Friscia’s statements as a threat and went back outside. Friscia then came downstairs and stood by the outer door. However, he retreated back through the door upon the officers’ approach. Officers then broke down the door, tazed Friscia, and took him into custody. Friscia was charged with destruction of a communication device and threats against an officer pursuant to § 45-7-102(1)(a)(i), MCA. Friscia entered a plea agreement. Later, he appealed his conviction, arguing that the officers entrance into his stairwell amounted to a warrantless search for which no warrant exception existed. Further, he argued on appeal that § 45-7-102(1)(a)(i), MCA, was facially unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court affirmed. It concluded exigent circumstances justified the officers’ entry into Friscia’s apartment. Furthermore, Friscia’s facial challenge amounted to an as-applied challenge which Friscia had not preserved at the District Court.
Points of Interest: searches, exigency, unpreserved issues
2026 MT 151
Trial court properly excluded testimony regarding undisclosed mental health records as a sanction for discovery abuse regarding the disclosure of those records.
In a contentious parenting plan case, the parties stipulated that Mother’s mental health providers “shall share all records” with the court-appointed parenting plan evaluator. The parties’ stipulation was adopted as an order of the District Court. Despite the stipulation, Mother’s therapist refused to provide Mother’s records to the parenting plan evaluator. Mother knew of the refusal bud did not supplement discovery. At the final parenting plan hearing, Mother’s counsel informed the court that the grounds for not producing the records was simply because the therapist “was not going to produce those records.” The District Court found the refusal to provide the records was intentional, prejudicial, and in violation of both the discovery rules and the court’s own order. As a sanction, the therapist was not allowed to testify about any treatment provided or records created after the date of the parenting plan evaluator’s report.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. Mother’s discovery violation was intentional and caused prejudice to Father. The District Court’s sanction was appropriate as it was tailored to the precise period of non-disclosure and preserved the remainder of the therapist’s testimony.
Points of Interest: discovery, sanctions, parenting plan
2026 MT 150
The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony on non-accidental trauma because the testimony was based on reliable “differential diagnosis” process which ruled out competing causes of an infant’s severe injuries. A warrant to search “all data” on a cell phone was an illegal general warrant but constituted harmless error and a prosecutor’s unobjected-to character comments during closing did not merit plain error review given the substantial evidence admitted at trial.
Proctor was charged with assault on a minor after her infant presented with numerous severe injuries. Proctor unsuccessfully moved to suppress the fruits of a warrant to search “all data” on her phone, which included photos showing bruising on the baby’s face, text messages to her husband, searches for defense attorneys, and social media activity. Proctor also moved to exclude expert testimony related to shaken baby syndrome, a controversial diagnosis based on a triad of brain swelling, brain bleeding, and retinal hemorrhages without a reliable biomechanical foundation. The District Court determined that the baby’s symptoms were broader than the SBS triad and the doctors had diagnosed the baby with non-accidental trauma through the reliable differential diagnosis process. At trial, the prosecutor contrasted her own good character with Proctor’s seemingly bad character. The jury convicted Proctor.
The Supreme Court affirmed. First, the admission of expert testimony regarding non-accidental trauma is distinguishable from shaken baby syndrome because the infant’s injuries exceeded the SBS triad and the non-accidental trauma diagnosis resulted from the reliable differential diagnosis method. The warrant to search Proctor’s phone was impermissibly overbroad but this constituted harmless error standard because cumulative, properly admitted evidence proved the same facts. Finally, the prosecutor’s misconduct, in the context of the evidence and trial, did not merit plain error review.
Points of Interest: experts, evidence, search warrant
2026 MT 147
Burton v. Flathead Conservation Dist.
Conservation District acted within its jurisdiction in denying application to dredge a pond and channel where the project fell within the administrative prohibition on dredging in-stream ponds.
Burtons applied to the Flathead Conservation District for approval of a project on their property located on the banks of the Flathead River. The Application sought approval to dredge a pond and a channel connecting the pond to the river. After a site visit, the FCD denied the application, concluding the preposed dredging did not fit the stated purpose of protecting a pole barn from seasonal flooding. Burtons filed a petition for judicial review and declaratory judgment in the district court, where they argued the FCD decision was contrary to the facts, beyond the FCD’s jurisdiction, and not in accordance with law. Burtons further argued that the FCD had failed to provide suitable reasoning for denying the application. The District Court concluded the FCD had jurisdiction over the application and the pond and granted summary judgment in its favor, concluding that the preposed dredging would alter a natural perineal flowing spring because the pond was an “in stream pond” which connected to the river by means of the channel.
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the District Court. It determined that the administrative rules’ prohibition on dredging an in-stream pond applied here, even though the pond and channel did not fit perfectly within the rule. As such, the Court concluded that the FCD acted within its jurisdiction when it denied Burtons’ application. Even if the FCD’s denial of the application was technically insufficient, any deficiency amounted to harmless error.
Points of Interest: natural resources, administrative rules, harmless error
2026 MT 146
District Court correctly awarded damages under the Montana Residential Landlord Tenant Act, and damages arising from fraud and deceit and slander of title, where evicted tenants attempted to force an estate to sell real property to them via a forged option to purchase allegedly signed by the decedent, and where the tenants attempted to leverage a better bargaining position by grossly overinflating the value of personal property they left upon vacating the property.
The Kahles lived on Tosch’s property for four years. After Tosch’s death, her Estate terminated the Kahles’ residential lease. The Kahles produced a copy of a lease with option to purchase purportedly signed by the decedent. The Estate renewed its eviction. Overwhelming evidence showed the option was a forgery: the Kahles made statements inconsistent with having an option to purchase, the option would result in a loss to the Estate, and the Kahles only had a copy of the option, not an original. Critically, the option to purchase contained two different file types, which is impossible in an authentic document. The Kahles vacated the home under court order and left personal property behind, which they retrieved months later. The Kahles grossly inflated the value of their abandoned personal property to leverage a better bargaining position. After trial, the District Court concluded that the Kahles committed actual fraud, were liable for compensatory damages for deceit and slander of title and under the Montana Residential Landlord Tenant Act, and the option to purchase was void.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Estate established by clear and convincing evidence that the lease with option to purchase was a forgery. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding damages for lost opportunity to sell under more favorable market conditions, insurance, property taxes, and mortgage payments, and damages under the MRLTA. The Kahles statutorily abandoned their personal property and were not entitled to damages. The District Court had the legal authority to award attorney fees arising from the Kahles’ slander of title and under the MRLTA.
Points of Interest: damages, attorney fees, MRLTA
2026 MT 145
A Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on attorney misconduct requires a movant to be blameless as to the circumstances underlying a judgment, not merely blameless as to the attorney’s alleged misconduct or gross neglect.
Taralyn and Dean DeCock executed a marital and property settlement agreement (MPSA) following mediation in their dissolution proceeding. Dean’s financial disclosures, provided to Taralyn’s counsel before mediation and available at mediation, identified his retirement assets. The MPSA listed those accounts, stated all assets had been disclosed, and provided the division was fair and equitable. Taralyn later moved to rescind the MPSA, alleging her attorney failed to inform her of Dean’s retirement assets and the resulting distribution was unconscionable. The District Court denied rescission. Months later, Taralyn executed a joint affidavit affirming the MPSA was fair, equitable, and not unconscionable and requesting its incorporation into the final decree. After entry of the decree, Taralyn sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief based on her former counsel’s alleged gross neglect.
The Supreme Court affirmed the deemed denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Taralyn’s Rule 60 motion relied on the same facts and theory underlying her earlier rescission motion—that her attorney’s conduct left her unaware of Dean’s retirement assets and resulted in an unconscionable agreement. Merely reframing counsel’s alleged failure as “gross neglect” did not establish a new injury, factual basis, or post-judgment circumstance warranting extraordinary relief. Taralyn also could not establish blamelessness because, with full knowledge of Dean’s assets, she subsequently attested under oath the MPSA was fair and equitable and expressly requested its incorporation into the decree. Thus, Rule 60(b)(6) could not relieve her from the judgment she knowingly sought.
Points of Interest: Rule 60, attorney misconduct, remedies
2026 MT 144
Because an amendment to a long-term lease, which provided for the removal of certain terms in the original lease, was ambiguous as to the breadth of the removal, the District Court did not err in considering extrinsic evidence in interpreting the lease.
The Slaters leased a portion of their land to DeRogo under a long-term lease. Section 5 of the lease contained two paragraphs, the first beginning “5. Option to Purchase,” and allowing DeRogo to purchase his leased portion if allowed under subdivision laws, and the second paragraph allowing DeRogo to purchase a percentage interest in tenancy in common if, after 20 years, he was unable to purchase the leased portion. In 2018, DeRogo sold his rights under the lease to the Britts. Transfer was formalized by a Second Amendment, which amended several provisions of the original lease and included language stating “Paragraph 5. ‘Option to purchase’ is hereby removed.” The Second Amendment also stated the Britts had “paid in full” for the tract. The parent tract was later sold to the Tumas. The Tumas, who did not obtain independent legal counsel prior to closing, believed the “option to purchase/tenancy-in-common provision” had been terminated by the Second Amendment. The Tumas eventually filed suit against the Britts. The Britts were granted summary judgment on their counterclaim because the District Court found the “Paragraph 5. ‘Option to purchase’ is hereby removed” language of the Second Amendment ambiguous and consulted extrinsic evidence showing the parties did not intend to remove the tenancy-in-common option from the original lease.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Second Amendment did not unambiguously remove the entirety of Section 5 of the original lease because the language could be read as either removing all of section 5 or only removing the first paragraph. Because the language was ambiguous, it was proper to consider extrinsic evidence which showed the contracting parties and their attorney all intended to only remove the “option to purchase” language and maintain the tenancy-in-common option, for which the Britts had already “paid in full.”
Points of Interest: contracts, extrinsic evidence, property
2026 MT 143
Mazurek hearing properly denied where Defendant offered no evidence the victim had prior false allegations of rape, but probation condition barring contact with minors was unwarranted where the conviction did not involve minors and the PSE did not indicate defendant was a danger to minors.
Morris rented a room in an apartment occupied by BB, her husband, and their two children. While alone with BB, Morris had intercourse with her despite her protestations. BB later told her ex-husband, her husband, and reported the incident to the police. Morris contends he went to sleep in his own bed and woke to find BB having intercourse with him. Morris was convicted of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent and Solicitation of Tampering with Physical Evidence.
Before trial, the State sought to exclude evidence of BB’s prior sexual history under Montana’s rape shield statute. Morris sought a Mazurek hearing, alleging BB made prior false allegations of rape. The court refused the hearing because Morris did not present evidence of the prior false allegation. During trial, the State offered several texts between BB and Morris mentioning BB previously experienced rape. Morris argued this opened the door to evidence of her prior sexual history. The court disagreed. Morris later attempted to introduce evidence BB and her ex-husband were unfaithful to each other during their marriage. The court excluded the evidence as a discovery sanction due to lack of prior disclosure. After trial, the court imposed several probation conditions limiting Morris’ contact with minors.
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the rulings on rape shield evidence. The Mazurek hearing denial was proper because Morris presented no evidence indicating BB made a prior false allegation of rape, the evidence of BB’s sexual history was barred by Montana’s rape shield statute, and the discovery sanction was proper because Morris failed to disclose it. However, the Court vacated the probation conditions involving Morris’s contact with minors because the conviction did not involve minors and the psychosexual evaluation did not indicate Morris is a threat to minors.
Points of Interest: sexual offenses, rape shield law, evidence
2026 MT 142
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on lack of objection to State’s statistical expert testimony about the victimization process was better suited for postconviction proceedings. Actual vindictiveness did not cause Defendant’s increased sentence after retrial before new judge.
After the Montana Supreme Court reversed Twardoski’s first conviction for various sex offenses, the case was retried before a different judge. The State prosecuted Twardoski under the same theory and offered evidence similar to the first trial. Twardoski claimed the complaining witness fabricated the allegations against him by drawing from a different person’s abusive conduct. Defense counsel did not object to the State’s expert testimony that children who are victims of abuse are 47% more likely to be abused a second time than children without abuse histories. The second jury convicted Twardoski of all charges.
The District Court imposed a sentence similar to the first, but added a 25-year parole restriction. The court expressed concern that Twardoski would circumvent a treatment-based parole restriction, and explained that the severity of the offenses, the lifetime victim impact, his denial of responsibility, and his stated intent to not engage in treatment justified the sentence. The court also commented that 24 people had found Twardoski guilty after hearing conflicting versions of events.
On appeal, Twardoski claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on the lack of objection to the 47% statistic. He also argued his increased sentence resulted from judicial vindictiveness, which violated his due process rights.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The IAC claim was more appropriate for postconviction proceedings, as the 47% statistic was not clearly inadmissible and the record did not indicate why counsel did not object. The presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because Twardoski was resentenced by a different judge upon retrial. Twardoski failed to prove the increased sentence was motivated by actual vindictiveness. The “twenty-four people” comments were insufficient to demonstrate the court impermissibly relied on the unconstitutional first verdict or Twardoski’s successful appeal, as it provided ample justification for a 25-year parole restriction.
Points of Interest: ineffective assistance of counsel, sentencing, retrial
2026 MT 136
In re Estate of Pfeifer-Murphy
Idaho judgment against Montana general partnership was void for lack of personal jurisdiction where partner had no authority to bind partnership.
Cook and Reynolds formed a Montana general partnership to operate agricultural land in Chouteau County. Reynolds was the managing partner and held all decision-making authority regarding the land. Cook and Reynolds later conveyed their respective property interests to the Partnership. Afterward, Cook purported to pledge the proceeds from selling land in Chouteau County to repay funds borrowed from the Estate of Pfeifer-Murphy, of which his wife, Karin, was the personal representative. In 2020, Karin admitted to misappropriating Estate funds between 2007 and 2019. Karin and Cook confessed to judgment in the Estate’s favor, and Cook purported to bind the Partnership as a judgment debtor and to submit to the Idaho Court’s personal jurisdiction.
The Estate filed a copy of the Idaho judgment in Montana District Court in 2020 and attempted to execute it against the Partnership in December 2024. The Partnership, through Reynolds, asked the District Court to vacate the Idaho Judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction, among other grounds. The Estate argued that the Partnership, through Cook, had consented to personal jurisdiction and that the Partnership’s challenge was late. The motion to vacate was deemed denied, and the Partnership appealed.
The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the portion of the domesticated Idaho judgment holding the Partnership liable to the Estate. Cook did not act within the ordinary course of the Partnership’s agricultural business by borrowing money from the Estate, and he did not participate in the Idaho probate proceedings to protect the Partnership. Cook did not have actual authority to submit to personal jurisdiction on the Partnership’s behalf, because Reynolds did not provide prior permission or subsequently ratify his conduct. Reynolds filed her Rule 60(b)(4) motion within a reasonable time, because there was no evidence that the four-year delay prejudiced the Estate and Reynolds was unaware of the Idaho judgment before the Estate attempted to execute it against the Partnership.
Points of Interest: partnerships, personal jurisdiction, business law
2026 MT 135
Where District Court conducted ability-to-pay analysis consistent with Gibbons, the case was remanded for reanalysis in light of Cole overruling Gibbons.
Hagberg was convicted for his fourth DUI pursuant to § 61‑8‑1008, MCA (2021). The District Court imposed the minimum $5,000 fine required, conducted an analysis of Hagberg’s ability to pay, and suspended half of the fine according to its findings. Hagberg challenged the $5,000 minimum fine required by § 61-8-1008, MCA (2021), because a nearly identical statute was found to be facially unconstitutional in State v. Gibbons, 2024 MT 63, 416 Mont. 1, 545 P.3d 686.
The Supreme Court held Hagberg’s argument was resolved by the recent decision in State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52, ¶ 21, 427 Mont. 64, 585 P.3d 955, which overruled Gibbons. The Court vacated the portion of the Judgment pertaining to the fine and remanded to the District Court to make appropriate findings of Hagberg’s ability to pay because that court’s analysis of Hagberg’s ability to pay was undertaken prior to Cole. Therefore, the parties’ arguments and the court’s findings could differ in light of Cole.
Points of Interest: sentencing, fines and surcharges, ability to pay
2026 MT 134
Proposed citizen initiative was invalid because if it became law, the Board of County Commissioners would not have statutory authority to implement or enforce it.
Under § 7-5-131, MCA, Edlund submitted a petition for a county election on a proposed citizen initiative. The initiative was a proposed ordinance that would create a land-use and permitting scheme regulating wind energy systems in Treasure County. At the County’s request, the District Court determined the ordinance was invalid under § 7-5-135, MCA, because it was beyond the Board of County Commissioners’ “legislative jurisdiction and power.”
The Supreme Court affirmed. Although Title 7, chapter 5, MCA, grants boards of county commissioners general governing authority, Title 76, chapter 2, MCA, specifically prescribes their authority in matters of land use and zoning regulations. Those specific powers control over the general powers. Because Title 76, chapter 2, parts 1 and 2, MCA, specifically provide for county- and citizen-initiated land use and zoning regulations, to be “valid” under § 7-5-135, MCA, and within the county’s “legislative jurisdiction and power” under § 7-5-131, MCA, any proposed ordinance purporting to regulate in those areas must be valid and enforceable by the county under part 1 or 2. Edlund’s proposed ordinance conflicted with numerous parts 1 and 2 provisions and therefore, if it became law, it would not be within the Board of County Commissioners’ power and authority to implement and enforce. The proposed ordinance was thus invalid under § 7-5-135, MCA, and could not be put before county voters for approval.
Points of Interest: ballot initiatives, ordinances, land use
2026 MT 133
The Department’s obligation to make reasonable efforts under § 41-3-423(1), MCA (2023), requires proactive assistance; however, a parent’s reluctance or inability to acknowledge substance abuse and engage in offered treatment does not establish a failure of reasonable efforts.
M.F. was removed from Mother’s care for the fourth time in October 2023 following concerns regarding substance abuse, unsafe individuals in the home, and educational neglect. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC, while M.F.’s hair follicle test was positive for methamphetamine. The Department developed a voluntary task plan, arranged evaluations and drug testing, provided visitation, pursued kinship placements, and referred Mother to treatment providers. Despite four chemical-dependency evaluations recommending treatment, Mother repeatedly declined inpatient placements, disengaged from outpatient treatment, inconsistently tested, and disputed positive drug tests. Mother eventually completed inpatient treatment after the Department petitioned for termination but was observed drinking alcohol within two weeks of discharge and failed to follow through with recommended outpatient services. The District Court terminated Mother’s parental rights.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The 2023 amendments to § 41-3-423(1), MCA, more specifically define the Department’s reasonable efforts obligations but do not make reasonable efforts a separate statutory element of termination under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA; inadequate efforts may nevertheless bear on whether the condition rendering a parent unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The Department satisfied its obligations through comprehensive assessment, referrals and active assistance obtaining treatment, kinship searches, visitation, transportation assistance, and continued monitoring. A trial home visit was not required because Mother had not addressed the conditions making her unsafe to parent. The District Court appropriately considered guardianship but reasonably concluded termination and adoption better served M.F.’s need for safety and permanency.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, reasonable efforts, parental rights
2026 MT 132
O’Brien v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue
Montana Department of Revenue was required to use the income approach to value the taxpayers’ property where information taxpayers provided satisfied the “sufficient, relevant information on income” standard of § 15-8-111(5), MCA.
On informal review of a property tax appraisal, MDOR switched from an income-based to cost-based approach to valuing taxpayers’ commercial condominium units. Taxpayers appealed to the county tax appeal board. There, MDOR claimed it lacked “sufficient, relevant information on income" to value the units under the income approach required by § 15-8-111(5), MCA, and therefore switched to the cost approach. CTAB disagreed, deciding the taxpayers provided income information—including rents for their units and the nearly-identical office building next door—sufficient to meet the -111(5) standard. After CTAB adopted the taxpayers’ income-based valuation, MDOR appealed to the Montana Tax Appeal Board, which reversed CTAB and adopted MDOR’s cost-based valuation. The district court affirmed MTAB on judicial review.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that MDOR’s and MTAB’s reading of § 15-8-111(5), MCA, as requiring income information sufficient to build a mass appraisal model for that property type was erroneous because it went beyond the statute’s plain language. Moreover, MDOR’s claims that the taxpayers’ appraisal was not performed by a certified appraiser, employed a flawed methodology, or resulted in an appraisal value below market was immaterial to the threshold “sufficient, relevant information on income” inquiry. MDOR could not reject taxpayers’ income information for any of these reasons under the plain language of § 15-8-111(5), MCA. Because substantial record evidence and comparable to rents charged at the adjacent offices supported the taxpayers’ income information, it satisfied the § 15-8-111(5), MCA, standard and MDOR had to value the taxpayers’ condos under the income approach. MTAB thus misapprehended the effect of substantial record evidence and misinterpreted § 15-8-111(5), MCA when it reversed CTAB’s decision.
Points of Interest: tax law, administrative law, administrative appeals
2026 MT 131
District Court did not err in declining to use randomized selection of substitute judges as enacted in SB 41 because the Montana Supreme Court created a substitution rule within its Constitutional authority to do so.
In 2025 the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 41, which required the Office of the Court Administrator to establish a procedure for randomized selection of substitute judges by October 1, 2025. SB 41 further mandated that OCA’s procedure be provided to all district court judges by October 15, 2025.
On August 6, 2025, Williams filed an action in the First Judicial District alleging the Governor unconstitutionally appointed a sitting legislator as Director of the Department of Commerce. On October 17, 2025 Judge Best of the Eighth Judicial District assumed jurisdiction after every judge in the First Judicial District had either been substituted or declined jurisdiction. On November 7, 2025 the Governor moved to return the case to the First Judicial District for reassignment pursuant to SB 41. On November 17, 2025, Judge Best denied the motion, treating § 3-1-804, MCA, the Court’s codified substitution rule, as the operative procedure.
The Governor argued SB 41 controlled and an August 28, 2025 memorandum proposal from the Chief Justice and OCA set forth an actionable procedure. The Supreme Court disagreed; the Constitution vests the Montana Supreme Court with the authority to make rules governing practice and procedure for district courts. Here, the Governor did not identify an order or rule by the Court to alter its existing substitution rule as codified in § 3-1-804, MCA.
Points of Interest: substitution, administrative rules, rulemaking
2026 MT 130
District Court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted Defendant’s niece to testify about prior acts of abuse, even though they occurred decades earlier, because the testimony was highly probative of Defendant’s motive, intent, and common plan and to rebut his defense that his victim’s memory was false.
After Adams’s adopted daughter R.A. disclosed that Adams molested her from ages 4 to 9, the State charged Adams with incest and sexual intercourse without consent. During its investigation, the State discovered Adams also adopted his biological niece A.P. during his previous marriage. When contacted, A.P. disclosed Adams molested her approximately 30 years earlier.
The District Court denied Adams’s motion to exclude A.P.’s testimony under Rule 403. At trial, A.P. and R.A. testified that Adams had forced them to perform similar sexual acts and had groomed them using similar techniques. Adams denied the allegations and claimed that R.A.’s memory was false. The jury found Adams guilty on all counts.
On appeal, Adams argued that the trial court erred by permitting A.P. to testify. Adams argued that A.P.’s testimony had limited probative value because her abuse occurred decades before trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, explaining that whether remoteness diminishes evidence’s probative value depends on the purpose for which the evidence is offered. A.P.’s testimony was highly probative of Adams’s motive, intent, and common plan to abuse his adopted daughters and tended to disprove Adams’s defense that R.A.’s memory was false. Although child sex abuse evidence is inherently prejudicial, the court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that A.P.’s testimony did not pose significant risk of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed its probative value.
Adams also claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to request a limiting instruction before A.P. testified, in addition to the instruction given at the end of trial. The Court concluded the record did not support Adams’s argument that he was prejudiced by counsel’s omission.
Points of Interest: Rule 403, witnesses, ineffective assistance of counsel
2026 MT 129
Under Montana’s criminal restitution statutes, even though the dog-wash machine Peterson damaged was used, substantial evidence supported the District Court’s determination that the full replacement cost for that dog-wash machine was the equivalent of a new machine.
Peterson and her boyfriend used a prybar and sledgehammer to break into a dog-wash machine at a car wash. In doing so, they severely damaged the machine’s door and electronics, rendering it largely inoperable. The District Court sentenced Peterson to pay restitution of $21,050—the cost of a new dog-wash machine, as substantiated by the car wash owner. She challenged the amount on appeal as excessive.
The Supreme Court affirmed. A victim may recover as a pecuniary loss the “full replacement cost of property . . . destroyed . . . or otherwise devalued as a result of the offender’s conduct . . . .” § 46-18-243(1)(b), MCA. In contrast to those pecuniary losses available under § 46-18-243(1)(a), MCA, the plain language of § 46-18-243(1)(b), MCA, supports full replacement cost. The victim testified to his unsuccessful efforts at repair and said the machine still was inoperable 60-70 percent of the time. Peterson did not provide evidence rebutting the victim’s affidavit and testimony that the only available replacement for the damaged machine was a new machine. The District Court therefore did not err in relying on the victim’s testimony and affidavit as substantial evidence supporting the court’s findings. Although Peterson further argued that the victim failed to mitigate his damages, despite spending dozens of hours ordering replacement parts and troubleshooting those parts, the Court held the District Court’s finding that the victim’s mitigation efforts were reasonable was supported by substantial evidence.
Points of Interest: restitution, sufficiency of evidence, sentencing
2026 MT 126
Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen
An Attorney General’s revision of a proposed ballot statement is not constrained to a point-by-point curing of each identified deficiency, but the revised statement must comply with § 13-27-212, MCA, and may not include language that would mislead voters.
Proponent TEI asked the Montana Supreme Court to declare the Attorney General’s ballot statement for CI-135 violated § 13-27-212, MCA. TEI alleged the AG should have limited his revision of TEI’s statement to curing deficiencies, and that his revised statement was inaccurate, argumentative, and prejudicial. It asked the Court to alter TEI’s proposed statement, and certify it for inclusion on the ballot.
The Court rejected TEI’s contention that the AG’s revision is constrained to curing deficiencies. Once the AG determines a proponent’s ballot statement does not comply with § 13-27-212, MCA, the AG must prepare a compliant statement as provided by § 13-27-226(3)(c), MCA. The AG is not required to connect each revision with a specific deficiency. The Court also disagreed that explaining CI-135 as a “prohibiting” certain expenditures rather than as “specif[ying] the scope” of permissible expenditures was objectionable because either framework accurately characterizes the initiative’s effects. Furthermore, the AG’s decision to incorporate the definition of “political spending power” was not misleading. TEI did not point out any crucial detail the AG omitted in favor of including the definition within the word limit. The Court also disagreed that the AG’s statement was misleading by using “contribution” and “revoking.” Although “contribution” is a campaign finance term of art, the context reflected its ordinary meaning that a layperson would understand. The AG’s statement that violating CI-135 would “result[] in revoking the artificial person’s legal status” was not misleading because that is effectively what CI-135 would do.
However, the AG’s statement failed to comply with § 13-27-212(1), MCA, in stating artificial persons “would not have any other powers under the Montana Constitution” because this would mislead voters into believing CI-135 revoked constitutional rights. Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Court removed the objectionable sentence and certified the revised statement.
Points of Interest: ballot initiatives, Attorney General
2026 MT 125
Right of foster parents to appear in child welfare proceeding does not make them parties; absent abandonment, they may not intervene. Further, foster parents who are not biological or adoptive parents or stepparents are not “parents” entitled to placement and dismissal under § 41-3-438(3)(d), MCA.
The Department became involved with R.J.F. shortly after his 2016 birth. It initially terminated Mother’s parental rights, but the Supreme Court reversed for failure to provide reasonable reunification efforts. Mother thereafter completed her treatment plan and agreed to a parenting plan with R.J.F.’s foster parents before the Department dismissed the case. In 2023, following Mother’s relapse, the Department again removed R.J.F. Mother subsequently completed all treatment-plan tasks, maintained sobriety, and met the conditions for reunification. The foster parents nevertheless moved for sole custody and dismissal under § 41-3-438(3)(d), MCA, asserting they were noncustodial, nonoffending parents based on the prior parenting plan. The District Court granted their motion and dismissed the child welfare proceeding.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The foster parents were not parties and could not intervene because Mother had not abandoned R.J.F.; merely listing them as “Legal Mother” and “Legal Father” in the Department’s petition did not confer party status. Nor had the prior parenting plan adjudicated them a parental interest being that no petition sought such an interest, no court made the required statutory findings, and § 40-4-228, MCA, precluded establishing a nonparent parental interest while the earlier Title 41 proceeding remained pending. Because the foster parents were not “parents” under Title 41, the District Court erred by granting them custody and dismissing under § 41-3-438(3)(d), MCA. The Court ordered the foster parents’ motion stricken and the proceeding dismissed based on Mother’s successful completion of her treatment plan, satisfaction of the conditions for return, and demonstrated fitness to parent. Any dispute concerning the prior parenting plan must be resolved separately under Title 40.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, foster placement, intervention
2026 MT 124
District Court erred in granting summary judgment on the theory that a law firm’s negligence in failing to appeal an adverse ruling was harmless because the appeal would have been unsuccessful since the litigant’s allegations of negligence also encompassed allegations of pre-appeal conduct that were factually disputed.
Bellamah retained attorneys at Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind to represent him in divorce proceedings, including the negotiation and drafting of a marital property settlement agreement. After a court denied a motion to enforce the MPSA, Bellamah’s attorneys filed a “Motion to Reconsider.” The motion was deemed denied, but Bellamah was not informed of the denial until after the deadline to appeal had passed. Bellamah then sued for legal malpractice, broadly alleging DML breached its duty to him by failing to use reasonable care and skill in its representation. The complaint referenced DML’s failure to appeal and included specific allegations regarding DML’s failure to revise certain language in the MPSA, its failure to correctly advise Bellamah as to certain terms in the MPSA, and its inadequate filings. Bellamah expanded on these claims in discovery, asserting DML inadequately captioned its motions, failed to present certain evidence and testimony, and failed to represent his interests in drafting the MPSA.
DML moved for summary judgment, arguing Bellamah would not have succeeded on appeal and thus, he could not establish causation as necessary for his legal malpractice claim. The District Court agreed. Citing Richards, the court concluded the only negligent conduct alleged was DML’s failure to appeal, and since DML established that appealing the deemed denial would not have resulted in a favorable outcome for Bellamah, DML was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court reversed, determining DML’s malpractice claim was not based solely on the failure to appeal but instead encompassed a broader scope of pre-appeal negligent conduct. Because genuine issues of material fact existed as to the pre-appeal negligent conduct, summary judgment was improper.
Points of Interest: negligence, legal malpractice, summary judgment
2026 MT 121
A bare or equivocal assertion of possible Indian ancestry generally does not create a reason to know a child is an Indian child.
In February 2023, the Department filed petitions regarding Mother’s three children, L.C., X.P., and N.C. The Department had information from a prior case indicating X.P.’s father, M.P., may have Blackfeet affiliation, so it requested verification from the Blackfeet Tribe and sent the Tribe notice identifying X.P., Mother, and M.P. The Tribe responded that X.P. was neither enrolled nor enrollable. Although the Department had no reason to know L.C. or N.C. were Indian children, it also sought verification as to them, and the Tribe responded that neither was a member. The verification requests for L.C. and N.C., however, misspelled their putative father D.A.’s last name, an error the Department later disclosed to the District Court. Throughout the proceedings, the court repeatedly found the Department had made diligent efforts to determine ICWA’s applicability and directed the parties to provide any new information bearing on the children’s Indian status. Mother did not object, provide additional information suggesting the children were Indian children, or challenge the Department’s investigation until appealing the eventual termination of her parental rights.
The Supreme Court affirmed. As to X.P., the Department’s efforts were diligent because it investigated the information suggesting Blackfeet affiliation, completed the appropriate ICWA forms, requested tribal verification, and provided the Tribe with M.P.’s identifying information. The Tribe’s determination that X.P. was not enrolled or enrollable—which the Tribe never revised after receiving additional information—was conclusive as to X.P.’s status. The Department had no reason to know L.C. or N.C. were Indian children, and the misspelling of D.A.’s name did not require further investigation because D.A.’s biological paternity had never been established and there was no evidence D.A. had tribal affiliation. Mother waived the issue by failing to object and acquiescing in the Department’s efforts throughout the proceedings.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, ICWA/MICWA, active efforts
2026 MT 119
The parties’ Buy-Sell Agreement, with its Amendment for seller financing, was a valid contract notwithstanding their failure to agree on final terms in the contract for deed.
Under a Buy-Sell Agreement, Melbys planned to purchase Doerings’ property, Marshall Mountain, through conventional financing. Unable to obtain conventional financing, Doerings and Melbys entered an Amendment, agreeing to seller financing, with final terms to be memorialized in a Contract for Deed. The Amendment incorporated all terms from the Buy-Sell, provided general terms for the Contract for Deed, and provided that “[f]inal contract for deed to be mutually agreed upon by both parties.”
Negotiations deteriorated and Doerings canceled the sale. When Melbys sought to enforce the Buy-Sell, Doerings contended it was not a legally binding contract because the Amendment contained a condition precedent to formation and the Contract for Deed contained additional material terms, to which the parties had not mutually agreed. Melbys sued Doerings for specific performance. The District Court ruled that the Buy-Sell and Amendment, together, constituted an enforceable contract that Doerings breached by failing to close, damaging Melbys.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. “Final contract for deed to be mutually agreed upon by both parties” was not a clear and unambiguous condition precedent to contract formation. The Buy-Sell contained contradictory terms, including those expressly providing that it constituted a legally binding contract. Furthermore, all other contract contingencies were condition precedents to performance and the above language was, at most, a condition precedent to performance. The parties had agreed on all material terms for the sale of Marshall Mountain despite the differences between conventional and seller financing. The Amendment’s general terms were sufficient to bind the parties and the additional terms mostly went to performance. Additionally, the Doerings sought to introduce a new term—a public access provision—that conflicted with the incorporated terms of the Buy-Sell, was an atypical term for Contract for Deed, and clearly was not contemplated by the parties.
Points of Interest: contracts,property
2026 MT 118
A district court does not err by excluding possible sources of age-inappropriate knowledge in a sexual abuse trial when the court balances the defendant’s constitutional trial rights with Montana’s rape shield statute and other rules of evidence.
The State charged Olson with sexual assault and incest against his minor daughter. During an interview with investigators, the daughter described age-inappropriate knowledge. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude claims that the daughter saw pornography on her brother’s phone and claims of inappropriate prepubescent touching between the daughter and brother. The State argued such evidence was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative. Olson argued that his defense theory relied on other sources of the daughter’s age-inappropriate knowledge. The District Court considered Montana’s rape shield statute, rules of evidence, and Olson’s constitutional rights to present a defense, and determined that the evidence of pornography on the brother’s phone would be admissible if the daughter testified that she had access to the phone, viewed adult content on the phone, and admitted that viewing such content influenced her sexual knowledge. Additionally, the District Court determined that the sibling touching allegations lacked factual similarities to the age-inappropriate knowledge that the daughter described and accordingly were excluded unless the daughter provided a further nexus at trial.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The District Court appropriately balanced Olson’s constitutional rights with evidentiary rules and Montana’s rape shield statute. The evidence Olson wished to admit never moved beyond conjecture and lacked sufficient connection to the daughter’s age-inappropriate knowledge. The trial court left the door open for the proffered evidence to become admissible if further relevance and nexus were developed at trial. The District Court here did not abuse its desertion with these evidentiary rulings.
Points of Interest: sexual offenses, Rule 404, rape shield law
2026 MT 117
District Court erred in issuing a three-year order of protection that named Appellant’s children as protected minors where it did not make the requisite child-specific findings and did not explain why Appellee’s requested remedy of supervised visitation would be insufficient to protect the children.
Helt sought a permanent order of protection for herself and requested that Guess have supervised visitation of their shared children. At hearing, Helt testified that Guess had threatened to take one child from her, had held a plastic bag up to the older child, and drove unsafely with the children in the vehicle. She also testified that Guess’s behavior towards Helt caused the children mental and emotional harm, but she did not testify that the children had been abused, witnessed abuse, or lived in an abusive environment. The District Court declined to issue a permanent order of protection but left a temporary order of protection in place. The court further advised Guess that he could have supervised contact with the children while a separate parenting plan action proceeded.
Two months after the hearing, Helt submitted notice that Guess had been arrested and charged with stalking while an order of protection was in place. Five days later, without holding another hearing, the court entered a three-year order of protection, naming the children as protected minors. The court stated that its order rested on the hearing alone, but it did not explain why the requested remedy of supervised visitation was inappropriate.
The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that § 40-14-204(4), MCA, only allows an order of protection to restrain contact with a child if a court finds the child was a victim of abuse, witnessed abuse, or were endangered by an abusive environment. Here, the District Court did not make the requisite child-specific findings and it did not explain why Helt’s requested remedy of supervised visitation would be insufficient. Because the court did not tailor its order to the protective purposes of a proceeding under Title 40, Chapter 15, the court exceeded its statutory authority.
Points of Interest: orders of protection, remedies, family law
2026 MT 116
Mont. Acad. of Salons v. Mont. Bd. of Barbers & Cosmetologists
The Board of Barbers does not have authority to graft additional requirements onto the “unprofessional conduct” statute in order to impose license discipline.
MAS is a cosmetology school licensed by the Board of Barbers and Cosmetologists. In 2012, it hired a massage therapy instructor, who students later accused of inappropriate conduct and sexual harassment. MAS investigated the allegations, but in a limited manner which sought to determine whether the allegations needed to be reported for Title IX purposes, not to determine whether the conduct occurred. MAS’s investigations generally did not comply with its own policies and procedures regarding investigating and writing reports related to sexual misconduct allegations. In 2016, MAS fired the instructor for unprofessional conduct and violations of ethical standards. In 2020, the Board charged MAS with unprofessional conduct for failing to meet generally accepted standards of practice when responding to the students’ allegations. After a four-day hearing, the Hearing Officer recommended dismissal of the case, determining the Board failed to meet its burden of demonstrating unprofessional conduct. The Board rejected the Hearing Officer’s recommendation, determined MAS failing to follow its own policies was unprofessional conduct, and imposed license discipline. The District Court affirmed the Board’s order.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The statute upon which the Board relied when imposing discipline defined unprofessional conduct as “conduct that does not meet the generally accepted standards of practice.” The Hearing Officer heard expert testimony on this point during the four-day hearing and determined the testimony reflected best practices and not “generally accepted standards of practice” for a salon school responding to sexual harassment claims. The Court determined Board’s rejection of that finding and requiring strict adherence to a school’s own internal policies grafted additional requirements onto the “unprofessional conduct” statute, which the Board lacked authority to do.
Points of Interest: administrative law, administrative appeals, statutory interpretation
2026 MT 115
A criminally convicted youth was denied the opportunity for a meaningful sentence review hearing where the court failed to note the CCYA applicability in the judgment and the defendant was consequently denied the benefit of the requisite periodic status reports and participation in rehabilitation programs and services.
Pehringer was convicted of a felony which he committed while a minor. The District Court’s judgment failed to reflect that he was a criminally convicted youth under the Criminally Convicted Youth Act or contain any of the relevant provisions applicable under the CCYA. Those provisions, in part, provided that the DOC was required to submit status reports detailing Pehringer’s progress towards rehabilitation every six months and that the District Court was required to hold a sentence review hearing before he turned 21. After he turned 21, and having received no DOC status reports during the years he was incarcerated, Pehringer filed for a CCYA sentence review hearing. The District Court set a sentence review hearing. After the hearing, the District Court determined Pehringer had not been substantially rehabilitated and was not entitled to a sentence reduction.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Pehringer was denied the rehabilitative provisions of the CCYA through no fault of his own when the District Court failed to incorporate the CCYA provisions into its judgment and the DOC did not provide the required status reports. Because of these failures, Pehringer did not receive the rehabilitative benefits expressly provided for by the CCYA and the Youth Court Act. Because he did not receive the benefit of periodic status reports and participation in rehabilitative programs or services, Pehringer was denied the opportunity for a meaningful sentence review hearing. The Court remanded the matter to allow the DOC and District Court to apply the rehabilitative CCYA provisions to Pehringer for a period of two years prior to conducting a new CCYA sentence review hearing.
Points of Interest: Youth Court, sentence review, rehabilitation
2026 MT 114
A criminally convicted youth was denied the opportunity for a meaningful sentence review hearing where the court failed to note the CCYA applicability in the judgment and the defendant was consequently denied the benefit of the requisite periodic status reports and participation in rehabilitation programs and services.
Pehringer was convicted in District Court of felonies which he committed while a minor. The judgments failed to reflect that he was a criminally convicted youth under the Criminally Convicted Youth Act or contain any of the relevant provisions applicable under the CCYA. Those provisions, in relevant part, provided that the DOC was required to submit status reports detailing Pehringer’s progress towards rehabilitation every six months and the District Court was required to hold a sentence review hearing before he turned 21. After he turned 21, and having received no DOC status reports during the years he was incarcerated, Pehringer filed for a CCYA sentence review hearing. The District Court set a sentence review hearing and ordered the DOC to submit a status report. After the hearing, the District Court determined Pehringer had not been substantially rehabilitated and was not entitled to a sentence reduction.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Pehringer was denied the rehabilitative provisions of the CCYA through no fault of his own when the District Court failed to incorporate the CCYA provisions into its judgments and the DOC did not provide the required status reports. Because of these failures, Pehringer did not receive the rehabilitative benefits expressly provided for by the CCYA and the Youth Court Act. Because he did not receive the benefit of periodic status reports and participation in rehabilitative programs or services, Pehringer was denied the opportunity for a meaningful sentence review hearing. The Court remanded the matter to allow the DOC and District Court to apply the rehabilitative CCYA provisions to Pehringer for a period of two years prior to conducting a new CCYA sentence review hearing.
Points of Interest: Youth Court, sentence review, rehabilitation
2026 MT 113
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied admission of evidence of the victim’s alleged internet history involving unconventional sex acts where Defendant was accused of PFMA (strangulation) because the evidence had minimal, if any, relevance and risked unfair prejudice.
Belcourt was convicted of strangulation of a partner or family member, unlawful restraint, and resisting arrest stemming from a three-day incident of escalating domestic violence. A neighbor called the police, who found Belcourt with a bloody hand and the victim, R.A., with cuts and injuries to her face and neck. R.A. reported that Belcourt had strangled her twice, once causing her to lose consciousness, and had hit and kneed her multiple times. R.A. attempted to escape several times, but was either prevented by Belcourt or returned to care for the couple’s young child. Before trial, Belcourt moved to admit evidence of R.A.’s alleged internet history indicating interests in nonconventional sex acts to support his defense theory that R.A. consented to being strangled. The District Court denied the motion but ruled that Belcourt could cross-examine R.A. on whether she ever consented to being choked.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Evidence must be relevant to be admissible and even if evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or other considerations. Here, R.A.’s internet history did not indicate an interest in being choked, only other non-conventional sex acts and therefore had minimal relevancy, if any. This evidence also risked unfairly prejudicing R.A.’s testimony and confusing the issues as it would be used to disparage the victim and put her on trial. The relevant acts at issue were whether Belcourt purposely or knowingly impeded R.A.’s breathing or blood circulation, not R.A.’s alleged interests in nonconventional sex acts.
Points of Interest: evidence, PFMA, Rule 404
2026 MT 112
Bradley v. Yellowstone Trails Ranch Owners’ Ass’n
Defendant’s appearance triggered Rule 55(b)(2)’s seven-day notice requirement and the trial court’s failure to wait seven days before ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment rendered the judgment premature and voidable.
Bradleys own a lot in the Yellowstone Trails Ranch subdivision that is designated as agricultural. YTROA opposed the Bradleys’ request to change the designation to residential. The Bradleys sued YTROA, and YTROA agreed to waive and acknowledge service of the complaint. The Bradleys’ attorney prepared the following acknowledgment of service: “Defendant hereby enters its voluntary appearance in this action, and consents to the jurisdiction of the Court.” The Bradleys’ attorney filed YTROA’s signed acknowledgment.
YTROA failed to timely answer the complaint, and the clerk entered YTROA’s default. The Bradleys moved for a default judgment and served their motion on YTROA. The court granted the motion the next day. YTROA promptly retained counsel and moved to set aside the judgment because it was entitled to relief under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) or, alternatively, because was not given proper notice of the Bradleys’ motion for default judgment. The court granted YTROA’s motion under Rule 60(b)(1).
Although the Bradleys argued on appeal that the court erroneously applied Rule 60(b)(1), the Supreme Court affirmed the court’s ruling setting aside the judgment on YTROA’s alternate argument. Rule 55(b)(2) entitles litigants who have appeared to seven days’ notice of a party’s motion for default judgment. Because YTROA’s acknowledgment of service provided that YTROA entered its “voluntary appearance” in the case, this unique language constituted an appearance under Montana law. The District Court failed to observe Rule 55(b)(2)’s seven-day notice requirement when it granted the Bradleys’ motion for default judgment the day after they filed it. The Court concluded that the district court’s premature entry of default judgment, in combination with other relevant factors, justified setting the judgment aside.
Points of Interest: zoning, civil procedure, Rule 55(b)(2)
2026 MT 111
District court erroneously classified decedent’s uncashed $80,000 cashier’s check, made out to himself from a savings account which the owned, as wife’s property because the court erroneously concluded the cashier’s check was meant to be an inter vivos gift to decedent’s wife.
About a month before his death, decedent withdrew $80,000 from a savings account associated with his business, and upon which his wife was an authorized signer, and purchased an $80,000 cashier’s check, payable to decedent, that he never cashed. When settling the decedent’s estate, his wife discovered the withdrawal and learned from the bank that the decedent had purchased a cashier’s check that had not been cashed. She then obtained a new check that she deposited into her personal account. Decedent’s son challenged the wife’s action. The district court determined that the $80,000 belonged to the wife because the cashier’s check was meant as an inter vivos gift to her and that it was a negotiable instrument which the wife could enforce under §§ 30-3-104(7), -210(1), and -301, MCA.
The Supreme Court reversed. Decedent’s wife testified that the decedent did not give her the money, she did not know why he withdrew $80,000, and she did not know what happened to the money. This testimony established that she did not know of, receive, possess, or control the cashier’s check during the decedent’s lifetime and therefore it could not be a completed inter vivos gift. Second, the wife was only an authorized signer on the account, not an owner, and the cashier’s check was not payable to, delivered to, or endorsed to her. The $80,000 was therefore not her property.
Points of Interest: estate law, inter vivos, property
2026 MT 109
MacLaurin v. Fischer Law, PLLC
District Court correctly dismissed legal malpractice claim for advice that allegedly extinguished certain property rights because the property rights at issue had been extinguished years earlier.
MacLaurin, Mary, and Wardwell owned real property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. In 1987, MacLaurin and Wardwell conveyed a life estate to Mary for the remainder of her life that granted her “the full use, control, income, possession, enjoyment and occupancy” of the property. Wardwell died during Mary’s lifetime. Upon Fischer’s legal advice in 2020, MacLaurin conveyed his interest in the Property to a trust. After Mary died, her estate claimed a 50% interest in the Property.
MacLaurin sued Fischer for legal malpractice, alleging that Fischer’s legal advice caused him to sever the joint tenancy and extinguish his right of survivorship. Fischer moved to dismiss, arguing that MacLaurin failed to plead a viable malpractice claim because he could not establish causation given that the joint tenancy was severed in 1987 when MacLaurin and Wardwell conveyed a life estate to Mary. The District Court dismissed the case, reasoning that MacLaurin could not establish causation because the joint tenancy was severed in 1987.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The District Court correctly applied the four unities approach established in Ballard v. Barrett. When MacLaurin and Wardell conveyed a life estate to Mary, they destroyed the unity of interest and severed the joint tenancy because the conveyance converted MacLaurin’s and Wardwell’s present possessory interest into a reversionary interest while Mary enjoyed a present possessory interest. The District Court did not err by declining to ascertain whether the parties intended to sever the joint tenancy pursuant to In re Estate of Rickner because conveying a life estate to Mary fundamentally changed the type of interest that each joint tenant held in the Property.
Points of Interest: legal malpractice, property, joint tenancy
2026 MT 108
District court did not violate federal or state law in awarding wife marital-home equity where husband’s veterans’ disability benefits payments were used to pay the home mortgage.
In a default dissolution proceeding, the District Court awarded $100,000 equity from the sale proceeds of the parties’ marital home to the wife. Husband argued that the award was improper because he paid the home’s mortgage payments with his veterans’ disability benefits, which cannot be divided as marital property under 10 U.S.C. § 1408, 38 U.S.C. § 5301, and Montana case law applying those federal provisions.
The Supreme Court held on appeal that, although a veterans’ disability benefits payments cannot be distributed as marital property, once those funds are converted to permanent investments, such as a marital home, the benefits lose their protected status. Thus, property purchased with those benefits may be equitably distributed as part of the marital estate. Because the court distributed the marital home and equity upon sale, and not the veterans’ benefits monies, the equity award was lawful.
Points of Interest: dissolution, marital estate, equity
2026 MT 107
Where a mandatory minimum fine is imposed pursuant to either subsection (1) or (3) of § 61-8-731, MCA (2019), the court must conduct an ability-to-pay analysis under § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019), and suspend any portion of the fine which the defendant lacks the ability to pay.
Spang challenged the $5,000 minimum fine required by § 61-8-731, MCA (2019) for his fifth DUI conviction because that statute was found to be facially unconstitutional in State v. Gibbons, 2024 MT 63, 416 Mont. 1, 545 P.3d 686 due to its conflicting nature with the ability to pay analysis required by § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019). The District Court did not specify which subsection of § 61-8-731, MCA (2019), Spang was sentenced under, and the parties disagreed as to whether Gibbons applied if Spang was sentenced under a different subsection than the one at issue in Gibbons.
The Supreme Court found Spang’s argument to be resolved by State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52, ¶ 5, 427 Mont. 64, 585 P.3d 955, which overruled Gibbons to the extent it held § 61-8-731(3), MCA (2019) was facially unconstitutional. The statute can be harmonized with an ability-to-pay analysis under § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019), through suspension of the portion of the fine the defendant lacks the ability to pay. Although Spang was sentenced under § 61‑8‑731(1), MCA (2019), the subsections are indistinguishable for the purpose of analyzing the defendant’s ability to pay under Cole.
Points of Interest: sentencing, fines and surcharges, ability to pay
2026 MT 106
For the purposes of § 46-15-322(5), MCA, a defendant fails to demonstrate a substantial need to access an original hard drive that is evidence of a crime when the defendant fails to present evidence that the cloned hard drive made available by the State was compromised or not identical to the original hard drive.
Smith was charged with sexual offenses in April 2017 based on media contained on a hard drive confiscated from his residence. The State offered Smith’s counsel an opportunity to analyze data contained on a cloned hard drive but did not permit Smith to analyze the data by accessing it from the original hard drive.
Smith moved to compel the State to allow his counsel to analyze the data using the original hard drive. The District Court denied Smith’s motion, reasoning that Smith did not establish a substantial need or undue hardship for the purposes of § 46-15-322(5), MCA. The court concluded Smith did not have a substantial need to analyze the original hard drive because the State offered to provide Smith a cloned hard drive that was a “perfect duplication of the [original] computer’s hard drive.” The court also concluded that the opportunity Smith was provided did not impose an undue hardship.
The Supreme Court concluded the District Court did not err by concluding that Smith did not demonstrate a substantial need. The State’s expert undisputedly testified that the cloned hard drive contained the same exact data as the original hard drive and Smtih failed to offer any evidence that indicated the cloned hard drive was compromised. The Court rejected Smith’s argument that the State should have offered him a second method to analyze the original hard drive because he did not establish the opportunity he was given imposed an undue hardship.
Points of Interest: discovery, criminal procedure, evidence
2026 MT 102
BMK Enters. v. Bailey Enters. of Mont., LLC
When contract language is ambiguous, courts must attempt to resolve the ambiguity by considering extrinsic evidence of intent before declaring the contract unenforceable.
Bailey Enterprises owned two adjacent properties that contained storage unit complexes: the Briar Property and the Bolinger Property. The Bolinger Property also contained several other commercial buildings and a residential home. In 2018, BMK purchased the Briar Property and requested the right of first refusal on the Bolinger Property in the event of future sale. Exhibit A to the parties’ Buy-Sell Agreement included the following provision: “Seller Grants Buyer the first right of refusal if Seller sells storage units at 151 Bolinger, Belgrade, Montana.” A few years later, Bailey sold the Bolinger Property to a third party without notifying BMK.
BMK sued for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Bailey moved for summary judgment, arguing that the provision was unenforceable. The District Court determined that the language was ambiguous because it was unclear whether the right of first refusal applied to the entire Bolinger Property or just a portion. The court declined to consider extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity. Because the provision failed to adequately describe the property to which it applied, the court ruled that the provision was unenforceable as a matter of law and granted summary judgment to Bailey.
The Supreme Court agreed that the right of first refusal provision was ambiguous. However, the District Court erroneously refused to consider extrinsic evidence. When faced with ambiguous contract language, courts must consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent to ascertain the contract’s meaning before declaring it unenforceable. Therefore summary judgment was premature.
Points of Interest: contracts, breach of contract, extrinsic evidence
2026 MT 101
District Court correctly denied juvenile defendant’s request to transfer criminal case to Youth Court because the interests of community protection and the seriousness of the offenses outweighed the best interest of the defendant.
After he was charged with six counts of sexual intercourse without consent and two counts of sexual abuse of children where the alleged acts were committed when he was 17 years old, Laman, then age 19, moved to transfer the prosecution to Youth Court. After hearing testimony about the allegations, expert testimony from mental health professionals who evaluated Laman, and a probation officer who testified about the difficulty in effectively supervising adults who were convicted of juvenile offenses in Youth Court, the District Court denied the transfer. It determined that Laman posed a moderate-high risk of reoffending, the offenses involved his predatory manipulation of victims during an 18-month period, and the juvenile probation office lacked the capacity to adequately supervise him. Laman then pled guilty to one count of SIWOC and one count of sexual abuse of children.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Under § 41-5-206(3), MCA, a juvenile defendant must show that a transfer to Youth Court would serve the interests of community protection, the serious nature of the offense does not warrant prosecution in a district court, and it would be in the best interests of the youth to be prosecuted in a youth court. The District Court properly weighed these factors and competing expert testimony regarding the best interests of Laman in determining Laman had not met the youth court transfer factors.
Points of Interest: Youth Court, sexual offenses, probation and parole
2026 MT 100
Victory Ins. Co. v. State Auditor
Commissioner properly awarded summary judgment where insurer failed to produce the requested records, and the record supported the agency’s decision to fine insurer the maximum permissible amount.
Pursuant to statutory authority, the Commissioner requested Victory’s managing general agent records in .csv format. Victory produced only some of the documents requested and in PDF format. The Commissioner initiated administrative action against Victory and moved for summary judgment. The Commissioner claimed Victory (1) refused to provide access to its records or, alternatively, (2) refused to provide access to its records in a usable format. The agency found Victory failed to provide its records in a usable format, awarded the Commissioner summary judgment, and fined Victory $25,000. The District Court affirmed the agency decision and upheld the fine because there was no dispute Victory failed to fulfill the records requests.
Victory appealed, arguing the District Court erroneously relied on the Commissioner’s alternative argument that Victory failed to produce the records requested. It also argued the agency incorrectly interpreted § 33-2-1602(4), MCA, to permit the Commissioner to specify what form of record is usable. The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. The plain language of § 33-2-1602(4), MCA, requires managing general agents to grant the Commissioner access in a “form usable to the commissioner.” Because Victory only produced a sample of the documents in PDF instead of .csv format, there was no genuine dispute of material fact that it violated § 33-2-1602(4), MCA. The Commissioner identified .csv as the “usable form,” “unless its native format is not conducive to a .csv file.” If Victory was not going to produce the records in the “usable form” the Commissioner identified, it was incumbent upon Victory to identify its “native format” and explain why this format was “not conducive to a .csv file.”
Victory also appealed the fine, claiming the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously because it imposed the maximum fine without providing adequate justification. Because the record showed that Victory deliberately frustrated the Commissioner’s investigation and misrepresented facts to the Hearing Examiner, the court upheld the fine.
Points of Interest: insurance, administrative law, statutory interpretation
2026 MT 96
When concurrent sentences merge, credit for incarceration and successful street time accrues against each sentence only from the date the sentences merge; a defendant is not entitled to credit on a later-imposed sentence for time served on an earlier sentence prior to merger.
Schmiedeke received a five-year suspended commitment for criminal endangerment in 2015. In 2017, she received a second five-year suspended commitment for issuing a bad check, ordered to run concurrently with the earlier sentence. The State subsequently sought several revocations of the concurrent sentences. During a 2019 revocation, Schmiedeke received 14 days of jail credit and five months of street time credit, the latter amount having been agreed upon by the parties. Following another revocation in 2023, the court awarded additional jail and street time credit. In 2024, the State sought a third revocation involving only the bad check sentence, and the District Court imposed a five-year unsuspended DOC commitment with additional jail and street time credit. Schmiedeke appealed, arguing she was entitled to an additional 12 days of jail credit she had served on the criminal endangerment charge before the bad check sentence was imposed and an additional three months of street time credit from the 2019 revocation.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Although Schmiedeke’s two sentences merged when the District Court ordered the 2017 sentence to run concurrently with the earlier sentence, the merger operated only from the date the concurrent sentence was pronounced. Thus, Schmiedeke was entitled to have subsequent incarceration and successful street time credit applied to both sentences, but she was not entitled to have the 12 days she served before the merger credited against the later bad check sentence. The Court also declined to consider Schmiedeke’s claim for three additional months of street time credit because Schmiedeke not only failed to object to the five-month street-time calculation in 2019 but expressly stipulated to it, therefore waiving the issue for appellate review.
Points of Interest: sentencing, credit for time served, elapsed time credit
2026 MT 95
A district court abuses its discretion by declaring a litigant vexatious and imposing a pre-filing restriction without first giving the litigant an opportunity to be heard, but it may deny a motion for disqualification as procedurally defective if the motion is not accompanied by an affidavit as required by § 3-1-805, MCA.
Heaven sued the Webers for tort, fraud, and breach of contract. The District Court entered judgment in favor of the Webers on all Heaven’s claims. Heaven filed numerous motions seeking to disqualify the presiding judge after the District Court denied his post-trial and judgment motions. The District Court deemed the motions to disqualify as procedurally defective because they were not accompanied by an affidavit as required by § 3-1-805, MCA. The District Court’s order denying Heaven’s motions to disqualify declared him a vexatious litigant and enjoined him from “fil[ing] any pleadings” without leave of the court.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that Heaven’s motions to disqualify were procedurally defective because they were not accompanied by an affidavit as required by § 3-1-805, MCA. The Court vacated the portion of the order declaring Heaven a vexatious litigant and imposing a pre-filing requirement because the District Court failed to comply with the test we established in Motta v. Granite Cnty. Cmm’rs. The District Court erred because the record did not demonstrate that it provided Heaven with an opportunity to be heard before it declared him a vexatious litigant and imposed the pre-filing restriction. The District Court also erred because it failed to support its order with an adequate analysis of the Motta factors given that the District Court summarily found the factors were satisfied.
Points of Interest: disqualification, vexatious litigation, due process
2026 MT 94
Because summary judgment requires courts to view evidence in light most favorable to the nonmoving party, District Court erred in making inferences in movant’s favor when granted summary judgment in favor of employer in a wrongful termination dispute.
DOC presented Pope a letter offering her a position as a Per Diem Registered Nurse that stated Pope would be subject to a six-month probationary period. Pope accepted the position, thereby becoming a Union member and privy to the Collective Bargaining Agreement with DOC. Approximately 5 months later, while Pope was working in the Per Diem Registered Nurse position, DOC presented Pope with a letter offering her a position as a Full-Time Registered Nurse. This letter also provided that Pope would be subject to a six-month probationary period. Pope again accepted the position, transitioning from one position to the other a few weeks later. DOC terminated Pope’s employment more than six months after she accepted the first position but less than six months after she accepted the second. Pope attempted to grieve the termination on the basis that DOC violated the CBA and she was no longer a probationary employee when DOC terminated her employment. DOC alleged Pope’s first position was a short-term position not subject to a probationary period—despite the language in the offer letter—under the CBA. In accordance with DOC’s claim, the Union did not allow Pope to pursue her grievance for wrongful termination under the CBA. Pope then filed a complaint in District Court, alleging wrongful termination and breach of the duty of fair representation by the Union. The court granted summary judgment in DOC’s favor.
On appeal, the Supreme Court found whether Pope was a probationary employee was a disputed material fact. The District Court made inferences in the DOC’s favor to conclude there were no disputed material facts, contrary to the summary judgment standard requiring courts to view evidence in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the District Court erroneously resolved the prerequisite issue of whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation in accordance with its erroneous resolution of the probationary status issue on summary judgment.
Points of Interest: summary judgment, wrongful discharge, disputed facts
2026 MT 93
Sentencing court abused its discretion in not considering the defendant’s mental condition at sentencing under §§ 46-14-311 and -312, MCA.
Myers-Starks’ counsel did not assert an intent to argue a mental-disease defense at trial, but reserved the right to amend the omnibus memorandum “once fitness has been determined.” Counsel never sought a fitness evaluation or raised the defense at trial. After Myers-Starks exhibited disturbing and disruptive trial behavior, counsel had him evaluated by a psychologist. The psychologist diagnosed Myers-Starks with schizophrenia and autism-spectrum disorder and opined that his mental condition rendered him unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law at the time of the offense. Based on the psychologist’s recommendation, defense counsel asked the court to consider alternate sentencing or postpone sentencing pending MDPHHS evaluation. The court agreed Myers-Starks had a mental illness but sentenced him to prison without considering §§ 46-14-311 and -312, MCA.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing a prison sentence without further analysis. When a defendant’s mental condition is put at issue at sentencing, a court must independently evaluate the defendant’s mental condition and show its deliberative process in considering alternate sentencing to MDPHHS custody for treatment in lieu of a sentence of incarceration. The issue of Myers-Starks’ mental condition was squarely before the sentencing court and the court abused its discretion in not considering the issue as required under §§ 46-14-311 and -312, MCA. The case was remanded for resentencing.
Points of Interest: sentencing, abuse of discretion, mental disease/defect
2026 MT 92
District Court did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior controlling acts involving the same victim in a domestic abuse situation because the prior acts showed Defendant’s motive of power and control over his girlfriend.
Mann and his girlfriend S.R. were engaged in an argument when Mann, weighing over 300 pounds, knocked S.R. down, put her in a chokehold, and placed a substantial amount of weight on her back. During trial, the District Court admitted evidence of prior controlling acts for the purpose of explaining Mann’s motive of power and control over S.R. and S.R.’s inconsistent statements and reluctance to report the incident to police. The court also allowed Mann’s recorded admission to strangling S.R.—which Mann argued occurred prior to the incident at hand—for the limited purpose of arguing it was an actual tentative admission to the incident charged rather than a past strangulation for propensity purposes. The jury found Mann guilty of Strangulation of a Partner or Family Member.
The Supreme Court upheld Mann’s conviction. The prior acts were admissible under the “motive” exception under M. R. Evid. 404(b) because they showed Mann’s motive of power and control over S.R. and were essential to explain S.R.’s behavior. The District Court properly balanced the probative value against prejudice by excluding highly prejudicial sexual assault evidence and allowing evidence of controlling behavior necessary to understand the relationship dynamics. Furthermore, Rule 404 was inapplicable to District Court’s decision to allow Mann’s recorded admission because the statement did not involve other crimes and was not used by the State for a propensity purpose.
Points of Interest: Rule 404, motive, prior bad acts
2026 MT 90
District Court abused its discretion in amending the parties’ parenting plan without an evidentiary hearing as required by § 40-4-220(1), MCA.
Mother filed a motion to amend her final parenting plan based on changed circumstances under § 40-4-219, MCA. Father agreed that changed circumstances warranted amendment, but disagreed that Mother’s proposed amendments were in the children’s best interests. The District Court set a briefing schedule and allowed supplemental filings. Each party supplied numerous affidavits, including from the children’s treatment providers. Mother’s and Father’s supporting affidavits conflicted regarding the children’s best interests. Taking up the issue, the District Court amended the parties’ parenting plan without an evidentiary hearing.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held this was error under § 40-4-220(1), MCA, which mandates setting a hearing on parenting plan amendment where either party establishes adequate cause. The District Court thus abused its discretion where cause for amendment existed, but the grounds remained highly contested, and by deciding parenting arrangements on competing affidavit assertions alone without live testimony. Compounding the error, the court also relied on the court-appointed counselor’s parenting assessments in its decision without holding a hearing where those assessments could be adversarially tested. Vacatur of the amended parenting plan in toto and remand for an evidentiary hearing was the correct remedy.
Points of Interest: parenting plan, remedies, abuse of discretion
2026 MT 89
District Court correctly denied summary judgment in negligence per se case when disputed facts preceding the collision rendered Plaintiff’s actions material in determining whether Defendant was negligent as a matter of law.
Murray and Steinmetz collided as Steinmetz slowly exited a parking lot to make a left turn onto a street which has a double centerline, indicating a no passing zone. Murray was operating a motorcycle and had passed several stopped vehicles that also obstructed Steinmetz’s sightline toward the direction from which Murray approached. Steinmetz swore to entering the intersection slowly, looking both left and right, and not seeing Murray until he collided with her van.
Murray moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Steinmetz was negligent as a matter of law because she did not yield the right-of-way as required by statute. The District Court denied Murray’s motion after finding several genuine issues of material fact. A jury ultimately found Murray 65% and Steinmetz 35% at fault for the collision.
The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that Steinmetz’s duty to yield required consideration of the relative positions of the vehicles and whether Murray maintained proper lookout and used reasonable care when driving through the congested intersection. Because the relative location of the vehicles prior to the collision, Murray’s speed and visibility, and the general nature of the intersection remained in dispute, summary judgment was inappropriate even when considering § 61-8-343, MCA.
Points of Interest: negligence, summary judgment, disputed facts
2026 MT 88
It was not prosecutorial misconduct to elicit impeachment evidence on direct examination, nor was it an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to permit the prosecutor’s questioning a witness about his prior inconsistent statements on direct examination.
Strobel was convicted of intimidation based on his threatening to “shoot up” the Helena pre-release center after he provided a positive urinalysis and the staff member administering the test informed Strobel he would report the positive UA to authorities. At trial, the staff member told the jury he was fearful of Strobel’s threat at the time. This testimony, however, contradicted the staff member’s prior statement to police the day after the incident that he was not fearful of Strobel’s threat. Aware of this impeaching fact, the prosecutor, on direct examination, elicited testimony from the staff member to explain his inconsistent statements.
Strobel claimed on appeal that it was prosecutorial misconduct to bolster the witness’s credibility by eliciting explanatory testimony on direct examination, thereby undermining the force of the impeachment evidence. Strobel also claimed the court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to preemptively address the impeachment evidence over his objections.
The Supreme Court disagreed. M. R. Evid. 607 allows any party to impeach the credibility of any witness, including the party that calls the witness. Even though the prosecutor’s preemptively addressing the witness’s inconsistent statements lessened the force of that impeachment evidence when Strobel got to it on cross-examination, the prosecutor’s conduct was not improper under the rules and the court did not abuse its broad discretion to control the presentation of evidence at trial.
Points of Interest: prosecutorial misconduct, Rule 607, bolstering
2026 MT 87
Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen
When determining if a proposed ballot initiative violates the separate-vote requirement, adding a new section to the Constitution does not count as a separate vote from the substance of the new material added, and defining the scope of the initiative’s reach does not require a separate vote from the substance of the initiative.
Ballot Initiative proponent TEI sought declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction, asking the Montana Supreme Court to declare the Attorney General erred in determining BI-9 was legally insufficient for violating the Montana Constitution’s separate-vote requirement. BI-9 would amend the Constitution to define “artificial person” in such a way as to prohibit corporations and other entities whose existence or limited liability shield is conferred by Montana law from exercising political spending power in Montana.
The Court rejected the AG’s position that adding a new section to the Constitution counted as a separate vote from the substance of the new matter. It further held that the inclusion of entities other than corporations did not require a separate vote from the application of the initiative to corporations because this merely defined the scope of BI-9’s intended reach. The Court also rejected the AG’s argument that BI-9 violated the separate-vote requirement because it would implicitly amend other constitutional provisions. Contrary to the AG’s position, BI-9 would not revoke any constitutional rights but would only redefine the powers of artificial persons. BI-9 would also not amend Article XIII, Section 1(1), of the Montana Constitution because corporate charters would still be granted, modified, or dissolved only pursuant to general law.
Points of Interest: ballot initiatives, Art. XIV(11)
2026 MT 86
MHSA must provide sufficient due process to students challenging adverse eligibility determinations by providing notice of the issues to be decided, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and a record and written decision sufficient to permit judicial review.
Hert, a high school basketball player, struggled with online schooling during the Covid pandemic, failing numerous classes during his sophomore year. He was declared academically ineligible to play basketball that season. He repeated his sophomore year and regained eligibility. Prior to his senior year, his fifth year of high school, the MHSA determined he was ineligible to compete under the Semester Rule. Hert appealed the decision to MHSA’s Executive Board, which unanimously voted to uphold the ineligibility determination but did not elaborate on their rationale. Hert sued, seeking a preliminary injunction to be allowed to play and a declaratory judgment that MHSA violated his right to due process. The District Court denied the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the basketball season ended and Hert graduated. Both parties then moved for summary judgment. The District Court determined the matter was moot because Hert had graduated and further found that students do not have a constitutional right to participate in extracurricular sports, ineligible students are not entitled to judicial review of the MHSA’s decision, and MHSA was not required to issue written findings related to its determination on a petition for waiver.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. The issue was not moot under the public interest exception as the issue presented—what due process a student challenging an MHSA decision is entitled—was an issue of public importance, was likely to recur, and an answer by the Court would guide public officers in the performance of their duties. Furthermore, when MHSA applies discretionary waiver criteria affecting a student’s constitutionally protected interest in participation in offered extracurricular activities, procedural due process requires, at minimum: (1) notice of the issues to be decided; (2) a meaningful opportunity to be heard; and (3) a record and written decision sufficient to permit judicial review.
Points of Interest: mootness, due process
2026 MT 84
District Court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing briefing on a speedy trial violation and when Defendant failed to preserve the claim prior to pleading guilty.
At Hill’s change-of-plea hearing, the District Court asked Hill if he had any concerns regarding his case. Hill responded that he believed he had a speedy trial violation and wanted to “keep that on the record.” Hill had not filed a speedy trial motion prior to the plea hearing. Without objection, the District Court responded that it was noting the speedy trial claim for the record but would not accept briefs on the issue.
On appeal, Hill argued the District Court abused its discretion when it did not allow briefing on the speedy trial violation. However, a defendant must raise all nonjurisdictional claims for appeal, including constitutional claims, prior to knowingly and voluntarily entering a guilty plea. After pleading guilty, the defendant may only challenge the voluntary and intelligent character that plea.
Here, Hill waived his right to raise a speedy trial issue because he did not raise the claim by appropriate motion before pleading guilty, receive an adverse ruling, and reserve the claim for appeal by proper appellate procedure. The District Court did not have the authority to accept briefing on the issue under established criminal and appellate procedure. It therefore did not abuse its discretion.
Points of Interest: speedy trial, waiver, abuse of discretion
2026 MT 83
The district court properly determined it had no jurisdiction to establish a parenting plan because Montana was not the child’s “home state” since the child had not lived in Montana for 25 months prior to Father filing his petition.
In August 2023, Mother returned to the Netherlands with R.A.A. without Father’s knowledge or consent. Six months later, Mother filed for divorce and child custody in the Netherlands. Father participated in this proceeding, represented by local counsel and with the aid of a translator. About a year later, Father filed a Hague petition for the return of R.A.A. The Hague Court determined that although R.A.A. had been wrongfully removed from the United States, the one-year automatic return period had lapsed and R.A.A. had since become settled in her new environment in the Netherlands. The Court of Appeal of the Hauge affirmed. In September 2025, Father filed a petition for a parenting plan in Montana. The District Court dismissed the petition upon concluding Montana was no longer R.A.A.’s “home state” since she had not resided here for 25 months.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Under the UCCJEA, a Montana court may only accept jurisdiction if Montana is the child’s “home state” or was the “home state” within 6 months of the commencement of a parenting action. Here, Montana was not R.A.A.’s “home state” because she had not lived in Montana for 25 months prior to the filing of the petition. It is not clear why Father waited a year and a half to file his Hague petition but, nonetheless, during that time Montana lost home-state jurisdiction of R.A.A. The UCCJEA explicitly contemplates international application of its criteria for determining jurisdiction and therefore the District Court correctly noted that Montana courts have a duty to recognize and enforce a valid child custody determination entered by a foreign court.
Points of Interest: UCCJEA, parenting plan, home-state jurisdiction
2026 MT 82
A defendant’s trial counsel were not ineffective when they did not file a motion to suppress the defendant’s statements to law enforcement because the defendant did not show the motion to be arguably meritorious.
Hyslop was convicted of felony murder related to the death of a child in his care. He petitioned for postconviction relief and asserted his trial counsel were ineffective when they failed to seek suppression of statements Hyslop made to law enforcement after he was advised of his Miranda rights, agreed to the interview, and signed a waiver. He did not confess to injuring the child during the interview, but suggested various theories as to how she may have been injured. Although the interview was admitted to evidence, the defendant did not testify at trial. The District Court denied the petition for postconviction relief.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. For counsel to be ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress, a defendant must show such a motion to be arguably meritorious. In this case, a motion to suppress the defendant’s statements—given voluntarily after being advised of Miranda and signing a waiver—would not have been arguably meritorious. Furthermore, even if such a motion would have had merit, it would not have been likely to change the outcome since Hyslop did not confess during the interview and steadfastly maintained he did not injure the child. Furthermore, his version of the events given during this interview could not have been presented to the jury without testifying at trial and subjecting himself to the rigors of cross-examination.
Points of Interest: ineffective assistance of counsel, suppression, postconviction relief
2026 MT 81
A timely filed petition for judicial review of a revoked driver’s license pursuant to Montana’s implied consent law is not mooted when the license is reinstated by operation of law but before a court rules on the petition because the court may order relief other than return of the license.
Kalafat’s driver’s license was subject to an automatic six-month suspension under § 61-8-1016, MCA, Montana’s implied consent statute. On February 21, 2024, Kalafat timely filed a petition for judicial review of his license suspension. An evidentiary hearing was eventually scheduled for June 25, 2024, but the State never filed briefing for the June 25 hearing. The District Court vacated the hearing until both parties filed briefs. Kalafat’s six-month suspension ended by operation of law on August 21, 2024. In April 2025, Kalafat moved to reset the evidentiary hearing, and the State moved to dismiss, arguing that the issue was moot because Kalafat’s license had been returned. The District Court agreed and dismissed the matter.
On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that for Kalafat, the issue was not moot. A finding that Kalafat’s license was wrongfully suspended would provide a refund or waiver to license reinstatement fees and the removal of the suspension from his driving record, which could affect insurance rates and future implied consent proceedings. Contrary to the State’s argument, the return of Kalafat’s license was not the only relief the District Court could grant. The matter was remanded back to the District Court for further proceedings.
Points of Interest: judicial review, mootness, remedies
2026 MT 80
A parent waives the right to challenge the appropriateness of a treatment plan by failing to contemporaneously object, and termination of parental rights is proper where the parent fails to comply with the plan and the conditions rendering the parent unfit are unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
In September 2023, the Department removed four children from Parents after reports of domestic violence and methamphetamine use. Father was given a treatment plan requiring substance abuse treatment, mental health evaluation, stable housing and employment, and cooperation with services. Although Father initially completed an evaluation, he failed to engage in treatment, delayed compliance for nearly a year, continued substance use, and failed to address mental health and parenting deficiencies. Evidence at the termination hearing showed Father minimized his substance abuse, failed to recognize the impact of domestic violence, maintained an unsafe relationship with Mother, and lacked protective capacity despite some late progress in treatment and visitation. The District Court terminated Father’s parental rights on multiple statutory grounds, including failure to comply with the treatment plan.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. Father waived any challenge to the treatment plan’s appropriateness by stipulating to it without objection. Substantial evidence supported the District Court’s finding that Father failed to comply with the plan and that the conditions rendering him unfit—namely inability to protect the children—were unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Late or partial compliance does not outweigh a long history of instability, and children are entitled to permanency without indefinite delay.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, waiver, treatment plans
2026 MT 79
Even though Defendant agreed to imposition of a $5,000 fine in a plea agreement, the District Court erred by imposing the fine without considering the Defendant’s ability to pay. Section 46-18-231, MCA (2019), requires courts to consider the burden of the imposed fine on the defendant and a defendant cannot agree to an illegal sentence.
Horn was charged with a fourth DUI offense and pleaded guilty to DUI per se following a plea agreement. Under the plea agreement, the parties would jointly recommend a $5,000 fine and a 13-month commitment to the Department of Corrections, with no time suspended. At sentencing, the District Court accepted Horn’s plea and imposed the agreed-upon $5,000 fine, the minimum under § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA, for a fourth DUI offense. Horn appealed, contending § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA, is facially unconstitutional.
Section 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA, is not facially unconstitutional. However, § 46-18-231, MCA (2019), requires a sentencing court to consider, among other things, the burden of an imposed fine upon the defendant. Section 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019), additionally prohibits a sentencing court from imposing a fine unless the offender has the ability to pay. Even though Horn agreed to the $5,000 fine pursuant to the plea agreement, the District Court erred by not considering Horn’s ability to pay. A defendant cannot agree to a sentence that is not statutorily authorized. The Court reversed imposition of the $5,000 fine and remanded back for the District Court to conduct an ability-to-pay analysis.
Points of Interest: fines and surcharges, plea agreements, ability to pay
2026 MT 78
Torgison v. Lincoln Cnty. Port Auth.
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying preliminary injunction where it refused to set aside consecutive property sales challenged by nearby property owner on the basis that the initial sale by Port Authority violated open meeting laws.
The Port Authority sold part of its real property to Noble in 2023. Noble later sold a portion of the purchased property to a third party. Torgison, who resided near the property, sued the Port Authority and the Lincoln County Commissioners in 2025, arguing that the sale to Noble was accomplished in violation of open meeting laws. He sought a preliminary injunction, asking the court to set aside the sale to Noble as well as the sale to the third party. The District Court denied the injunction.
On appeal, Torgison argued that the District Court failed to consider all the statutory injunction factors and improperly reached the ultimate issue of the case. Torgison also argued that equitable tolling should be applied to his claim. The Port Authority argued that the District Court had not erred and asserted that Torgison had failed to preserve his equitable tolling claim.
The Supreme Court concluded the issues of timeliness, mootness, and equitable tolling were not ripe. Additionally, the District Court had not entered a ruling on the ultimate issue of the case. If the District Court found that a violation of the open meeting laws had taken place, it could fashion a remedy. Therefore, the District Court had not manifestly abused its discretion in denying the motion for preliminary injunction.
Points of Interest: preliminary injunction, ripeness, open meetings
2026 MT 77
The District Court imposed a lawful sentence when it suspended the mandatory $5,000 fine for Trombley’s felony DUI conviction. The court could not delegate to the probation and parole office the authority to reimpose suspended fees and fines.
Pursuant to a global plea agreement, Trombley pleaded guilty to several offenses, including driving under the influence—fourth or subsequent offense, under § 61-8-1002, MCA (2021). The District Court sentenced Trombley on that charge to thirteen months to the Department of Corrections, followed by a suspended five-year term in the Montana State Prison. The sentencing court imposed the $5,000 mandatory minimum fine pursuant to § 61-8-1008(1)(a)(i), MCA, and suspended the entire amount. The sentencing judgment included a condition allowing the probation office to reinstate the suspended fees and fines “if they find reason that Defendant is not complying with the terms of his probation.” Trombley appealed.
Relying on its recent decision in State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The Court explained that § 46-18-231(3), MCA, which provides that a sentencing judge “may not sentence an offender to pay a fine unless the offender is or will be able to pay the fine,” may be harmonized with § 46-18-201(2), MCA, which grants a sentencing judge express authority to “suspend execution of [a] sentence.” The District Court complied with § 46-18-231(3), MCA, by considering Trombley’s financial circumstances, prospects for future income, and ability to pay a fine; complied with § 61‑8‑1008(1)(a)(i), MCA, by imposing the $5,000 minimum fine; and followed § 46-18-201(2), MCA, when it suspended the fine in its entirety.
The Supreme Court remanded the case for the District Court to strike from the judgment its provision allowing the probation office to “reinstate” suspended fees and fines. Section 46-18-203(7)(a), MCA, authorizes only a district court, not the office of probation and parole, to revoke a sentence and to continue or modify any of its conditions.
Points of Interest: fines and surcharges, suspended fines, ability to pay
2026 MT 76
District court did not abuse its discretion when it preliminarily enjoined enforcement of SB 458 (2023), which defines sex as binary, and related State Policies governing the amendment of birth certificates because SB 458 and the related policies likely violate Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection.
The Legislature enacted SB 458, providing a binary definition of sex based solely on biology. In response, DPHHS promulgated a rule specifying that birth certificates could only be amended to correct a data entry error at birth. The MVD also adopted a policy requiring a court order or corrected birth certificate to update the sex designation on a driver’s license. Plaintiffs challenged the law to obtain amended birth certificates and driver licenses matching their gender identity as previously allowed. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, reasoning that discrimination against a person for being homosexual or transgender is sex discrimination.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Montana’s Individual Dignity Clause provides greater protection than the federal Equal Protection Clause. Under the post-SB 458 policies and rules, Plaintiffs would be forced to present identification documents that do not reflect their respective gender identities and, as a result, would be compelled disclose that they are transgender each time an inquiry is made. Because government-issued identification documents are necessary to access public life, documents which inaccurately reflect a person’s identity prevent transgender Montanans, based on their sex, the ability to obtain the same attributes of public life that other Montanans enjoy. Transgender discrimination is, by its very nature, sex discrimination and violates the Montana Constitution. Because being transgender is a suspect class, the District Court properly applied strict scrutiny when it determined that Plaintiffs independently met each of the four preliminary injunction factors.
Points of Interest: administrative rules, Art. II(4), strict scrutiny
2026 MT 73
The District Court correctly determined Dolans did not have an implied easement because the Certificate of Subdivision Approval, the landowners’ conduct, and the reviewing authorities’ continued disapproval of the ditch presented evidence contrary to the alleged intent that the use would continue after severance of common ownership.
In 2006, Cobb Hill subdivided a tract of land. As part of that process, regulation required that Cobb Hill receive the reviewing authorities’ approval for compliance with sanitation regulations. In return, Cobb Hill received a Certificate of Subdivision Approval. The reviewing authorities placed conditions on subdivision approval, including that Cobb Hill abandon feeder ditches running through the property and build water supply and treatment systems at designated locations.
In 2018, the Dolans filed a complaint against their neighbors, claiming ditch interference when the Guenthers installed two culverts. The Guenthers installed the culverts in response to the reviewing authorities’ disapproval of the ditch. The Guenthers moved for partial summary judgment that the Dolans did not have an easement. The Dolans cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The Dolans argued that Ewing Trust, who bought several lots from Cobb Hill, created an implied easement by existing use when it used the ditch and conveyed Lot 2 giving the impression that subsequent buyers could use the ditch. The District Court decided both motions in the Guenthers’ favor.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Although the COSA did not bind subsequent landowners to Cobb Hill’s intent, it provided evidence contrary to the intent the Dolans alleged. Because subsequent landowners had constructive notice of the COSA’s conditions but failed to amend the COSA or mitigate the sanitation issues, an implied easement by existing use was not established. The reviewing authorities continued to disapprove of the ditch as it existed when common ownership was severed. It was not reasonable of the parties to expect that use of the ditch would continue after conveyance.
Points of Interest: easements and roads, land use, summary judgment
2026 MT 67
The scope of the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency review does not include considering the substantive constitutionality of a ballot measure.
Montana Mining Association and other organizations sought declaratory relief on original jurisdiction, challenging the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency determination for BI-10, a statutory initiative that would redefine “artificial persons” and “artificial person powers” to prohibit artificial persons from political spending. MMA maintained that the AG failed to consider whether BI-10 would violate the First Amendment by limiting corporate speech when he found the initiative legally sufficient. MMA asked the Montana Supreme Court to hold that that the AG has the authority to review a proposed ballot initiative for substantive constitutionality as part of his legal sufficiency review.
The Court denied the petition. Previous holdings of the Court emphasize that the AG’s legal sufficiency review does not authorize him to withhold a proposed ballot measure for an alleged substantive constitutional infirmity. Although the Legislature has since amended the definition of “legal sufficiency” in § 13-27-110(7), MCA, to include “the substantive legality of the proposed issue if approved by the voters,” the amendment was declared invalid and enjoined. Since the statute purporting to confer such authority is not presently in effect, the Court declines to confer such authority in light of its caselaw to the contrary.
Points of Interest: ballot initiatives
2026 MT 66
Section 72-3-617, MCA, authorizes a court sitting in probate to restrain the conduct of a personal representative, regardless of whether she administers the estate under informal or formal probate.
Jaime was informally appointed personal representative of her husband’s estate and opened an informal probate. Paul, the decedent’s father, initiated a civil action based on various contract and tort theories naming Jaimie and the estate as defendants. While that separate proceeding was pending, Paul sought injunctive relief in the probate proceedings, alleging Jaimie was violating her fiduciary duties and depleting estate assets. The probate court held a formal hearing on Paul’s motion and granted a “preliminary injunction” restraining Jaimie’s conduct under § 72-3-617, MCA, of the probate code.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the court had jurisdiction under the probate code to adjudicate Paul’s request for injunctive relief. Section 72-3-617, MCA, grants a probate court discretion to restrain a personal representative, regardless of whether the probate proceeding is formal or informal. Further, § 72-3-617’s restraining authority is distinct from injunctive relief available in civil actions under §§ 27-19-201 and -314, MCA (“preliminary injunctions” and “temporary restraining orders”). Finally, a probate court is not required to impose a bond under § 27-19-306, MCA, when restraining a personal representative under § 72-3-617, MCA. The Court held that the probate court had authority to restrain Jaimie’s conduct as personal representative and did not abuse its discretion in requiring her to obtain pre-approval from the court for estate distributions.
Points of Interest: estate law, probate, restraining authority
2026 MT 65
The District Court imposed a lawful sentence when it suspended the mandatory $600 fine for Curran’s DUI conviction.
Curran pleaded guilty in August 2020 to first-offense DUI per se under § 61-8-406(1)(a), MCA (2019). The parties’ plea agreement recommended in part that the court impose a combined fine and surcharge of $685, with a proviso that “Defendant requests the court inquire into his ability to pay the fine and suspend the fine and surcharge in the interests of justice if the court finds that he is unable to pay the fine.” At sentencing, the Municipal Court, though sympathetic, did not believe it had discretion to suspend the mandatory fine despite Curran’s inability to pay. In Curran’s first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and directed the Municipal Court to consider statutory alternatives to satisfy Curran’s obligation for the fine. On remand, the sentencing court reimposed the $600 fine and suspended the entire amount. Curran appealed.
Relying on its recent decision in State v. Cole, 2026 MT 52, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The Court explained that § 46-18-231(3), MCA, which provides that a sentencing judge “may not sentence an offender to pay a fine unless the offender is or will be able to pay the fine,” may be harmonized with § 46-18-201(2), MCA, which grants a sentencing judge express authority to “suspend execution of [a] sentence.” The Municipal Court complied with § 46-18-231(3), MCA, by considering Curran’s financial circumstances, prospects for future income, and ability to pay a fine; complied with § 61‑8‑722(1), MCA, by imposing the $600 minimum fine; and followed § 46-18-201(2), MCA, when it suspended the fine in its entirety.
Points of Interest: fines and surcharges, sentencing, ability to pay
2026 MT 64
All Families Healthcare v. State
A state law defining an “abortion clinic” as a health care facility created impermissible discrimination between providers who offer identical medications and procedures, distinguished only by whether the facility offers abortions or miscarriage management. The law also implicated the fundamental right to privacy because it limited the availability of qualified abortion providers. The State failed to demonstrate a compelling interest because the State could not prove abortion care and miscarriage care do not subject patients to different safety risks.
In 2023, the Montana Legislature passed HB 937, which defined “abortion clinics” as facilities performing five or more abortions per year and subjected those facilities to specific DPHHS licensing requirements regulating sanitation, staff qualifications, emergency care procedures, physical layout, and standards for inspections. Reproductive healthcare providers challenged the law as a violation of several provisions of the Montana Constitution on behalf of their staff and patients. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that abortion care utilizes the same medications and procedures as miscarriage care, but the law does not subject miscarriage treatment providers to the same requirements. The State’s lone witness, who supervised the DPHHS licensing scheme, could not identify any specific health or safety concerns distinguishing “abortion clinics” from miscarriage treatment providers. The District Court granted the preliminary injunction.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, determining that the District Court did not abuse its discretion granting the preliminary injunction. HB 937 and DPHHS regulations likely discriminated between two similarly situated types of healthcare providers whose practice included identical medications, procedures, and safety risks. These rules implicated the right to privacy and thus triggered strict scrutiny, and the State was unlikely to justify the regulations with a narrowly tailored, compelling State interest. The likely violation of the Plaintiff’s rights to equal protection and abortion access absent a preliminary injunction constituted an irreparable injury, and the balance of equities and the public interest favored the granting of the preliminary injunction.
Points of Interest: preliminary injunction, right to privacy, equal protection
2026 MT 63
D’Hooge v. Cincinnati Ins. Co.
The version of § 33-18-242, MCA, of the Uniform Trade Practices Act that was effective prior to the 2023 amendment does not prohibit a third-party claimant from suing an insurer based on breach of contract, equity, or tort based on the insurer’s mishandling of an insurance claim.
D’Hooge contacted Cincinnati Insurance Company after sustaining an injury while on the premises of Cincinnati’s insured. D’Hooge requested lost wages and medical bills pursuant to Montana law and forwarded supporting documents to Cincinnati. Cincinnati told D’Hooge “[Cincinnati] [is] accepting liability for your claim” and D’Hooge need not gather additional evidence to support her claim.
D’Hooge sued Cincinnati for breach of contract, equitable causes of action, and tort. The District Court granted Cincinnati summary judgment because it concluded the pre-2023 version of § 33-18-242, MCA, only permitted third-party claimants to sue insurers for statutory or common law bad faith based on the insurer mishandling an insurance claim.
The Supreme Court reversed. The plain language of pre-2023 § 33-18-242, MCA, did not preclude a third-party claimant from asserting causes of action other than statutory or common law bad faith against an insurer based on how the insurer handles an insurance claim. Section 33-18-242, MCA, limited only the causes of action an insured may assert against its insurer while no similar provision limited the causes of action a third-party claimant may assert against an insurer. Federal caselaw also supports this conclusion because federal district courts interpreted the pre-2023 version of § 33-18-242, MCA, to allow third-party claimants to assert common law actions against insurers based on how the insurer handled the claim.
Points of Interest: insurance, torts, breach of contract
2026 MT 61
A district court exceeds its statutory authority in a revocation proceeding when it revokes and converts probationary time remaining on a custodial sentence into a DOC commitment; only suspended time may be revoked.
In 2019, Sanchez was convicted of felony DUI and sentenced to two years with DOC followed by four years suspended. After completing a residential treatment program, the remainder of his custodial sentence was to be served on probation. Sanchez violated probation multiple times, resulting in two revocation proceedings. After the second revocation in January 2024, the District Court imposed a five-year, three-month DOC commitment with credit for time served, effectively including both suspended time and remaining probationary time from the custodial portion of the original sentence. Sanchez appealed, arguing the sentence unlawfully extended his original sentence and improperly included time not subject to revocation.
The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded. Although the total time imposed did not exceed the original sentence, the District Court erred by revoking and converting 206 days of remaining probationary time from the custodial portion of the sentence into a DOC commitment. Under § 61-8-731, MCA, completion of treatment required the remainder of the custodial sentence to be served on probation, and under § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, a court’s revocation authority is limited to suspended time only. Accordingly, the District Court lacked authority to revoke the probationary portion of the custodial sentence. The District Court is instructed on remand to correct the disposition to revoke only the remaining 1,204 days of suspended time, while leaving undisturbed previously awarded credits for time served and unchallenged street time credit determinations.
Points of Interest: revocation, sentencing, illegal sentences
2026 MT 60
Roaring Lion Ranch, LLC, v. YC Props.
The District Court abused its discretion when it converted YC’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without indicating that it considered information outside the Plaintiffs’ complaint other than the parties’ actions in underlying litigation.
Roaring Lion Ranch and other Plaintiffs sued YC Properties for abuse of process and malicious prosecution arising from its conduct in a prior water rights dispute. YC moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief because their complaint misrepresented the facts of the underlying action. The District Court sua sponte converted YC’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, ruled in YC’s favor, and dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice.
The Supreme Court reversed. Courts are required to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment only when they consider information outside the complaint. The purpose of this rule is to avoid surprising the parties and afford them an opportunity to present additional facts to avoid summary judgment. In the present case, the District Court did not indicate that it considered any information outside the Plaintiffs’ complaint. The District Court’s references to the underlying action did not require conversion because the parties participated in both cases and could not claim that they were surprised by the inclusion of this information. Because Plaintiffs pleaded facts to support every element of their abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims, the Court concluded that their complaint was sufficient to withstand dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
Points of Interest: summary judgment, abuse of process, malicious prosecution
2026 MT 59
Montana’s bail-jumping statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant, released on condition of appearance at a specified hearing where he then failed to appear, because the mental state element of the crime provided fair notice that his conduct was prohibited, the statute provided adequate safeguards for enforcement, and the “without lawful excuse” element of the statute does not unlawfully shift the burden of proof to the defendant but provides an affirmative defense to the crime charged.
Montana petitioned to revoke Trombley’s probation in January 2023. After his initial appearance, Trombley was released pending an adjudicatory hearing set for February 2023. Trombley did not appear at that hearing and the State then filed bail jumping charges. Trombley did not communicate his whereabouts until he was arrested in May 2023. Trombley moved to dismiss, arguing the lack of a statutory definition for “lawful excuse” rendered the statute void for vagueness and impermissibly shifted the burden to him to prove a “lawful excuse.” After the court denied this motion, Trombley pled guilty but reserved his right to appeal.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The statute was not unconstitutionally vague because it provided fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that failing to appear at the hearing could result in criminal sanctions. The “purposely” mental state element distinguished between intentional absence from circumstances beyond Trombley’s control. Trombley, who knew of his obligation to appear, neither appeared nor offered a lawful excuse for his absence. Second, the bail-jumping statute did not impermissibly shift the burden onto Trombley to prove a “lawful excuse” because the term operates as an affirmative defense, for which he bore the initial burden of production. Finally, the charging documents alleged sufficient facts to establish probable cause that Trombley committed bail jumping because the State has no obligation to allege facts establishing that he did not have a lawful excuse.
Points of Interest: bail-jumping, vagueness, mental state
2026 MT 58
Trial court properly dismissed a charge for failure to register as a sex offender under the 2023 SVORA because the post-2007 SVORA is punitive and cannot be applied retroactively.
Pratt was previously convicted of a sex offense requiring him to register as a sexual offender. When he failed to report in-person as directed, the State charged Pratt with failure to register in violation of the 2023 Sexual of Violent Offender Registration Act, as identified in the affidavit of probable cause and charging documents. The trial court dismissed the charge on Pratt’s motion as violative of the Ex Post Facto clause and State v. Hinman, 2023 MT 116, 412 Mont. 434, 530 P.3d 1271.
The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the State’s argument that it could have charged Pratt under a pre-2007 version of SVORA. Where the State’s charging documents relied exclusively on the 2023 SVORA, which could not be applied retroactively, the prosecution was barred.
Points of Interest: SVORA, ex post facto, dismissal
2026 MT 56
Opening a closed container found in a concealed compartment of a stolen vehicle was beyond the scope of the vehicle owner’s consent.
When police stopped Flores-Reyes on report of a stolen vehicle, he claimed that all the vehicle contents belonged to him. Police obtained the vehicle owner’s consent to search the vehicle and secure it and visible property for return to her. When searching, police manipulated a dashboard panel to reveal a concealed compartment. In the compartment, police found a closed zippered pouch which they opened to discover fentanyl. Police used the drugs as probable cause for a warrant to more thoroughly search the vehicle and Flores-Reyes’ hotel room, where they discovered additional narcotics, the basis for the charged offenses. Flores-Reyes moved to suppress, arguing that the warrantless opening of the concealed compartment and closed pouch violated his constitutional search and seizure rights, and that the subsequently obtained warrants were tainted because they were based on evidence discovered during the unlawful search. The District Court denied suppression and a jury ultimately convicted Flores-Reyes.
The Supreme Court reversed. Although the vehicle owner gave consent to search the stolen car and retrieve her visible property, the scope of her consent did not extend to a closed, concealed pouch that Flores-Reyes said belonged to him. The fruits of the illegal search of the zippered pouch formed the basis for the later search warrants and the drugs obtained under those searches were also subject to the exclusionary rule.
Points of Interest: search and seizure, warrantless searches, suppression
2026 MT 55
Defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated in spite of a 476-day delay where 126 days of the delay were attributable to the defendant, the defendant’s conduct in vacating a trial date for plea negotiations he never completed demonstrated the Defendant did not want a speedy trial, and Defendant failed to establish actual prejudice from the delay.
The State charged Larson with felony DUI, among other charges. Trial was initially set for October 31, 2022, but that date was used for one of Larson’s older pending cases. The matter was then reset to January 9, 2023, which was later vacated at Larson’s request so he could pursue a global plea agreement with another pending case. After the change-of-plea hearings on January 12 and 19, 2023, failed because Larson did not accept the global plea agreement, trial was reset for May 1, 2023, but that date was eventually given to another defendant with higher priority. Larson’s case was then reset for July 10, 2023. On July 6, 2023, Larson moved to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. The next day he entered a no-contest plea, preserving his right to appeal. The total delay from arrest to plea was 476 days.
Under the Ariegwe balancing test, the 476-day delay (276 days beyond the 200-day trigger) weighed in Larson’s favor. 350 days were institutional delay attributable to the State, while 126 days were caused by Larson’s own continuances and unsuccessful plea attempts. Larson’s conduct, vacating a priority trial date for plea negotiations he never completed, showed he did not genuinely want a speedy trial and weighed against him. Larson also failed to establish actual prejudice, as his pretrial incarceration was not oppressive and he showed no impaired defense or unusual anxiety. On balance, no speedy trial violation occurred.
Points of Interest: DUI, speedy trial, prejudice
2026 MT 54
An individual on conditional discharge does not terminate the time remaining on his sentence by moving out of State. Allowing Defendant to remain out of state while on probation is not a banishment condition, and although Defendant should have been required to return to Montana for probation, it wasn’t impossible for him to comply with probation conditions.
In 2019, Emmings was sentenced to a total of 12 years DOC with 10 suspended after he pled guilty to 8 counts of violating an order of protection. After Emmings was later granted conditional discharge, he moved to California. The court revoked Emmings’ discharge after he threatened individuals in California. The court placed Emmings back on probation and reimposed all prior probation conditions except those that required him to be in Montana.
The State later petitioned to revoke Emmings’ suspended sentence for absconding due to failure to comply with probation conditions, for failure to communicate with his probation officer, and explicitly refusing to comply. The judge presiding over the case recused herself. A different judge assumed jurisdiction, dismissed the petition to revoke, and struck the order reimposing probation on two grounds: (1) the time remaining on Emmings’ sentence was terminated when he moved to California, and (2) the prior judge illegally banished Emmings from Montana and imposed impossible probation conditions.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, reasoning first that the initial judge’s order was the law of the case because it wasn’t arbitrary or materially or clearly erroneous. Second, the latter judge misconstrued the conditional discharge statute to terminate Emmings’ sentence because he moved out of state. Third, although Emmings should have been required to return to Montana for probation, allowing him to remain in California was not a banishment; because he wasn’t banished, the probationary conditions were not impossible, and Emmings failed to show a good faith effort to comply.
Points of Interest: revocation, probation and parole, conditional discharge
2026 MT 53
Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC v. State
Property owners did not prove public participation or equal protection violations where new legislation allowed for denser development where the statutes allowed for public participation prior to final governmental decisions and the classes identified were not similarly situated.
Property owners in single-family neighborhoods challenged housing reform bills enacted by the 2023 Legislature that allowed higher density development, arguing, in part, that the Montana Land Use Planning Act infringed on citizens’ right to know and participate during the land-use planning and approval process. The District Court denied MAID’s request for injunction.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court concluded the MLUPA did not unconstitutionally limit public participation. Although the MLUPA limits the right to participate during site-specific development decisions, it encourages participation during development of the land use plan, zoning regulations, and subdivision regulations. The site-specific limitations do not violate Montana’s right to participate because the law allows for material participation on the land use plan and regulations that ultimately govern site specific decisions.
The Court further held that the MULPA does not violate equal protection by irrationally burdening landowners not subject to restrictive covenants with the bulk of urban growth and arbitrarily limiting public participation in MLUPA municipalities but not in other localities. MAID was unable to establish that the classes it identified were similarly situated. Those subject to restrictive covenants were parties to a contract; the burdens and benefits MAID identified derived from private contracts and were not statutory. The Court held further that residents of MLUPA municipalities were not similarly situated to those in non-MLUPA municipalities. The distinction between them is related to, and a result of, the MLUPA’s purpose of fostering more comprehensive data collection and public participation during the long-range community planning process in Montana’s more densely populated areas.
Points of Interest: land use, equal protection, public participation
2026 MT 52
Courts must consider a defendant’s ability to pay when imposing a mandatory minimum fine and must suspend the portion of a fine that the defendant is or will be unable to pay.
Cole pled guilty to felony DUI. At sentencing, the District Court inquired into Cole’s financial situation and found Cole had limited income. The District Court imposed the $5,000 mandatory minimum fine, but gave Cole credit for time spent in jail and suspended the $4,900 balance.
Cole appealed the imposition of the suspended fine. Cole argued the fine was unconstitutionally excessive under the U.S. and Montana constitutions, because the statute required the imposition of a minimum fine regardless of a defendant’s ability to pay. Cole asserted State v. Gibbons, 2024 MT 63, which held a similar mandatory minimum fine facially unconstitutional, stripped the District Court of authority to impose a mandatory minimum fine, regardless of its suspension.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The District Court acted under two equal statutory mandates: (1) to impose the $5,000-minimum fine required by § 61-8-731(1)(a)(iii), MCA (2019); and (2) to consider Cole’s ability to pay and to not require Cole to pay a fine beyond his ability, pursuant to § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019). The court exercised authority expressly granted by § 46-18-201(2), MCA (2019), to suspend the portion of the fine Cole could not pay. The suspended fine demonstrated a set of circumstances under which a mandatory minimum fine does not prohibit the court from considering the proportionality factors necessary to determine whether a fine is unconstitutionally excessive, including a defendant’s ability to pay. Based on these new circumstances, the Supreme Court overruled Gibbons’s holding that a similar mandatory minimum fine provision in § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019), was unconstitutional in all applications. The remainder of Gibbons remains intact, thus § 46-18-231(3), MCA (2019) still applies to mandatory fines, and a defendant may still bring an as-applied constitutional challenge based on a sentencing court’s failure to consider the defendant’s ability to pay.
Points of Interest: fines and surcharges, ability to pay, suspended fines
2026 MT 49
Defendant’s guilty plea to one or more counts of an Information does not bar continued prosecution of the remaining count(s).
The State charged Standifur with four offenses arising from a traffic stop, including criminal possession of dangerous drugs and criminal possession of drug paraphernalia. Standifur pleaded guilty to all offenses except the possession charge, which he sought to have dismissed immediately after his pleas as violative of the same-transaction rule and double jeopardy. The trial court denied dismissal and Standifur later pleaded guilty to the possession offense, reserving the right to appeal.
The Supreme Court upheld his conviction. Section 46-11-503, MCA, bars multiple prosecutions for offenses arising out of the same transaction, but only if a “former prosecution” arising out of that transaction “results in a conviction.” Standifur’s partial resolution by guilty pleas did not bar continued prosecution for unresolved counts under the same charging document. Further, separate convictions for possession of drugs and paraphernalia did not violate double jeopardy under the same-elements test. One can possess paraphernalia without possessing drugs and vice versa; therefore, one offense was not included in the other.
Points of Interest: double jeopardy, transaction rule, charges
2026 MT 48
District Court acted within its discretion when it declined to modify the parenting plan based on another child’s sexual abuse allegations against Father, as Mother did not show clear error in the court’s factual findings. The judge’s remote appearance at the hearing was not plain error.
Mother and Father divorced in 2022 and agreed to share parenting of their daughter, A.M. After the divorce, Mother’s daughters from a previous marriage—A.R.M. and E.M.—disclosed that Father had sexually abused them. Mother obtained an order of protection against Father prohibiting his contact with A.R.M. for one year and with A.M. for thirty days. In October 2024, Mother moved in the dissolution case to amend the parenting plan to prohibit Father’s unsupervised contact with A.M.
The District Judge presided over the show cause hearing via Zoom for health and safety reasons. E.M. testified, but A.R.M. opted not to. The court permitted Mother to testify only about her observations of A.R.M. The court found the parties presented insufficient evidence for it to conclude that the allegations were true and that Father posed a risk to A.M.’s safety. The court declined to restrict Father’s parenting.
The Supreme Court concluded the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and it did not abuse its discretion in permitting unsupervised visitation. The record contained little evidence to substantiate the sexual abuse allegations other than the parties’ conflicting testimony, and the Supreme Court could not reweigh the evidence.
The Court rejected Mother’s argument that the District Court’s remote appearance was structural error and prejudiced her right to a fair trial. Mother did not raise this objection in the District Court and thus failed to preserve this claim for appeal. On appeal, Mother failed to convince the Court she was entitled to plain-error review of the unpreserved claim.
Points of Interest: parenting plan, sufficiency of evidence, remote appearance
2026 MT 47
Briggs could not show that his hired counsels’ seeking withdrawal while retaining payments under their fee agreement was a structural denial of counsel under Cronic or actual ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.
After 10 months of representation, Briggs’ relationship with his hired counsel was irretrievably broken. However, Briggs opposed counsel’s motion to withdraw because Briggs did not want to lose payments made in advance under their fixed-fee contract. The trial court permitted withdrawal and immediately appointed new counsel who represented Briggs through his trial and sentencing.
In postconviction proceedings, Briggs claimed ineffective assistance of hired trial counsel. He alleged the fixed-fee contract created a conflict of interest that caused counsel to fail to act as his advocate and the State’s adversary—a presumptively prejudicial denial of counsel under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984). Alternatively, he alleged counsel was constitutionally ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
The Supreme Court disagreed. Cronic error arises out of exceedingly rare circumstances so inherently prejudicial that ineffective assistance may be presumed without considering counsel’s actual performance. Strickland claims establish “actual” ineffective assistance arising out of counsel’s deficient performance and resulting prejudice to outcome of proceedings. Briggs could not demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation under either standard. Counsel’s purported financial conflict of interest did not cause them to totally and completely abandon their duties of loyalty and confidentiality and join the State in obtaining a conviction. There was thus no complete failure of the adversarial process that would give rise to a presumption of prejudice under Cronic. Briggs also did not show that the “financial conflict” actually adversely affected counsels’ performance. There was thus no conflict-based claim under Strickland.
Points of Interest: ineffective assistance of counsel, conflict of interest, attorney fees
2026 MT 46
Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies between a complaining witness’s prior statements to law enforcement and their statements at trial does not establish falsity, as required to establish a claim under Napue.
Stinger was convicted of multiple PFMA charges arising from two separate incidents involving Stinger and his then-wife Kasondra. Kasondra testified at trial, as did the responding officers and paramedic. Extensive dashboard and body cam footage was also admitted as evidence. Stinger appealed his convictions, asserting the State violated Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, by failing to correct several of Kasondra’s statements at trial that were inconsistent with her prior statements to responding emergency personnel, as evidenced by body cam and dashcam footage.
The Supreme Court affirmed. To succeed on a Napue claim, a defendant must show the testimony at issue was actually false. Generally, mere inconsistencies or honestly mistaken witness recollections do no not satisfy the falsehood requirement. The statements, which specific details of how a physical altercation played out—whether someone had been punched in the head versus punched in the eye, and whether they had been punched in the head before being placed in a headlock or while in the headlock, are not false statements but minor inconsistencies in witness recollection. Accordingly, the State had no duty to correct the witness testimony.
Points of Interest: witnesses, prior inconsistent statements
2026 MT 45
Trial court committed reversible error where it overruled defendant’s objection to repeated use of the word “victim” to refer to the complaining witness and where the court allowed the prosecution to question the defendant about attempting to “wipe” his phone after his arrest as evidence of consciousness of guilt.
Sandberg was charged with several crimes, including sexual intercourse without consent. At trial, the prosecution and several state witnesses repeatedly referred to the complaining witness as “victim.” The trial court granted, but overruled, defense counsel’s standing objection to the reference. Although the court further noted it would be “highly problematic” for the court to make such references, the word “victim” was used in the jury instructions. Additionally, the prosecutor questioned Sandberg about an attempt to “wipe” his phone after his arrest. While Sandberg objected to this questioning, the court ruled that the evidence was admissible to show consciousness of guilt. A jury ultimately convicted Sandberg of the charges.
The Supreme Court reversed on both grounds. The word “victim” is conclusive in nature and connotes a predetermination that a crime occurred. It is improper to refer to a complaining witness as “victim” where the commission of a crime remains in dispute. Pervasive use of the word “victim” at trial deprives a defendant of their right to a fair trial by jury. Pursuant to the transaction rule, subsequent act evidence is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, but only if the evidence demonstrates a consciousness of guilt specific to the crime charged. Like other evidence admissible under the transaction rule, the evidence is subject to Rule 404(b) and Rule 403. The District Court erred in admitting the subsequent act evidence because it demonstrated a consciousness of guilt as to uncharged offenses and because it introduced an improper propensity inference prohibited by Rule 404(b) that was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.
Points of Interest: transaction rule, Rule 404, evidence
2026 MT 42
The presence in the jury pool of two individuals who no longer resided in the county did not impact Hinkle’s rights to an impartial jury because the individuals did not respond to the jury summons. Further the use of testimony from another case was not an error.
Hinkle was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. Her original trial date was postponed due to jury summoning errors in the county. Between the canceled trial date and the rescheduled date, another trial was held in the same district court before a different judge. In that case, the defendant requested a hearing, alleging the jury had been incorrectly summoned. The District Court held a hearing and ultimately concluded the summoning rules had been substantially complied with. In the present case, before the new trial date, Hinkle moved for a hearing regarding jury summoning issues, namely that two people in the jury pool no longer resided in the county. The court denied the motion, citing to testimony given in the other case as support.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court concluded that the presence in the jury pool of two individuals who no longer resided in the county had not implicated the impaneling process. Furthermore, in light of the other case in the same court that dealt with similar issues drawn from the same pool, the District Court did not err in considering the testimony from the other case in its denial of Hinkle’s motion for new trial.
Points of Interest: jury pool, new trial, evidence
2026 MT 41
Trial court erred in dismissing the entire action when summary judgment motion addressed only one of five relevant debt accounts because dismissal of the entire action exceeded the scope of the motion.
Centron filed a complaint for “account stated” against the Hollewijns arising out of five separate debt accounts related to medical services. The Hollewijns sought summary judgment that Centron had not established an account stated, but addressed only one of the five debt accounts in their motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in their favor, deciding that Centron had failed to establish an account stated as a matter of law. The court then dismissed the entire action, including the four unaddressed debt accounts.
The Supreme Court reversed. First, whether Centron had established an account stated remained a question of fact subject to two reasonable inferences—either Hollewijns objected to the debt in a reasonable time, or they did not and therefore acquiesced. The trial court could not decide this material fact question as a matter of law where a genuine dispute existed. Second, the court erroneously dismissed the entire action where summary judgment addressed only one debt account, but not the remaining four. This decision was beyond the scope of Hollewijns’ summary judgment motion and therefore erroneous.
Points of Interest: summary judgment, dismissal, disputed facts
2026 MT 40
A district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror when the totality of the juror’s responses does not raise serious doubt about the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial.
The State charged Haacke with possession of dangerous drugs and possession of drug paraphernalia. During voir dire, defense counsel emphasized that the State bears the burden of proof and the defendant has no obligation to present evidence or testify. After several other jurors were struck for cause, prospective juror M.W. stated that if the State presented “solid evidence,” it would be “very difficult” to acquit without rebuttal from the defense. He added he would “strongly prefer” Haacke to take the stand. Neither the State nor the court attempted to rehabilitate M.W. However, when defense counsel posed increasingly leading questions, M.W. clarified that the outcome would “depend on the evidence,” he could find Haacke not guilty if the State’s case was weak or circumstantial, and he would honor the presumption of innocence. The District Court denied the for-cause challenge. Haacke used a peremptory strike to remove M.W., was convicted, and appealed.
A prospective juror may be dismissed for cause when his statements raise serious doubt about his ability to be fair and impartial. Spontaneous and unprompted responses to open-ended questions are the most reliable indicators of bias, and a juror’s belief that a defendant must testify or prove his innocence can raise serious concerns. Although M.W.’s initial spontaneous comments raised a close question, he did not express the kind of fixed opinions requiring reversal. All his statements came during defense questioning, which became increasingly leading. His unprompted answers grew more nuanced, emphasizing that the outcome would depend on the strength of the State’s evidence and he would apply the presumption of innocence. The District Court has discretion to assess a juror’s impartiality, and the record did not compel a finding that a serious question arose regarding M.W.’s ability to be fair and impartial.
Points of Interest: jury selection, juror challenges, abuse of discretion
2026 MT 39
Attorney General’s determination of legal insufficiency was overruled regarding a proposed Constitutional initiative to add a section limiting the government’s ability to burden initiative process because the initiative’s provisions did not create the need for separate votes under the implied-effects doctrine.
Proponents of BI-8, a ballot initiative that would amend the Montana Constitution to add a new section that would limit the government’s ability to deny or burden citizens’ right to place initiatives on the ballot, sought declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction after the Attorney General found BI-8 legally insufficient for violating the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, and the AG also appended a fiscal statement that Proponents maintained the AG lacked the authority to append.
The Supreme Court rejected arguments the AG raised as to whether BI-8 would survive post-election constitutional scrutiny because such questions fall outside the AG’s limited pre-ballot legal sufficiency review. The Court further determined that BI-8 did not combine independent constitutional subjects but contained provisions that operate together to define and protect a single constitutional right. It rejected the AG’s argument that BI-8 would implicitly amend other constitutional provisions by imposing judicial timelines because merely interacting with existing guarantees of access to courts and due process does not necessarily amend those provisions. It also disagreed with the AG that BI-8’s limitation on the use of government resources to support or oppose ballot issues would require a separate vote because constraining government action does not in and of itself create the need for a separate vote under the implied-effects doctrine. The Court further disagreed with the AG that a provision that would create procedural safeguards limiting the Legislature’s power would require a separate vote because it would not strip the Legislature of administrative power; the implied-effects doctrine cannot be extended so far that any structural interaction with other constitutional provisions would create a separate amendment.
The Court also agreed with Proponents that the AG’s appended fiscal statement was invalid because the fiscal note did not indicate a fiscal impact.
Points of Interest: ballot initiatives, Art. XIV(11), implied-effects doctrine
2026 MT 34
Petrich Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. Trout Unlimited
Water Court correctly determined Claimants’ water rights from a 1964 court decree were limited to May 1 to July 15, but erred when it generated implied use claims for dates exceeding the decreed period of use because it must further consider the implied claims after providing notice to other water users.
In 1964, a district court entered the Petrich Decree, pronouncing water rights to excess waters flowing in Mill Creek, including Claimants’ disputed claims. That court found that excess waters flowed in Mill Creek “during . . . May and June until approximately July 15.”
In their statements of claim, Claimants claimed periods of use from as early as April 1 to as late as November 1, attaching the Petrich Decree as the sole document supporting their period of use. Trout Unlimited objected to several of Claimants’ rights decreed in 43B’s Preliminary Decree. On summary judgment, the Water Court limited the periods of use from May 1 to July 15. Before trial, Claimants requested the Water Court generate implied claims.
Claimants testified they had not understood the Petrich Decree as decreeing a period of use but a right to water so long as it was available. The Water Court found from witness testimony that water was historically diverted outside of the Petrich Decree’s period of use and generated implied claims for use rights.
The Supreme Court agreed the Water Court had authority to generate use rights on finding Claimants had perfected those rights prior to July 1973. But the court erred when it failed to consider a stipulation made during the Petrich Decree litigation (agreeing water was available “no later than July 15”) and water diversion improvements made on Mill Creek. It also erred when it failed to give notice before generating the implied claims. The Court reversed and remanded, instructing the Water Court to more thoroughly consider when Claimants perfected their water rights and the effect the implied claims would have on other water users.
Points of Interest: water rights, water law
2026 MT 33
Bluebird Prop. Rentals, LLC v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC
A contract containing conflicting provisions both mandating a bench trial and allowing one party to compel arbitration is ambiguous. If Montana’s hierarchical framework for resolving ambiguity by determining the parties’ intent fails, the contract will be interpreted in favor of the non-drafting party’s interpretation.
WBL issued a business loan to Bluebird with an 84.57% APR secured by Bluebird’s real property. The loan was comprised of three agreements that contained both arbitration agreement provisions and jury waiver provisions. The arbitration agreement provision asserted parties “may choose to arbitrate any or all disputes. . . arising out of or relating to this Loan Agreement. . . .” One of the jury waivers stated, on a separate page in bold capitalized letters, that any disputes resulting from the Loan Documents “SHALL BE DECIDED BY TRIAL TO THE COURT WITHOUT A JURY.” Bluebird signed an acknowledgement below that text, but no acknowledgement was required under any of the arbitration provisions. Bluebird eventually defaulted and sued WBL, alleging WBL used a rent-a-bank scheme to evade Montana’s 15% usury cap. WBL moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The District Court denied the motion, concluding the arbitration provision was unenforceable because the ambiguous loan documents were intentionally misleading.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed. Montana’s Constitution defines access to a trial by jury as a fundamental right, which may only be waived if done knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. While the Federal Arbitration Act encourages the scope of an arbitration agreement be resolved in favor of arbitration, the provision must still be found enforceable under state law. WBL’s contract language was susceptible to at least two reasonable but conflicting meanings. The contract itself, and later objective extrinsic evidence, could not determine the parties’ intent at the time of signing. Construing the ambiguous contract in favor of the non-drafting party, Bluebird could not have waived its fundamental right to jury trial.
Points of Interest: contracts, arbitration, waiver
2026 MT 32
Trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify via videoconference where the defendant’s actions delayed trial until such time as the witness’ personal circumstances prevented him from attending the trial in person and the trial court took steps to ensure the reliability of the witness’ testimony.
After learning that law enforcement was searching for a suspect in a stolen-vehicle incident, Maw discovered Johnson hiding in his garage. Johnson was subsequently apprehended and charged with several felonies. Prior to Johnson’s trial, Maw moved to Washington.
Before trial, the State moved to allow Maw to testify by live, two-way videoconference. It alleged: Johnson caused the trial’s delay and in the interim Maw relocated; Maw was 86 years old, the primary caregiver to young children, and his wife required his presence due to her health issues; Maw was eager to testify to hold Johnson accountable for his conduct; and it was impractical to secure Maw’s physical presence at trial. The District Court granted the motion over Johnson’s objection. A jury convicted Johnson of criminal mischief, burglary, and bail jumping.
The Supreme Court affirmed The Court clarified that, prior case law discussing the unavailability of a witness notwithstanding, the Confrontation Clause requires that remote testimony be (1) supported by case-specific findings that remote testimony is necessary to further an important public policy, and (2) the remote testimony does not impinge upon the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Here, the case-specific findings support the trial court’s determination that trial was delayed due to Johnson’s failure to appear, and Maw’s family circumstances, location, and travel difficulties prevented him from testifying in-person. Permitting Maw to testify remotely furthered an important public policy. Furthermore, the court took steps necessary to ensure that Maw’s testimony was reliable and the remote testimony thus did not impinge upon truth-seeking.
Points of Interest: remote witnesses, confrontation clause
2026 MT 31
District Court’s comments at sentencing criticizing the defendant for “wasting” court time for taking the case to trial and refusing to admit guilt illegally punished the defendant for exercising constitutional trial rights in violation of due process. Jail staff’s refusal to provide medication to Defendant before scheduled administration time, despite his demands, did not constitute outrageous government conduct warranting reversal because the defendant’s own actions disrupted his medication schedule.
While in custody at the CSKT detention center, Matt demanded he receive his medication from staff shortly before the 9:00 a.m. medication schedule. When he splashed water in a detention officer’s face, he was restrained by jail staff and began self-harming. Staff attempted to restrain him and Matt kicked an officer in the face. Matt was charged with Assault on a Peace Officer and convicted following a jury trial. At sentencing, the District Court criticized him for “wasting” court time and taxpayer money despite clear video evidence and further faulted him for refusing to take responsibility while maintaining his innocence. The District Court then sentenced him to 24 years in MSP.
The Supreme Court vacated Matt’s sentence and remanded for resentencing before a new judge. The District Court’s comments violated Matt’s right to due process by predicating his sentence on his exercise of his right to a jury trial and his right to maintain his innocence, rendering his sentence illegal. The Supreme Court affirmed Matt’s conviction, however, and declined to exercise plain error review of his treatment by CSKT detention center staff, finding Matt initiated the physical confrontation and disrupted the medication schedule. Thus, Matt could not demonstrate he experienced outrageous government conduct because law enforcement did not manufacture the crime or violate his constitutional rights.
Points of Interest: due process, sentencing, plain error review
2026 MT 30
State could not secure Defendant for trial because he was in federal custody for a separate offense. The resulting delay, and delay from untimely counsel substitutions, is attributable to Defendant’s conduct, creating no speedy trial violation.
Redd was found guilty of aggravated assault after severely injuring a child. When the State charged Redd, he was in federal custody for violating his supervised release. The State petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, but Redd remained in federal custody for several months until his federal sentence was revoked. After 91 days, Redd was made available for arrest by the State. 522 more days passed before Redd’s trial. During this time, Redd made multiple untimely motions and counsel substitutions which contributed to the delay. On appeal, Redd argued the District Court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial asserting the delay was mostly attributable to the State.
The Supreme Court found the speedy trial provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers did not apply because Redd was awaiting sentencing and not serving a sentence when the court issued the writ. The Court conducted its analysis under the speedy trial guarantees of the United States and Montana Constitutions and found that, although the 613‑delay was significant, most of the delay was attributable to Redd’s own conduct. Additionally, the Court concluded that Redd demonstrated insincerity in his desire for a speedy trial through untimely counsel substitution and failure to act in furtherance of a speedy trial.
Points of Interest: speedy trial
2026 MT 26
District Court abused its discretion by ignoring and reweighing evidence when substantial evidence supported administrative hearing findings that hospital selected the winning job candidate based on his interview performance.
Difolco, Spear, Martin, and two others applied for a Treatment Rehabilitation Manager position at Montana State Hospital. Although Difolco and Spear had bachelor’s degrees and prior experience in the field, MSH hired Martin based on his demonstrated management skills during the interview process.
Difolco and Spear filed claims with the Montana Human Rights Bureau, alleging MSH discriminated against them based on sex during the hiring process. After a contested case hearing, the administrative hearing officer concluded that although Difolco and Spear established prima facie cases of discrimination, they could not prove MSH used Martin’s interview performance as a hiring pretext. The Human Rights Commission affirmed. Spear and Difolco appealed to the District Court. The court determined five of the administrative findings were clearly erroneous and MSH’s hiring justification was pretext for discrimination.
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the District Court and reinstated the final agency decision. MAPA only grants a reviewing court authority to reverse an agency if it determines that the administrative findings lack substantial evidentiary support. Although MSH’s hiring process may have been imperfect, there was no evidence to suggest MSH was motivated by discriminatory animus. Uncontradicted witness testimony established that Martin outperformed Spear and Difolco during the interview process; therefore, MSH had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for hiring him. The District Court abused its discretion by ignoring and reweighing evidence that supported the agency’s findings.
Points of Interest: weight of evidence, abuse of discretion, administrative appeals
2026 MT 21
Atkinson v. City of Livingston
Ten-year statute of repose under § 27-2-208, MCA, barred Atkinsons’ negligence-based claims against the City for damages arising out of “expansive and collapsible” soils in their subdivision.
In 2012, the Atkinsons received a building permit from the City to construct a home on a lot in the Ridgeview Trails subdivision. The permit did not disclose a 2006 geotechnical evaluation identifying the subdivision soils as “expansive and collapsible,” requiring additional measures for stabilizing construction. In 2013, the City issued a “Statement of Substantial Completion,” indicating the Atkinsons’ residence complied with inspection requirements. In 2021, the Atkinsons observed cracking in their home which led to their 2024 lawsuit against the City for negligence and negligent misrepresentation, which they alleged arose out of the failure to disclose the 2006 report when inspecting and approving their new construction. The trial court dismissed the action on the City’s motion as time-barred by the § 27-2-208, MCA, 10-year statute of repose.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Based on the “gravamen” of Atkinsons’ complaint, the alleged negligent conduct arose out of the City’s “planning” and “inspection” of improvements to real property, bringing it within the conduct contemplated under § 27-2-208, MCA. Because the claim accrued upon the City’s issuance of the “Statement of Substantial Completion” in 2013, the Atkinsons’ 2024 complaint was beyond the 10-year statute of repose and thus time-barred.
Points of Interest: statute of repose, negligence, civil procedure
2026 MT 20
Because Father’s parental rights were appropriately terminated in a YINC proceeding, he lacked standing on appeal to bring an ICWA violation claim on behalf of Indian tribes related to tribal preferences for guardianships rather than terminations.
The Department removed Mother and Father’s children (both under the age of 2) after a report of methamphetamine use in the home. Both children are Indian children subject to ICWA, but the Department was unable to find an ICWA-compliant foster care placement and the children were placed into a noncompliant foster home, where the children remained for the next five years. Eventually, the Department petitioned to terminate Parents’ parental rights. At a hearing, tribal representatives explained the tribes generally preferred guardianships over termination of parental rights. The District Court terminated Mother’s parental rights at that time, but allowed Father more time to complete his treatment plan. Months later, after Father was facing felony charges, the Department again petitioned to terminate his parental rights. Tribal representatives did not participate at the termination hearing and the District Court terminated Father’s parental rights.
On appeal, Father asserted the District Court violated ICWA by not pursuing guardianship in accordance with the stated preferences of the children’s tribes. However, Father lacked standing to bring a claim related to a general tribal preference for guardianships because the termination of his parental rights was appropriate. In such a situation, the claim related to a tribal preference for guardianship belongs to the children and/or the tribes themselves. The tribes could have intervened to assert their interests related to guardianships, but instead only sporadically participated during the pendency of the case and did not seek to intervene at any point.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, ICWA, standing
2026 MT 19
Collins v. Whitefish Hous. Auth.
A party cannot structure its entire litigation strategy around a piece of evidence and then object to the evidence admittance at trial. Further, the statutory cap cannot be applied to these proceedings because the issue is not ripe for judicial review.
Collins left her job at the Whitefish Housing Authority because she felt unsupported by the WHA board after she was accused of preferentially treating certain tenants. Collins’ replacement participated in an interview with a reporter. The article published after the interview was titled “After scandal, Whitefish Housing Authority strives to rebuild trust.” The article, which was later republished and widely disseminated, stated that Collins had acted with malfeasance and engaged in unethical practices. Collins sued for defamation. WHA used the article throughout its pretrial preparation and listed it as an exhibit in the pretrial order. WHA then objected to the article’s admission on hearsay grounds at trial. The District Court admitted the article over objection. Further, the District Court did not apply statutory caps on damages in the award granted to Collins.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court rejected WHA’s argument that the District Court erred in admitting the article into evidence. WHA’s pretrial strategy had focused on the article and thus WHA consented to its introduction at trial. As to the question of whether the trial court erred by not applying the statutory cap to the damages awarded by the jury, the Court held the damages question was not ripe for judicial review because WHA’s insurer was not a party to the litigation and the claim between WHA and the insurer was ongoing.
Points of Interest: evidence, ripeness, hearsay
2026 MT 18
Trial court’s reference to a “change of circumstances” standard in its order denying Grandmother’s request for placement was not error where it applied the correct legal standard and determined deviation from the placement preference was warranted under the facts of the case.
Intervenor Grandmother sought placement of M.L.O.-L. with her instead of a foster family. However, M.L.O.-L.’s brother, who allegedly abused M.L.O.-L., lived with Grandmother. After hearing expert testimony that M.L.O.-L. had developed a strong attachment to her foster care provider, the court decided that departure from the statutory preference for kinship placement was in the child’s best interests and denied Grandmother’s placement request.
On appeal, Grandmother pointed to the court’s use of “change of circumstances” language in its order as evidence that the court applied the incorrect legal standard for departing from a kinship placement. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court referred to a change in circumstances in a different context and had, in fact, stated and applied the correct standard under §§ 41-3-450 and -451, MCA. Although relative placements are preferred under the statutes, a court may deviate from that statutory preference upon finding the child’s “extraordinary physical, mental, or emotional needs require a particular placement.” Where removing M.L.O.-L. from her foster placement would be detrimental to her mental and emotional health, deviation under §§ 41-3-450 and -451, MCA, was warranted.
Points of Interest: dependent neglect, changed circumstances, foster placement
2026 MT 17
Admission of inadmissible hearsay text messages is not harmless error where the messages undermine a defendant’s credibility and support key elements of an offense.
In April 2022, Henderson was implicated in the removal of property from Zeman’s storage unit. Surveillance footage showed Henderson and a co-defendant accessing the unit and removing items multiple times. Zeman reported approximately $12,000 in missing property, most of which was recently purchased clothing. She testified extensively at trial regarding ownership and value, relying on a self-prepared list and presenting no receipts. Henderson maintained she had permission to access the unit, that she was retrieving her own belongings, and that any removal of Zeman’s property was inadvertent and largely returned. Over defense objection, the District Court admitted a series of text exchanges between Zeman and the co-defendant, which included accusations of theft and statements undermining Henderson’s version of events. A jury convicted Henderson of felony theft of property valued between $1,500 and $5,000.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The admitted text messages were inadmissible hearsay, as conceded by the State, and admission constituted reversible trial error. Applying the harmless error analysis from State v. Van Kirk, the error was not harmless because the State relied on the texts to establish key elements of the offense, including ownership, unauthorized control, and value of the property. The messages also bolstered the complaining witness’s credibility while undermining Henderson’s defense in what was essentially a credibility contest. Although Henderson admitted to removing some property, this admission did not establish the value element of felony theft. Because there was a reasonable possibility the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, the State failed to meet its burden of proving harmless error, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.
Points of Interest: hearsay, co-defendants, harmless error
2026 MT 16
Water Comm’r to Measure & Distribute Water on Beaver Creek Within
Bason 41I v. Dodge
District Court erroneously dismissed a dissatisfied water user complaint and affirmed the Water Commissioner’s distribution without considering whether she was administering water under the controlling decree.
Hoeffner, a Beaver Creek water rights holder, filed a dissatisfied water user complaint under § 85-5-301, MCA, alleging the new Water Commissioner was illegally reducing his water right. Years before, Hoeffner and his neighbors, who also have an equal-priority right on Beaver Creek, stipulated that the neighbors’ rights were subject to distribution under a 1973 conveyance by which they were created, but Hoeffner’s right was not similarly limited because it was created by a separate chain of title. The Water Court ordered the neighbors’ water rights claims amended to reflect the stipulation. In 2022, the Water Court issued a preliminary decree for Basin 41I which reflected these stipulation-based distribution restrictions.
During the 2024 irrigation season, the Water Commissioner began reducing Hoeffner’s water alongside his neighbors’, so Hoeffner complained to the District Court. The court concluded that Hoeffner was not a party to the 1973 conveyance creating the distribution restriction, and therefore could not enforce it, and that the Water Commissioner took appropriate management measures during times of low flow.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the District Court erroneously framed the dissatisfied water user complaint as a contract dispute. The proper legal framework was to decide whether the Water Commissioner was administering the Beaver Creek water rights under the controlling 2022 preliminary decree for the basin that incorporated the parties’ stipulations regarding distribution as reflected in their respective water rights claims abstracts. The Court remanded the matter for consideration of Hoeffner’s complaint under the correct legal standard.
Points of Interest: water law, water rights, contracts
2026 MT 15
Sufficient evidence supported conviction for obstruction of a peace officer where defendant, a bystander filming a traffic stop, was repeatedly asked to move further away, and defendant did not preserve a constitutional argument related to the obstruction charge.
Doman was riding his bicycle in Kalispell when he saw a vehicle that Officer Willey had pulled over. Doman stopped next to the vehicle, began filming with his cell phone, and gestured to the vehicle’s occupants to roll down the window. Officer Minaglia arrived to provide backup and asked Doman to move. Doman responded that he was engaging in protected activity under the First Amendment. Minaglia agreed but directed him to stand further back. Doman refused and began to argue, prompting Willey to assist Minaglia. Doman eventually began to back away while asking, “How far? How far, tyrant?” The officers arrested Doman and the City charged him with obstructing a peace officer.
At trial, Doman argued his activity did not obstruct the officers’ ability to conduct the traffic stop. The trial court instructed the jury that citizens have a First Amendment right to film a peace officer but this right is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. As provided in the statute, the court also instructed the jury, “It is no defense to a prosecution under this section that the peace officer was acting in an illegal manner, provided that the peace officer was acting under the peace officer’s official authority.” Doman did not ask the court to dismiss the obstruction charge or otherwise argue it violated his First Amendment rights. The jury found Doman guilty.
The Supreme Court held there was sufficient evidence to support Doman’s conviction. Although no one disputed Doman had a right to record the officers’ activities, Doman became increasingly aggressive and argumentative as Minaglia ordered him to back away. Willey had testified that Doman’s conduct took his attention “completely off of the traffic stop.” The Court did not consider Doman’s constitutional claims because he failed to raise them in the Municipal Court.
Points of Interest: sufficiency of evidence, 1st Amendment, obstruction
2026 MT 14
Trial court’s failure to sua sponte consider lesser-included mitigated deliberate homicide was not plain error where defendant did not request it and it would have contradicted the defendant’s denial defense.
At bench trial on the offense of deliberate homicide, the defendant’s theory was that he was not the shooter. He did not argue for or present any evidence to support findings on mitigation, extreme emotional stress, or any other lesser-included offense. The trial court found him guilty. The defendant asserted on appeal that the trial court committed plain, reversible error.
The Supreme Court declined to exercise plain error review. The trial court was not required to make a finding on mitigation sua sponte when no evidence would support it and when a lesser-included mitigated deliberate homicide theory contradicted the defendant’s denial defense.
Points of Interest: plain error review, lesser-included offense
2026 MT 13
West failed to show that the State prejudiced his substantial rights when it played an overlay video of two admitted exhibits during closing argument where the overlay video was not included in the record and thus could not be reviewed on appeal and where the available record supported the conclusion that the State’s use of the overlay video did not prejudice the defense.
After a pharmacy employee identified West as the person who demanded medication and then forced the pharmacy’s employees to hide in the bathroom while he fled, the State charged West with robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and possession of dangerous drugs.
At trial, the State played surveillance footage of the robber and of West entering a pawn shop. The court admitted both video exhibits into evidence without objection. The State informed the court that it intended to use an overlay of the two exhibits during closing argument to argue that the robber walked with a limp like West. West objected. The court reviewed the overlay and allowed the State to play it as an illustrative aid but did not admit it into evidence. Neither party requested that the overlay be put in the record for preservation purposes.
On appeal, West claimed that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he played the overlay video and argued that the underlying videos showed the same person. However, the Supreme Court could not review the overlay because it was not included in the record. Without speculating about the overlay’s contents, the Court concluded that, after reviewing the two admitted exhibits and the trial transcript, the State’s use of the overlay did not prejudice West’s defense. The District Court viewed the overlay before allowing the prosecutor to play it; the overlay consisted of two video exhibits that were admitted without objection; the court instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence; and West had the opportunity to rebut the State’s argument.
Points of Interest: evidence, record on appeal, prosecutorial misconduct
2026 MT 12
An officer did not unconstitutionally seize an individual by requesting his name and address because he possessed particularized suspicion to conduct an investigative stop for the offense of trespass.
Fish and Torres were asleep in a car outside a casino. Noticing the two had been asleep for several hours, a casino employee called the police and requested a welfare check and to ask the couple to leave the parking lot. Two deputies awoke Fish and Torres. After Fish informed one of the deputies that he was alright, the officer requested his name and date of birth. The deputy then relayed this information to dispatch, which then informed him of a possible warrant. The deputy requested dispatch to confirm the warrant’s existence. Once confirmed, the deputies arrested Fish, searched him incident to the arrest, and found a baggie containing less than 0.1 gram of methamphetamine in his possession.
The State charged Fish with felony possession. Fish moved to suppress on grounds that the deputies effectuated a Terry stop without sufficient justification by asking for his name absent a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. The court denied Fish’s motion. A jury found Fish guilty.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning the deputy possessed particularized suspicion justifying the request of Fish’s name and date of birth. The Court rejected Fish’s arguments that the deputies needed to either know Fish had previously refused to leave or intentionally disobeyed a “no trespassing” sign, and found such requirements would exceed the data necessary to justify a particularized suspicion.
Points of Interest: search and seizure, Terry stop, particularized suspicion
2026 MT 9A
Sapphire Coal. v. Ravalli Cnty.
Even though county subdivision regulations did not expressly require the county planning department to provide public notice before rendering decisions on subdivision exemption applications, the regulations require public notice and it would be an absurd result to interpret the regulations that notice after decision fulfilled the objective of allowing public comment.
The Ravalli County Subdivision Regulations require the County Planning Department to receive public comments on subdivision exemption applications, but the Regulations do not expressly require the Planning Department to provide notice before rendering a decision on the application. After the Department approved a subdivision exemption application without providing any notice, Sapphire Coalition sued the County, alleging the Department failed to comply with the Regulations by approving the subdivision exemption without providing notice. The District Court dismissed Sapphire’s complaint for failure to state a claim because it concluded the Regulations did not require the Department to provide notice.
The Supreme Court reversed. The County intended to incorporate public participation into the subdivision exemption application process by requiring the Department to receive public comments on exemption applications. The Court construed the County Regulations to require the Department to provide notice because it gave effect to the purpose of facilitating public participation through public comment. The Court rejected the County’s argument that the Regulations did not require the Department to provide notice because it would lead to an absurd result (i.e., the public cannot comment on matters they do not know about).
Points of Interest: property, local ordinances, notice
2026 MT 8
Thompson Chain of Lakes Stewardship Coal. v. Lincoln Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs
RV Park’s environmental assessment satisfied criteria of § 46-3-603, MCA, because it provided “available ground water information” and was not required to include information that was, at the time, still the subject of an ongoing hydrogeological study of the Thompson Chain of Lakes area.
After contested review, the Lincoln County Board of Commissioners approved a preliminary subdivision plat creating an RV and tent-camping park in the Thompson Chain of Lakes area. The Thompson Chain of Lakes Stewardship Coalition appealed the decision to district court, which affirmed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, TCLSC argued the RV Park’s environmental assessment was deficient for failure to identify and describe area groundwater hydrology that would be affected by the development, and the County erred in approving the plat without considering the “specific, documentable, and clearly defined impact” of the development on area groundwater, among other things, as § 76-3-608, MCA, required.
The Supreme Court held that the environmental assessment was legally sufficient because it correctly identified no waters likely to be affected by the landlocked development. As for likely groundwater impacts, the Chain of Lakes area hydrology was the subject of an ongoing scientific study, years from completion, and that information was therefore not “available” yet for inclusion in the environmental assessment. Nor were the groundwater effects TCLSC alleged “specific, documentable, or clearly defined.” Because the County properly considered the statutory requirements of §§ 76-3-603 and -608, MCA, the Court affirmed its plat approval decision.
Points of Interest: natural resources, environmental law, property
2026 MT 4
Cooper v. Mont. Dep’t of Justice
Where the defendant pled guilty to an offense in North Dakota whose equivalent Montana statute did not trigger a duty to register, the defendant had no duty to register as a sexual offender after moving to Montana.
In 2017, Cooper was charged with Gross Sexual Imposition in North Dakota, a sexual offense including an element that the offender must be three or more years older than the victim. Cooper ultimately pled guilty to Sexual Assault, which does not contain an age element, and his plea agreement explicitly exempted him from a duty to register. In 2019, Cooper moved to Montana. The DOJ sent Cooper letter advising him that had a duty to register based on the 2019 statutes. Cooper petitioned for a writ of prohibition, which the District Court denied, agreeing with DOJ that Cooper had a duty to register based on the allegations raised in the charging documents.
The Supreme Court reversed. Because the sex offender registry requirements are punitive in nature, any facts triggering a duty to register must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted to by the defendant. Cooper did not admit to the age of the victim in his plea agreement, and it was the State’s burden to prove this fact. The relevant statutes were those in effect in 2017, when Cooper admitted to his offensive conduct, not 2019. Here, the relevant Montana statute triggering a duty to register contains a necessary age element, which is not contained in the North Dakota statute under which Cooper was convicted. Therefore, the two statutes are not reasonably equivalent to each other.
Points of Interest: SVORA, plea agreements
2026 MT 3
Medical malpractice claims were properly dismissed as time-barred where the original complaint was timely filed but never served on defendants and the “amended complaint” was filed after expiration of the limitations period.
Days before expiration of the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, Athy filed claims for personal injury arising from his mother’s illness and death while a resident of Defendants’ long-term memory care facility. Athy never served the complaint. A year later, he filed an “amended complaint,” which the District Court dismissed with prejudice as untimely.
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied Estate of Phillips, 2024 MT 174, and held that, because Athy’s original complaint was never served, it was subject to mandatory summary dismissal without prejudice under § 25-3-106, MCA. But, because Athy recommenced the action beyond the § 27-2-205(1), MCA, two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims, his “amended complaint” was subject to dismissal with prejudice as time-barred. The Court remanded for further proceedings on two claims that were not medical malpractice claims.
The Court also rejected Athy’s relation-back arguments, holding that M. R. Civ. P. 15(c) would not operate to permit the “amended complaint” to relate back to the timely-filed original complaint where the original complaint was never served and defendants had no notice of the lawsuit.
Points of Interest: medical malpractice, statute of limitations, amended pleadings
2026 MT 2
Transparent Election Initiative v. Knudsen
Supreme Court upheld Attorney General’s determination that ballot initiative that would have defined “artificial person,” revoked all artificial person powers, and then allowed Legislature to regrant powers except for the right to engage in election or ballot issue activity violated the separate-vote requirement because it would have forced voters who supported the narrow goal to more broadly limit the rights of artificial persons in significant but unspecified ways.
TEI, proponents of BI-4, sought declaratory judgment on original jurisdiction after the Attorney General determined BI-4 was legally insufficient because it violated the separate-vote requirement of Article XIV, Section 11, of the Montana Constitution. BI-4 would have created a new section in Article XIII that would have revoked and regranted powers to artificial persons, prohibiting the reinstatement of the right to engage in election or ballot issue activity, and requiring the forfeit of all charter privileges if the artificial person engaged in such activity.
The Supreme Court upheld the Attorney General’s determination. BI-4 would have, at a minimum, effectuated two changes to the Montana Constitution. Although its intent was to prohibit artificial persons from having the power to spend money or anything of value on elections or ballot-issue activities, its effect would have been significantly broader, revoking all powers and privileges and then regranting only those that fell within BI-4’s definition of “artificial person powers.” BI-4 would have eliminated all artificial person powers upon enactment and artificial persons would have no powers until and unless the Legislature conferred them. Although BI-4 did not engage in “logrolling” as Article XIV, Section 11, prohibits, it would have forced voters who support the abolishing corporate spending on elections to, more broadly, limit the rights of corporations and other entities that fall within BI-4’s definition of “artificial persons” in significant but unspecified other ways.
Points of Interest: ballot initiatives, declaratory judgment, Art. XIV(11)
2026 MT 1
S.L. v Mont. Fourth Jud. Dist. Ct.
Minor who was charged in District Court via Information had right to substitute judge under § 3-1-804, MCA, prior to court ruling on whether to transfer the matter to Youth Court; filing the motion prior to arraignment was not premature.
S.L., a minor, appeared before the District Court after the State charged her with several felonies. She was not arraigned at that hearing and the court set a future hearing to determine whether S.L.’s case should be transferred to Youth Court. The court further ruled that an evaluation would be completed prior to the transfer hearing. The court issued a written order but it was misfiled in another case. S.L. then moved to substitute judge under § 3-1-804, MCA. The court then filed its evaluation order under the correct cause number. The court denied the motion without prejudice, explaining that it would grant substitution if the case remained in District Court after the transfer hearing.
S.L. petitioned for writ of supervisory control under M. R. App. P. 14(3)(c), arguing that the District Court lacked the authority to deny her motion to substitute and that the order for evaluation was void because the court lacked the authority to issue it once she moved to substitute.
The Supreme Court granted the writ. Although the District Court maintained S.L. could not move to substitute because substitution is prohibited in Youth Court actions, S.L.’s case remained a pending criminal case in the District Court at the time she moved to substitute. Because the State charged S.L. via information, the Youth Court did not have jurisdiction at that juncture. The Court further rejected the State’s argument that S.L.’s substitution motion was untimely because it was prematurely filed prior to arraignment. The substitution rule is intended to allow substitution prior to a ruling on a “substantial matter,” and the question of whether to transfer to Youth Court is such. However, S.L.’s request to vacate the evaluation order was denied because it was issued, albeit misfiled, prior to S.L. moving to substitute and thus the District Court had the authority to issue the order at that time.
Points of Interest: supervisory control, substitution, Youth Court